PURPOSE. - Here it is to be understood as an act of the penitent, and it is the will not to sin in the future. It must not, therefore, be a mere wish, nor, on the other hand, is it necessary that it include a true and proper promise or the vow to avoid all sins. The purpose can be twofold: explicit and formal, if it is emitted by a special act distinct from contrition; implicit and virtual, if it is already included in another act in which it is necessarily required, for example, contrition.
I. NECESSITY
Here it is to be understood as an act of the penitent, and it is the will not to sin. For the validity of the Sacrament of Penance there is required at least an implicit p., which is necessarily contained in every true and universal contrition, since a true contrition consists of two distinct moments: detestation of past sins and the will to avoid them in the future. One who detests an act already committed in the past must necessarily have the will to avoid it in the future; otherwise the detestation would be neither true nor certain. This is the opinion commonly held by moralists; but Bellarmine (De Sacramento Poenitentiae, I, II, Venice 1599, ch. 6) and Concina (Theol. dogm. mor., Rome 1749, de Sacr. poen., I, I, diss. 3, ch. 1, q. 8) oppose it, demanding an explicit p. The latter bases his argument on the fact that the Council of Trent requires a «propositum non peccandi de coetero» (sess. XIV, ch. 4, de Poen.). This reason is false, so much so that the Council, in enumerating the explicit acts of the Sacrament of Penance on the part of the faithful, enumerates only contrition, confession and satisfaction, without any mention of the necessity of an explicit p. Just as the act of faith and of hope are required implicitly in this Sacrament, so must it be said of the p. In practice it is almost impossible to have a sincere contrition without a true and real p., because it is an essential part of it; just as it is not possible to believe in the mercy and justice of God without the act of faith, and to obtain forgiveness, together with the graces to avoid in the future the occasions of sin, without the act of hope. Nevertheless, for the greater efficacy of the Sacrament, a universal and particular explicit p. is better, according to the needs of the penitent.
For one who repents of mortal sins for a particular motive, for the very validity of the Sacrament it is required at least that he have a habitual aversion toward every mortal sin: thus teach the majority of authors, although the opinion is not shared by all moralists.
II. QUALITY
The purpose must be true: that is, one must really will to do what one promises, as the effect of the actual will that commands a determined action and forbids another, although in the future one may fail to meet this imperative demand: constancy, therefore, does not enter into the real efficacy of the purpose. It is required only that at this moment one sincerely and effectively resolve to sin no more, since the object of the purpose is the present will, not the future event, which cannot be in our power and is subject to various circumstances that, at present, human reason can hardly evaluate. From this it follows that one must clearly distinguish the purpose from the penitent's persuasion: one may have a good purpose, yet at the same time the fear that, given past experience, one may fall back into sin through the inconstancy and fragility of human nature. In this case, if the purpose is strengthened by trust in divine Grace, one certainly has a true and sincere purpose. In this matter the acts of the will must not be confused with those of the intellect: the purpose is an act of the will, the persuasion of the intellect.
The purpose must be efficacious, that is, it is required that the will move the intellect to use all the necessary means, both positive and negative, to avoid sin and proximate occasions and to make reparation for the harm that may have resulted from sin. Whoever wills the end must also will the means to attain it. For this quality too it is required that the penitent actually have the serious will to use all means to remove sin.
Finally the purpose must be universal, inasmuch as it must extend to the exclusion of all mortal sins. In this it is distinguished from sorrow, which embraces only the sins committed, whereas the purpose must extend also to sins not perpetrated. However, a particular purpose for each individual sin is not necessary; the general purpose of no longer willing to sin mortally suffices. For venial sins a firm and efficacious purpose is required, as for mortal sins; it is not, however, necessary that it be universal. On the other hand, although the Council of Trent (sess. VI, can. 23) teaches that it is impossible, without a special privilege, to avoid all venial sins, nothing nevertheless forbids that in practice one may make the firm and efficacious purpose to avoid all and each of the venial sins, even semi-deliberate ones.
Bibliography4 works
Giuseppe Damizia