FECONDAZIONE ARTIFICIALE

ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION. — This expression is commonly understood to mean the introduction of male semen into the internal female organs by means of methods and instruments other than those provided by nature.

I. MORAL THEOLOGY

Nevertheless, man has found a way to achieve this artificially. The first attempts at artificial insemination were made on animals: on fish (salmon and trout) by H. Weltheim and L. Jacobi (1725); on domestic mammals (rabbits and dogs) by L. Spallanzani (1779) and P. Rossi (1782). The method was given a more scientific form by E. Ivanov (1889-1930), who also indicated its application to domestic animals. Thus, in animal husbandry, artificial insemination developed extensively and effectively, beginning in Russia and gradually spreading to other countries.

When the experiment was transferred to the human sphere, it initially encountered considerable obstacles, both technical and biological, but especially moral; hence it proceeded slowly and cautiously, so much so that up to 1927 only 88 cases were recorded worldwide. However, in the last twenty years, progress has become very rapid, and extensive applications have been attempted, especially in English-speaking countries.

The methods used essentially reduce to four: 1) semen is directly extracted from the epididymis by puncturing its tail and then injected, more or less deeply, into the internal female organs; 2) semen is obtained through masturbation, collected in a syringe, and then injected as above; 3) semen is obtained through interrupted intercourse or by condom, collected, and injected as above; 4) semen is obtained through normal intercourse, collected by syringe from the vaginal fundus, and then injected, etc.

The increase in cases of artificial insemination in the human sphere has made the problem of its moral liceity a pressing one. Before addressing it, it should be noted that the term "artificial insemination" is not precise, since what is artificially performed is not the fusion of the two cells (i.e., fertilization), but merely the introduction of sperm into the internal female organs. For this reason, many rightly propose to replace the expression "artificial insemination" with "artificial insemination with artificial animation" or "spermiogenesis." Moreover, the question can be examined from several perspectives: historical, medical, social, legal, and moral. Here, we limit ourselves to the last aspect, further restricted to the human sphere and in line with Catholic thought.

The issue emerged toward the end of the last century. A. Eschbach (Disputationes physiologico-theologicae..., Paris 1884, pp. 69-70), E. Berardi (Praxis confessariorum..., I, 3rd ed., Faenza 1898, no. 2109, pp. 400 ff.), and D. Palmieri (A. Ballerini - D. Palmieri, Opus theologico-morale, VI, 2nd ed., Prato 1894, tr. X, sect. S, no. 1304, p. 689) addressed II. The first argued that artificial insemination is licit only if the semen is from the husband and obtained without onanistic means or masturbation. The second and third were satisfied with the first condition.

The Holy Office intervened in the matter with a decree in March 1897, which stated, among other things: "Proposed doubt: Can artificial insemination of a woman be employed? After the most diligent examination and the prior vote of the R. D. Consultors, the same E. N. Cardinals ordered the following response: It is not licit. On Friday, the 26th of the same month and year, during the usual audience granted to the R. P. D. Assessor of the S. O., after a thorough report on the above, His Holiness Pope Leo XIII approved and confirmed the resolution of the Fathers of the Holy Office."

After this decree, the issue gradually lost much of its practical and urgent character and received less attention from authors. There has been a revival in recent years: the spread of the practice of artificial insemination has sparked lively discussions and notable disagreements.

In general, Catholic moralists distinguish between artificial insemination with the husband's semen and artificial insemination with semen from a man who is not the husband and who, by analogy with blood donation, is called a "donor." For artificial insemination with the husband's semen, a distinction is made between normal cases (i.e., those in which insemination could occur through natural means and methods) and exceptional cases. The latter are further distinguished based on the methods by which the semen is obtained.

Thus, the following questions arise: 1) Is artificial insemination with donor semen licit?; 2) Is artificial insemination with the husband's semen licit even in normal cases?; 3) What should be said about artificial insemination with the husband's semen in exceptional cases?

The first question arises practically only for married women who wish to have children but cannot conceive from their own husband. All Catholics agree in giving a negative answer. For all, artificial insemination with donor semen is always illicit, regardless of the condition of the woman to be inseminated or the man who donates the semen (whether married, unmarried, or widowed), whatever the motive for resorting to it and the method by which the semen is obtained.

In this regard, all the considerations that are made against the liceity of sexual relations between unmarried persons apply. Man cannot dispose of his generative power—and thus of the semen that is part of it—except within a single and indissoluble marriage in favor of the other spouse: for it is a matter of generating human beings who also need to be instructed and educated, which can practically be achieved only within a stable, indeed single and indissoluble, marriage. In the hypothesis under consideration, the man would dispose of his semen outside of marriage, in favor of a person who is not his legitimate spouse. He would therefore commit a sin, which would be even more serious if one or both of the parties were married to another person: in that case, the specific sin of adultery would be committed.

Some social considerations are added. First, it would open the door to easy disguises of illicit conceptions resulting from illegitimate relations, while at the same time not providing sufficient social guarantees for those who actually conceive as a result of artificial insemination. How, indeed, could a woman prove that she conceived as a result of artificial insemination and not as a result of sinful sexual relations? And, on the other hand, how could a woman be accused of sinful conception and, by implication, of illicit sexual relations if artificial insemination with non-donor semen were permitted?

For these reasons, all Catholics without exception reject artificial insemination with donor semen. Nor does the comparison with blood donation hold. Germ cells, in fact, are sources of life, indeed—under the circumstances being considered—of human life; consequently, they are subject to all the conditions that govern the legitimate transmission of human life, namely, a single and indissoluble marriage. On this point, Pius XII was quite explicit in his address to the participants of the Fourth International Congress of Catholic Doctors (cf. L'Osservatore Romano, Oct. 17, 1949).

Nor are there any real differences among Catholics regarding the second question: all agree in rejecting its liceity. Indeed, sexual union fulfills not only a generative function but also one of intimacy, which is of considerable importance for the consolidation and deepening of marital life. Therefore, it cannot normally be dispensed with; whereas this is what happens in artificial insemination.

The discussion on the third question is very lively, and the divergences are profound. The opinions that have emerged can essentially be reduced to three main currents.

The first current holds that in exceptional cases, artificial insemination (f.a.) with the husband’s semen is always licit, regardless of how the semen is obtained. This current is represented by S. Di Francesco (cf. *È lecita la f.a.*, in *Clinica nuova*, 1 [1945], nos. 9–10) and, in part (i.e., limited to condomized coitus or, more precisely, the Courty method), by P. Tiberghien (cf. *La fécondation artificielle*, in *Méthodes de science religieuse*, 1 [1944], pp. 339 ff.; and *La fécondation artificielle*, in *Nouvelle revue théologique*, 68 [1946], pp. 819–20) and by E. Tesson (cf. *L’insémination artificielle et la morale*, in *Cahiers Laënnec*, 6 [1946], 11). It is based chiefly on the following argument: in artificial insemination, the semen is directed toward its natural end, namely, fertilization and generation; thus, it does not involve the malice proper to masturbation or omission. It is true that this occurs in a manner different from that ordained by nature, but—as is argued—just as nature is corrected in other fields (e.g., sight is corrected and enhanced by eyeglasses, microscopes, and telescopes; nutrition is corrected by injections) without offending moral order, so too there is no reason to suppose that correcting nature in the realm of generation should offend moral order.

The second current, by contrast, holds that artificial insemination is never licit, not even in exceptional cases, regardless of how the semen is obtained. It is represented especially by Fr. Hürth (*La fécondation artificielle*, in *Nouvelle revue théologique*, 68 [1946], pp. 402–26), A. Boschi (*Nuove questioni matrimoniali*, 2nd ed., Turin 1948, pp. 283–33), A. Gemelli (*La f.a.*, 2nd ed., Milan 1949; id., *La f.a. secondo la teologia morale cattolica*, in *La scuola cattolica*, 74 [1946], pp. 273–81; 75 [1947], pp. 3–13), R. Biot (*Génération et amour*, in *Nouvelle revue théologique*, 69 [1947], pp. 32–47), and F. Cappello (*De Matrimonio*, 5th ed., Turin 1947, pp. 382–83, no. 383). The principal reason is that in artificial insemination, there is “the objective and real separation of two elements that nature has constituted as a single act, namely, the conjugal act. For it is precisely in the conjugal act itself that (1) the semen is secreted by the man and (2) introduced into the receptive organ of the woman for the purpose of transmitting life. Artificial insemination, however, dissociates these two elements into two objectively independent acts, and—so to speak—severing the intrinsic and natural connection between them and with the end of generation. It matters little that, intentionally, they remain connected: the agent’s intention cannot alter the nature of things or correct an intrinsic vice that renders an act immoral” (A. Boschi, *op. cit.*, p. 320 ff.).

The third current distinguishes between the manner of obtaining the semen and the manner of insemination itself. If the semen is obtained through natural coitus or by puncture of the epididymis, it holds that artificial insemination cannot be condemned; but if the semen is obtained through interrupted coitus, condomized coitus, or—worse—masturbation, it considers such insemination illegitimate, because these acts are intrinsically immoral and thus can never be performed, even for the purpose of artificially inseminating a woman. This current is represented, among others, by A. Vermeersch (*Theol. mor.*, IV, 3rd ed., Rome 1933, no. 64, p. 59), E. Génicot – I. Salsmans (*Causa conscientiae*, 8th ed., Brussels 1948, p. 755), A. Gennaro (*La f.a. dal punto di vista morale*, in *Perfice munus*, 22 [1947], pp. 209–21), and E. Toffoleto (*La f.a. della donna*, in *Rivista medica per il clero*, 18 [1947], pp. 99–126).

The divergences of opinion regarding the liceity of artificial insemination are reflected, in part, in the interpretation of the decree of the Holy Office. According to some (e.g., Hürth, Gemelli, Boschi), it condemns every form of artificial insemination; according to others (e.g., D. Prümmer, *Man. theol. mor.*, III, Freiburg im Breisgau 1940, no. 799; H. Blatzill, *Decisiones Sanctae Sedis de sua et abusu matrimonii*, 2nd ed., Turin 1944, p. 31), it condemns only those forms in which the semen is obtained through masturbation or onanistically.

It is not possible here to discuss at length the various positions assumed by Catholics and the arguments each advances in its favor. Only a few considerations can be offered to guide those who wish to delve further into the matter.

First, the question concerns the morality or immorality of the act in itself, not the intention of the one who resorts to it; in other words: is it certain that in artificial insemination there is a rupture into two moments of a process that, in the manner ordained by nature, occurs in a single moment? Is this rupture in itself, objectively, licit or illicit? Is it never licit, under any circumstances, not even in exceptional cases, or is it licit in at least some cases? If it is intrinsically illicit, it can never be performed, for no reason whatsoever. The intention of the agent is irrelevant here. This point must be emphasized, particularly with regard to the manner of obtaining the semen: what matters is not the purpose for which the semen will be used, but whether that manner of obtaining it is in itself licit or illicit.

To the question thus framed, the first current replies that this rupture is not licit because nature has established a unitary mode; the second current, however, counters that the mode established by nature is the normal mode, not the only licit one. Yet neither current, at least thus far, seems to have provided a definitive proof of its position. The reasons adduced appear to be mere repetitions of their respective stances, not demonstrations of their validity.

The question therefore requires further study. In such study, the norms indicated by Pius XII to the participants of the IV International Congress of Catholic Physicians should be kept in mind, namely: the mere fact that the desired result is achieved by such means does not justify the use of those means; nor can the desire, in itself fully legitimate, of spouses to have a child suffice to prove the liceity of resorting to artificial insemination. It goes without saying that the active element can never be procured licitly by means of an unnatural act. Although new methods cannot be ruled out *a priori*... nonetheless, with regard to artificial insemination, not only must one be extremely cautious, but it must absolutely be excluded. In saying this, one is not necessarily proscribing the use of certain artificial means intended solely either to facilitate the natural act or to enable the natural act, when normally performed, to achieve its end (*L’Osservatore Romano*, Oct. 10, 1949).

**

**II. Canon Law.** Artificial insemination gives rise to serious juridical problems, all the more complex in that the laws generally still ignore this mode of fertilization. Some of these problems are touched upon here, especially in relation to canon law and Italian civil law.

In matters of marriage, while no particular problem can arise when artificial insemination (f. a.) is performed by collecting semen obtained from normal intercourse (except when the semen is injected into a different woman), for all other methods of artificial insemination it is generally held that such insemination is not sufficient to consummate the marriage. Therefore, a person who can only have conjugal relations in this manner is to be considered impotent (this has also been confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff in the address delivered on 29 September 1949 to participants in the IV International Congress of Catholic Physicians; see also the Pro-TENZA). There is no doubt, however, that children conceived through artificial insemination are always legitimate if the semen was that of the mother’s husband; otherwise, as the Supreme Pontiff expressly declared in the aforementioned address, they are illegitimate (incestuous, adulterous, sacrilegious, etc., depending on the circumstances, even if the mother acted in good faith).

It is, however, questionable whether judicial declaration of paternity is possible under Article 269, no. 3 of the Civil Code in the case of forced artificial insemination without sexual union. Meanwhile, the case must be considered as one not foreseen by the law where, despite the circumstances allowing for disavowal of paternity under Articles 235, nos. 1–3 of the Civil Code, it is nonetheless proven that the wife was artificially inseminated with her husband’s semen.

As for the legal aspects of artificial insemination, nothing particular arises regarding the possibility that twins may have different fathers.

In criminal law, the main issue raised by artificial insemination is whether, for crimes whose constitutive element is carnal intercourse, such an element can consist in artificial insemination. The most obvious answer, given the current state of legislation (both canon and civil), is in the negative, although some writers seem to hold the contrary view. Therefore, both forced artificial insemination by the husband and that performed by third parties (or with semen from strangers) does not constitute the crime of rape (Article 319 of the Penal Code); the crime of incest (Article 364) does not exist unless there has been sexual intercourse, but only artificial insemination, and the same must be said of seduction (Article 526), which, like any other fraudulent artificial insemination, will in itself constitute only a civil wrong, without being punishable criminally.

For crimes whose constitutive element is the act of lust, the same must be said regarding actual artificial insemination, while noting that the act of lust may be present in some of the procedures used to obtain semen. This must be borne in mind especially for crimes of acts of lust (Article 521 of the Penal Code), corruption of minors (Article 530), as well as for crimes of abduction (Articles 523–525), procuring (Articles 531–533), and abduction or concealment of minors or incapacitated persons (Articles 573–574), where the act or purpose of lust is criminally relevant.

Without doubt, the crime of venereal infection (Article 553 of the Penal Code) can be committed through artificial insemination, while it will depend on the circumstances whether, in cases of artificial insemination, the crime of obscene acts (Article 527) or that of acts contrary to public decency (Article 726) is also committed.

As for adultery, it presents aspects that must be carefully distinguished. While simple artificial insemination cannot constitute adultery or concubinage for penal purposes or as grounds for separation of spouses, it is certainly to be equated with adultery for the purposes of disavowal of paternity (Article 235, no. 4 of the Civil Code), since the reasons for both are identical.

Indeed, any contract or agreement that obliges to artificial insemination or the provision of semen for this purpose is to be considered legally illicit under Articles 5, 634, 1343, and 1354 of the Civil Code; and this is probably the case even when artificial insemination is lawful.