PLUTARCH OF CHAERONEA. - Greek philosopher and historian, b. in Chaeronea (Boeotia) between 46 and 50 A.D. He studied philosophy and mathematics in Athens. He stayed for a long time in Rome. Having returned definitively to Chaeronea after 96, he was archon of the small town and a Delphic priest. D. between 120 and 127. Most learned and versatile, he is among the most prolific ancient writers: about eighty various writings remain under his name, generically called Ἰθωᾶ (Moralia), some of which are spurious or doubtful, and 50 biographies of illustrious men. His many other works are lost.
Among the Moralia, the De animae procreatione in Timaeo and the Quaestiones platonicae discourse on difficult points of Platonism; the De stoicorum repugnantiis, the De communibus notitiis, and the De paradoxis stoicorum polemicize against the Stoa; the Adversus Coloten, the Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum and the De latenter vivendo combat Epicureanism. Of religious or philosophical-religious subject matter are the dialogue De sero numinis vindicta (the delay or the apparent lack of earthly punishment of certain guilty persons does not conflict with Providence), the dialogues De Ei Delphico, De defectu oraculorum, De Pythiae oraculis (which speculate on matters pertaining to the Pythian χρηστήριον), the De Iside et Osiride, which illustrates the Egyptian myth and discerns in it an allegory of the cosmic dualism between Good and Evil. In the De Iside (as also in the De defectu oraculorum) there also appears the conception of demons, which are found again in the dialogue De genio Socratis and in the final myth of the De facie in orbe Lunae, a booklet predominantly astronomical. Besides the De facie, other short works attest to P.'s doctrine in the matter of natural sciences.
More popular are the properly ethical writings, pertaining to the part of philosophy that P. preferred. In the De virtute morali the Academic-Peripatetic metriopathy is advocated; in the De profectibus in virtute the psychological signs of moral progress are studied; in the De cohibenda ira, in the De garrulitate and in other short works the symptoms and remedies of the diseases and vices of the soul are shown. Of the family virtues treat the De fraterno amore and the Coniugalia praecepta, of friendship the De adulatore et amico and the De amicorum multitudine (equaled in refinement by the De inimicorum utilitate). A more general content has the De tranquillitate animi (virtue and mastery over the passions procure inner peace), to which the consolatory writings addressed to his wife and to an exile (De exilio) should be brought back alongside. Within ethics fall the pedagogical short works De audiendis poetis (on the way in which the young must listen to and understand poetry) and the De audiendo, on the way of listening to lessons and speeches (the superficial booklet De educatione puerorum appears spurious); and ethical is the substance of the political opuscules (Praecepta gerendae reipublicae etc.), in which a high sense of public life is expressed.
P.'s thought is essentially Platonic: he himself calls the Academy ἑστία πατρῶν (De ser. num. vind., 4). But it is a matter of an eclecticizing Platonism, in keeping with the times, with a marked Pythagorean coloring (speculations on numbers, demonology), with Aristotelian influences (especially in ethics), and not without a vein of scanty Neo-Academicism (v. ACCADEMIA, I. L'a. greca). With Stoicism (v.) P. is in disagreement (opposing its pantheism, its fatalism, its ethical rigorism); he draws however many ideas from the middle Stoa (and especially from Posidonius). Most hostile to the Epicureans, he upholds Providence and the immortality of the soul (v.). He admits a supreme and perfect God, qualifiable as the true Being (while mutable things do not have full subsistence), transcendent and most exalted with respect to man; and he admits together an eternal matter, and furthermore a universal Soul preexisting, like matter, to the cosmogony, and originally irrational and evil, indeed a principle of evil (while matter is in itself neutral). With the cosmogonic action (which P. conceives as temporal) God, the principle of the good, ordered matter by infusing reason into the primitive ψυχή; but the irrational element remains always in the Soul itself; and thus there persists in the universe an ἀρχή κακῶς in opposition to God (De an. procr. in Timaeo; De Iside et Os.). In this dualism (of Zoroastrian stamp) P. departs from the majority of the Platonists because he refuses to identify evil with matter and makes of it a principle of its own; and he shows originality in reattaching his orientalizing conception to Plato himself, to the ἀνακτὲς ψυχή of the Laws (Plato, Leg., 986 E, 898 C), to the Ἀνακτὲς of the Timaeus and of the Republic, to the μεριστὴ οὐσία of the Timaeus (cf. Tim., 35 A). Besides the supreme God, he then admits (despite the intimate monotheistic tendency) lesser gods and demons intermediary between the Divinity and men (and also evil demons); and he adheres to the religion of his fathers, allegorizing on the myths and identifying oriental gods with Hellenic gods (he did not know Christianity). As for man, he professes Platonic spiritualism; but he distinguishes the νοῦς from the soul properly so called (cf. De gen. Socratis, 22; De fac. in orbe Lun., 28). In morals, he does not want the innate mean, but the Aristotelian μεσότης; and he sees in the teaching of virtue the highest task of the philosopher (on the predominantly ethical end of philosophy, cf. among other things De prof. in virt., 7; Adv. Colot., 2). In pedagogy he gives no fundamental contributions, but only good thoughts and advice; he approves, against Plato, the reading of the poets and admits the education of women.
The Lives are almost all gathered in pairs (Βίοι παράλληλοι) in which there figure for the purpose of comparison a Greek and a Roman (e.g., Theseus-Romulus, Pericles-Fabius Maximus, Alexander-Caesar, etc.). There are then 4 isolated Βίοι. P. aims essentially at representing the character of the personages; and for this reason he gives a large part also to their private life, and to anecdotes and sayings. He pursues an ethical purpose, and presents above all examples of virtue (not however omitting vices and defects). He narrates history dramatically, but without romanticizing it. He generally uses good sources, and does not love to depart from the truth, although lacking a profound critical sense. Despite errors and deficiencies, the Lives (naturally excluding those relating to legendary times) prove sufficiently worthy of belief and give a vivid image of many protagonists of ancient history. Their ethical significance joins them with the Moralia.
The immense influence of P. through the centuries appears justified. As a biographer of the "heroes" he has very great effectiveness and attractiveness (he inspired Shakespeare and Alfieri and pleased very many great men). As a moralist, he makes himself loved for his psychological refinement and the delicate art of a "physician of souls." With respect to theoretical philosophy, although without strong originality, he reveals himself a conscious thinker and not devoid of personal views, and occupies a notable place in middle Platonism.
Bibliography21 works
Raffaello Del Re
