Clement of Alexandria

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. - Greek ecclesiastical writer.

CONTENTS:

I. The Man

II. Works

III. Doctrine.
I. PERSON. - 1. Life. - Titus Flavius C., surnamed the Alexandrian, was born around the middle of the 2nd century. Few details of his life are found in ancient writers. Regarding his birthplace, tradition wavers between Alexandria and Athens (Epiphanius, Haer., 32, 6). Modern critics prefer Athens, referring to his Greek culture; however, strong doubts have recently been raised against this opinion (F. Quatember, Die christliche Lebenshaltung des Klemens V. Al., Vienna 1946, pp. 18-23). Of his family, only the gentile name is known, which indicates an unspecified relationship (perhaps a family of freedmen?) with the celebrated Flavian family.

It appears that C. was educated in paganism and later converted (Eusebius, Praep. evang., II, 2, 64) after an anxious search for truth, during which he encountered the various philosophical and religious currents of his time. Having become a Christian, he sought to deepen his knowledge of the Church’s doctrines. To this end, he undertook long journeys to hear the most celebrated Christian teachers (Strom., I, 12, 1); in Greece, an Ionian; in southern Italy, a Syrian and an Egyptian; in the East, another Syrian; in Palestine, a converted Jew; and finally in Egypt, the last and dearest, whom he recalls with great esteem (ibid., I, 11). According to Eusebius (Hist. eccl., VI, 6), this teacher was Pantaenus, head of the Catechetical School of Alexandria. It must be said that almost nothing is known about this catechetical school. In any case, C. intellectually developed in Alexandria and taught there, under unclear circumstances, Christian doctrine.

When persecution broke out under Septimius Severus (in 202), he took refuge in Cappadocia with one of his disciples, Bishop Alexander. In 211, he was still with him, zealously practicing his ministry. Indeed, that year the holy bishop, imprisoned, sent a letter to the Church of Antioch through the "blessed presbyter C.," who "has confirmed and expanded the Church of God" in Cappadocia (Eusebius, ibid., 11, 6). The same Alexander, later bishop of Jerusalem, in a letter to Origen, speaks of the "holy C.," his "lord and benefactor" (Eusebius, ibid., 14, 9), as a father already deceased, without mentioning the place or circumstances of his death.

2. Environment and Culture. - Beyond doctrine, the cultural environment of Alexandria exerted a decisive influence on C.’s intellectual development. At that time, Alexandria was the second city of the Roman Empire, where men of diverse nationalities met, but also a center of Hellenistic culture, a rival to Athens. Though the famous library of the Museion, with its 400,000 volumes—the largest in the world at the time—had been destroyed by the fire that broke out during Julius Caesar’s conquest of the city (in 47 B.C.), by C.’s time it had already been rebuilt and refilled with new copies; there was also the library of the Serapeion, and intellectual interest was in full vigor. The ancient city of the Ptolemies was not only a meeting place for merchants of all nations but also for philosophers, scientists, and literati of various schools and tendencies. The Museion itself, whose head was appointed by the emperor, gathered the most eminent scholars.

No document attests to a direct relationship between C. and the Museion’s scholars, from which one might speak of an influence of Greco-Hellenistic culture upon him; yet his frequenting of the great libraries cannot seriously be doubted, as evidenced by the vast number of quotations from philosophers and literati in his works (O. Stählin, in his index, records approximately 350 secular authors cited by C.). Today, it is beyond doubt that he made use of anthologies and compilations then in vogue in Alexandria, but this does not mean he was a mere compiler who uncritically copied his quotations, e.g., from Favorinus’ Pantodape Historia, as J. Gabrielsson claimed (Über die Quellen des Klemens Al., I, Uppsala 1906; II, ibid. 1909, p. 437). Alongside superficial and sometimes misunderstood quotations from philosophers and poets, entire passages attest to his vast erudition, the fruit of assiduous study. Among Greek philosophers—mentioning only the most frequently cited—besides Plato, his preferred author, he knew Heraclitus, Aristotle, Chrysippus, and Musonius; among literati: Homer, Herodotus, Hesiod, and Euripides. Nor should one overlook the fact that his audience, as glimpsed in his writings, was largely recruited from the intellectuals of his time, who, having completed an encyclopedic education, expected the Christian teacher to be abreast of the scientific questions then debated in Alexandria.

The influence of Judeo-Hellenistic culture on C.’s thought was no less important. The ancient capital of the Ptolemies had for centuries been the cultural center of Hellenized Jews. There, the Greek version of the Old Testament (Septuagint) was born, along with the allegorical method of interpreting Sacred Scripture to harmonize sacred history with Greek thought. Using the same sacred book, the Christian teacher could not avoid contact with the Jews. Indeed, C. always cites the Old Testament according to the Septuagint, never the original text (cf. O. Stählin, op. cit. in bibl.). He knew the so-called deuterocanonical books, especially Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus. He was also familiar with many Judeo-Hellenistic writers, such as the historians Demetrius, Philo the Elder, Eupolemus, Josephus, the Jewish Peripatetic philosopher Aristobulus, the tragedian Ezekiel, the Jewish Sibyl, and others. Even more important was the allegorical interpretation of Sacred Scripture. The most significant representative of this tendency was Philo, the philosopher. C. made extensive use of his writings (over 300 times), adapting to his method and applying it also to the New Testament. One example suffices to grasp C.’s Christian originality: the entry of the High Priest into the Sancta Sanctorum is interpreted by both Philo and C. as the passage of the contemplative from the sensible world to the intelligible world, but for C., this has the meaning of imitating Christ, the great high priest, who by his passion opened the way to heaven (cf. G. Békés, De continua oratione Clementis Al. doctrina, in Studia Anselmiana, 14 [1942], pp. 5-28).

To complete the picture of C.’s culture, it is necessary to mention his extraordinary knowledge of the New Testament and early Christian literature. The New Testament is cited or freely used by him approximately 2,000 times, the Old Testament approximately 1,500 times. According to A. Harnack, his knowledge of the Bible is extraordinary and personal (Die Chronologie der altchristlichen Literatur, Leipzig 1897-1904, p. 16). C. also knew the Apostolic Fathers, the Didaché, Tatian, Melito, Irenaeus, and the "traditions" concerning the Apostles, as well as apocryphal and Gnostic literature (cf. J. Ruwet, art. cit. in bibl.).

II. WORKS

Of Clement’s work, only a part remains, certainly the principal one. A list of Clement’s writings is provided by Eusebius (Hist. eccl., VI, 13; cf. the «testimonies» in vol. I of the Stählin edition).

1) The Protrepticus (Προτρεπτικὸς πρὸς Ἕλληνικα) is an invitation to the Greeks, and generally to the followers of pagan worship, to detest idolatry and convert to the true religion, that is, to Christianity.

In terms of literary form, the Protrepticus belongs to the genre of προτρεπτικοί, admonitory and hortatory sermons, which aim to persuade listeners to something noble, for example, to engage in philosophy. A famous example of this genre is found in Cicero’s Hortensius, which decisively spurred St. Augustine toward the first step of his conversion (Conf., III, 4). It seems that Clement was acquainted with Aristotle’s (lost) Protreptikos (cf. G. Lazzati, L'Aristotele perduto, Milan 1938, p. 9 ff.).

Regarding content, the author, following Jewish and Christian apologists, employs arguments drawn from popular historical philosophy against polytheistic religion, against myths, and superstitious cults. In contrast to the stupidity and immorality of paganism, he demonstrates the divine wisdom, spiritual richness, and transcendent purity of the doctrine of the incarnate Logos: in this doctrine, all the noble desires of man concerning the knowledge of truth and the eternal salvation of the soul are realized. It remains for man, therefore — this is the thought with which Clement concludes the Protrepticus — to choose between judgment and Grace, between perdition and life (Protr., 123, 2).

2) The three books of the Paedagogus (Παιδαγωγός) are a direct continuation of the Protrepticus, addressed to those who, heeding the exhortation, have converted to Christianity. The Divine Pedagogue, Christ Himself, sets forth in them the norms of a truly Christian life.

In Book I, general questions concerning the nature and method of the Divine Pedagogue are treated. Among the ancients, the pedagogue was distinguished from the schoolmaster: his task did not consist in imparting intellectual instruction but in forming the character of the child through moral education. Precisely this is the task of the Divine Pedagogue toward the newly converted: He heals their souls from passions, preparing them for the teaching of the Master (Paed., I, 1, 4). All who have been freed from sin and reborn in Baptism to a new life are children to be educated by the Divine Pedagogue: this, however, does not mean that they are in a lower degree of the Christian life, to which the gnostic life could be opposed, as heterodox Gnosticism would have it (ibid., 25, 1). The Divine Pedagogue is full of goodness, but He also employs justice when necessary: the two do not exclude each other (ibid., 62, 1-4). Even chastisement is a means of education in His hands (ibid., 75, 1).

Practical instruction is expounded in Books II and III, which are true treatises on Christian morality. Clement explains in detail how the true Christian should conduct himself at the baths, at banquets, in conversations, regarding furnishings, clothing, ornaments, married life, etc. Underlying these admonitions is the problem of a Christian living amid a wealthy pagan metropolis, where all forms of dissoluteness were at home. Clement does not preach an ascetic ideal: not total renunciation, but honesty of conduct and wise moderation in the enjoyments of this life.

His doctrine is based on the moral precepts of the Old Testament, often interpreted allegorically, on the Sapiential books, and especially on Ecclesiastes. From the New Testament, he utilizes the doctrines of the parenetic sections of St. Paul’s letters and various passages from the Gospel. But Clement’s characteristic stance is most evident in his extensive use of Greek ethics. Various prescriptions are established by him with reference especially to Plato’s Republic and Laws and to Plutarch’s moral writings: however, the fundamental conception of the principal problems of morality is due to Stoic ethics (cf. J. Stelzenberger, op. cit. in bibl.). His dependence on Musonius Rufus is evident: there are entire passages of the Paedagogus parallel to the extracts of his doctrine preserved by Stobaeus (cf. O. Hense, C. Musonii Rufi reliquiae, Leipzig 1905). It should not be forgotten, however, that those Stoic doctrines are always amalgamated, modified, and perfected with Christian doctrines.

At the conclusion of the Paedagogus, in the manuscripts, there is a beautiful hymn to Christ the Savior, who is the Logos of God and the Good Shepherd of men. Since its ideas correspond perfectly to those of the Paedagogus, its authenticity is no longer doubted today.

3) The Stromata (Τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν γνωστικῶν ὑπομνημάτων ἀτροματεῖς) consist of eight books. The title means tapestries, woven fabrics, but perhaps in Clement’s time it had the meaning of ἀτροματεῖς, a container of coverings. Thus, metaphorically, the title would indicate a collection of various things without systematic order, a miscellany (cf. J. A. Hort-J. B. Mayor, Clement of Al. Miscellanies Book VII, London 1902, Introduction). Clement was not the only one to give this title to his work; in profane literature, too, authors who wrote books under this title are encountered (e.g., Plutarch and L. Caecilius Vindex). Clement himself, to express the character of his work, compares his title with others similar, such as Meadow, Peplos, Helicon, Beehive, etc. (Strom., VI, 2, 1).

Despite this fragmentary character, there is a certain plan, or more precisely, a concatenation of ideas in the Stromata (cf. E. de Faye, op. cit. in bibl., p. 90). First, two main themes can be distinguished: one, the relation of Christianity to profane culture, especially Greek philosophy; the other, the explanation of true gnosis and its fundamental principles, in continuous discussion with heterodox gnosis. The first theme is explicitly treated in Book I of the Stromata, but it also appears occasionally in other books. In opposition to the attitude of the Christians of his time, Clement manifests a positive appreciation of profane culture, though he still maintains the thesis of the Jewish apologists concerning the famous «theft» of the philosophers.

The second theme permeates the work from Book II onward. In Book II, faith and the Christian virtues that lead to perfection, that is, to likeness to God, are treated; in Book III, polemics against heterodox gnosis and other heretical opinions are found. In Book IV, the ideal of the perfect Christian — Clement’s gnostic — is presented as a living martyr. In Books V and VI, religious knowledge and true gnosis are treated; finally, in Book VII, a beautiful portrait of the gnostic is given: the ideal of the religious man.

In accordance with the character of the literary genre, these themes do not unfold systematically. Quotations from Sacred Scripture or profane literature allow Clement to make digressions, more or less lengthy and often without direct connection to the main theme.

Book VIII, as it stands today, cannot be considered the continuation of the seventh and the conclusion of the work. Rather, it is a collection of notes, most of which have already been used in the preceding books. The same applies to the two pieces appended to the Stromata: Excerpta ex Theodoto and Eclogae propheticae.

A. HAMMAN.

The three aforementioned writings of Clement were considered as three parts of a trilogy until de Faye, who, with his critique of this thesis, sparked a discussion that continues to this day. Given that « the starting point for any literary research on Clement’s works is the plan of the trilogy preserved in the Pedagogue, I. I » (J. Munck, op. cit. in bibl., p. 25), it will be appropriate to address the question. Clement distinguishes a threefold activity of the Logos: exhorting to conversion, educating the convert to salvation, and instructing the educated in gnosis. At the end of chapter 3, he summarizes these three tasks with the three expressions: προτρέπων, παιδαγωγῶν, ἐκδιδάσκων (Paed., I, 3, 3).

The first and second activities were undoubtedly explained in the Protrepticus and the Pedagogue. The question of the trilogy, however, concerns the third part, whose title would have been, according to critics: the Teacher (Διδάσκος). The question thus arises whether the Stromata can be considered the realization of the projected Teacher, or whether, for some unknown reason, Clement instead abandoned the realization of his plan.

De Faye was the first to critique the traditional conception. He regards the Stromata as a « hors d'oeuvre »: neither the title nor the content corresponds to that of the projected book. The Stromata owe their origin to Clement’s concern, who, before writing the Teacher, wished to clarify the role of philosophy in matters of faith, given that, due to the abuses of heterodox gnosis, a general distrust of all profane wisdom had arisen among the faithful. His hypothesis

was first criticized by C. Heussi (Die Strom. des Klemens Al. und ihr Verhältnis zum Protrep. und Paed., in Zeitschr. für Wiss. Theologie, 45 [1902], pp. 465-512). He holds the opinion that the first four books of the Stromata were composed before the Protrepticus and the Pedagogue. Having completed book IV, Clement would have decided to compose the Protrepticus and the Pedagogue, then continued the Stromata, treating the material of the Teacher. Tradition would thus be correct: with some modification, we would have in the Stromata the third part of the trilogy. J. Munck, revisiting the problem, does not admit the precedence of the first books of the Stromata and maintains the traditional chronological order. He agrees with de Faye in not seeing the Stromata as the third part of the trilogy; instead, he believes that Clement abandoned, for unknown reasons, the execution of his original plan. Lazzati joins him in rejecting any relation of the Stromata to the Protrepticus and the Pedagogue.

A new position on the problem emerges from the work of F. Quatember (op. cit.). He simply denies that Clement intended to write a trilogy. His principle is that from chapter 1 of the Pedagogue, one cannot draw the conclusion that scholars generally draw about Clement’s intention. There, the economy of salvation is always discussed, which is realized by the divine Logos in three successive stages: for the conversion of the soul from the world, for its purification and preparation for gnosis, for instruction in gnosis, up to perfection. The three stages indicate the plan of the Logos himself, not that of Clement. Certainly, having treated the first two stages in two books, one is led to conclude that the third book should have treated the third stage, or at least that this would have been Clement’s original project. But such a conclusion comes only from a syllogism of modern scholars. Clement himself rather demonstrates a concern to conceal the holy mysteries of the faith (cf. Strom., I, 14, 3; 18, 1; 20, 4; 21, 2).

Quatember’s opinion may contribute greatly to clarifying the problem. Perhaps the traditional opinion has some merit: Clement described the economy of salvation, concealing the third stage, instruction in gnosis, in the Stromata.

4) The short work Quis dives salvetur?, the only one entirely preserved besides the three mentioned above, is a so-called homily on Mk. 10:17-31. In the first part, it argues against an overly literal interpretation of evangelical poverty, as if wealth itself excluded the possession of salvation. The Lord rather invites us to purify the heart from the disordered love of wealth: to spiritual poverty. In the second part, it asserts that the practices of Christian charity with sincere repentance of sins can lead even the rich into heaven. Finally, as an example of true penitence, it recounts the well-known story of the young man beloved by St. John, who became a brigand but was ultimately converted by the Apostle.

5) Lost Works. — Among Clement’s lost writings, the most important was a collection of notes on Holy Scripture in eight books, entitled Hypotyposes ('Ὑποτυπώσεις, outlines). The fragments preserved by Eusebius and in the Commentaries of Ecumenius, as well as the Latin version of a considerable part of them (the apostolic letters: I Pt., I and II Io., and that of St. Jude), are printed in vol. III of Stählin’s edition. Besides the books of Holy Scripture, the work also included the Letter of Barnabas and the Apocalypse of Peter. Photius states that he found in these notes several errors, such as the eternity of matter, the conception of the Son as a creature, a docetic conception of the Incarnation, metempsychosis, and the existence of several worlds before Adam. However, the value of this attestation is highly contestable.

Other lost writings include: Περὶ τὸ πάσχα, on the question of Pascha; Κανὼν ἐκκλησιαστικὸς, on the ecclesiastical canon (cf. Unnik, in Nederl. Archief vor Kerkgeschiedenis, 1941, p. 49 ff.); Περὶ προνόξας, on providence (not mentioned by Eusebius); Προτρεπτικὸς εἰς ἀπομονὴν, an exhortation to patience addressed to neophytes; and numerous letters. Fragments of these writings remain, collected in vol. III of Stählin; nothing remains of a sermon on fasting or another work on the prophet Amos.

Regarding manuscripts and the textual tradition, everything can be found in vol. I of O. Stählin. There, the various editions of Clement’s works are also recorded. Here, only the most recent bilingual editions (Greek-Italian) of the Protrepticus (edited by Q. Cataudella [*Corona Patrum Sales], Greek series, 2), Turin 1937) and the Pedagogue (edited by A. Boatti [ibid., 3), ibid. 1940) are mentioned; the bilingual edition (Greek-English) of the Protrepticus, Quis dives salvetur?, and the fragment of the Exhortation to Patience in one volume, edited by G. W. Butterworth (The Loeb Classical Library), London 1919; the bilingual edition (Greek-English) of the Excerpta ex Theodoto by R. P. Casey, London 1934. Among recent translations, the French version of the Protrepticus by C. Mondésert (Sources chrétiennes, 2), Paris 1942, is noteworthy; a florilegium translated and commented in French by G. Bardy, Clément d'Al. Les chrétiens, ibid. 1926; and the German translation of Clement’s principal writings by O. Stählin (Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*, 2nd series, Munich 1934-38).

A. CAMPIANI.

III. DOCTRINE

1. General Attitude: The Relationship with Philosophy and Gnosis. — Before outlining the principal points of Clement’s doctrine, it is necessary to consider his relationship with philosophy and gnosis, which undoubtedly left an imprint on his thought.

In the judgment of F. Overbeck (Über die Anfänge der patrist. Literatur, in Hist. Zeitschrift, 48 [1882], p. 467), Clement’s work in relation to philosophy may be called « the most audacious literary enterprise in the history of the Church ». For Clement’s attitude in this regard was contrary to that of the majority of Christians of his time. The development toward a positive appreciation of philosophy had been strongly hindered, for a certain period, by heterodox Gnosticism, which, with its syncretistic tendency, attempted to introduce foreign elements—drawn from philosophical speculation and pagan myths—into the doctrine of Revelation. The struggle against this danger, which threatened the Church in its very existence, was fiercest, and, at the end of the 2nd century, when the Church emerged victorious, it resulted in a general distrust among the faithful toward every kind of human wisdom. « They fear philosophy — Clement notes — as children fear spirits » (Strom., VI, 80, 5; 89, 1; 93, 1).

His opinion, however, is that without intellectual education, no development of faith can be expected, just as one cannot harvest grapes without tending the vine (ibid., I, 43, 1). Study, therefore, is very useful. To justify this opinion, Clement first offers a new positive appreciation of Greek philosophy. It is true: the theory of the Jewish apologists concerning the theft by philosophers—that Greek philosophers had taken fragments of truth from the « barbarian philosophy » (Sacred Scripture)—is still present in him (ibid., I, 81, 1; 87, 2; 100, 4; 135, 2; II, 1, 1; V, 140), but the other idea prevails, namely, that philosophy is a gift of God: just as the Law was given to the Jews, so God bestowed philosophy upon the Greeks. It was granted to them almost as a Testament (ibid., VI, 67, 1), preparing them intellectually and morally for the « most royal way of doctrine » of Christ (ibid., I, 80, 6).

But Clement does not stop here. He believes that the task of philosophy did not cease with the coming of Christ. Its preparatory significance remains unchanged: the study of philosophy prepares the Christian for the intellectual penetration and moral realization of his faith, that is, for true gnosis (ibid., I, 28, 1; 30, 1; 99, 1; VII, 20, 2). This positive attitude toward philosophy, and generally toward profane culture, certainly seemed audacious in Clement’s time, but, with his enlightened and balanced wisdom, it ultimately prevailed in the Church.

Even more audacious appears Clement’s endeavor to present the comprehension and realization of Christian doctrine under the title of gnosis. It must be remembered that Alexandria was one of the centers of heterodox Gnosticism: there Basilides and Valentinus taught, making numerous proselytes among the faithful. The very word gnosis was enough to arouse grave suspicions regarding the orthodoxy of a Christian writer.

Clement’s attitude should not surprise: on the one hand, standing on the historical ground of the apostolic tradition of the Church, he had to reject the fantastic speculations and diluted spiritualism of the Gnostics; on the other, he had to provide a positive response to the spiritual demands from which Gnosticism arose. As for the first task, Clement admits no distinction (against Marcion) between the Creator God (inferior) and the Father of Jesus: between the just God, who punishes, and the good God, who through His providence benefits (Paed., I, 8) mankind; he teaches creation by God the Father, despite the presence of evil in the world (various chapters of Book III of the Stromata [cf. Strom., IV, 46, 5]); he rejects the essential distinction between the spiritual and the simple faithful based on personal responsibility (Strom., II, 10-11); he excludes the strange coupling, connected with that distinction, of an unreal asceticism with moral dissoluteness (cf. the whole of Book III of the Stromata). As for the second task, Clement opposes those Christians who, with heterodox gnosis, rejected every tendency toward a deeper knowledge of divine truth, every development and perfection of faith. He indeed wishes to guide his disciples, through intellectual and ascetic education, from simple faith to true gnosis, and finally to the vision of God.

2. God

a) Natural Knowledge. In all men a certain divine effluence has been instilled (Protr., 68, 2), which is nothing other than the rational soul, breathed upon man’s face on the day of creation (Strom., V, 94, 3). Through it, all are capable of recognizing the existence of one God, eternal (Protr., 68, 2), omnipotent (Strom., V, 87, 2). This applies above all to philosophers, who, through a certain reflection and transparency of creation, have indeed succeeded in knowing the Creator (Strom., I, 94, 1-7; V, 87, 2). The reason for this knowledge is, on the one hand, that in the wise constitution and harmonious order of the universe, the divine rationality—the Logos—is manifested; on the other, that man was created by the Logos in His likeness, as logikos (Protr., 98, 4; Strom., V, 6, 2-3). Revelation teaches the possibility of knowing the existence of God from the created world (Rom., 1, 20), but in explaining this doctrine, Clement is under the influence of the Stoa: indeed, the Stoics presented the universe as permeated by a divine rationality knowable to all rational beings. The essential difference, however, lies in his concept of God.

b) Nature of God. In opposition to Stoic immanentism (God identified with the vital force of the universe), Clement speaks of a God absolutely transcendent (Strom., II, 6, 1); moreover, above all names, all thoughts, all ideas (ibid., V, 65, 2), simply invisible, incomprehensible to the human mind, and, consequently, ineffable, inexpressible with human concepts and words (ibid., V, 78, 3; 81, 5; 82, 2).

Our ideas of Him are formless (ibid., II, 6, 1). He encompasses the entire universe within Himself, yet He Himself remains inaccessible and infinite (ibid., V, 81, 3); He is one, yet also beyond unity: ἐν δὲ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν μονάδα (Paed., I, 71, 1).

When speaking of God, Clement generally means the first Person of the Most Holy Trinity, that is, the Father. This does not imply a denial of the divinity of the Son or the Holy Spirit, nor even an indirect affirmation of a secondary or tertiary divinity in the Arian sense, but simply reflects that aspect of the Most Holy Trinity—as with the Greek Fathers—whereby the individual Persons are considered directly, following the economy of Revelation, while their consubstantiality is considered only consequently (cf. Th. de Régnon, Etudes de théol. posit. sur la S.te Trinité, I, Paris 1898, p. 252). This fact is clearly evident in his doctrine on the Logos.

c) The Logos: true God, essential revelation of the Father. The principal text on this point is found in chapter 5 of book VII of the Stromata, which treats the excellence of the Son. There, expressions undoubtedly bearing a subordinationist flavor are present. Although the Son is presented as a most perfect being, above every creature, true Lord of the universe, nevertheless his nature is said to be very close to the Almighty (Strom., VII, 5, 3). This expression may seem, not without reason, quite deficient if measured by modern terminology, but from the context one may easily be persuaded of C.’s orthodoxy. In fact, the activity of the Logos is described there: he is the excellent governor of the universe because, contemplating uninterruptedly the arcane ideas of God, he realizes his will in all things (ibid., 5, 4). Therefore, the Logos never separates from the Father and, nevertheless, at the same time, is present everywhere, being “all intellect (νοῦς), all paternal light, all eye: he sees all, hears all, knows all” (ibid., 5, 5).

The origin of the Logos is considered by C. as a spiritual generation, that is, as an intellectual emanation (ibid., IV, 162, 5), since God by his spiritual nature is νοῦς, pure intellect. The Son, therefore, is a perfect being from the perfect Father (Paed., I, 25, 3), image of God (Protr., 98, 4) formed in eternity (Strom., V, 38, 7; VI, 138, 1; VII, 7, 2); he is also pure intellect, that is, the idea of the divine intellect (ibid., V, 16, 3) emanated in the identity of the divine nature.

Other expressions also confirm this thesis: God and the Logos are: ἐν ἄμερ, ὁ θεός (Paed., I, 62, 4); the Father is in him and he in the Father (ibid., 24, 3; 53, 1); he is the “truly most manifest God, compared to the master of the universe” (Protr., 110, 1; cf. P. B. Pade, op. cit. in bibl., pp. 148-71).

Having thus established the true divine nature of the Logos, one may consider his characteristic and essential task, that is, to be the essential revelation of the Father. This idea is already contained in the doctrine of the emanation of the Logos and in his various names, such as truth (Strom., I, 32, 4), image of God (ibid., V, 38, 7), face of God (Paed., I, 57, 2; Strom., V, 34, 1); but it is directly expressed by C. when he says that the Father is not the object of our knowledge, while the Son, as wisdom, knowledge, and truth, is directly the object of our understanding (ibid., IV, 156, 1). C. certainly does not think of the incarnate Logos, but of his divine nature. How, then, can one say, without falling into subordinationism, that the Father is not directly knowable but only in the Logos? One might conclude that the Logos is a being inferior to him.

The explanation of this difficulty lies in the Clementine concept of God in his relation to the world. This concept results from the fusion, already made by Philo, of Platonic ideas with Stoic forces. The Platonic ideas are the ideal and transcendental forms of the things of this world; the Stoic δυνάμεις, on the other hand, are the immanent and vital forces of the material world. Philo conceived his ideas at the same time as active causes, forces operating in this world, and conversely the forces as ideas. The transcendental point of encounter of the ideas is God (cf. E. Bréhier, Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Al., 2ᵃ ed., Parigi 1925, p. 157).

C. conceives God as Philo does; God is for him pure intellect, the “place of ideas” (γῶσι Ἰδεῖον: Strom., IV, 155, 2; V, 73, 3) of Plato, in which the ideas of all things preexist, so that in this sense he may say that God is all (Paed., I, 88, 1). But since God is omnipotent, these ideas are also δυνάμεις, that is, active forces, efficient causes, which realize every being in the world (ibid., 74, 1).

Now the Logos, proceeding from the paternal intellect as his perfect image, is, on the one hand, that infinite world of ideas (intellect of the Father) in an expressed idea (Strom., V, 16, 3), and on the other hand, he too is omnipotent (Paed., III, 39, 4; Strom., V, 6, 3; 103, 1), that is, “the second cause of all beings, generated from the first” (Strom., VI, 78, 5), or rather the δυνάμεις of the Father (ibid., V, 6, 3; VII, 9, 1) par excellence, who contains in himself all the active δυνάμεις of the universe (ibid., IV, 156, 1-2). In this sense, C. defines him as πάντα-ἐν: a single perfect idea and δυνάμεις of the Father, comprising in himself all the ideal forms of created beings and all the active forces realizing the life of these beings, and, in general, the origin and existence of the entire universe.

Thus, God expresses his infinite fullness of ideas and forces in his consubstantial Logos, making him thereby his essential revelation.

d) The Holy Spirit: true God, divine force. In chapter 14 of book V of the Stromata, explaining a text of Plato, C. understands it as a reference to the Most Holy Trinity, in which, after the Father, the second is the Son, the third the Holy Spirit (cf. V, 103, 1). He is furthermore glorified with the Father and the Son (Paed., III, 101, 2; Quis dives?, 42, 20), and—like them—is one and at the same time omnipresent (Paed., I, 42, 1). He is the light of truth, that is, of the Logos, which, divided without division, illumines the faithful (Strom., VI, 138, 1-2) and pours forth into souls according to their capacity, being in himself without limitation (ibid., 120, 2). He is the δυνάμεις of the Logos, which penetrates the entire universe and, like the attractive force of the magnet on pieces of iron, draws men to God according to their capacity and free spiritual correspondence (ibid., VII, 9, 4); he is the δυνάμεις τοῦ θεοῦ, which is given by Christ (ibid., VII, 79, 4), or rather Ἰησοῦς of the Logos, which penetrates the Christian soul, transforming it into a wholly spiritual being (ibid., V, 80, 9; cf. VI, 118, 1).

The person of the Holy Spirit thus completed C.’s conception of the Most Holy Trinity: the Father is the source of divinity who, in his absolute transcendence, is not knowable except through his Son, the Logos, his genuine expression and essential revelation; the Logos, in turn, as creator and governor of the universe, manifests himself with his providence in material and spiritual life, which is realized through the Holy Spirit. “O mysterious wonder—exclaims C.—one is the Father of all, one also the Logos of all, the Holy Spirit too is one and the same everywhere...” (Paed., I, 42, 1).

3. The Universe

a) Creation. The universe proclaims the great power of God (Protr., 63, 23). God created all things through the Logos: exemplar idea and realizing force of the universe (ibid., 98, 3-4; Strom., VI, 58, 1; 78, 5). C.’s conception of creation—with some reminiscences of Plato and Philo—is, on the whole, not erroneous. He admits neither the eternity of spirit nor the eternity of matter (Strom., V, 94, 3). C. thinks he can find in Plato the idea of creation from nothing (ibid., V, 92, 3). He also wishes to discover in Sacred Scripture the Platonic doctrine of the intelligible and sensible world (κόσμος νοητός, κόσμος αἰσθητός), but identifies the intelligible world with God or rather with the Logos (ibid., V, 93, 4; cf. ibid., IV, 155, 2; V, 73, 3). Creation is a spiritual act of God: “By the simple act of willing he creates, and at the sole expression of his will follows immediately its realization” (Protr., 63, 3). The material world, and consequently the generation of man, are not essentially vitiated things, as heterodox Gnosticism would have it (Strom., III, 12, 1-2). C. energetically rejects metaphysical dualism with its lascivious consequences in morals and celebrates the sanctity of Christian marriage (ibid., III, 105-10).

BIBL.:
P. B. Pade, La dottrina del Logos in Clemente Alessandrino, Roma 1938; E. de Faye, Clement d'Alexandrie, Parigi 1906; W. Völker, Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus, Berlino 1952; M. Pohlenz, Klemens von Alexandrien und sein hellenisches Christentum, Gottinga 1943; J. Munck, Untersuchungen über Klemens von Alexandrien, Copenaghen 1933; G. Bardy, Clement d'Alexandrie, Parigi 1926; H. Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition, Oxford 1966.

A. ORBE

b) Gli angeli. Tra le creature di Dio l'essere più eccellente è l'angelo, il quale essendo ancora più puro del più puro tra gli uomini (cioè dello gnostico cristiano, il quale viene chiamato ἰσάγγελος) partecipa più da vicino alla vita eterna nel cielo (Strom., VII, 5, 2). Anche gli angeli pregano per ottenere la Grazia divina, ma differentemente dagli uomini (ibid., VII, 39, 3). La caduta di una parte degli angeli è dovuta alla concupiscenza (Paed., III, 14, 2; Strom., III, 59, 2). L'esercito degli angeli è soggetto al Logos (Strom., VII, 5, 6): essi sono i suoi ministri nell'esercizio della sua provvidenza nel governo delle nazioni, delle città, come anche dei singoli (ibid., VI, 157, 3-5; VII, 6, 4). Gli angeli sono anche ministri nella punizione degli scellerati (ibid., V, 90, 6). C. pensa che la filosofia è stata comunicata dagli angeli (inferiori) ai Greci (ibid., VII, 6, 4).

c) L'uomo. L'uomo è, sulla terra, la più bella di tutte le creature di Dio (Paed., I, 63, 1), formata personalmente da lui (ibid., 7, 1). E composto di anima e di corpo (Strom., IV, 9, 4): il corpo è stato formato dalla terra, mentre l'anima ragionevole è stata insufflata sul volto da Dio (ibid., V, 94, 3). C. rigetta l'opinione di Basilide, secondo cui l'anima sarebbe una cosa estramondana (ibid., IV, 165, 4). Non ammette quindi la preesistenza dell'anima, ma solo una preesistenza ideale dell'uomo stesso nella mente divina, secondo la quale viene formato da Dio (ibid., IV, 150, 2). Il corpo non è una parte dell'anima, ma piuttosto il suo organo: cioè sua sede e suo veicolo (ibid., IV, 163, 2). Essendo composto di anima e di corpo, l'uomo ha una parte razionale e una parte irrazionale (τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ ἄλογον: ibid., IV, 9, 4). La parte razionale, l'anima ragionevole, è chiamata generalmente la parte principale dell'uomo (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), o semplicemente l'intelletto, νοῦς, l'uomo interno, il vero uomo (Protr., 98, 4). Essa è stata creata « a immagine di Dio e a sua somiglianza » cioè a immagine del Logos, perciò λογικός (ibid.; cf. Strom., V, 94, 5). L'anima ragionevole vivifica il corpo e diventa il principio della sua costituzione animale (ibid., VI, 135, 2 e 4). Il suo effetto è quindi il cosiddetto spirito vitale (ibid., 134, 2; 136, 1-2). Due caratteristiche manifestazioni dello spirito vitale, che hanno un rapporto con la vita morale dell'uomo, sono l'irascibilità e la concupiscenza (τὸ θυμικόν, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν). C. accetta il tricotomismo platonico (Paed., III, 1, 2), trovando espresse nell'ira e nella concupiscenza tutte le passioni animali dell'uomo, le quali dovrebbero stare sotto il principato dell'ἡγεμονικόν (Strom., VI, 136, 1). Nell'attuale stato dell'umanità

invece l'anima tripartita, ἡ τριμερὴς ψυχή, ha bisogno di un nuovo principio spirituale, della forza del Logos, per raggiungere lo stato ideale dell'unità spirituale (ibid., V, 80, 9); ma questa questione appartiene già all'economia della salute.

d) La Provvidenza. La Provvidenza, πρόνοια, è una cosa tanto evidente per C., che i negatori di essa non sono ritenuti da lui degni di discussione, ma piuttosto di castigo (Strom., VI, 122, 3; V, 6, 2). Essa consegue direttamente dal concetto della bontà di Dio, il quale vuol far del bene agli uomini e si prende cura di loro (Paed., I, 8). Si vede subito da questo che il concetto clementino della Provvidenza non ha niente in comune con il fatalismo stoico: è una concezione autenticamente cristiana. La radice della Provvidenza è la scienza universalissima di Dio, che si estende a tutte le cose, a tutti i tempi, a tutto lo spazio, e penetra non soltanto fino nelle cose singole, ma anche nell'interno dell'anima (Strom., VI, 156, 57). Per mezzo di questa scienza — usando il ministero degli angeli — Dio, o piuttosto il Logos (ibid., VII, 5, 6; 8, 4), esercita la sua Provvidenza.

La divina pedagogia della Provvidenza appare specialmente nella filosofia greca (ibid., VI, 67, 1; 153, 1) e nella « filosofia barbara », cioè nella S. Scrittura, per mezzo delle quali il genere umano è guidato dalla divina Saggezza alla fede del Vangelo e alla salute (ibid., VII, 11, 1-3). La differenza però tra le due « filosofie » è assai grande: la filosofia è stata data ai Greci per mezzo degli angeli inferiori (ibid., VII, 6, 4), la Legge, invece, per mezzo del Logos stesso, non ancora incarnato ma apparso come un angelo (Paed., I, 7). Difatti il Vecchio Testamento è strettamente connesso al Nuovo, con cui non forma che un unico ordine divino della salute, essendo ambedue opera dello stesso Signore, forza e saggezza di Dio (Strom., I, 174, 3; II, 29, 2).

4. L'economia della salute

a) Cristo. Nella dottrina clementina di Cristo Salvatore si possono distinguere tre aspetti: egli è il rivelatore di Dio, il redentore dal peccato, il rigeneratore e pedagogo degli uomini all'immortalità.

Rivelatore di Dio. Dio, come si è veduto, nella sua essenza non è conoscibile dall'uomo, benché rivelatosi, per mezzo del Logos, nel creare l'universo. La ragione è che nel mondo creato le singole perfezioni (idee-forze) del Logos appaiono disgiunte e disperse, e perciò non lo rappresentano sufficientemente per la conoscenza umana (Strom., IV, 156, 1). Queste condizioni si sono cambiate per l'Incarnazione. Prima dell'Incarnazione il divin Logos non aveva un nome personale tra gli uomini (Paed., I, 57, 2). Ma Dio dimostrò la sua carità verso l'umanità inviando il Figlio quale λόγος τῆς πίστεως, cioè come sua parola personale, come dottrina della fede (ibid., 8, 2; cf. anche 22, 3-23, 1; Strom., V, 81, 3). Egli, con la sua Incarnazione, divenne faccia del Padre, cioè il rivelatore in persona della natura propria di Dio (Strom., V, 34, 1; cf. VII, 58, 3); in esso e per esso Iddio si fa vedere e conoscere (Paed., I, 57, 2). Solo Cristo è, quindi, ambedue le cose: Dio e uomo (Protr., 7, 1) egli è Dio nell'uomo, semplicemente: Dio-uomo (ὁ ἄνθρωπος Θεός: Paed., III, 2, 1). Ora la sua divinità non toglie la realtà della sua umanità, la verità della sua carne sensibile. Contro l'opinione di Fazio, non ci può essere dubbio, nemmeno in questo punto, sull'ortodossia di C. Egli asserisce in tutte e tre le sue opere la realtà dell'Incarnazione: il piccolo corpo infantile e sensibile del Logos, venne generato dalla Madre-Vergine (Strom., VI, 127, 1; cf. anche Protr., 7, 1; Paed., I, 41, 3; III, 2, 2; Strom., III, 102, 1). Assunse quindi un corpo con i cinque sensi (Strom., V, 34, 1).

La difficoltà proviene principalmente da un testo apparentemente docetista che parla dell'apátheia del Signore con qualche esagerazione (Strom., VI, 71, 2). Ma l'apátheia non è una negazione della realtà del corpo, altrimenti non sarebbe possibile proporla, nello stesso testo, come perfezione ideale dello gnostico cristiano.

Redentore dal peccato. Oltre la rivelazione di Dio, l'Incarnazione aveva anche lo scopo di liberare l'umanità dal peccato e dalle sue conseguenze, e di riconciliare i figli infedeli con il loro Padre celeste (Protr., 6, 1). Questo avvenne per mezzo della morte redentrice del Signore, che viene espressa da C. con il termine scritturistico: λύτρον, riscatto (Mt. 20, 28; Mc. 10, 45), o con termini equivalenti (Paed., I, 85, 1-2; Strom., IV, 43, 2; Quis dives?, 23, 4; 33, 6; 37, 3-4). Quel riscatto che il Signore diede per la redenzione dell'umanità, è in concreto il suo sangue prezioso (Paed., II, 19, 4; III, 85, 1; Strom., IV, 107, 8). Infatti Cristo è un sacrificio di singolare valore, un olocausto per noi (Strom., V, 66, 5; 70, 4).

Rigeneratore ed educatore dell'immortalità. Cristo ha sofferto per noi, affinché noi, per la sua Passione, possiamo vivere (Strom., IV, 43, 2). Per la sua Passione dunque rigenera quelli che credono in lui: «egli stesso diede alla luce con doglie del corpo, egli stesso fasciò con sangue prezioso» (Paed., I, 42, 2) le nuove generazioni. Tutto questo avviene in una stretta unione con Cristo. L'unione si realizza nella parentela con Cristo, avvenuta per la forza rigenerativa del suo sangue; nella conformità coi suoi sentimenti, συμπάθεια, che viene realizzata attraverso la sua parola come nutrimento spirituale, cioè dottrina e Sacramento eucaristico (ibid., 42, 1-43, 4; II, 20, 1); finalmente nell'immortalità, ἀφθαρσία (incorruzione), alla quale guida i suoi fedeli (ibid., I, 49, 4), poiché egli possiede Ἰάφθαρσία e Ἰαθανασία, avendo liberata la propria carne dalla morte (ibid., III, 2, 2-3) ed essendo entrato nei cieli (Strom., V, 34, 7).

b) La Chiesa. C. vede nella Chiesa il mezzo provvidenziale per realizzare l'opera di Cristo, la salvezza degli uomini: «Come il volere di Dio è atto, e questo si chiama mondo, così il suo proposito è salvezza degli uomini, e questa si chiama Chiesa» (Paed., I, 27, 2). Essa è una come uno è il Padre, uno il Figlio e lo Spirito Santo (ibid., 42, 1). C. la chiama Madre-Vergine per la sua purezza verginale e per la sua amabilità materna (ibid.). Il suo compito è l'allevamento dei fedeli con nutrimento spirituale, cioè Logos, il quale è dottrina divina e Sacramento eucaristico in una persona (ibid., 42, 2-43, 4; II, 20, 1), o piuttosto essa stessa è un istituto, dove il Logos alleva i suoi fedeli alla salvezza (ibid., III, 101, 3).

Altri aspetti presentano la Chiesa come la Gerusalemme celeste, governata dal Logos, il quale è la sua legge, così che in essa si realizza la volontà divina sulla terra, come nei cieli (Strom., IV, 172, 2; cf. Paed., I, 84, 3). Essa è un sacro tempio, costruito dalla volontà divina con grandi spese, vale a dire con il sangue di Gesù, all'onore di Dio; non è un luogo però, ma la comunità stessa dei fedeli (Strom., VII, 29, 3-4).

Negli ultimi capitoli (15-18) del I. VII degli Stromata, C. parla della Chiesa, come conservatrice e maestra della fede ortodossa. È vero: la fonte della fede è la S. Scrittura, la quale — come Maria — è una Madre Vergine: madre, perché genera la verità, e vergine, perché nasconde il suo mistero (Strom., VII, 94, 1). Ma chi non osserva la regola della verità, κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας ο κανὼν ἐκκλησιαστικὸς, cioè la tradizione della Chiesa, non è fedele al Signore e diventa eretico (ibid., 95, 1; 90, 2). La vera gnosi, cioè la conoscenza della verità, si trova «nella Chiesa primitiva» (ibid., 92, 3). Il vero gnostico — secondo C. — è un fedele interprete della S. Scrittura, perché osserva l'ortodossia apostolica ed ecclesiastica (ibid., 104, 1-2), cioè il deposito divino, secondo la dot-

trina del Signore, trasmesso per mezzo degli Apostoli (ibid., VI, 124, 1-6).

c) Il cristiano. La finalità del cristianesimo è la vita eterna (Strom., II, 134, 3) che si raggiunge per Cristo Salvatore nella Chiesa. Parlando però del fine (τέλος) del cristianesimo, C. non l'intende generalmente come una meta o uno scopo esteriore, ma piuttosto come la perfezione stessa, alla quale l'uomo partecipa quanto più vi si avvicina; come una pienezza di vita che lo completa nell'intimo suo essere. In questo senso distingue — seguendo Platone — tra il τέλος μεθεκτῶν, o fine partecipabile, e il τέλος μετέχων o fine partecipato. Il primo è Dio stesso, il secondo è la perfezione che si acquista avvicinandosi a Dio, per mezzo dell'assimilazione (ibid., 131, 2). Il concetto della perfezione, come assimilazione a Dio, ὁμοίωσις θεῷ è di Platone, ma corrisponde — secondo C. — al concetto degli stoici: vivere secondo la natura; o alla dottrina di Mosè: seguire il Signore, cioè adempiere i suoi comandamenti. In questo senso la rivelazione parla degli amici di Dio, e Cristo esorta ad essere misericordiosi, come il Padre celeste (ibid., 100, 3-4; V, 99, 1-2). Tutto questo si realizza nella vita cristiana per assimilazione all'ὀρθὸς λόγος, come C. dice con un termine stoico. Il Logos secondo gli Stoici esprime l'immanente ragionevolezza del mondo; l'uomo, conoscendo questa ragionevolezza, conosce la legge della vita, e vivendo secondo questa legge, segue la natura, cioè segue Dio. Ora per C. l'ὀρθὸς λόγος non è una astrazione, ma una legge «regale e animata» (ibid., II, 19, 2), il Signore stesso, il quale è unico maestro della giusta vita (ibid., IV, 162, 5; VII, 7, 4). La legge è: «fare la volontà del Padre»; questa legge fu scritta sulla Croce (ibid., VII, 104, 4). I cristiani fanno lo stesso seguendo la dottrina del Signore. Così la perfezione, cioè l'assimilazione a Dio, si realizza vivendo secondo la dottrina del Signore.

Gradi della perfezione. Nella realizzazione della perfezione C. distingue tre gradi di perfezione tra i cristiani: i servi, i quali, convertiti a Dio, ascoltano prontamente la sua parola; i ministri fedeli, che, temendo il Signore, osservano i suoi comandamenti; i figli o amici, i quali, raggiunta la perfezione, agiscono per carità (Strom., VI, 173, 6). Ma praticamente la distinzione è ridotta a quella di servi (primi due gradi) e figli: cioè semplici fedeli e gnostici. Questa distinzione però differisce da quella degli gnostici eterodossi. C. non conosce una distinzione tra perfetti e imperfetti fondata sulla stessa loro natura. La vera perfezione gnostica secondo lui sta sulla linea della vita cristiana e non è altro che il suo sviluppo organico (ibid., VI, 31, 1-3; VII, 20, 2). La gnosi stessa oltre che supporre la fede, è la stessa fede in uno stato sviluppato (ibid., V, 2, 4-6; 5, 2; VII, 55, 3; 95, 6). Non di meno C. suppone un'indole contemplativa (ibid., II, 45, 4), una tendenza intellettualistica e un interesse scientifico (ibid., VII, 56, 21) cosicché praticamente la maggior parte dei cristiani non potrà raggiungerla: la gnosi non è per tutti (in riferimento a I Cor. 8, 7; cf. Strom., IV, 97, 1; V, 17, 5; 61, 3; VI, 120, 3; VII, 104, 3). Questo non significa però che C. volesse escludere la maggior parte dei fedeli dalla perfezione evangelica. Egli sa molto bene che non pochi sono arrivati alla dottrina del Signore senza studio di filosofia, spinti unicamente dalla Grazia di Cristo (ibid., I, 99, 1). Ma ciò che intende è una perfezione speciale, un «intellectus fidei» che non si ha senza lo studio (ibid., 35, 2). Inoltre, per la sua indole intellettualistica, pensa che senza la conoscenza non si arriva nemmeno ai costumi in uso: i semplici fedeli possono comportarsi bene (ibid., II, 45, 6), ma né sempre, né con tanta scienza, come lo

gnostico (ibid., VII, 84, 1), che conosce anche la causa delle sue azioni (ibid., VI, 103, 2).

L'ascesa spirituale del cristiano. Il punto di partenza dell'ascesa spirituale del cristiano è il Battesimo. L'effetto soggettivo di questa unione sacramentale è un'internale illuminazione (Paed., I, 28, 1), che produce nell'anima una nuova facoltà di conoscenza spirituale (θαρατύνων: ibid., 29, 4), rendendolo capace di conoscere Dio, cioè di avere la gnosi. In questo senso dice C. che la gnosi viene comunicata nel Battesimo (ibid., 29, 3, 4). La nuova facoltà spirituale si manifesta prima nella fede. C. la chiama una compendiosa gnosi (Strom., VII, 57, 3), cioè una conoscenza delle più importanti verità religiose, prima di tutto dell'esistenza di Dio (ibid., 55, 2). Ma essa è anche una persuasione che si deve vivere una vita moralmente giusta (ibid., V, 86, 1; VII, 5, 1), osservando i comandamenti di Dio. C. però desidera il perfezionamento di questa fede semplice e fondamentale, la quale è piuttosto un'obbedienza (Paed., I, 101, 1; Strom., II, 17, 3), un assenso dato a un superiore (Strom., II, 27, 4), una cognizione che gli stoici chiamavano πρόκλησις, anticipazione (ibid., 8, 4; 16, 3; cf. K. Prüm, art. cit. in bibl., pp. 23-24). La sua forma sviluppata è la gnosi (Strom., V, 2, 4-6; 5, 2; VII, 55, 3; 95, 6). Il perfezionamento si realizza in campo intellettuale per lo studio delle discipline enciclopediche e della filosofia (ibid., I, 177, 3; VI, 82, 1-83, 2; 90, 4-91, 2), e per la ricerca intorno alla persona e dottrina di Cristo nella S. Scrittura e nella tradizione (ibid., VI, 122, 1). Lo studio rivolge l'attenzione dalle cose sensibili, soggette al cambiamento continuo, alle cose spirituali, intelligibili, che hanno un valore assoluto e un essere immutabilmente vero (cf. J. Meifort, op. cit. in bibl., pp. 11-19). Mentre esercitandosi in esse si acquista l'acume dell'ingegno (Strom., VII, 44, 6) che potrà penetrare il mondo intelligibile e fermarsi nella contemplazione τῶν νοητῶν (ibid., V, 39, 4; 40, 1; VI, 68, 1; VII, 82, 5). Tutto questo sa molto di platonismo. Ma non bisogna dimenticare che, secondo C., il mondo intelligibile è Dio stesso (ibid., IV, 155, 2; V, 73, 3), e che l'ascesa spirituale tendente a lui è un'initiazione dell'ascensione di Cristo (ibid., V, 34, 7). Inoltre la persona di Cristo e la sua dottrina sono la rivelazione di questo «mondo». Acquistato quindi l'acume dell'ingegno, lo gnostico potrà raggiungere — per le ricerche e per lo studio della dottrina di Cristo — una perfetta scienza spirituale (ibid., VI, 68, 1-2), una contemplazione di tutte le verità rivelate nel Logos, che diventa una visione intellettuale, evidente e chiara (ibid., VII, 13, 3) del Logos stesso, e in esso una visione di Dio (cf. G. Békés, art. cit., pp. 50-61). Essendo la gnosi anche una attuazione pratica della dottrina del Signore, l'ascesa intellettuale è, di natura sua, accompagnata dall'ascesa morale. Il rivolgimento dalle cose sensibili alle cose spirituali cagiona nella vita morale del cristiano la separazione dai vizi (Strom., IV, 12, 1) e dalle passioni (ibid., V, 67, 1).

C. ammette in relazione alla vita morale, la tripartizione dell'anima. L'intelletto, la parte principale, deve avere — di natura sua — il dominio sulla parte irascibile e concupiscibile, sedi di ogni passione. L'intelletto stesso deve essere guidato da Dio (Paed., III, 1, 2). Infatti, nel presente stato dell'umanità, dopo il peccato originale, l'intelletto ha perduto il suo dominio e le passioni perturbano l'anima (Strom., VI, 136, 1-2). Il principale scopo della vita spirituale è dunque il ristabilimento dell'ordine voluto da Dio (ibid., IV, 40, 2). Ed è proprio compito della gnosi di ristabilirlo, poiché la conoscenza spirituale della dottrina del Signore fa sparire dall'anima l'ignoranza spirituale, fonte di ogni passione disordinata (ibid., V, 67, 4). L'ascesi del Signore, che viene imparata dal cristiano, libera la sua anima dal corpo e dalle sue passioni (ibid., IV, 27, 1; VI, 60, 1-2). In tal guisa il suo corpo cessa di essere una «caro peccati» (ibid., IV, 137, 3), ed egli nel suo corpo, morto alla concupiscenza, vive δάσχεος (ibid., VII, 79, 3; 86, 7). Questo è proprio lo stato dell'ἀπάθεια, realizzata attraverso la gnosi (ibid., 86, 5) secondo il modello di Cristo (ibid., V, 94, 5; VI, 71, 2): una morte spirituale che conduce

alla vita di «beneficenza», cosicché il cristiano potrà dire al Signore: vivo come tu lo vuoi (ibid., VII, 71, 3).

È chiaro che per C. l'apátheia non significa insensibilità, ma libertà dall'influsso disordinato delle passioni, altrimenti non potrebbe essere la virtù speciale dello gnostico il far bene al prossimo per amore disinteressato (ibid., VI, 60, 2-3; IV, 29, 2; VII, 81, 3, 7).

Tutta questa ascesa si realizza in stretta unione con Cristo per la fede, per la gnosi e per la carità (ibid., VII, 56, 1), a gradi diversi, fino al supremo, dove sta Cristo, Sommo Sacerdote dell'universo (ibid., 9, 1-4; 56, 1-57, 2). In realtà essa è nient'altro che lo sviluppo della Grazia battesimale, ovvero un'iniziale e continuata partecipazione del Logos, non per essenza, ma per potenza (ibid., VI, 138, 4; II, 5, 4), per libera cooperazione del cristiano gnostico.

La perfezione gnostica. La perfezione del cristiano gnostico consiste quindi da una parte nella perfetta conoscenza del Logos, che raggiunge il grado di una sintetica visione intellettuale, dall'altra dello stato di apátheia congiunta con il fattivo amore del prossimo. Ora la forza realizzatrice di questa perfezione nello gnostico stesso è la carità gnostica che rende Dio amato all'anima amante (ibid., VII, 57, 4). Mentre cioè si occupa di Dio e della propria perfezione nella carità incessante (ibid., VII, 3, 1), diventa un essere puramente spirituale (ibid., 44, 5), pienamente assimilato a Dio puramente uno (ibid., IV, 40, 1; cf. ibid., 138, 1; VI, 74, 1; VII, 5, 5; 10, 1; 88, 4). Finalmente in questo stato anticipa la futura beatitudine (ibid., V, 13, 1; VI, 73, 3-4; 76, 4; 77, 1-6; 78, 4-6); diventa cioè una viva intelligenza (ibid., IV, 136, 4) la quale non ha la scienza e la gnosi, ma è scienza e gnosi (ibid., 40, 1), simile agli angeli (ἐπάγγελος: ibid., VI, 105, 1; VII, 78, 6; 84, 2) e contempla «facie ad faciem» Dio, vale a dire come un volto vedente il volto di Dio, il Logos. È logico che lo gnostico in questo grado di spiritualità sta in una pura conversazione con Dio (ibid., IV, 40, 1), cosicché non soltanto nelle pratiche della pietà, ma anche nei comuni atti della vita quotidiana sta unito con Dio (ibid., VI, 113, 3; VII, 80, 3). Difatti tutta la sua vita è divenuta una preghiera e una continua conversazione con Dio (ibid., VII, 73, 1).

in Zeitschrift f. kath. Theol., 56 (1932), pp. 175-89; K. Prüm, Glaube und Erkenntnis im zweiten Buche der Strom., in Scholastik, 12 (1937), pp. 17-57; P. B. Pade, Ligos Theos. Untersuchungen zur Logos-Christologie des Klemens V. Al., Roma 1939. C. A. e la morale: K. Ernesti, Die Ethik des Klemens V. Al., Paderborn 1900; W. Capitaine, Die Moral des Klemens V. Al., ivi 1903; J. Stelzenberger, Die Beziehungen der frühchristl. Ethik zur Ethik der Ston, Monaco 1933, pp. 166-70, 266-31, 283-85, 323-27, 419-22. C. A. e la spiritualità: J. Lebreton, s. V. in DSp, II, coll. 950-61; G. W. Butterworth, The defi-cation of man in Clement of Al., in Journ. of Theol. St., 17 (1916), pp. 157-69; M. Viller, La spiritualité des premiers siècles chrétiens, Parigi 1930; A. Koch, Klemens V. Al., als Lehrer der Vollkommenheit, in Zeitschrift f. Ass. u. Myst., 7 (1932); G. Bardy, La vie spirituelle d'après les Pères des trois premiers siècles, Parigi 1935, pp. 183-214; H. D. Pire, L'apothea stoïcienne et la pitié chez Clément d'Al., in Rev. sc. phil. et théol., 1938, pp. 427-31; G. Békés, De continua oratione Clementis Al. doctrina, in Studia Anselmiana, 14 (1942), pp. 1-109; id., Pura oratio apud Clementem Al., ibid., 18-19 (1947), pp. 157-72.

Gerardo Békés