LASSISM. - Laxism is less a moral system distinct from the others than a tendency, a laxus opinandi modus, as Alexander VII put it, by virtue of which certain authors in the 17th century proposed in Catholic morality, as safe, opinions that were highly doubtful and only apparently probable, thus "relaxing" the norms of Christian life. Therefore, although none of them formally and explicitly professed laxism, on their part there was an overstepping of bounds in certain points of Christian morality by denying or minimizing the extent of the law (in direct opposition to laxism stands tuziorism [v.] or rigorism in general), though not without laxist doctors, with regard to certain parts of genuine morality, showing themselves to be non-laxist in other parts. Laxism thus also falls within the 17th-century movement of elaboration of moral systems and represents the most relaxed extreme of that movement. In the subjective sphere the lax conscience is but one aspect of the erroneous conscience, which judges as lawful what is not lawful, or as prohibited sub levi what is sub gravi, and after the fact judges the morality of its own action in its own favor or diminishes its imputability. Insufficiency of accurate information and polemical preoccupations led to identifying laxism with Molinism and with probabilism, whereas these, especially the former, are quite a different thing. It is not accurate, however, to see laxism as the most excessive solution of probabilism (v.), because in every shade of probabilism (and also of probabiliorism and equiprobabilism) the question is always one of deciding on a "true probability," whereas generally for the laxists any probability, even a minimal one, has value.
Of the lax opinions, some met with no favor at all, others fell into discredit thanks to the polemics they aroused; but in some cases the magisterium of the Church had to intervene, by which were condemned the books that defended such doctrines, or individual propositions that threatened to gain credit by corrupting right morality. The disputes over laxism took on particular prominence and sometimes even sharpness of tone, especially in France, from the 17th century onward.
By decree of Sept. 26, 1640, the Pratique du droit canonique au gouvernement de l'Eglise, correction des moeurs et distribution des bénéfices and the Somme des péchés, qui se commettent en tous estats, de leurs conditions et qualités et en quelles occurrences ils sont mortels ou véniels of Fr. Etienne Bauny were placed on the Index; on Dec. 16 of the same year the De sacramentis ac personis sacris was also placed on the Index. The first two works had also been referred, in Nov. 1640, to the Theological Faculty of Paris (laxist propositions concerned chastity, usury, excommunications, reserved cases, etc.). In Apr. 1641 the Assembly of the Clergy of France declared that Bauny with his writings was pushing souls toward libertinism and resolved to thank the Pope for the condemnation.
Among the first to attack the casuists and laxists was Pascal (v.) with Les provinciales (1656-57), who in turn, in combating them, was more meticulous than the casuists themselves in splitting hairs over questions, in exaggerating accusations and in using texts; he aimed in particular at the Jesuits, whom he blamed as teachers of laxism.
Censures against the laxists were also issued by the Faculty of Paris in 1658. In Rome the Holy Office continued to condemn laxist writings: on Aug. 21, 1659, the Apologie pour les casistes contre les calomnies des jansénistes of Georges Pirot; Marco Vidal, Arca vitalis (Sept. 23, 1653); id., Arca salutaris consultus utriusque iuris includens (March 8, 1661); Angelo Maria Verricelli, Quaestiones morales et legales (Apr. 21, 1654); Giovanni Caramuel, Apologema pro antiquissima et universalissima doctrina de probabilitate (Jan. 15, 1664); Francesco Verde, Theologiae fundamentalis Caramuelis positiones selectae (June 28, 1664); Honoré Fabri, Apologeticus doctrinae moralis Societatis Iesu (Jan. 17, 1672); Zaccaria Pasqualigo, Decisiones morales iuxta principia theologica, et sacras atque civiles leges, difficultatum, quae in utroque foro passim occurrunt (May 11, 1683). The work of the Jesuit Mathieu de Moya, Adversus quorundam expositaciones contra nonnullas Iesuitarum opiniones morales (published under the pseudonym Amadaceus Guimenius and containing grave errors on the administration of the Sacraments) was condemned by the Sorbonne in Feb. 1665 and by the Holy Office in Apr. 1666.
Under Alexander VII, on two occasions (Sept. 24, 1665 and March 18, 1666), 45 propositions contrary to divine and ecclesiastical law were condemned at least as scandalous (Denz-U, 1101-45); then on March 2, 1679, the Holy Office, under Innocent XI, condemned another 65 propositions as laxist (ibid., 1151-1215). As is clear, no moralist had upheld all the condemned propositions as a whole; they had been defended by theologians of different schools in different works, anxious to reconcile as far as possible the worldly prejudices of their age with the spirit of the Gospel.
The condemnation of laxism did not involve the very principle of casuistry, because the latter, even with its dangers of juridical formalism, corresponds to that sound exigency of the spirit by which, case by case, one may side with freedom or with the law. The exigency of probability then remained a legacy to be deepened for the age of St. Alphonsus de' Liguori: but in the 18th century, in any case, in Catholic theology, laxism is dead: at most it is taken up by the libertines; but it is clear that these move outside metaphysics, and therefore the problem is different. As for the question whether laxism spurred the capitalist world in its speculations, that may well be; but laxism, rather than directing it, had made itself its slave, indulging it by justifying it in its illicit race toward the whirlwind accumulation of wealth.