GREGORY OF NYSSA, St. — One of the great Doctors who, in the second half of the 4th century, brought sudden splendor to the Church of Cappadocia; none surpasses him as a speculative and contemplative thinker, as a philosopher and mystic.
OUTLINE:
I. Life
II. Works
III. Doctrine.I. Life
N. was born at Caesarea in Cappadocia c. 335, died c. 394. His youth was marked by the conflicts characteristic of his time and environment. No family was more Christian than his. His grandparents had been disciples of Gregory the Wonderworker.G. was influenced by many diverse currents. The conditions under which he pursued his studies are unknown, but it is certain that he acquired a very complete education. As a writer, he is one of the most characteristic representatives of the Second Sophistic. Already Photius noted that his style surpassed that of any other rhetorician in musicality and color. Méridier has succeeded in tracing in him all the artistic precedents that characterize this school (*L’influence de la seconde Sophistique sur l’œuvre de Grégoire de Nysse*, Paris 1906). As a philosopher, he seems to have possessed the eclectic culture that the Sophists of his day imparted to their pupils, combining at the same time Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic elements; he certainly read Plotinus, with whom he presents undeniable affinities (cf. H. F. Cherniss, *The Platonism of G. of Nissa*, Berkeley 1930). His work also demonstrates a very serious knowledge of medicine and music.
Though absorbed in his studies, these did not divert him from the Christian life. He decided, in fact, to take holy orders and was admitted to the rank of lector. But his love of the Holy Scriptures had not estranged his heart from profane literature. At that time he discovered Libanius, of whom Basil had spoken to him. “I became passionately enamored of the beauty of your art,” he later wrote to the writer, “without being able to sate myself of this passion” (*PG* 46, 1050 A). He then abandoned his sacred duties and embraced the profession of rhetorician (did he marry at that time? This has been inferred from a letter of Gregory Nazianzen, and the interpretation is unchallenged [*PG* 37, 321 A–324 B]). Greek wisdom triumphed in his heart over “barbarous” Christianity.
Nevertheless, around him, in his family and among his friends, a broad current of spiritual life was taking shape. Basil, the first touched by grace, had retired to the hills of the Iris valley, not far from where his sister Macrina was to found, in her turn, a women’s monastery. Soon he drew to himself his friend Gregory, the future Bishop of Nazianzus, and a whole group of young men; there they lived, united in study and prayer, inaugurating a form of life that was later to enjoy immense success in East and West.
Gregory’s defection grieved Gregory Nazianzen, who wrote him a letter, still extant (*PG* 37, 41 B–41 B), in which he reproached him for allowing himself to be ensnared by worldly ambitions and for preferring the name of rhetorician to that of Christian; he also sought to make him understand the scandal his conduct gave to the faithful and the pain it caused his friends, and begged him to return to himself. It is unknown what struggles took place in the young rhetorician’s soul; but the call of God was stronger, and G. rejoined his brother and his friends.
For several years G. devoted himself, under Basil’s guidance—whom he always called his father and master—to the spiritual life. Few documents survive from this period of his life, only a letter written to one of his Sophist friends inviting him to his desert retreat. But one can form an idea of his state of mind from a work he wrote at that time, at Basil’s behest, the treatise *De virginitate*, where he appears fully happy to be able to devote himself, far from the tumult of worldly affairs, to his love of the contemplative life. In this work of his youth, in which the Neoplatonic influence is still very much in evidence, one already glimpses what a great mystic G. would one day become.
At the same time, in his retreat G. devoted himself to study as well. This was indeed part of the program assigned by Basil to his monks. It was then that G. formed the philosophical and theological thought that would later manifest itself in his mature works. In addition to the Holy Scriptures, which were customarily read in the monasteries of that time, he studied the great Doctors who had preceded him, in particular Origen—very dear to the Cappadocians—and also his opponent Methodius of Olympus. He also perfected his knowledge of profane authors, thus acquiring that double culture for which Gregory Nazianzen was later to praise him in a discourse.
The fervent years of study at Annesi were certainly among the best of his life. But service to the Church was soon to tear him away from this peace. In 370 Basil had been elected Bishop of Caesarea, where he had to face an extremely difficult situation: difficulties with the Emperor Valens, who favored the Arians, and difficulties with Pope Damasus, who did not fully grasp the situation in the East. He needed reliable collaborators. He had his brother G. elected Bishop of Nyssa, a small town not far from Caesarea, in the heart of Asia Minor. Doubtless he had no illusions about the latter’s administrative abilities, for his goodness and candor made him too naive for such affairs. When
At the same time, besides contemplation, G. devoted himself to study during his retreat. Indeed, this was part of the program assigned by Basil to his monks. It was then that G. formed the philosophical and theological thought that would later manifest itself in his mature works. In addition to the Holy Scriptures, which were customarily read in the monasteries of that time, he studied the great Doctors who had preceded him, particularly Origen, who was very dear to the Cappadocians, and also his opponent Methodius of Olympus. Moreover, he perfected his knowledge of profane authors, thereby acquiring that double culture for which Gregory Nazianzen would one day praise him in a discourse.
The fervent years of study at Annesi were certainly among the best of his life. But the service of the Church was soon to tear him away from this peace. In 370 Basil had been elected bishop of Caesarea, where he had to face an extremely difficult situation: difficulties with the emperor Valens, who favored the Arians, and difficulties with Pope Damasus, who did not fully grasp the situation in the East. He needed reliable collaborators. He had his brother G. elected bishop of Nyssa, a town not far from Caesarea, in the heart of Asia Minor. Of course, he had no illusions about the latter’s abilities in affairs of state, for his goodness and candor made him too naive. When
In 381 he attended the Second Ecumenical Council, in Constantinople. It is possible that he was entrusted with drafting the profession of faith that concluded the Council’s work. In any case, it is certain that he was designated by Theodosius, along with four other bishops, as a witness to Eastern orthodoxy. It was then that he delivered the funeral oration for Meletius of Antioch, who had caused so much difficulty between East and West (PG 46, 852-64). It also seems that he was then entrusted with restoring order in the Churches of Palestine and Arabia. Many of his letters refer to these journeys; among others, one in which he criticizes the abuses that accompanied pilgrims at the time and declares that it is more important to ascend with the affections of the heart to the heavenly Jerusalem than to journey to the earthly one, has been the subject of an interpretation of reform (PG 46, 1009-16).
His position in the Church of the East also led him to take a stand in doctrinal controversies. His intellectual temperament and natural indulgence would not have inclined him in that direction. But it was necessary to enlighten minds; from all sides people turned to G. No one was more suited for this than the heir to Basil’s faith, the man whose learning and holiness Gregory Nazianzen celebrated in a discourse. G. then set to work. It was then that he wrote his treatises against Eunomius, against Apollinaris, and against the Pneumatomachi. His authority earned him the honor of delivering the funeral oration for the Empress Flacilla in 386. He died in 394. He has no feast in the Latin Church; he is included in the Roman Martyrology on March 9; the Greek Church venerates him on January 10.
II. Works
The literary output of St. G. consists of 44-46 works, and seems to have been almost entirely preserved. It includes, first of all, the seated works, of various kinds. The first among them is the *Inexamen etiamque explicatio apologetica* (PG 44, 61-124). St. Basil had delivered five homilies on the Hexaemeron, and G.’s intention was to complete his brother’s work by delving into certain questions (61 D) and attempting to reconcile the text of Genesis with the science of his time. The work is of interest for the understanding of cosmological conceptions (v. K. Gronau, *Posidonius und jüdisch-christliche Genesisexegese*, Leipzig 1914, pp. 112-41). The treatise *De hominis officio* is a sequel to it and is motivated by similar concerns. Certain similarities with Cicero’s *De natura deorum*, Books I-II, reveal the influence of Posidonius (cf. E. von Ivanka, *Die Quelle von Ciceros De Natura deorum*, II, 45-60, in *Archiv. f. Philolog.*, 1935, p. 1 ff.). The final chapter is a treatise on physiology inspired by Galen. But there are also here extremely important pages in which G., starting from an exegesis of Gen. 2 inspired by Philo, develops the theory of the double creation of man, a theme to which he would return.After the treatise, the PG includes two homilies, *In verba Scripturae: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram* (PG 257-97): a slightly different text of these homilies is found in the works of St. Basil, under the title *De structura hominis* (ibid. 29, 324 ff.). Fr. Stephanou had defended their Basilian authenticity (Le sixième jour de l'Hexaméron de St Basile, in *Échos d'Orient*, 31-32 [1932], pp. 385-98), while Avanna has claimed them for G. (Die Autorschaft der Homilien: Faciamus hominem, in *Byzant. Zeitschrift*, 45 [1936], pp. 46-47). S. Griet distinguishes the two series, but according to him those of G. lie between the works of Basil and vice versa (St Basile a-t-il donné suite aux Homélies sur l'Hexaméron, in *Recherches de science religieuse*, 33 [1946], pp. 317-59). It seems rather that both are late works of Basilian inspiration and owe nothing to G.
Contrary to these early works, which depend on literary exegesis, the other exegetical treatises of St. G. are expositions of spirituality in which Scripture is interpreted in a spiritual sense. G. offers an exegesis full of allegories, influenced by Origen and also directly by Philo. The *De vita Moysis* comprises first a *historia*, a literal explanation of Exodus, then a *theoria* that applies this explanation to the soul’s journey toward God after leaving Egypt—an allegory of sin—up to the ascent of Sinai (PG 44, 297–429). This is perhaps G.’s masterpiece. In the preface, he sets forth his principal theory, which regards the spiritual life as a perpetual progress. In this treatise are also found some pages on mystical darkness, inspired by Philo but far surpassing his indications, which later inspired the *Mystical Theology* of Pseudo-Dionysius (J. Daniélou, *Vie de Moïse*, Paris 1944, introduction, pp. 27–44).
There follow two treatises *In Psalmos*. The first deals with the symbolism of the titles of the psalms (PG 44, 432–83), while the second interprets the first part of the Psalter as a description of the stages of the spiritual life (PG 44, 488–608). A short treatise *De octava* comments on the sixth psalm (PG 44, 608–16). There are also references to commentaries on the sapiential books. G. explains that Proverbs correspond to spiritual infancy, Ecclesiastes to youth, and the Song of Songs to maturity (PG 44, 768 A; this division derives from Origen and is also found in St. Basil: PG 30, 412 ff.). Unfortunately, it seems he did not write a treatise on Proverbs. What remain are a study on Ecclesiastes and another on the Song of Songs. Unlike the previous works, which were commentaries, these are homilies. The *Homilies on Ecclesiastes* (PG 44, 615–753) contain admirable passages on the transcendence of God, but even more admirable are the *Homilies on the Song of Songs* (PG 44, 756–1120), where G. explicitly draws inspiration from Origen but develops a mysticism of ecstatic love foreign to him, opening new horizons for spirituality. Less composed than the *De vita Moysis*, the homilies sometimes have more personal accents: they are among the peaks of spiritual literature of all time.
The works cited thus far pertain to the Old Testament. Yet there remain two treatises that may be linked to New Testament exegesis. The first is a small work on prayer, in the form of a commentary on the *Our Father* (*De oratione dominica*: PG 44, 1119–93). This was a classical genre: Origen’s treatise on prayer and Tertullian’s are also commentaries on the *Our Father*. There is also a treatise *De beatitudinibus*, a commentary on the Beatitudes, which contains, in particular, a chapter on the purity of heart that is very important for G.’s spiritual theology.
Among the works that deal with the refutation of the doctrine of Apollinarius, there is a theology of the Incarnation in its relation to the unity of human nature, illustrated by images such as that of the lost sheep or the broken reed, etc. The short treatise *In illud, quando sibi subiecerit omnia* (PG 44, 1304–25) may also be included among the Christological works.
Alongside these works that are connected to the great controversies of the 4th century, G. of Nyssa’s theological output comprises various treatises on diverse subjects. The most important of these is the *Oratio catechetica magna* (PG 45, 1–105), an exposition of the entire plan of salvation as a whole: the creation of man, original sin, the Incarnation, Redemption, and the Sacraments. In no other writing does G.’s thought appear more clearly. More than any other Father of the 4th century, he delves deeply into dogma and strives to account for it in the face of the objections of philosophers. Close to the *Great Catechesis* is the *De anima et resurrectione dialogus* (PG 46, 12–160), a dialogue between G. and his sister Macrina on the eve of her death. It is a faithful replica of the *Phaedo*; the Platonic influence is notable, and this places the treatise among G.’s earliest works. He there takes up the criticisms directed against Origen by Methodius of Olympus in his *Treatise on the Resurrection* (CB, XXVII, pp. 220–324), while remaining faithful to the theology of Alexander. Similarly, the question of the fate of man after death is connected to the treatise *De infantibus qui praemature abripiuntur* (PG 46, 161–93) and to *De mortuis* (PG 46, 458–538); the latter is important for Gregorian doctrine on man’s original state and provides clarifications not found in other studies. The work *Contra fatum* belongs to the tradition against astral fatalism (PG 45, 145–75; cf. also D. Amand, *Fatalisme et liberté dans l’antiquité grecque*, Louvain 1945, pp. 404–35). The treatise *De Pythonissa* resumes the controversy that had opposed Eustathius of Antioch to Origen (cf. E. Klostermann, in *Kleine Texte*, 83, Bonn 1912): G. shares Eustathius’s position, seeing in the appearance of Samuel a diabolical illusion. Finally, the *Epistola canonica ad Letoium Melitenum episcopum*, which deals with penitential discipline (PG 45, 222–37), may be linked to the theological works; here G. speaks not as a theologian but as a bishop and sets forth the rules maintained in his Church.
As for the treatises on spirituality, it is clear that they are principally constituted by the scriptural commentaries already discussed. There must one look for the essentials of Gregorian spirituality. Yet G. also composed some treatises that are strictly and properly spiritual. The most important is the *De virginitate* (PG 46, 318–410), the study in which the Platonic influence is most evident. Without doubt it is his first writing, dating from the time when he was a monk at Annesi, and it is interesting as a testimony to the spirit animating that community. Virginity is celebrated as a return of man to his true nature, a participation in the life of the angels. Shorter are the treatises *De professione christiana* (PG 46, 237–51), *De perfecta christiani forma* (PG 46, 251–87), and *Adversus eos qui castigationes aegre ferunt* (PG 46, 307–18). The *Hypotyposis* (PG 46, 287–307) is not by G. and belongs to the pseudo-Macarian writings (cf. A. Wilmart, *La tradition de l’Hypotypose ou Traité de l’ascèse attribué à Grégoire de Nysse*, in *Revue de l’Orient Chrétien*, 3rd ser., 1 [1918], pp. 214–422).
To G.’s spiritual writings is also connected one of his most interesting works, the *Vita s. Macrinae virginis* (PG 46, 959–99), the elder sister of the saint. This is an extremely important historical document for fixing various points in the lives of St. Basil and St. G. Moreover, the text contains many valuable details for the history of ancient Christian customs: Macrina dies facing east; she wears around her neck a religious cross (cf. F.-J. Dölger, *Das Anhänge-Kreuzchen der hl. Makrina und ihr Ring mit der Kreuzpartikel*, in *Antike und Christentum*, III, 11, Münster in V. 1932, pp. 81–117). G. also left a life of St. Gregory the Wonderworker, through which Origen’s influence reached the Cappadocians.
G.’s sermons belong to various genres. The funeral orations for Meletius of Antioch, St. Basil, and the Empresses Pulcheria and Flaccilla have a marked
It should also be noted that while G.’s inspiration is chiefly Platonic, other influences seem to have had almost an equal effect upon him: first and foremost Neoplatonism, that is, Plotinus. The doctrine of the purification of the soul as a condition for the knowledge of God is expressed by means of images drawn from the *Enneads* (cf. J. Daniélou, *Platonisme et théologie mystique*, Paris 1945, pp. 224-26). Another very important influence is that of Philo of Alexandria, and this has already been observed by F. Diekamp (*Die Gotteslehre des heil. Gregor von Nyssa*, Münster 1896, p. 35; cf. also H.-Ch. Puech, *La ténèbre mystique chez le Pseudo-Denys*, in *Études carmélitaines*, 23 (1938), pp. 49-52). The fact is significant because here G. stands opposed to Origen. His doctrine of knowledge in the divine darkness derives directly from the *De posteritate Caini*, reproducing its very expressions: “To see God consists in not seeing” (*De posteritate Caini*, 5 and *Vita Moysis*: PG 44, 437 B). G. also owes to Philo another of his most important ideas, that of the double creation of man (*De munis officio*: PG 44, 181).
In addition, the historical contribution must be noted. K. Gronau (*Poseidonios und die jüdisch-christliche Genesis-Exegese*, Leipzig-Berlin 1914, pp. 112-28; see also E. von Ivanka, *Die Quelle von Ciceros De natura deorum*, II, 45-60, in *Arch. f. Phil.*, 1935, pp. 1-12) was the first to note the parallel between G.’s *De hominis officio* and Cicero’s *De natura deorum*: since it cannot be a question of Cicero’s influence on G., a common source must be sought. Cicero’s treatise takes its inspiration from Posidonius, and Posidonius is also the source for G. The historical influence is especially evident in the doctrine of knowledge, where G. asserts that the human spirit is confined to knowledge of the visible world (E. von Ivanka, *Vom Platonismus zur Theorie der Mystik*, in *Scholastik*, 11 (1936), p. 184; H. Urs von Balthasar, *Présence et pensée. Essai sur la philosophie religieuse de St. Grégoire de Nysse*, Paris 1944, pp. 6-7), and in the conception of man as the completion of the cosmos. It should finally be observed that G. was acquainted with the writings of physicians and astronomers; in particular, he draws upon Galen’s treatise on the creation of man.
The second problem is how G. utilized philosophy. This question is of capital importance in the history of Christian theology. Before him, on the one hand, there was the biblical theology of Irenaeus and Athanasius, which had no interest in philosophy; on the other, the more philosophical theology of Clement and Origen, though still tainted with Platonic deviations, especially regarding the connaturality of the human *logos* and the divine *Logos*. G. stands in the succession of the latter but completes their reform of Platonism, bending it to the integral demands of Revelation. This has been demonstrated by Ivanka (*Hellenisches und Christliches im frühbyzantinischen Geistesleben*, Vienna 1948, pp. 43-68; *Vom Platonismus*, etc., pp. 163-95; J. Daniélou, *Platonisme et théologie mystique*, cit., pp. 230-35). Thus, in relation to the New Testament, he played a role analogous to that which H.-A. Wolfson recognizes in Philo in relation to the Old (*Philo*, I, Cambridge [March] 1948); and it is not surprising that G. felt this kinship.
G. of Nyssa is a theologian in the strictest sense, inasmuch as the mystery of God occupies a considerable place in his work. But here two questions must be distinguished: that of the divine *ousia* and that of the Persons; the former is the more important in his work. Indeed, his theology was defined in reaction to the error of Eunomius. This radical Arian was an advocate of *anomeism*, that is, of a difference of nature between the Father and the Son; this doctrine was based on the interpretation of *agennesia* as designating the nature of the Father. All other names by which God is indicated were, for the *anomeists*, mere *epinoiai*, without any foundation. Instead, *agennesia* truly gives the content of the divine *ousia*, of which one can thus have clear knowledge (S. Gonzalez, *Mà ousia y tesis ὑποστάσεις en la doctrina de G. de N.*, Rome 1939). At the end of the 4th century, a renewal of negative theology took place in reaction to this doctrine. St. John Chrysostom devoted to it around 380 some remarkable homilies (*De incomprehensibili* (G. J. Daniélou, *L'incompréhension de l'essence divine d'après st Jean Chrysostome*, in *Recherches de science religieuse*, 37 (1950), pp. 5-35). And it is precisely this same doctrine that G. treats in part of his *Contra Eunomium*. But he returns to it frequently in his other works, especially in the homilies *In Cantica canticorum*; in the *De vita Moysis* he seems to affirm the absolute impossibility for the human intellect of an immediate knowledge of God. It must be noted, however, that this refers first and foremost to the impossibility of grasping God “conceptually” (cf. A. Lieske, *Die Theologie der Christusmystik Gregors von Nyssa*, in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, 71 (1949), p. 163). In the love that enables it to transcend its limits, the soul experiences this feeling of presence, the only immediate knowledge possible of Him who is beyond all determination. Moreover, this immediate knowledge, even in beatific vision, is never absolutely comprehensible. This explains the many passages in which G. emphasizes the incomprehensibility of the divine *essence*. In the face of Eunomius’ rationalism, his work is a testimony to a remarkable sense of the mystery of God and is permeated by a profound spirit of adoration (cf. J. Daniélou, *Platonisme et théologie mystique*, Paris 1945, pp. 309-26).
As for G.’s Trinitarian doctrine, it is simply a development of that of St. Basil. The terminology is very clearly defined. G. designates the Persons by the terms πρόσωπον or διάστασις. The only point that has given rise to controversy is a passage in the treatise *Quod non sint tres Dii*, in which G. compares the Trinity of Persons in the unity of nature to the multiplicity of individuals within human life. This comparison has been described as a form of tritheism. But G. Jaye has clearly demonstrated the unfoundedness of this reproach (*L’unité de l’opération divine dans les écrits trinitaires de St Grégoire de Nysse*, in *Rech. de science religieuse*, 27 (1937), pp. 422-39). This Trinitarian theology is the expression of Catholic doctrine in its most classical form. It may be noted that in the *Oratio catechetica magna* G. attempts an exposition of the Trinity beginning from the operations of the soul, which anticipates St. Augustine (PG 45, 16-17).
After *theologia*, we come to *oikonomia*, the doctrine concerning the creation, fall, and redemption of man. G.’s anthropology is one of the most interesting, but also one of the most difficult, parts of his work. The principal elements are found in the *Oratio catechetica magna* and in the treatise *De hominis officio*. This doctrine takes its starting point from the biblical doctrine of the *imago Dei*. Unlike other Fathers of the Church, and closer in this to the literal sense of Scripture itself, G. makes no distinction between *imago* and *similitudo*. To use modern terms, one may say that in him there is no opposition between man as “natural” and man as “supernatural.” Rather, the “nature” of man is the man as conceived by God, comprehending all those gifts that are called supernatural. G. makes this very explicit in his treatise on creation, where purity, *parrhesia*, charity, and beatitude are considered as part of “nature” in the same way as “reason and freedom” (PG 44, 137 A-C).
But the man as he now is falls far short of presenting this image of God; the humanity before us is not the “nature” of man as God willed it and as it will exist in the end. Over this humanity, made in the image of God and alone constituting nature, there is superimposed what G. calls “the coats of skin.” These coats of skin in man are the animal nature, that is, whatever he has in common with the animals: “sexual union, conception, birth, nourishment, adolescence, maturity, old age, sickness, death” (PG 46, 148 D). It is not a question of the body as such. Indeed, G., unlike Origen, considers that being composed of intelligible and sensible elements is part of human nature (and this shows that G.’s conception is the biblical opposition of sarx and pneuma, that is, of man vivified by divine energies, which is his nature, or deprived of these energies, which is his misery). It is rather a question of all that constitutes the mortal condition, the corruptibility, whereas the true nature of man is the incorruptibility of the risen body (PG 44, 184 B).
But then what is the cause of this state of corruptibility contrary to human nature? The most remote cause is man’s freedom. God could not create man in his image without giving him that freedom which is one of the characteristics of the divine nature. And in this regard it may be noted that after Origen, and before St. Bernard, G. makes the essence of the likeness to God consist more in freedom than in intelligence (PG 44, 184 C-D). But, in another passage, every created being, by its very essence, is subject to change (Oratio catechetica magna, VI, 2-5). Consequently, created freedom was capable of separating itself from God. More immediately, the cause of sin was the jealousy of the angel, to whom the universe had been entrusted and who was jealous on seeing a created being made in the image of God appear in his kingdom. Here we encounter the traditional idea, of Hebrew origin, of the relation of the angels to the cosmos. The Angel of the earth is disturbed at the appearance of Adam in his kingdom, just as the Prince of the world will be disturbed at the appearance of the new Adam.
Since then, man’s soul having turned away from God, who is its life, his body was stripped of incorruptibility and clothed in coats of skin. This clothing— and this is important in G.’s thought— if it is a consequence of sin, is also less a punishment than a remedy. And we find again the great original idea of the medicinal character of penalties (cf. J. Daniélou, Origène cit., p. 727 sq.). This presents two aspects. On the one hand, in De Mortuis, G. explains that the coats of skin give man the possibility of turning freely to God (PG 46, 522 D) and allow him to experience sensible goods and to return voluntarily to the desire for his first beatitude” (PG 46, 524 B).
In the Oratio catechetica magna, G. also adduces another reason: the coats of skin, that is, the mortal condition, by allowing the dissolution of man’s sensible part, into which evil had been mixed, make it possible to eliminate the latter and restore man to his purity. For this reason man returns to the earth by decomposing like a clay vessel, so that, once freed from the impurity which he now carries within himself, he may be restored by the resurrection to his primitive form (Oratio catechetica magna, III). The coats of skin, then, are foreign to human nature; they have been applied to it with a view to provident solicitude.
There remains one final question: to know whether historically man was first created without the coats of skin, that is, without sexuality and mortality, in a state similar to that of the risen bodies: God, foreseeing man’s sin, would have created him from the beginning in the corruptible state which was to be the means of his restoration (PG 44, 189 C-D).
In this perspective G. interprets the distinction between the two accounts of the creation of man in Genesis. Already Philo had seen in them two stages of creation. The man made in the image, the first created, is the preexistent archetype in the intelligible world; the “male and female” man who comes after is the one that appears on earth. G. takes up the opposition, but discards any idea of real preexistence, and thus eliminates what of Philo Origen had retained; he sees in the man made in the image the preexistence of the divine thought of perfect humanity, which will in fact exist only at the end of time (PG 44, 185 B), so much so that it is the “male and female” man who, according to the intentional order, is chronologically first (v. BALDASSARRE, op. cit., pp. 25-29; J. Daniélou, Platonisme ecc., cit., pp. 52-55).
The two aspects to which G. gives particular attention in the fall of man are on the one hand the role of the demon and on the other the mortal condition. Redemption considered as a victory of Christ over the demon is, in the early Church, a traditional theme. It involves two moments: the demon, who from the temptation onward saw in Jesus a power dangerous to his dominion over the world, thinks, on the evening of Good Friday, that he has him finally in his power. But on Easter morning Christ shatters the gates of death, thus also freeing all those whom the demon held in his power. In this way what appeared to the demon as the means of his triumph becomes the instrument of his definitive dispossession.
The second aspect of human decline was corruptibility and death. It has been seen that this was not only a punishment but also, and at the same time, a means of restoration, in that it allowed the elimination of sin. Nevertheless this was purely negative and did not restore man to his incorruptibility. The redemptive work of Christ was, by his death, to unite himself to man in a state of dissolution, so that, by his Resurrection, he might reunite the separated parts, recomposing them into an indestructible union (Oratio catechetica magna, XVI, 7).
It may be noted in this connection that Redemption appears to G. identical with the Incarnation. For the Incarnation is the union of the Word not only with human nature but with fallen nature, the sarx. This state of decay is fully realized in death (Oratio catechetica magna, XXXII, 3). Therefore the Incarnation-Redemption is the union of the Word with man in the state of a corpse in order to raise him up.
It will have been noted that the Resurrection of Christ is “the starting point of the resurrection of man.” For the Resurrection of Christ is the principle of that of humanity, and this must be understood, in G., in a very realistic sense: no theologian indeed has insisted more on the ontological solidarity of men among themselves. The image of God is for him the concrete totality of men, constituting one body (PG 44, 185 C), which preexists in the thought of God and will not be brought to birth until the end of time.
Consequently Christ could not unite himself to one member of human nature without this having repercussions on all humanity. G. expresses this idea in the Contra Apollinarem with notable symbols. Human nature is the lost sheep, far from
Spiritual creatures and that Christ, the Good Shepherd, came to seek (PG 44, 1153; see also 44, 546), thereby indicating the Incarnation. In another passage he compares fallen humanity to a broken reed: Christ cannot bring the two pieces together at a single point without their being restored in their entirety (PG 44, 1260 A-C). Some have maintained that GREGORY held by a hypostatic union of the Word with all humanity. But various texts show that this is not the case, but rather a very realistic sense of the solidarity of men within human nature (see L. Malevez, L'Eglise dans le Christ, in Recherches de science religieuse, 25 [1935], pp. 260-80; see also S. Gonzales, El realismo platónico de s. Gregorio de Nisa, in Gregorianum, 20 [1939], pp. 189-206).
How can man appropriate this resurrection, which Christ has merited for all humanity? Through the Sacraments. In keeping with ancient tradition, the sacramental theology of GREGORY comprises three main aspects. The first is the explanation of Old Testament figures: the most important text in this regard is the sermon On the Baptism of Christ (PG 44, 577-600). The second aspect is proper mystagogy, or explanation of the symbolism of the rites: here the most interesting is the sermon Adversus eos qui Baptismum differunt (PG 46, 416-32; see also J. Daniélou, Le mystère du culte dans les sermons de St Grégoire de Nysse, Festgabe Casel 1950, p. 25 ff.). Finally, the most properly theological exposition is found above all in the Oratio catechetica magna.
For GREGORY, Baptism is first of all a sacramental imitation of Christ dead and risen, which effects real change (Oratio catechetica magna, XXV, 6). Just as Christ’s death purified nature from the admixture that had corrupted it and His Resurrection restored humanity to its integrity, so too does Baptism effect the same change, though only in a proleptic manner. For evil to disappear completely, it would be necessary “that in this imitation one could undergo a complete death” (Oratio catechetica magna, XXXV, 10).
Here GREGORY’s baptismal theory is linked to biblical depictions of liberation, in particular the crossing of the Red Sea (PG 46, 589 D; see also J. Daniélou, Sacramentum futurum, Paris 1950, pp. 152-76). In another passage another symbol is encountered, the Jordan represented as a paradisiacal river: this emphasizes regeneration. Baptism is presented as a return to Paradise (PG 46, 417 D, 600 A-B; see also J. Daniélou, ibid., pp. 13-20). Access to Baptism signifies “that Paradise is once more accessible to man and that the flaming sword no longer bars the way” (PG 46, 600 A-B). The change of vesture—stripping off the garment of fig leaves, the consequence of the Fall, and putting on the tunic of incorruptibility (PG 46, 420 C, 600 B). The Jordan is also considered a figure of Baptism, according to common tradition, both in the episode of Naaman (PG 46, 592 C) and in the episode of the entry into the Promised Land (PG 46, 421 A).
Yet GREGORY’s originality lies in the connection he establishes between the Jordan and Paradise. Taking up a theme perhaps exploited earlier by the Gnostics, he contrasts two rivers that flow into Paradise with the Jordan that ascends toward it and has its source in Christ: “Hasten to my Jordan. It does not have its source in Paradise nor does it empty into the Sea of Tiberias, but has its source in Christ and, descending from him, covers the whole earth. And it empties into Paradise, flowing against the current of the four rivers that issue from it and introducing into Paradise men regenerated by the Spirit” (PG 46, 420 C-D; see also F. J. Dölger, Der Durchzug durch den Jordan als Sinnbild der christlichen Taufe, in Antike und Christentum, II, Münster in V. 1930, pp. 76-79). The true Jordan, which covers the whole earth, is the baptismal water, consecrated by Christ’s Baptism, which is like an immense river carrying men into Paradise.
GREGORY regards the Eucharist as the realization of the eschatological banquet foretold in the Old Testament. The three essential Old Testament texts are Prov 9:5 ff., Ps 22:5, and Cant 5:1 (see J. Daniélou, Les repas de la Bible et leur signification, in La Maison-Dieu, 18, pp. 8-12). GREGORY interprets them in an eucharistic sense. The character of wisdom in Prov appears interpreted in various places in an eucharistic sense (PG 44, 772 A, 956 D). Of Psalm 22, whose importance in ancient sacramental liturgy is well known, the sermon In Ascensionem Christi gives a remarkable commentary (PG 46, 692 A-B). Finally, the invitation of the Bridegroom in the Canticle to the wedding feast is also interpreted in this sense (PG 44, 989 C).
The theological explanation GREGORY gives of the Eucharist is also eschatological. Just as the soul is regenerated by Baptism, the body, subject to corruption, needs a remedy that will grant it immortality. This remedy is the glorious body of Christ, become for us a source of life. To penetrate into our own, the glorious body of Christ takes on the appearance of bread and wine. This realistic doctrine of the Eucharist follows in the footsteps of Ignatius of Antioch, Irenaeus, and Athanasius.
GREGORY does not consider the Eucharist only as a sacrament but also as a sacrifice. In this regard one must cite a notable passage on which Fr. de la Taille laid great stress in his Mysterium fidei (Paris 1921, p. 43). GREGORY wishes to demonstrate the voluntary character of Christ’s death, that is, its sacrificial meaning. He explains, therefore, that this death was already accomplished during the Supper, since only a dead victim could be distributed to the Apostles to be eaten. Thus the offering of the Supper appears as a sacramental anticipation of the sacrifice of the Cross (PG 46, 611 C).
The spiritual theology of St. GREGORY, certainly the most important part of his work, is a clear consequence of his sacramental theology. It is, under the action of the Sacraments, the outworking of the divinized powers of the soul. According to an image dear to him, GREGORY compares the virtues of the soul vivified by the Sacraments of the Church to the trees of Paradise. This spiritual theology is diffused throughout GREGORY’s commentaries (for the separation and ordering of the principal themes, as well as for a fuller exposition, see J. Daniélou, Platonisme etc., cited above).
GREGORY distinguishes in the spiritual life three great ways: and this is nothing other than an extension, a sequel to what is found in Origen. But the expression of these three ways is quite different from what is generally understood; for GREGORY represents the spiritual life as a journey from light to darkness.
The first way, that of light, corresponds to beginners. By contrast with the darkness of sin, the supernatural life is illumination. This way is characterized by the purification of all elements foreign to the soul and by the restoration of the image of God within her. The first aspect consists in the struggle against passion. By this GREGORY does not mean sensible dispositions in themselves, which can only be eliminated by the resurrection, but their perversion. This struggle against the passions is also an interiorization of the soul through recollection and unification by rejection of all sensible things (see J. Daniélou, op. cit., pp. 30-110). Thereby the image of God is restored. Its characteristics, for GREGORY, are above all apátheia, that is, detachment from all vain concern, and parrhēsía, the filial confidence regained with the disappearance of shame and fear (cf. E. Peterson, Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte von παράγκα, in Reinhold Seeberg Festschrift, Leipzig 1929).
This purification and unification of the soul, beyond making it more like God, allows it to have a first knowledge of Him within itself. Such knowledge of God in the mirror of the soul characterizes the second way, compared to a cloud because “proceeding from visible things to invisible things, the soul sees sensible realities grow dark and becomes accustomed to the contemplation of hidden things” (PG 44, 1000 C). At this point one enters properly into the mystical order. It must moreover be noted that the three ways are not exclusive of one another. Each is defined by a predominant aspect, yet which is also found in the other two: knowledge characterizes the second, but was already adumbrated in the first and is found again in the third.
In what does what G. calls knowledge of God in the mirror of the soul consist? It is an essential aspect of his mysticism (J. Daniélou, op. cit., pp. 221-74; cf. also A. Lieske, Die Theologie der Christusmystik Gregors von Nyssa, in Zeitschrift f. katholische Theologie, 70 [1948], pp. 12-16). It is not an experience that the soul has of its own substance in a Platonic sense. As E. von Ivanka has rightly noted (Von Platonismus zur Theorie der Mystik, in Scholastik, 31 [1936], pp. 192-93), it is rather an experience of grace, which G. expresses through the doctrine of spiritual senses, inherited from Origen and greatly developed by him. The essential experience of grace is a knowledge of God. But the crucial point is that it is not a knowledge of the essence of God, which is inaccessible; it is rather an experience of the presence of God, which G. defines with the expression ἀληθής παροδός, a feeling of presence (PG 44, 1001 B-C).
The foundation of this experience, which gives it its privileged character tied to the essence of Christianity, is the presence of the Trinity in the soul through grace. The divinization of the soul is indeed a divine action that entails a special nearness of God to it: G. compares it to the presence of a bundle of myrrh without which the perfume would evaporate from the garments (PG 44, 828 A). Grace is like the perfume that betrays the nard, like the ray that reflects the sun, like the taste that manifests the substance. Thus, knowledge in the mirror is indeed an experience of God and not of the soul, but it is a mediated knowledge, in which the presence of God is known through His action upon the soul (PG 44, 821 A).
The soul can thus have an experience of the presence of God within II. At the outset, this experience is sufficient to fill II. But the more the soul progresses, the more it discovers that God infinitely transcends all that it can know.
This introduces the third way, knowledge of God in darkness: it consists in understanding that true knowledge of God lies in understanding that He is incomprehensible, enveloped on all sides by His incomprehensibility as by a darkness (PG 44, 377 A). This discovery at first casts the soul into despair, until it understands that, in G.’s words, “to find God is to seek Him unceasingly” (PG 46, 97 A; cf. also J. Daniélou, Essai sur la psychologie des mystiques, II, Paris, pp. 105-111) and that “in ever advancing in the search lies the true enjoyment of the Beloved” (PG 44, 1037 C).
Up to this point, theorists had conceived knowledge of God as a possession. This is the tendency of Clement and Origen, culminating in Evagrius Ponticus. G. instead makes it a dispossession. Instead of bringing God down to the soul, he raises the soul to God; in this way he passes from an intellectualistic spirituality to the ecstatic spirituality of love (cf. J. Hausherr, Les grands courants de la spiritualité orientale, in Orient. christ. per., 1 [1935], pp. 111-38). True mystical experience is, beyond all intellect, in darkness, the union in love. G. expresses this with the terms “sober intoxication” (cf. H. Lewy, Sobria ebbrezza, pp. 132-37), “wakeful sleep,” and above all “spiritual eros.” It would be mistaken to derive Gregorian eros from Platonic eros, as A. Nygren (Eros und Agape, 2 [1937], p. 91 ff.) and G. Horn (L'amour divin, note sur le mot «eros» dans St Grégoire de Nysse, in Revue d'ascétique et mystique, 6 [1925], pp. 378-89) have done. G. himself defined what he means by eros with the expression intense charity (ἐπιστάμενον ἀγάπη; PG 44, 1048 C). Eros is thus charity in its violent form, the madness of love, which tears the soul from itself to hurl it into God (cf. J. Daniélou, Essai, cit., pp. 211-20).
There remains to speak of the eschatology of St. G. Two questions are especially important. The first is that of the resurrection of the body. We have seen what part the doctrine of the incorruptibility of the body played in the thought of G. and in that of Irenaeus. In this regard G. stands in the great tradition of the Church. This is especially evident in his position regarding Origen; the latter had taught the return of man to a state of pure spirituality such as he had before falling into flesh. Against this error G. takes up the positions of Methodius of Olympus, affirming not only that the resurrected man will have a body, but also that this body will be composed of the same material particles that constituted him during his earthly existence (PG 54, 225 B - 228 B).
More difficult is the question of apocatastasis. There are certainly many texts of G. that teach that at the end of time evil will entirely disappear (PG 46, 526 A) and that the pleroma of spiritual creatures will be reconstituted (PG 46, 135 A). This is based for him both on biblical texts (notably 1 Cor 15:29) and on the philosophical consideration that evil, having had a beginning, must have an end. The orthodoxy of G. on this point was already debated in antiquity, defended by St. Maximus and St. Barsanuphius (PG 86, 898 B-C and 90, 795 B). The proof that some texts were questionable is that attempts were made to suppress them. Thus, a passage from the Life of Moses to which Germanus of Constantinople refers is not found in the manuscript on which the PG edition is based, and was recovered from a manuscript in Venice (J. Daniélou, L'apocatastase chez st Grégoire de Nysse, in Recherches de science religieuse, 30 [1940], pp. 329-37). Similarly, M. Pellegrino rejects the hypothesis of interpolation for the texts of De anima et resurrectione [Il platonismo di S. G. Nisseno, in Rev. de philos. néo-scholast., 41 [1938], p. 465 ff.].
But it must be noted that the texts of St. G. do not at all have the character of those of Origen. He does not affirm the salvation of wicked angels, nor does he consider, as Origen does, that eternal hell is a pedagogical fiction for sinners, while perfect souls are granted knowledge of the doctrine of universal salvation. G. simultaneously affirms the total disappearance of evil and the eternal condemnation of sinners: the question is how these two things are compatible. Now, he has expressed himself on this without any possible ambiguity: “sin will disappear and be reduced to nothing, and with no malice remaining anywhere, the Kingdom of the Lord will extend from one end to the other. But men will remain in the state in which they are now, choosing between good and evil. Thus, he who has fallen from the City on high will be punished by being deprived of goods” (PG 44, 605 D).
G. insists above all on the restoration of all creation to its integrity. This signifies at the same time the salvation of human nature as the substantial totality of men and the restoration of the totality of the spiritual creation from which humanity had fallen. But if human nature is to be thus restored, nevertheless some individuals may escape this restoration. Only, the question of individual salvation— and this is very Greek— interests G. less than the salvation of nature.
GREGORIO, bishop of Ostia, saint. — The year and place of his birth are unknown, nor is the year of his death known with precision; it probably occurred on 9 May 1044 at Logroño (Lat. Lucernium) in Navarre (Spain). He was a Benedictine monk and abbot of SS. Cosmas and Damian in Mica Aurea in Rome (998-1004).
He was elected bishop of Ostia probably under Benedict IX, around 1033-34. Some consider him to have been librarian of the Roman Church, while others say he was only chancellor. He was certainly a man of great learning and sanctity. In 1039, Pope Benedict IX sent him as legate to the Kingdom of Navarre in Spain. On one occasion when the kingdom was troubled by locusts, he freed the land with the sign of the cross, for which reason he is still invoked against locusts and other harmful insects.