Artificial Fecundation

ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZATION. — This expression commonly denotes the introduction of the male seed into the internal female organs by methods and means other than those provided by nature.

I. MORAL THEOLOGY

Nevertheless, man has found a way to accomplish this artificially as well. The first attempts at artificial insemination were carried out on animals: on fish (salmon and trout) by H. Weltheim and L. Jacobi (1725); on domestic mammals (rabbit and dog) by L. Spallanzani (1779) and P. Rossi (1782). E. Ivanov (1889–1930) gave these attempts a scientific form, also indicating the method of applying them to domestic animals. Thus, in animal husbandry, artificial insemination underwent a very broad and effective development, beginning in Russia and gradually spreading to the other countries of the world.

When the experiment was transferred to the human sphere, it initially encountered considerable obstacles, both technical and biological, and above all moral; it therefore proceeded only slowly and cautiously, so that up to 1927 there were only 88 cases in the whole world. In the last twenty years, however, progress became very rapid and extensive applications were attempted, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

The methods used are essentially four: 1) the semen is taken directly from the epididymis, by puncturing its tail, and is then injected more or less deeply into the internal female organs; 2) the semen is obtained by masturbation, collected in a syringe, and then injected as above; 3) the semen is obtained by interrupted or condensed intercourse, collected, and injected as above; 4) the semen is obtained through normal intercourse, collected with a syringe from the vaginal fornix, injected, etc.

The multiplication of cases of artificial insemination in the human sphere has brought the question of its moral licitness sharply to the fore. Before addressing it, it should be noted that the designation artificial insemination is not exact, since what is performed artificially is not the fusion of the two cells (that is, fertilization), but simply the introduction of sperm into the internal female organs. For this reason, several propose—and rightly so—that the expression “artificial insemination” be replaced by “artificial insemination” or “sperm insemination.” Moreover, the question may be treated from several points of view: historical, medical, social, juridical, and moral. Here we shall limit ourselves to the last aspect, and furthermore only to the human sphere and along the lines of Catholic thought.

The question emerged toward the end of the last century. It was discussed by A. Eschbach (Disputaciones physiologico-theologica..., Paris 1884, pp. 69–70), E. Berardi (Praxis confessororum..., I, 3rd ed., Faenza 1898, no. 2109, pp. 400 ff.) and D. Palmieri (A. Ballerini — D. Palmieri, Opus theologico-morale, VI, 2nd ed., Prato 1894, tr. x, sect. 8, no. 1304, p. 689). The first maintained that artificial insemination is licit only if the semen is that of the husband and was obtained neither through coitus interruptus nor through masturbation. The second and third were satisfied with the first condition.

The Holy Office intervened in the matter with a decree of March 1897, which stated, among other things: «Proposito dubio: An adhiberi possit artificialis mulieris focundatio? Omnibus diligentissimo examine perpensis prachabitoque R. D. Consultorum voto, fidem E.mi Cardinales respondendum mandarum: Non licere. Feria vero VI, die 26 eiusdem mensis et anni, in solita audientia R. P. D. Assessori S. O. imperita, facta de supradictis accurata relatione S.mo D. N. Leoni PP XIII, Sanctitas Sua resolucionem E.morum Patrum adprobavit et confirmavit».

After this decree, the question gradually lost all practical and urgent character and received ever less attention from authors. There was a revival in these last years: the spread of the practice of artificial insemination gave rise to lively discussions and considerable disagreement.

Catholic moralists generally distinguish between artificial insemination with the husband’s semen and artificial insemination with the semen of a man who is not the husband and who, by analogy with one who donates part of his blood, is called a “donor.” With regard to artificial insemination using the husband’s semen, a distinction is made between normal cases (that is, those in which insemination can occur by the means and methods provided by nature) and exceptional cases. In the latter, a further distinction is made according to the ways in which the semen is obtained.

Hence the following questions: 1) Is artificial insemination also licit with a donor’s semen?; 2) Is artificial insemination with the husband’s semen licit also in normal cases?; 3) What is to be said of artificial insemination with the husband’s semen in exceptional cases?

The first question arises in practice only with regard to married women who desire to have children but cannot have them by their own husbands. All Catholics agree in giving a negative answer. For all of them, artificial insemination with a donor’s semen is always illicit, whatever the condition of the woman to be inseminated and of the man who donates his semen (married, unmarried, widowed), whatever the reason for resorting to it and the manner in which the semen is obtained.

In this regard, all the considerations brought forward against the licitness of sexual relations between unmarried persons apply. Of his generative power—and therefore of the semen that forms part of it—a man may dispose only in marriage, where one is united indissolubly in favor of the other spouse: in fact, the purpose is to generate human beings who also need to be instructed and educated, which in practice can be provided only in a stable marriage, indeed one that is united and indissoluble. In the case under consideration, the man would dispose of his semen outside marriage, in favor of a person who is not his lawful wife. He would therefore commit a fault, which would be even graver if one or both of them were married to another person: there would then be the specific guilt of adultery.

Some considerations of a social order must be added. First of all, this would open the way to easily concealing illicit conceptions resulting from illegitimate relationships, while at the same time it would offer insufficient social protection to a woman who had actually conceived through artificial insemination. How, indeed, could a woman prove that she had conceived through artificial insemination and not through sinful sexual relations? And, on the other hand, how could a woman be accused of sinful conception and, consequently, of illicit sexual relations when artificial insemination with donor semen was permitted?

For these reasons, all Catholics without exception reject artificial insemination with donor semen. Nor is the comparison with the donation of part of one’s blood valid. Germinal cells are in fact sources of life, indeed—in the case under consideration—of human life; consequently, they are subject to all the conditions upon which the legitimate transmission of human life depends, namely, marriage that is one and indissoluble. On this point Pius XII was quite explicit in his address to the participants in the Fourth International Congress of Catholic Physicians (cf. l’Osservatore Romano of 1 October 1949).

There are no real differences among Catholics regarding the second question either: all agree in rejecting its licitness. Sexual union fulfills not only a generative function but also a function of intimacy, which is of considerable importance for the consolidation and deepening of married life. It therefore cannot be dispensed with, at least ordinarily; whereas this is what occurs in artificial insemination.

Assai viva invece è la discussione e molto profonde le divergenze sulla terza questione. Le opinioni affiorate si possono ridurre sostanzialmente a tre correnti principali. La prima sostiene che nei casi eccezionali la f. a. con seme del marito è sempre lecita, comunque il seme sia ottenuto. Tale corrente è rappresentata da S. Di Francesco (cf. E lecita la f. a.?, in Clinica nuova, 1 [1945], nn. 9-10) e in parte (ossia limitatamente al coito condonato o più precisamente al procedimento di Courty) da P. Tiberghien (cf. La fécondation artificielle, in Mélanges de science religieuse, 1 [1944], p. 339 sgg. e La fécondation artificielle, in Nouvelle revue théologique, 68 [1946], pp. 819-20) e da E. Tesson (cf. L'insémination artificielle et la morale, in Cahiers Laënnec, 6 [1946], II), e si fonda soprattutto sulla seguente argomentazione: nella f. a. il seme è avviato alla sua destinazione naturale, ossia alla fecondazione ed alla generazione; non si ha quindi la malizia propria della masturbazione e dell'onomismo; è vero che questo avviene in modo diverso da quello predisposto dalla natura, ma - si fa osservare - come si corregge la natura in altri campi (ad es., si corregge e si potenzia la vista mediante occhiali, il microscopio e il telescopio; si corregge la nutrizione mediante le iniezioni), senza offendere l'ordine morale, così non si vede perché si debba offenderlo quando la si corregge nel campo della generazione.

La seconda corrente sostiene invece che la f. a. non è mai lecita, nemmeno nei casi eccezionali, comunque il seme sia ottenuto. È rappresentata specialmente da Fr. Hürth (La fécondation artificielle, in Nouvelle revue

théologique, 68 [1946], pp. 402-26), A. Boschi (Nuove questioni matrimoniali, 2ª ed., Torino 1948, pp. 283-333), A. Gemelli (La f. a., 2ª ed., Milano 1949; id., La f. a. secondo la teologia morale cattolica, in La scuola cattolica, 74 [1946], pp. 273-81; 75 [1947], pp. 3-13), R. Biet (Génération et amour, in Nouvelle revue théologique, 69 [1947], pp. 32-47) e F. Cappello (De Matrimonio, 3ª ed., Torino 1947, pp. 382-85, n. 383). La ragione principale è che in essa si ha « la separazione oggettiva e reale di due elementi che la natura ha costituito in atto unico, l'etto coniugale. È infatti nel momento dell'atto coniugale a mediante esso che si ha (1° elemento) la secrezione del seme da parte dell'uomo a insieme (2° elemento) la sua intromissione nell'organo recettivo della donna, al fine di trasmettere la vita. La f. a., invece, dissocia i due elementi in due atti oggettivamente indipendenti e a sé, tagliendo, per così dire, il collegamento intrinseco e naturale che hanno tra loro e, ambedue, con lo scopo della generazione. Poco importa che intenzionalmente essi restino ancora connessi: l'intenzione dell'agente non può cambiare la natura delle cose e correggere un vizio intrinseco che rende immorale un atto » (A. Boschi, op. cit., p. 320 sg.).

La terza corrente distingue fra modo e modo di ottenere il seme; se questo è ottenuto per coito naturale o per puntura della coda dell'epididimo ritiene che la f. a. non si possa condannare; se invece il seme è ottenuto per coito interrotto o condannato o, peggio, per masturbazione, pensa che sia illegittima, perché tali atti sono per loro natura immorali e quindi non si possono compiere mai, nemmeno per fecondare artificialmente una donna. Questa corrente è rappresentata tra gli altri da A. Vermeerach (Theel. mor., IV, 3ª ed., Roma 1933, n. 64, p. 59), E. Génicot - I. Salamans (Casus conscientiae, 8ª ed., Bruxelles 1948, p. 755), A. Gennaro (La f. a. dal punto di vista morale, in Perfice munus, 22 [1947], pp. 209-21) ed E. Toffolotto (La f. a. della donna, in Risista medica per il clero, 18 [1947], pp. 99-126).

Le divergenze di opinione sulla liceità della f. a. si riflettono in parte sull'interpretazione del decreto del S. Ufficio. Secondo alcuni (ad es., Hürth, Gemelli, Boschi) esso condannerebbe ogni forma di f. a.; secondo altri (ad es., D. Prümmer, Man. theol. mor., III, Friburgo in Br. 1940, n. 799; H. Blatzli, Decisiones Sanctae Sedis de usu et abusu matrimonii, 2ª ed., Torino 1944, p. 31) condannerebbe solo quelle forme in cui il seme è ottenuto per masturbazione od onanisticamente.

Non è possibile qui discutere ampiamente le diverse posizioni assunte dai cattolici e gli argomenti che ciascuno porta in suo favore. Solo si possono proporre alcune considerazioni per indirizzare chi volesse approfondire ulteriormente le cose.

Innanzitutto si tratta della moralità o immoralità dell'azione in se stessa, non dell'intenzione di chi vi ricorre; in altri termini: è certo che nella f. a. si ha la rottura in due momenti di un processo che nel modo predisposto dalla natura avviene in un momento solo; tale rottura in se stessa, oggettivamente, è legittima o illegittima? Non è mai legittima, in nessun caso, nemmeno in quelli eccezionali, o almeno in qualche caso è legittima? Se consta che è per se stessa illegittima non potrà essere compiuta mai, per nessun motivo. L'intenzione di chi vi ricorre qui non ha importanza. Questo va notato in modo particolare per la questione del modo di ottenere il seme: ciò che importa non è lo scopo per il quale il seme sarà usato, ma se tale modo di ottenerlo è in se stesso legittimo o no.

Alla questione così impostata la prima corrente risponde che quella rottura non è legittima perché la natura ha stabilito un modo unitario; la seconda corrente invece oppone che il modo stabilito dalla natura è il modo normale, non l'unico legittimo. Nessuna delle correnti però sembra, almeno finora,

aver dato una prova sicura delle proprie affermazioni.
Le ragioni che portano sembrano una pura ripetizione delle rispettive posizioni, non una dimostrazione della loro validità.

La questione quindi deve essere ancora approfondita. In tali approfondimenti si dovranno tener presenti le norme indicate da Pio XII ai partecipanti al IV Congresso internazionale dei medici cattolici ossia: « il semplice fatto che il risultato a cui si mira è raggiunto per tale via, non giustifica l'uso del mezzo stesso; né il desiderio in sé pienamente legittimo negli sposi di avere un bambino può bastare a provare la legittimità del ricorso alla f. a... È superfluo osservare che l'elemento attivo non può giammai esser procurato lecitamente mediante atti contro natura. Benché non si possano escludere a priori metodi nuovi... tuttavia per quanto concerne la f. a., non soltanto si deve essere estremamente riservati, ma bisogna assolutamente escluderla. Dicendo ciò non si proscrive necessariamente l'uso di taluni mezzi artificiali destinati unicamente sia a facilitare l'atto naturale, sia a procurare il raggiungimento del proprio fine all'atto naturale normalmente compiuto » (Osservatore Romano del 1º ott. 1949).

II. CANON LAW

In matrimonial matters, while no particular problem can arise when artificial insemination is carried out by collecting semen obtained through normal intercourse (unless the semen is injected into a different woman), for all other methods of artificial insemination it is generally held that such fertilization is not sufficient to consummate the marriage, and that consequently anyone unable to have conjugal relations except in this manner is to be considered impotent (this was also reaffirmed by the Supreme Pontiff in the address given on 29 September 1949 to the participants in the Fourth International Congress of Catholic Physicians; V. IMPOTENZA). There is no doubt, moreover, that children conceived through artificial insemination are always legitimate if the semen belonged to the mother’s husband; otherwise, as the Supreme Pontiff expressly declared in the address cited, they are illegitimate (incestuous, adulterous, sacrilegious, etc., according to the circumstances, even if the mother was acting in good faith).

It is, on the other hand, doubtful whether a judicial declaration of paternity is possible under art. 269, no. 3, of the Civil Code, in the case of forcible artificial insemination without sexual intercourse. The case must instead be regarded as one not provided for by law in which, although the circumstances exist for proceeding with a denial of paternity under nos. 1–3 of art. 235 of the Civil Code, it is nevertheless demonstrated that the wife was artificially inseminated with her husband’s semen.

Artificial insemination presents nothing legally particular, moreover, with regard to the possibility that twins may be the children of different fathers.

In criminal law, the principal question to which artificial insemination gives rise is whether, in offences for which carnal conjunction is a constitutive element, that element may consist in artificial insemination. The most obvious answer, under the legislation currently in force (both canonical and civil), is negative, although some writers appear to hold the contrary view: consequently, neither forcible artificial insemination carried out by the husband nor that carried out by third parties (or in any event with the semen of outsiders) constitutes the offence of rape (art. 519 of the Penal Code); the offence of incest (art. 564) does not exist unless sexual intercourse has taken place, but only artificial insemination, and the same must be said of seduction (art. 526), which therefore, like any other fraudulent artificial insemination, in itself constitutes only a civil wrong, without being subject to criminal prosecution.

For offences in which an act of lust is a constitutive element, the same must be said with regard to insemination proper; it should nevertheless be noted that an act of lust may instead be involved in some of the procedures used to obtain the semen. This must be borne in mind especially for the offences of indecent acts (art. 521 of the Penal Code) and corruption of minors (art. 530), as well as, insofar as the act or purpose of lust is legally relevant, for the offences of abduction (arts. 525–25), procuring (arts. 531–533), and the abduction of minors or incapacitated persons (arts. 533–74).

The offence of venereal contagion (art. 533 of the Penal Code) can undoubtedly be committed through artificial insemination, whereas whether, in a case of artificial insemination, the offence of obscene acts (art. 527) or that of acts contrary to public decency (art. 726) exists or not will depend on the circumstances.

As for adultery, it presents aspects that must be distinguished. While simple artificial insemination cannot constitute adultery or concubinage for criminal-law purposes, or serve as grounds for separation of the spouses, it must certainly be equated with adultery for the purposes of denying paternity (art. 235, no. 1, Civil Code), since the reasons for one and the other are identical.

Indeed, any contract or condition that obliges a person to undergo artificial insemination or to provide semen for that purpose must be regarded as legally unlawful under arts. 5, 634, 1343, and 1354 of the Civil Code; and this probably also applies in cases in which artificial insemination is lawful.