CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. - Greek ecclesiastical writer.
I. PERSON
1. Life
Titus Flavius C., surnamed the A., born around the middle of the 2nd century. Few notices about his life are found in the ancient writers. In indicating the place of his birth, tradition wavers between Alexandria and Athens (Epiphanius, Haer., 32, 6). Modern critics prefer Athens, referring to his Greek culture; but recently strong doubts have been raised against this opinion (F. Quatember, Die christliche Lebenshaltung des Klemens v. Al., Vienna 1946, pp. 18-23). Of his family nothing is known but the gentile name, which indicates an unspecified relationship (perhaps a family of freedmen?) with the famous family of the Flavii.
One has the impression that C. was educated in paganism and that he was later converted (Eusebius, Praep. evang., II, 2, 64) after an anxious search for the truth, during which he had occasion to become acquainted with the various philosophical and religious currents of his time. Having become a Christian, he wished to deepen his knowledge of the doctrines of the Church. For this purpose he undertook long journeys to listen to the most celebrated Christian teachers (Strom., I, 12, 1); in Greece an Ionian, in southern Italy a Syrian and an Egyptian, in the East another Syrian, in Palestine a converted Jew, and in Egypt finally the last, the dearest, whom he recalls with words of great esteem (ibid., I, 11). According to Eusebius (Hist. eccl., VI, 6), this teacher was Pantaenus, head of the Catechetical School of Alexandria. It must be said that almost nothing is known about this catechetical school. In any case, C. developed intellectually at Alexandria and there taught Christian doctrine, in circumstances that cannot be precisely determined.
When the persecution broke out under Septimius Severus (in 202), he took refuge in Cappadocia with one of his disciples, the bishop Alexander. In 211 he is still with him, zealously carrying out his ministry. In fact, in that year the holy bishop, having been thrown into prison, sends a letter to the Church of Antioch by means of the "blessed presbyter C.", who "confirmed and enlarged the Church of God" in Cappadocia (Eusebius, ibid., 11, 6). The same Alexander, later become bishop of Jerusalem, in a letter written to Origen, speaks of the "holy C." his "lord and benefactor" (Eusebius, ibid., 14, 9) as of a father already dead, without saying anything about the place or the circumstances of his death.
2. Environment and culture
Besides doctrine, the cultural environment of Alexandria exercised a decisive influence on the intellectual development of C. In those times Alexandria was the second city of the Roman Empire, where men of different nationalities met, but also a center of Hellenistic culture, a rival of Athens. Although the famous library of the Museion, with its 400,000 volumes, the largest in the world at that time, had been destroyed by the fire that broke out at the capture of the city by Julius Caesar (in 47 B.C.), in the time of C. it had already been rebuilt and filled with new copies; there was furthermore the library of the Serapeion, and intellectual interest was in full vigor. The ancient city of the Ptolemies was a place of contact not only for merchants of all nations, but also for philosophers, scientists and men of letters of different schools and tendencies. The Museion itself, whose head was appointed by the emperor, gathered the most considerable scientists.
Of a direct relation of C. with the scientists of the Museion, such that one could speak of an influence on him of Greco-Hellenistic culture, there exists no document; but one cannot seriously call into doubt his frequenting of the great libraries, which is attested by the great number of citations of philosophers and men of letters in his works (O. Stählin in his index registers ca. 350 profane authors cited by C.). Today it is beyond doubt that he made use of anthologies and compilations then much in use at Alexandria, but from this one cannot conclude that he was a mere compiler who copied his citations without criticism, for example from the Παντοδαπή Ιστορία of Favorinus, as J. Gabrielsson claimed (Über die Quellen des Klemens Al., I, Uppsala 1906; II, ibid. 1909, p. 437). Alongside the superficial, and sometimes misunderstood, citations of philosophers and poets, entire pages attest to his vast erudition, the fruit of assiduous study. Among the Greek philosophers — to name only the most frequently cited — besides Plato, his favorite author, he knows Heraclitus, Aristotle, Chrysippus, Musonius; among the men of letters: Homer, Herodotus, Hesiod, Euripides. Nor should one forget the fact that his audience, as can be glimpsed from his writings, was recruited in large part from among the intellectuals of his time, who, having completed their encyclopedic education, demanded of the Christian teacher that he be up to date on the scientific questions agitated at that time in Alexandria.
No less important for the thought of C. is the influence of Judeo-Hellenistic culture. The ancient capital of the Ptolemies had for centuries been the cultural center of Hellenizing Jews. There the Greek version of the Old Testament (Septuagint) was born, as was the allegorical method in the interpretation of Sacred Scripture for harmonizing Sacred History with Greek thought. Using the same sacred book, the Christian teacher could not fail to be in contact with the Jews. In fact C. cites the Old Testament always according to the Septuagint, and never according to the original text (cf. O. Stählin, op. cit. in bibl.). He knows the so-called deuterocanonical books, especially Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus. Furthermore he knows many Judeo-Hellenistic writers, such as the historians Demetrius, Philo the Elder, Eupolemus, Josephus, the Jewish Peripatetic philosopher Aristobulus, the tragic poet Ezekiel, the Jewish Sibyl and others. But even more important was the allegorical interpretation of Sacred Scripture. The most significant representative of this tendency was Philo, the philosopher; C. makes wide use of his writings (more than 300 times), adapting himself to his method and applying it also to the New Testament. But one example suffices to understand the Christian originality of C.: the entry of the High Priest into the Sancta Sanctorum is interpreted by Philo and by C. alike as the passage of the contemplative from the sensible world to the intelligible world, but all this for C. has the sense of the imitation of Christ, the great priest, who by his passion opened the way of heaven (cf. G. Békés, De continua oratione Clementis Al. doctrina, in Studia Anselmiana, 14 [1942], pp. 5-28).
To complete the picture of the culture of C. it is necessary also to mention his extraordinary knowledge of the New Testament and of early Christian literature. The New Testament is cited or freely used by him ca. 2000 times, the Old Testament ca. 1500 times. According to A. Harnack, his knowledge of the Bible is extraordinary and personal (Die Chronologie der altchrist. Literatur, Leipzig 1897-1904, p. 16). C. also knows the Apostolic Fathers, the Didaché, Tatian, Melito, Irenaeus and the "traditiones" concerning the Apostles, as well as the apocrypha and Gnostic literature (cf. J. Ruwet, art. cit. in bibl.).
II. WORKS
Of Clement's work only a part has survived, certainly the principal part. A list of Clement's writings is furnished us by Eusebius (Hist. eccl., VI, 13; cf. the "testimonies" in vol. I of Stählin's edition).
1) The Protrepticus (Προτρεπτικὸς πρὸς Ἕλληνας) is an invitation to the Greeks, and generally to the followers of pagan worship, to detest idolatry and be converted to the true religion, that is, to Christianity.
As for its literary form, the Protrepticus belongs to the genre of the προτρεπτικοί, admonitory and exhortatory sermons, whose purpose is to persuade their hearers to something noble, for example, to devote themselves to philosophy. A famous example of this genre is found in Cicero's Hortensius, which decisively impelled St. Augustine to the first step of his conversion (Conf., III, 4). It appears that Clement knew the (lost) Protreptikós of Aristotle (cf. G. Lazzati, L'Aristotele perduto, Milan 1938, p. 9 ff.).
As regards content, the author, following the Jewish and Christian apologists, employs the arguments known from popular historical philosophy against polytheistic religion, against myths and superstitious worship. In contrast to the stupidity and immorality of paganism he demonstrates the divine wisdom, the spiritual richness and the transcendent purity of the doctrine of the incarnate Logos: in this doctrine all the noble desires of man concerning the knowledge of truth and the eternal salvation of the soul are realized. It remains therefore for man — this is the thought with which Clement closes the Protrepticus — to choose between judgment and Grace, between perdition and life (Protr., 123, 2).
2) The three books of the Paedagogus (Παιδαγωγός) are a direct continuation of the Protrepticus, addressed to those who, following the exhortation, have been converted to Christianity. The Divine Pedagogue, Christ himself, sets forth in them the norms of a truly Christian life.
In Book I, general questions concerning the nature and method of the Divine Pedagogue are treated. Among the ancients the pedagogue was distinguished from the schoolmaster: his task did not consist in imparting intellectual instruction, but in forming the child's character by means of moral education. Precisely this is the task of the Divine Pedagogue toward the newly converted: he heals their souls from the passions, preparing them for the teaching of the Master (Paed., I, 1, 4). All those who have been freed from sin and reborn in Baptism to a new life are children to be educated by the Divine Pedagogue: this, however, does not mean that they are on a lower level of the Christian life, to which the gnostic life could be opposed, as heterodox gnosis claimed (ibid., 25, 1). The Divine Pedagogue is full of goodness, but he also employs justice when it is necessary: the two things do not exclude each other (ibid., 62, 1-4). Even punishment is a means of education in his hands (ibid., 75, 1).
Practical teaching is explained in Books II and III, which are true treatises on Christian morality. Clement sets forth in detail how the true Christian must behave at the baths, at banquets, in conversations, with regard to household furnishings, clothing, ornaments, married life, etc. Beneath these admonitions one senses the problem of a Christian in the midst of a rich pagan metropolis, where all dissoluteness had its home. Clement does not preach an ascetic ideal: not a total renunciation, but honesty of morals and a wise moderation in the enjoyments of this life.
His doctrine is based on the moral precepts of the Old Testament, often interpreted allegorically, on the Sapiential books, and especially on Ecclesiasticus. From the New Testament he makes use of the doctrines of the parenetic parts of St. Paul's letters and of various passages of the Gospel. But Clement's characteristic attitude manifests itself above all in the extensive use of Greek ethics. Various prescriptions are established by him with reference especially to Plato's Republic and Laws and to the moral writings of Plutarch: however, the fundamental conception of the principal problems of morality is due to the ethics of the Stoa (cf. J. Stelzenberger, op. cit. in bibl.). His dependence on Musonius Rufus is evident: there are entire periods of the Paedagogus parallel to the extracts of his doctrine preserved by Stobaeus (cf. O. Hense, C. Musonii Rufi reliquiae, Leipzig 1905). One should not forget, however, that those Stoic doctrines are always amalgamated, modified and perfected with Christian doctrines.
As a conclusion to the Paedagogus there is found, in the manuscripts, a beautiful hymn to Christ the Savior, who is the Logos of God and the Good Shepherd of men. Since its ideas correspond perfectly to those of the Paedagogus, its authenticity is no longer doubted today.
3) The Stromata (Τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν
γνωστικῶν ὑπομνημάτων στρωματεῖς), are in eight books. The title means: carpets, fabrics, but perhaps in Clement's time it had the meaning of στρωματεῖς, a receptacle for coverlets. Hence in a metaphorical sense, the title would indicate a collection of various things without systematic order, a miscellany (cf. J. A. Hort-J. B. Mayor, Clement of Al. Miscellanies Book VII, London 1902, Introduction). Clement was not the only one to give this title to his writing; in profane literature too one encounters authors who wrote books under this title (for example Plutarch and L. Caecilius Vindex). Clement himself, to express the character of his writing, compares his title with other similar ones, as, for example, with those of Pratum, Peplos, Helicon, Honeycomb etc. (Strom., VI, 2, 1).
Despite this fragmentary character, in the Stromata there is a certain plan, or more exactly a concatenation of ideas (cf. E. de Faye, op. cit. in bibl., p. 90). First of all two principal themes can be distinguished: the one, the relation of Christianity to profane culture, especially to Greek philosophy; the other, the explanation of true gnosis and its fundamental principles, in a continuous discussion with heterodox gnosis. The first theme is treated explicitly in Book I of the Stromata, but appears occasionally also in other books. Clement, in opposition to the attitude of the Christians of his time, manifests a positive appreciation of profane culture, although he still maintains the thesis of the Jewish apologists on the famous "theft" of the philosophers.
The second theme infiltrates from Book II onward into the whole work. In Book II faith and the Christian virtues that lead to perfection, that is, to divine likeness, are treated: in Book III there are polemics against heterodox gnosis and against other heretical opinions. In Book IV the ideal of the perfect Christian — Clement's gnostic — is presented as a living martyr. In Books V and VI religious knowledge and true gnosis are treated; in Book VII finally there is a beautiful portrait of the gnostic: the ideal of the religious man.
In accordance with the character of the literary genre these themes are not developed systematically. Quotations from Holy Scripture or from profane literature allow Clement to make digressions more or less long and often even without direct connection with the principal theme.
Book VIII, as it remains today, cannot be considered as the continuation of the seventh and the conclusion of the work. It is rather a collection of notes for the most part already used in the preceding books. The same may be said of the two pieces appended to the Stromata: Excerpta ex Theodoto and Eclogae propheticae.
The three aforementioned writings of C. were considered as three parts of a trilogy until de Faye, who, by criticizing this thesis, sparked a discussion that continues to this day. Given that "the starting point for every literary investigation concerning the works of C. is the plan of the trilogy preserved in the Paedagogus, I, 1" (J. Munck, op. cit. in bibl., p. 25), it will be appropriate to touch upon the question. C. distinguishes a threefold activity of the Logos: to exhort to conversion, to educate the convert toward salvation, to instruct the educated in gnosis. At the end of ch. 3 he again summarizes these three tasks with the three expressions: προτρέπων, παιδαγωγῶν, ἐκδιδάσκων (Paed., I, 3, 3).
The first and second activities were undoubtedly explained in the Protrepticus and in the Paedagogus. The question of the trilogy concerns instead the third part, whose title would have been, according to the critics: the Teacher (Διδάσκος). That is, the question arises whether the Stromata can be considered as the realization of the projected Teacher, or whether, for some unknown reason, C. did not rather set aside the realization of his plan.
De Faye raised the first criticisms against the traditional conception. He considers the Stromata as an "hors d'oeuvre": neither the title nor the content corresponds to those of the projected book. The Stromata owe their origin to a concern of C., who, before writing the Teacher, wished to clarify the task of philosophy in matters of faith, since, because of the abuses of heterodox gnosis, a general distrust of all profane wisdom had arisen among the faithful. His hypothesis was criticized first of all by C. Heussi (Die Strom. des Klemens Al. und ihr Verhältnis zum Protrep. und Paed., in Zeitschr. für Wiss. Theologie, 45 [1902], pp. 465-512). The latter is of the opinion that the first 4 books of the Stromata would have been composed before the Protrepticus and the Paedagogus. Having finished bk. IV, C. would have decided to compose the Protrepticus and the Paedagogus, then would have continued the Stromata, treating the material of the Teacher. Tradition would therefore be right: with a slight modification we would have in the Stromata the third part of the trilogy. J. Munck, taking up the problem again, does not admit the precedence of the first books of the Stromata, and maintains the traditional chronological order. He agrees with de Faye, not seeing in the Stromata the third part of the trilogy; he believes instead that C. renounced, for unknown reasons, the execution of his original plan. Lazzati joins him, accepting no relation of the Stromata to the Protrepticus and the Paedagogus.
A new position on the problem emerges from the work of F. Quatember (op. cit.). He simply denies that C. intended to write a trilogy. His principle is that from ch. 1 of the Paedagogus one cannot draw the conclusion that authors generally draw about C.'s intention. There it is always a question of the economy of salvation, which is realized by the divine Logos through three successive stages: for the conversion of the soul from the world, for its purification and preparation for gnosis, for instruction in gnosis, up to perfection. The three stages indicate the plan of the Logos himself, not that of C. Certainly, since two books have treated the first two stages, one is led to the conclusion that the third book should have treated the third stage, or at least that this would have been C.'s original plan. But such a conclusion comes only from a syllogism of modern authors. C. himself rather demonstrates a concern to hide the holy mysteries of the faith (cf. Strom., I, 14, 3; 18, 1; 20, 4; 21, 2).
Quatember's opinion may contribute much to the clarification of the problem. Perhaps the traditional opinion has some truth: C. described the economy of salvation, hiding the third stage, instruction in gnosis, in the Stromata.
4) The short writing: Quis dives salvetur?, the only one entirely preserved besides the three mentioned, is a so-called homily on Mk. 10, 17-31. In the first part it turns against a too literal interpretation of evangelical poverty, as if wealth in itself excluded the possession of salvation. The Lord rather invites us to purify the heart from the disordered love of wealth: to spiritual poverty. In the second part it asserts that the practices of Christian charity together with sincere repentance of sins will be able to lead even the rich man into heaven. Finally, as an example of true penance, it narrates the well-known story of the young man beloved by St. John, who became a brigand, but was finally converted by the Apostle.
5) Lost works. — Among the lost writings of C. the most important was a collection of notes on Sacred Scripture in eight books, entitled Hypotyposeis ('Ὑποτυπώσεις, sketches). The fragments preserved by Eusebius and in the Commentaries of Oecumenius, and the Latin version of a considerable part of them (the apostolic letters: I Pt., I and II Jn., and that of St. Jude) are found printed in vol. III of Stählin's edition. Besides the books of Sacred Scripture, the work also included the letter of Barnabas and the Apocalypse of Peter. Photius says he found in these notes various errors, such as the eternity of matter, the conception of the Son as a creature, a docetic conception of the Incarnation, metempsychosis, and the existence of several worlds before Adam. But the value of this testimony is quite contestable.
Other lost writings are: Περὶ τὸ πάσχα, on the question of Passover; Κανὼν ἐκκλησιαστικὸς, treating of the ecclesiastical canon (cf. Unnik, in Nederl. Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis, 1941, p. 49 ff.); Περὶ προνοίας, on providence (not mentioned by Eusebius); Προτρεπτικὸς εἰς ὑπομονήν is an exhortation to patience addressed to the neophytes; and numerous letters. Of these writings fragments remain, collected in vol. III of Stählin; of a sermon on fasting and of another writing on the prophet Amos nothing remains.
As for the manuscripts and the tradition of the text, everything is found in vol. I of O. Stählin. There are also recorded the various editions of the works of C. Here we recall only the most recent bilingual editions (Greek-Italian) of the Protrepticus (edited by Q. Cataudella [*Corona Patrum Sales], Greek series, 2), Turin 1937) and of the Paedagogus (edited by A. Boatti [ibid., 3), ibid. 1940); the bilingual edition (Greek-English) of the Protrepticus, Quis dives salvetur?, and the fragment of the Exhortation to Patience in one volume, edited by G. W. Butterworth (The Loeb Classical Library), London 1919; the bilingual edition (Greek-English) of the Excerpta ex Theodoto by R. P. Casey, London 1934. Among recent translations mention should be made of the French version of the Protrepticus by C. Mondesert (Sources chrétiennes, 2), Paris 1942; a florilegium translated and commented in French by G. Bardy, Clément d'Al. Les chrétiens, ibid. 1926; and the German version of the principal Clementine writings by O. Stählin (Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*, 2nd series, Munich 1934-38).
III. DOCTRINE
1. General attitude: The relation to philosophy and gnosis
Before indicating the main points of C.'s doctrine, one must consider his relation to philosophy and to gnosis, which undoubtedly left its mark on his thought.
In the judgment of F. Overbeck (Über die Anfänge der patrist. Literatur, in Hist. Zeitschrift, 48 [1882], p. 467) C.'s work in relation to philosophy can be called "the most audacious literary enterprise in the history of the Church." For C.'s attitude in this regard was contrary to that of most Christians of his time. The development toward a positive appreciation of philosophy was strongly impeded, for a certain time, by heterodox Gnosticism, which, with its syncretistic tendency, attempted to introduce foreign elements, taken from philosophical speculation and from pagan myths, into the doctrine of Revelation. The struggle against this danger, which threatened the Church in its intimate existence, was extremely fierce, and, at the end of the 2nd century, when the Church emerged victorious from it, the result was a general distrust in the souls of the faithful against every kind of human wisdom. "They are afraid of philosophy," C. notes, "as children are of spirits" (Strom., VI, 80, 5; 89, 1; 93, 1).
His opinion, on the other hand, is that without intellectual education no development of faith can be expected, just as one cannot harvest grapes without tending the vine (ibid., I, 43, 1). Study is therefore very useful. To justify this opinion C., first of all, gives a new positive appreciation of Greek philosophy. It is true: there is still found in him the theory of the Jewish apologists about the theft of the philosophers, namely that the Greek philosophers had taken fragments of truth from "barbarian philosophy" (Holy Scripture) (ibid., I, 81, 1; 87, 2; 100, 4; 135, 2; II, 1, 1; V, 140), but the other idea prevails rather, namely that philosophy is a gift of God: as the Law was given to the Jews, so God gave philosophy to the Greeks. It was granted to them almost as a Testament (ibid., VI, 67, 1), which prepared them intellectually and morally for the "way of the most royal doctrine" of Christ (ibid., I, 80, 6).
But C. does not stop at this point. He thinks that the task of philosophy did not cease with the coming of Christ. Its preparatory significance remains unchanged: the study of philosophy prepares the Christian for the intellectual penetration and the moral realization of his faith, that is, for true gnosis (ibid., I, 28, 1; 30, 1; 99, 1; VII, 20, 2). This positive attitude toward philosophy, and generally toward profane culture, certainly seemed audacious in C.'s time, but, with its enlightened and balanced wisdom, it finally prevailed in the Church.
Even more audacious seems C.'s enterprise of presenting the understanding and the realization of the Christian doctrine under the title of gnosis. It must be remembered that Alexandria was one of the centers of heterodox Gnosticism: Basilides and Valentinus taught there, making numerous proselytes among the faithful. The very word gnosis was enough to arouse grave suspicions about the orthodoxy of a Christian writer.
C.'s attitude must not surprise: on the one hand, standing on the historical ground of the Church's apostolic tradition, he had to reject the fantastic speculations and the diluted spiritualism of the Gnostics; on the other, he had to give a positive answer to the spiritual demands from which Gnosticism was born. As for the first task, C. admits no distinction (against Marcion) between God the Creator (inferior) and the God and Father of Jesus: between the just God, who punishes, and the good God, who with his providence benefits (Paed., I, 8) men: he teaches the creation made by God the Father, notwithstanding the presence of evil in the world (several chapters of Book III of the Stromata [cf. Strom., IV, 46, 5]); he rejects the essential distinction between spiritual and simple faithful on the basis of personal responsibility (Strom., II, 10-11); he excludes the strange pairing, connected with that distinction, of an unreal asceticism with a moral dissoluteness (cf. the whole of Book III of the Stromata). As for the second task, C. opposes those Christians who, with heterodox gnosis, rejected every tendency toward a deeper knowledge of divine truth, every development and perfecting of the faith. For he wishes indeed to guide his disciples by means of an intellectual and ascetic education from simple faith to true gnosis, and finally to the vision of God.
2. God
a) Natural knowledge. In all men a certain divine effluence has been instilled (Protr., 68, 2), which is nothing other than the rational soul, breathed upon the face of man on the day of creation (Strom., V, 94, 3). Through it all are capable of recognizing the existence of one God, eternal (Protr., 68, 2), almighty (Strom., V, 87, 2). This holds above all for the philosophers, who, through a certain reflection and transparency of creation, did in fact succeed in knowing the Creator (Strom., I, 94, 1-7; V, 87, 2). The reason for this knowledge, on the one hand, is that in the wise constitution and the harmonious order of the universe the divine rationality is manifested: the λόγος; on the other, that man was created by the Logos in his likeness, λογικός (Protr., 98, 4; Strom., V, 6, 2-3). Revelation teaches the possibility of knowing the existence of God from the created world (Rom., 1, 20) but in the explanation of this doctrine, C. stands under the influence of the Stoa: indeed the Stoics presented the universe as penetrated by a divine rationality knowable by all rational beings. The essential difference, however, consists in the diversity of his concept of God.
b) Nature of God. In opposition to Stoic immanentism (God identified with the vital force of the universe), C. speaks of an absolutely transcendent God (Strom., II, 6, 1); moreover: above all names, all thoughts, all ideas (ibid., V, 65, 2), simply invisible, incomprehensible to the human mind, and, consequently, ineffable, inexpressible with human concepts and words (ibid., V, 78, 3; 81, 5; 82, 2).
Our ideas about him are formless (ibid., II, 6, 1). He embraces within his bosom the whole universe, but he himself remains inaccessible and infinite (ibid., V, 81, 3), he is one, but also beyond unity: ἐν δὲ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν μονάδα (Paed., I, 71, 1).
In speaking of God, C. generally means the first person of the Most Holy Trinity, that is, the Father. This does not mean the denial of the divinity of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, nor even an indirect affirmation of a secondary or tertiary divinity in the Arian sense, but simply reflects that aspect of the Most Holy Trinity — almost as for the Greek Fathers — according to which the individual persons are considered directly, following the economy of Revelation, while their consubstantiality is considered only consequently (cf. Th. de Régnon, Etudes de théol. posit. sur la S.te Trinité, I, Paris 1898, p. 252). This fact appears clearly from his doctrine on the Logos.
c) The Logos: true God, essential revelation of the Father. The principal text on this point is found in ch. 5 of book VII of the Stromata, which deals with the excellence of the Son. There are undoubtedly found in it expressions with a subordinationist flavor. Although the Son is presented as a most perfect being, above every creature, true Lord of the universe, nevertheless his nature is said to be very close to the Almighty (Strom., VII, 5, 3). This expression may seem, not without reason, very deficient if it is measured by means of modern terminology, but from the context one can easily be persuaded of the orthodoxy of C. In fact, the activity of the Logos is described there: it is the excellent governor of the universe, because by contemplating uninterruptedly the arcane ideas of God, it realizes his will in everything (ibid., 5, 4). Therefore the Logos is never separated from the Father and, nevertheless, at the same time, is present everywhere, being "all intellect (νοῦς), all paternal light, all eye: it sees all, hears all, knows all" (ibid., 5, 5).
The origin of the Logos is considered by C. as a spiritual generation, that is to say as an intellectual emanation (ibid., IV, 162, 5), since God by his spiritual nature is νοῦς, pure intellect. The Son therefore is a perfect being from a perfect Father (Paed., I, 25, 3), image of God (Protr., 98, 4) formed in eternity (Strom., V, 38, 7; VI, 138, 1; VII, 7, 2); it is also pure intellect, or rather the idea of the divine intellect (ibid., V, 16, 3) emanated in the identicalness of the divine nature.
Other expressions also confirm this thesis: God and the Logos are: ἐν ἄμερ, ὁ θεός (Paed., I, 62, 4); the Father is in it and it in the Father (ibid., 24, 3; 53, 1); it is the "truly most manifest God, compared to the master of the universe" (Protr., 110, 1; cf. P. B. Pade, op. cit. in bibl., pp. 148-71).
Once the true divine nature of the Logos is thus established, one may consider its characteristic and essential task, that is, to be the essential revelation of the Father. This idea is already contained in the doctrine of the emanation of the Logos, and in its various names, such as truth (Strom., I, 32, 4), image of God (ibid., V, 38, 7), face of God (Paed., I, 57, 2; Strom., V, 34, 1); but it is directly expressed by C. when he says that the Father is not the object of our science, whereas the Son, as wisdom, science and truth, is directly the object of our knowledge (ibid., IV, 156, 1). C. certainly is not thinking of the incarnate Logos, but of its divine nature. How then can one say, without arriving at subordinationism, that the Father is not knowable directly but only in the Logos? One would conclude that the Logos is a being inferior to him.
The explanation of this difficulty lies in the Clementine concept of God in his relation to the world. This concept results from the fusion, already made by Philo, of the Platonic ideas with the Stoic forces. The Platonic ideas are the ideal and transcendental forms of the things of this world; the Stoic δυνάμεις, on the other hand, are the immanent and vital forces of the material world. Philo conceived his ideas at the same time as active causes, forces operating in this world, and conversely the forces as ideas. The transcendental point of encounter of the ideas is God (cf. E. Bréhier, Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Al., 2nd ed., Paris 1925, p. 157).
C. conceives God as Philo does; God is according to him the pure intellect, the "place of the ideas" (γῶσι Ἰδεῖον: Strom., IV, 155, 2; V, 73, 3) of Plato, in which the ideas of all things preexist, so that in this sense he will be able to say that God is all (Paed., I, 88, 1). But since God is omnipotent, these ideas are also δυνάμεις, that is, active forces, efficient causes, which realize every being in the world (ibid., 74, 1).
Now the Logos, having proceeded from the paternal intellect as its perfect image, is, on the one hand, that infinite world of ideas (intellect of the Father) in one expressed idea (Strom., V, 16, 3), and on the other hand it too is omnipotent (Paed., III, 39, 4; Strom., V, 6, 3; 103, 1), that is, "the second cause of all beings, generated by the first" (Strom., VI, 78, 5), or rather the δυνάμεις of the Father (ibid., V, 6, 3; VII, 9, 1) par excellence, which contains in itself all the active δυνάμεις of the universe (ibid., IV, 156, 1-2). In this sense C. defines it as πάντα-ἐν: unique perfect idea and δυνάμεις of the Father, comprising in itself all the ideal forms of created beings and all the active forces realizing the life of these beings, and, in general, the origin and the existence of the whole universe.
Therefore, God expresses his infinite fullness of ideas and forces in his consubstantial Logos, thereby making it his essential revelation.
d) The Holy Spirit: true God, divine force. In ch. 14 of book V of the Stromata, explaining a text of Plato, C. understands it as an allusion to the Most Holy Trinity, in which, after the Father, the second is the Son, the third the Holy Spirit (cf. V, 103, 1). It moreover is glorified with the Father and with the Son (Paed., III, 101, 2; Quis dives?, 42, 20), and — like them — is one and at the same time omnipresent (Paed., I, 42, 1). It is the light of truth, that is, of the Logos, which, divided without division, enlightens the faithful (Strom., VI, 138, 1-2) and pours itself into souls according to their capacity, being in itself without limitation (ibid., 120, 2). It is the δυνάμεις of the Logos, which penetrates the whole universe, and, like the attractive force of the magnet on pieces of iron, attracts men to God according to their capacity and free spiritual correspondence (ibid., VII, 9, 4); it is the δυνάμεις τοῦ θεοῦ, which is given by Christ (ibid., VII, 79, 4) or rather Ἰησοῦς of the Logos, which penetrates the Christian soul transforming it into an entirely spiritual being (ibid., V, 80, 9; cf. VI, 118, 1).
The person of the Holy Spirit thus completed C.'s conception of the Most Holy Trinity: the Father is the source of divinity which in its absolute transcendence is not knowable except through his Son, the Logos, his genuine expression and essential revelation; the Logos, in turn, as creator and governor of the universe manifests itself with its providence in material and spiritual life, which is realized by means of the Holy Spirit. "O mysterious wonder — exclaims C. — one is the Father of all, one also is the Logos of all, the Holy Spirit also is one and the same everywhere..." (Paed., I, 42, 1).
3. The universe
a) Creation. The universe proclaims the great power of God (Protr., 63, 23). God created everything through the Logos: exemplary idea and realizing force of the universe (ibid., 98, 3-4; Strom., VI, 58, 1; 78, 5). C.'s conception of creation — with some reminiscence of Plato and of Philo — on the whole is not erroneous. He admits neither the eternity of spirit nor the eternity of matter (Strom., V, 94, 3). C. thinks he can find in Plato the idea of creation from nothing (ibid., V, 92, 3). He would also like to discover in Holy Scripture Plato's doctrine on the intelligible and sensible world (κόσμος νοητός, κόσμος αἰσθητός), but he identifies the intelligible world with God or rather with the Logos (ibid., V, 93, 4; cf. ibid., IV, 155, 2; V, 73, 3). Creation is a spiritual act of God: "By the simple willing he creates, and to the mere expression of his will the actualization immediately follows" (Protr., 63, 3). The material world, and consequently the generation of man, are not things essentially vitiated, as the heterodox gnosis wanted (Strom., III, 12, 1-2). C. energetically rejects metaphysical dualism with its licentious consequences in morals and celebrates the holiness of Christian marriage (ibid., III, 105-10).
b) The angels. Among God's creatures the most excellent being is the angel, who, being still purer than the purest among men (that is, than the Christian gnostic, who is called ἰσάγγελος), participates more closely in eternal life in heaven (Strom., VII, 5, 2). Angels too pray to obtain divine grace, but differently from men (ibid., VII, 39, 3). The fall of a part of the angels is due to concupiscence (Paed., III, 14, 2; Strom., III, 59, 2). The army of the angels is subject to the Logos (Strom., VII, 5, 6): they are his ministers in the exercise of his providence in the government of nations and cities, as well as of individuals (ibid., VI, 157, 3-5; VII, 6, 4). Angels are also ministers in the punishment of the wicked (ibid., V, 90, 6). C. thinks that philosophy was communicated by the (lower) angels to the Greeks (ibid., VII, 6, 4).
c) Man. Man is, on earth, the most beautiful of all God's creatures (Paed., I, 63, 1), formed personally by him (ibid., 7, 1). And he is composed of soul and body (Strom., IV, 9, 4): the body was formed from the earth, while the rational soul was breathed into his face by God (ibid., V, 94, 3). C. rejects the opinion of Basilides, according to which the soul would be something outside the world (ibid., IV, 165, 4). He therefore does not admit the pre-existence of the soul, but only an ideal pre-existence of man himself in the divine mind, according to which he is formed by God (ibid., IV, 150, 2). The body is not a part of the soul, but rather its organ: that is, its seat and its vehicle (ibid., IV, 163, 2). Being composed of soul and body, man has a rational part and an irrational part (τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ ἄλογον: ibid., IV, 9, 4). The rational part, the rational soul, is generally called the principal part of man (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), or simply the intellect, νοῦς, the inner man, the true man (Protr., 98, 4). It was created "in the image of God and in his likeness," that is, in the image of the Logos, therefore λογικός (ibid.; cf. Strom., V, 94, 5). The rational soul gives life to the body and becomes the principle of its animal constitution (ibid., VI, 135, 2 and 4). Its effect is therefore the so-called vital spirit (ibid., 134, 2; 136, 1-2). Two characteristic manifestations of the vital spirit, which have a relation to the moral life of man, are irascibility and concupiscence (τὸ θυμικόν, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν). C. accepts Platonic trichotomy (Paed., III, 1, 2), finding expressed in anger and in concupiscence all the animal passions of man, which ought to stand under the principate of the ἡγεμονικόν (Strom., VI, 136, 1). In the present state of humanity invece l'anima tripartita, ἡ τριμερὴς ψυχή, ha bisogno di un nuovo principio spirituale, della forza del Logos, per raggiungere lo stato ideale dell'unità spirituale (ibid., V, 80, 9); ma questa questione appartiene già all'economia della salute.
d) Providence. Providence, πρόνοια, is so evident a thing for C. that those who deny it are not considered by him worthy of discussion, but rather of punishment (Strom., VI, 122, 3; V, 6, 2). It follows directly from the concept of God's goodness, who wishes to do good to men and takes care of them (Paed., I, 8). One sees at once from this that the Clementine concept of Providence has nothing in common with Stoic fatalism: it is an authentically Christian conception. The root of Providence is God's all-embracing knowledge, which extends to all things, to all times, to all space, and penetrates not only into individual things, but also into the interior of the soul (Strom., VI, 156, 57). By means of this knowledge — using the ministry of the angels — God, or rather the Logos (ibid., VII, 5, 6; 8, 4), exercises his Providence.
The divine pedagogy of Providence appears especially in Greek philosophy (ibid., VI, 67, 1; 153, 1) and in "barbarian philosophy," that is, in Sacred Scripture, through which the human race is guided by divine Wisdom to faith in the Gospel and to salvation (ibid., VII, 11, 1-3). The difference, however, between the two "philosophies" is very great: philosophy was given to the Greeks through the lower angels (ibid., VII, 6, 4), whereas the Law was given through the Logos himself, not yet incarnate but appearing as an angel (Paed., I, 7). In fact, the Old Testament is closely connected to the New, with which it forms but a single divine order of salvation, since both are the work of the same Lord, power and wisdom of God (Strom., I, 174, 3; II, 29, 2).
4. The economy of salvation
a) Christ. In Clement's doctrine of Christ the Savior three aspects can be distinguished: he is the revealer of God, the redeemer from sin, the regenerator and pedagogue of men unto immortality.
Revealer of God. God, as has been seen, in his essence is not knowable by man, although he has revealed himself, through the Logos, in creating the universe. The reason is that in the created world the individual perfections (idea-forces) of the Logos appear disjoined and scattered, and therefore do not represent him sufficiently for human knowledge (Strom., IV, 156, 1). These conditions changed with the Incarnation. Before the Incarnation the divine Logos had no personal name among men (Paed., I, 57, 2). But God demonstrated his charity toward humanity by sending the Son as λόγος τῆς πίστεως, that is, as his personal word, as the doctrine of faith (ibid., 8, 2; cf. also 22, 3-23, 1; Strom., V, 81, 3). He, through his Incarnation, became the face of the Father, that is, the revealer in person of God's own nature (Strom., V, 34, 1; cf. VII, 58, 3); in him and through him God makes himself seen and known (Paed., I, 57, 2). Only Christ is, therefore, both things at once: God and man (Protr., 7, 1); he is God in man, simply: God-man (ὁ ἄνθρωπος Θεός: Paed., III, 2, 1). Now his divinity does not take away the reality of his humanity, the truth of his sensible flesh. Against the opinion of Fazio, there can be no doubt, even on this point, about the orthodoxy of C. He asserts in all three of his works the reality of the Incarnation: the small, infant and sensible body of the Logos was generated by the Virgin Mother (Strom., VI, 127, 1; cf. also Protr., 7, 1; Paed., I, 41, 3; III, 2, 2; Strom., III, 102, 1). He therefore assumed a body with the five senses (Strom., V, 34, 1).
The difficulty comes mainly from a text that is apparently docetic and speaks of the Lord's apátheia with some exaggeration (Strom., VI, 71, 2). But apátheia is not a denial of the reality of the body; otherwise it would not be possible to propose it, in the same text, as the ideal perfection of the Christian gnostic.
Redeemer from sin. Besides the revelation of God, the Incarnation also had the purpose of liberating humanity from sin and from its consequences, and of reconciling the unfaithful children with their heavenly Father (Protr., 6, 1). This came about through the redeeming death of the Lord, which C. expresses with the scriptural term: λύτρον, ransom (Mt. 20:28; Mk. 10:45), or with equivalent terms (Paed., I, 85, 1-2; Strom., IV, 43, 2; Quis dives?, 23, 4; 33, 6; 37, 3-4). That ransom which the Lord gave for the redemption of humanity is, concretely, his precious blood (Paed., II, 19, 4; III, 85, 1; Strom., IV, 107, 8). Indeed Christ is a sacrifice of singular value, a holocaust for us (Strom., V, 66, 5; 70, 4).
Regenerator and educator of immortality. Christ suffered for us, so that we, through his Passion, might live (Strom., IV, 43, 2). Through his Passion, therefore, he regenerates those who believe in him: "he himself gave birth with the pangs of his body, he himself swaddled with precious blood" (Paed., I, 42, 2) the new generations. All this takes place in a close union with Christ. The union is realized in kinship with Christ, brought about by the regenerative power of his blood; in conformity with his sentiments, συμπάθεια, which is realized through his word as spiritual nourishment, that is, doctrine and the Eucharistic Sacrament (ibid., 42, 1-43, 4; II, 20, 1); finally in immortality, ἀφθαρσία (incorruption), to which he guides his faithful (ibid., I, 49, 4), since he possesses ἀφθαρσία and ἀθανασία, having freed his own flesh from death (ibid., III, 2, 2-3) and having entered the heavens (Strom., V, 34, 7).
b) The Church. C. sees in the Church the providential means for realizing the work of Christ, the salvation of men: "As the will of God is an act, and this is called the world, so his purpose is the salvation of men, and this is called the Church" (Paed., I, 27, 2). It is one as the Father is one, the Son one, and the Holy Spirit one (ibid., 42, 1). C. calls it Mother-Virgin because of its virginal purity and its maternal lovableness (ibid.). Its task is the rearing of the faithful with spiritual nourishment, that is, the Logos, who is divine doctrine and the Eucharistic Sacrament in one person (ibid., 42, 2-43, 4; II, 20, 1), or rather it is itself an institution, where the Logos rears its faithful unto salvation (ibid., III, 101, 3).
Other aspects present the Church as the heavenly Jerusalem, governed by the Logos, who is its law, so that in it the divine will is realized on earth, as in the heavens (Strom., IV, 172, 2; cf. Paed., I, 84, 3). It is a sacred temple, built by the divine will at great cost, that is, with the blood of Jesus, to the honor of God; it is not a place, however, but the community of the faithful itself (Strom., VII, 29, 3-4).
In the last chapters (15-18) of Book VII of the Stromata, C. speaks of the Church as the guardian and teacher of the orthodox faith. It is true: the source of faith is Sacred Scripture, which — like Mary — is a Virgin Mother: a mother, because it gives birth to the truth, and a virgin, because it conceals its mystery (Strom., VII, 94, 1). But whoever does not observe the rule of truth, κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας or κανὼν ἐκκλησιαστικὸς, that is, the tradition of the Church, is not faithful to the Lord and becomes a heretic (ibid., 95, 1; 90, 2). True gnosis, that is, the knowledge of the truth, is found "in the primitive Church" (ibid., 92, 3). The true gnostic — according to C. — is a faithful interpreter of Sacred Scripture, because he observes apostolic and ecclesiastical orthodoxy (ibid., 104, 1-2), that is, the divine deposit, according to the doctrine of the Lord, handed down through the Apostles (ibid., VI, 124, 1-6).
c) The Christian. The goal of Christianity is eternal life (Strom., II, 134, 3), which is attained through Christ the Savior in the Church. However, when speaking of the end (τέλος) of Christianity, C. does not generally understand it as an exterior goal or purpose, but rather as perfection itself, in which man participates the more closely he approaches it; as a fullness of life that completes him in his inmost being. In this sense he distinguishes — following Plato — between the τέλος μεθεκτῶν, or participable end, and the τέλος μετέχων, or participated end. The first is God himself, the second is the perfection acquired by drawing near to God, through assimilation (ibid., 131, 2). The concept of perfection as assimilation to God, ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, is Plato's, but it corresponds — according to C. — to the concept of the Stoics: to live according to nature; or to the doctrine of Moses: to follow the Lord, that is, to fulfill his commandments. In this sense revelation speaks of the friends of God, and Christ exhorts us to be merciful, as the heavenly Father is (ibid., 100, 3-4; V, 99, 1-2). All this is realized in the Christian life through assimilation to the ὀρθὸς λόγος, as C. says with a Stoic term. According to the Stoics, the Logos expresses the immanent reasonableness of the world; man, knowing this reasonableness, knows the law of life, and living according to this law, follows nature, that is, follows God. Now for C. the ὀρθὸς λόγος is not an abstraction, but a "royal and living" law (ibid., II, 19, 2), the Lord himself, who is the sole teacher of the right life (ibid., IV, 162, 5; VII, 7, 4). The law is: "to do the will of the Father"; this law was written on the Cross (ibid., VII, 104, 4). Christians do the same by following the doctrine of the Lord. Thus perfection, that is, assimilation to God, is realized by living according to the doctrine of the Lord.
Degrees of perfection. In the realization of perfection C. distinguishes three degrees of perfection among Christians: the servants, who, converted to God, promptly listen to his word; the faithful ministers, who, fearing the Lord, observe his commandments; the sons or friends, who, having reached perfection, act out of charity (Strom., VI, 173, 6). But in practice the distinction is reduced to that of servants (the first two degrees) and sons: that is, simple faithful and gnostics. This distinction, however, differs from that of the heterodox gnostics. C. does not know a distinction between perfect and imperfect founded on their very nature. The true gnostic perfection according to him lies on the line of the Christian life and is nothing other than its organic development (ibid., VI, 31, 1-3; VII, 20, 2). Gnosis itself, besides presupposing faith, is the same faith in a developed state (ibid., V, 2, 4-6; 5, 2; VII, 55, 3; 95, 6). Nonetheless C. presupposes a contemplative disposition (ibid., II, 45, 4), an intellectualistic tendency and a scientific interest (ibid., VII, 56, 21), so that in practice the majority of Christians will not be able to reach it: gnosis is not for everyone (with reference to 1 Cor. 8, 7; cf. Strom., IV, 97, 1; V, 17, 5; 61, 3; VI, 120, 3; VII, 104, 3). This does not mean, however, that C. wished to exclude the majority of the faithful from evangelical perfection. He knows very well that not a few arrived at the doctrine of the Lord without the study of philosophy, driven solely by the Grace of Christ (ibid., I, 99, 1). But what he intends is a special perfection, an «intellectus fidei» that one does not have without study (ibid., 35, 2). Moreover, because of his intellectualistic disposition, he thinks that without knowledge one does not even arrive at the customs in use: the simple faithful can behave well (ibid., II, 45, 6), but neither always, nor with as much knowledge, as the gnostic (ibid., VII, 84, 1), who also knows the cause of his actions (ibid., VI, 103, 2).
The spiritual ascent of the Christian. The starting point of the Christian's spiritual ascent is Baptism. The subjective effect of this sacramental union is an inner illumination (Paed., I, 28, 1), which produces in the soul a new faculty of spiritual knowledge (θαρατύνων: ibid., 29, 4), making it capable of knowing God, that is, of having gnosis. In this sense C. says that gnosis is communicated in Baptism (ibid., 29, 3, 4). The new spiritual faculty manifests itself first in faith. C. calls it a compendious gnosis (Strom., VII, 57, 3), that is, a knowledge of the most important religious truths, first of all of the existence of God (ibid., 55, 2). But it is also a persuasion that one must live a morally righteous life (ibid., V, 86, 1; VII, 5, 1), observing God's commandments. C., however, desires the perfecting of this simple and fundamental faith, which is rather an obedience (Paed., I, 101, 1; Strom., II, 17, 3), an assent given to a superior (Strom., II, 27, 4), a cognition that the Stoics called πρόκλησις, anticipation (ibid., 8, 4; 16, 3; cf. K. Prüm, art. cit. in bibl., pp. 23-24). Its developed form is gnosis (Strom., V, 2, 4-6; 5, 2; VII, 55, 3; 95, 6). This perfecting is realized in the intellectual field through the study of the encyclopedic disciplines and of philosophy (ibid., I, 177, 3; VI, 82, 1-83, 2; 90, 4-91, 2), and through research into the person and doctrine of Christ in Sacred Scripture and in tradition (ibid., VI, 122, 1). Study turns attention away from sensible things, subject to continuous change, toward spiritual, intelligible things, which have an absolute value and an immutably true being (cf. J. Meifort, op. cit. in bibl., pp. 11-19). While exercising oneself in them one acquires the acumen of the intellect (Strom., VII, 44, 6) that will be able to penetrate the intelligible world and to rest in the contemplation τῶν νοητῶν (ibid., V, 39, 4; 40, 1; VI, 68, 1; VII, 82, 5). All this smacks strongly of Platonism. But one must not forget that, according to C., the intelligible world is God himself (ibid., IV, 155, 2; V, 73, 3), and that the spiritual ascent tending toward him is an imitation of Christ's ascension (ibid., V, 34, 7). Moreover, the person of Christ and his doctrine are the revelation of this "world." Having therefore acquired the acumen of the intellect, the gnostic will be able to attain — through research and the study of Christ's doctrine — a perfect spiritual science (ibid., VI, 68, 1-2), a contemplation of all the truths revealed in the Logos, which becomes an intellectual, evident and clear vision (ibid., VII, 13, 3) of the Logos himself, and in him a vision of God (cf. G. Békés, art. cit., pp. 50-61). Since gnosis is also a practical realization of the Lord's doctrine, the intellectual ascent is, by its very nature, accompanied by the moral ascent. The turning away from sensible things toward spiritual things brings about in the Christian's moral life the separation from vices (Strom., IV, 12, 1) and from the passions (ibid., V, 67, 1).
C. admits, in relation to the moral life, the tripartition of the soul. The intellect, the principal part, must have — by its very nature — dominion over the irascible and concupiscible parts, the seats of every passion. The intellect itself must be guided by God (Paed., III, 1, 2). In fact, in the present state of humanity, after original sin, the intellect has lost its dominion and the passions disturb the soul (Strom., VI, 136, 1-2). The principal goal of the spiritual life is therefore the re-establishment of the order willed by God (ibid., IV, 40, 2). And it is precisely the task of gnosis to re-establish it, since the spiritual knowledge of the Lord's doctrine makes spiritual ignorance, the source of every disordered passion, vanish from the soul (ibid., V, 67, 4). The asceticism of the Lord, which the Christian learns, frees his soul from the body and from its passions (ibid., IV, 27, 1; VI, 60, 1-2). In this way his body ceases to be a "caro peccati" (ibid., IV, 137, 3), and he, in his body, dead to concupiscence, lives δάσχεος (ibid., VII, 79, 3; 86, 7). This is precisely the state of ἀπάθεια, realized through gnosis (ibid., 86, 5) after the model of Christ (ibid., V, 94, 5; VI, 71, 2): a spiritual death that leads alla vita di «beneficenza», cosicché il cristiano potrà dire al Signore: vivo come tu lo vuoi (ibid., VII, 71, 3).
It is clear that for C. apátheia does not mean insensibility, but freedom from the disordered influence of the passions; otherwise it could not be the special virtue of the gnostic to do good to one's neighbor out of disinterested love (ibid., VI, 60, 2-3; IV, 29, 2; VII, 81, 3, 7).
All this ascent is realized in close union with Christ through faith, through gnosis and through charity (ibid., VII, 56, 1), in different degrees, up to the supreme one, where Christ stands, High Priest of the universe (ibid., 9, 1-4; 56, 1-57, 2). In reality it is nothing other than the development of baptismal Grace, that is, an initial and continued participation in the Logos, not by essence, but by power (ibid., VI, 138, 4; II, 5, 4), through the free cooperation of the gnostic Christian.
Gnostic perfection. The perfection of the Christian gnostic therefore consists on the one hand in perfect knowledge of the Logos, which reaches the level of a synthetic intellectual vision, and on the other in the state of apátheia joined with active love of neighbor. Now the realizing force of this perfection in the gnostic himself is gnostic charity, which makes God loved by the loving soul (ibid., VII, 57, 4). That is, while he occupies himself with God and with his own perfection in ceaseless charity (ibid., VII, 3, 1), he becomes a purely spiritual being (ibid., 44, 5), fully assimilated to the purely one God (ibid., IV, 40, 1; cf. ibid., 138, 1; VI, 74, 1; VII, 5, 5; 10, 1; 88, 4). Finally, in this state he anticipates future beatitude (ibid., V, 13, 1; VI, 73, 3-4; 76, 4; 77, 1-6; 78, 4-6); that is, he becomes a living intelligence (ibid., IV, 136, 4) which does not possess science and gnosis but is science and gnosis (ibid., 40, 1), like the angels (ἐπάγγελος: ibid., VI, 105, 1; VII, 78, 6; 84, 2), and contemplates God "face to face," that is to say, as a face seeing the face of God, the Logos. It is logical that the gnostic at this degree of spirituality is in pure conversation with God (ibid., IV, 40, 1), so that not only in the practices of piety but also in the common acts of daily life he is united with God (ibid., VI, 113, 3; VII, 80, 3). In fact, his whole life has become a prayer and a continuous conversation with God (ibid., VII, 73, 1).