PLUTARCH OF CHERONEA. - Greek philosopher and historian, born in Cheronea (Boeotia) between 46 and 50 AD. He studied philosophy and mathematics in Athens. He spent a long time in Rome. After 96 AD he returned definitively to Cheronea, where he became archon of the small city and priest of Delphi. He died between 120 and 127 AD. A man of vast learning and wide-ranging interests, he is among the most prolific ancient writers. About eighty works of various kinds survive under his name, generally known as the *Moralia*, many of which are spurious or doubtful, along with fifty biographies of illustrious men. Many other works are lost.
Among the *Moralia*, the *De animae procreatione in Timaeo* and the *Quaestiones platonicae* discuss difficult points of Platonism; the *De stoicorum repugnantiis*, the *De communibus notitiis*, and the *De paradoxis stoicorum* polemicize against the Stoa; the *Adversus Coloten*, the *Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum*, and the *De latenter vivendo* attack Epicureanism. Works of religious or philosophical-religious content include the dialogue *De sera numinis vindicta* (the delay or apparent absence of earthly punishment for certain guilty parties does not conflict with Providence), the dialogues *De E apud Delphos*, *De defectu oraculorum*, and *De Pythiae oraculis* (which speculate on matters pertaining to the Pythian *chresmēterion*), and the *De Iside et Osiride*, which elucidates the Egyptian myth and discerns within it an allegory of the cosmic dualism between Good and Evil. The concept of demons also appears in the *De Iside* (as well as in the *De defectu oraculorum*); they reappear in the dialogue *De genio Socratis* and in the final myth of the *De facie in orbe Lunae*, a work primarily astronomical. Besides the *De facie*, other short treatises attest to Plutarch’s views on natural science.
More popular are the works properly ethical, relating to the branch of philosophy Plutarch most favored. In the *De virtute morali* he advocates the Academico-Peripatetic *metriopatheia*; in the *De profectibus in virtute* he studies the psychological signs of moral progress; in the *De cohibenda ira*, the *De garrulitate*, and other treatises he shows the symptoms and remedies for the diseases and vices of the soul. Domestic virtues are treated in the *De fraterno amore* and the *Coniugalia praecepta*; friendship in the *De adulatore et amico* and the *De amicorum multitudine* (surpassed in subtlety only by the *De inimicorum utilitate*). More general in scope is the *De tranquillitate animi* (virtue and mastery over the passions procure inner peace), to which may be linked the consolatory writings addressed to his wife and to an exile (*De exilio*). Within ethics also fall the pedagogical treatises *De audiendis poetis* (on how young people should listen to and understand poetry) and *De audiendo* (on how to listen to lectures and speeches; the superficial *De educatione puerorum* appears spurious); and ethical is the essence of the political pamphlets (*Praecepta gerendae reipublicae*, etc.), in which he expresses a high sense of public life.
Plutarch’s thought is essentially Platonic: he himself calls the Academy his “fatherland” (*De sera numinis vindicta*, 4). But this is an eclectic Platonism, suited to the times, with a marked Pythagorean coloring (speculations on numbers, demonology), Aristotelian influences (especially in ethics), and not without a touch of New Academy skepticism (v. GRECIA). With Stoicism (v.) he is at odds (opposing its pantheism, fatalism, and ethical rigorism), though he draws many ideas from Middle Stoicism (notably from Posidonius). He is extremely hostile to the Epicureans, upholding Providence and the immortality of the soul (v.). He admits a supreme and perfect God, describable as the true Being (while mutable things do not possess full subsistence), transcendent and exalted above man; and alongside this he posits an eternal matter, and also a universal soul preexisting, like matter, the cosmogony, originally irrational and evil—indeed the principle of evil (while matter is in itself neutral). Through the cosmogonic act (which Plutarch conceives as temporal) God, the principle of good, ordered matter by infusing reason into the primitive *psyche*; yet the irrational element remains within the Soul itself, and thus there persists in the universe an *archē kenēs* in perpetual conflict with God (*De an. procr. in Timaeo*; *De Iside et Os.*). In this dualism (of Zoroastrian stamp) Plutarch departs from most Platonists by refusing to identify evil with matter and making it a principle in its own right; and he shows originality in tracing this orientalizing conception back to Plato himself, to the *archē* of the *Laws* (Plato, *Leg.*, 986 C, 808 C), to the *Anankē* of the *Timaeus* and *Republic*, and to the *meristē ousia* of the *Timaeus* (cf. *Tim.*, 35 A). Besides the supreme God, he also admits (despite an underlying monotheistic tendency) lesser intermediary demons between the Divinity and mankind (and even evil demons); and he adheres to the religion of his homeland, allegorizing myths and identifying oriental deities with Hellenic ones (he did not know Christianity). As for man, he professes Platonic spiritualism; yet he distinguishes the *nous* from the soul proper (cf. *De gen. Socratis*, 22; *De fac. in orbe Lun.*, 28). In ethics, he rejects *apatheia* in favor of Aristotelian *mesotēs*; and he sees the teaching of virtue as the philosopher’s highest task (on the predominantly ethical aim of philosophy, cf. among other works *De prof. in virt.*, 7; *Adv. Colot.*, 2). In pedagogy he makes no fundamental contributions, only offering good thoughts and advice: he approves, against Plato, the reading of poets and admits the education of women.
The *Lives* are almost all arranged in pairs (*Vitae parallelae*), in which a Greek and a Roman are compared (e.g., Theseus–Romulus, Pericles–Fabius Maximus, Alexander–Caesar, etc.). There are also four *Vitae* of single figures. Plutarch’s essential aim is to depict the characters of his subjects; hence he devotes much space to their private lives, anecdotes, and witticisms. He pursues an ethical purpose, presenting chiefly examples of virtue (though not neglecting vices and defects). He narrates history dramatically but without novelistic embellishment. He generally uses good sources and does not shrink from the truth, though lacking deep critical sense. Despite errors and deficiencies, the *Lives* (excluding those relating to legendary times) are fairly reliable and give a vivid picture of many protagonists of ancient history. Their ethical purpose links them with the *Moralia*.
The immense influence Plutarch exerted through the centuries is thus justified. As a biographer of “heroes” he created a grand structure (he inspired Shakespeare and Alfieri and pleased many great men). As a moralist, he is beloved for his psychological subtlety and delicate art of being a “physician of souls.” In theoretical philosophy, though lacking strong originality, he appears as a thoughtful thinker with personal insights and occupies a notable place in Middle Platonism.