BEATIFIC VISION. - It is the intuitive knowledge of God, reserved for souls who have passed to the other life in the state of Grace (v.) and completely purified of every imperfection (v. PURGATORIO).
(from V. Laroquais, Les livres d'Heures mss. de la bibliothèque Nationale, Paris 1887, vol. 11)
BEATIFIC VISION. - The beatific vision. Miniature from a Book of Hours, according to the liturgical use of Paris (15th century) - Paris, National Library, ms. lat. 9471, f. 143r.
I. EXISTENCE OF THE BEATIFIC VISION
1. Documents of Revelation
In the Old Testament there is only a remote preparation for the doctrine of the intuitive vision of God, reserved for perfect souls (A. Van Hove, Praeparatur in V. T. revelatio dogmatis Visionis beatificae, in Collectanea Mechlinensis, 35 [1950], pp. 177-180); in the New Testament, on the other hand, its full enunciation is found: "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God" (Mt. 5:8). "Their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father who is in heaven" (Mt. 18:10), since subsequently (Mt. 22:30) Jesus, affirming that at the moment of the resurrection the elect will be like the angels, implicitly asserts their elevation to the intuitive knowledge of God.
The classic text is in 1 Cor. 13:9-12: "For now we see through a glass, in an enigma, but then we shall see face to face; now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I am known." St. Paul affirms here that charity will never fail even in eternal life, whereas knowledge, although charismatic (προφητεῖαι, γλῶσσαι, γνῶσις), will cease. Indeed, the knowledge of the future life will be absolutely superior to that of this life, since while present knowledge is partial (τὸ ἐκ μέρους), mediated (ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ), obscure (ἐν αἰνίγματι), the future knowledge will be total (τὸ τέλειον), face to face (πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον), that is, immediate and clear (cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum [a Deo]; cf. also 2 Cor. 5:7 ff.).
Extremely clear is 1 Jn. 3:1-2: "Beloved, even now we are children of God, and it has not yet been manifested what we shall be. We know that when it is manifested, we shall be like him (to God), because we shall see him as he is" (videbimus eum sicuti est: "ὅτι ὀψόμεθα αὐτὸν καθώς ἐστιν").
Even with the different exegetical nuance regarding apparuerit (referred by some to the parousia of Jesus Christ, by others to the full manifestation of adoptive sonship: cf. F. Ceuppens, Theologia Biblica: De Deo Uno et Trina, Rome 1938, p. 120; P. De Ambroggi, Le Epistole cattoliche, Rome 1949, pp. 245-47), the text offers the most precise testimony on the intuitive vision of the divine essence (sicuti est). And in the Apocalypse: "He showed me the holy city Jerusalem... having the glory of God" (21:11): "And they shall see his face (ὄψονται τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ) and his name on their foreheads" (22:4).
Tradition falls within this luminous furrow; St. Ignatius of Antioch desires martyrdom in order to reach God (Ὅκοῦ ἐπιτυχεῖν: Rom. 4:1) and therefore implores the faithful of Rome not to hinder his death, through which he will obtain "pure light" (καθαρὸν φῶς: Rom. 6:2). Theophilus of Antioch assures Autolycus that, once the corruption of the body is laid aside, he will see God, according to the merits acquired in life (Ad Autolycum, I, 7: PG 6, 1036). St. Irenaeus presents a first precise and complete doctrinal synthesis: "Those who see God are in God and participate in his splendor. Therefore those who see God are made partakers of life. Now this participation consists in the vision of God and in the enjoyment of his goodness" (Adv. Haeres., IV, 20: PG 7, 1032).
Clement of Alexandria (Paedagogus, I, 6: PG 8, 280) adds an important clarification: through baptismal illumination one will be able to intuit (ἐποπτεύεται) the holy and saving light, which will permit one to see God, in a manifestation "face to face" (col. 292). By now Christian teaching is focused on the "visio Dei"; individual authors do nothing but express the same concept in different ways (Origen, In Io., I, 116: PG 14, 49); St. Cyprian (De zelo et livore, 18: PL 4, 460); St. Basil (Ep., 8, 7: PG 32, 257); St. Gregory of Nazianzus (Oratio, 28, 17: PG 36, 48); St. Hilary (In Ps. 118, 58: PL 9, 555); St. Ambrose (De bono mortis, 11: PL 14, 562); St. Augustine (Ep. 147, 8: PL 33, 605).
2. Deviations and errors
After Eunomius (d. c. 395) affirmed the perfect intelligibility of God, even in this life and by natural faculties alone: "Tam Deum novi quam meipsum, immo non tam meipsum quam Deum" (St. Epiphanius, Haeres., 76: PG 13, 516; cf. X. Le Bachelet, Eunomius, in DThC, V, coll. 1507-11), there arose among the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers of the East a current of anti-Eunomian polemicists who, insisting on the Pauline text "(Deum) nullus hominum vidit, nec videre potest" (1 Tim. 6:16), held that not even in the future life is the vision of the divine essence possible, and therefore asserted that all biblical and patristic phrases alluding to a "visio Dei" are to be interpreted as a vision of a reality emanating from God, just as the human eye, unable to fix the sun, endures only its ray. The first to open this path seems to have been St. John Chrysostom, who although he had affirmed several times, outside of any polemic, the intuitive vision of God by the blessed (cf. Ad Theodorum, 1, 11: PG 47, 292; Hom. 15 in Io. 1, 118: PG 59, 99), nevertheless in the famous Hom. 3 de incomprehensibili, 3: PG 48, 722, polemicizing against Eunomius, asserted: "Cur obvelant (Angeli) facies suas alasque protendunt (Is., 6, 2)? Cur, inquam, nisi quia fulgur a throno progrediens, radiosque illos ferre non possunt? Atque non ipsa sine temperamento (συγκατάβασις) lucem, neque ipsam puram substantiam videbant, sed quae videbantur temperamentum erat." While Chrysostom, with these ambiguous phrases, was probably alluding only to the "incomprehensibility" of God's nature on the part of all creatures, both angels and men, Theodoret sharply opposed the vision of God's substance to that of the divine glory and therefore explicitly affirmed that the angels do not contemplate the essence of God, but a certain splendor adapted to their nature (ἀλλὰ δόξαν τινὰ τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει συμμετρουμένην, Eranistes, 1: PG 83, 49). He was followed by various Eastern authors, who formed a doctrinal current parallel and opposed to the orthodox one: Basil of Seleucia: PG 85, 454; Anastasius Sinaita, Ὁδηγός, c. 7: PG 89, 132; Oecumenius, In I Io. 3, 2: PG 119, 648; followed by Theophylact and especially by Gregory Palamas (v.), who on the distinction between the divine essence and the splendor of the essence (Taborite light) created an entire theological system, which deeply agitated the Greek Church in the 14th century (cf. M. Jugie, Palamas [in DThC, XI, coll. 1735-76; id., Palamite (controverse), ibid., XI, coll. 1777-1818]).
The error penetrated the West as well. St. Gregory already noted it (Moralia, 18, 54; PL 76, 93). But the doctrinal deviation gained greater following after Hilduin and Scotus Eriugena translated, in the 9th century, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, who in De divinis nominibus, ch. 1, § 2 (PG 3, 588-89) accentuates, with evident exaggeration, the transcendence of God considered absolutely unattainable by any nature. Areopagitic and Greek tinges are found in authors otherwise orthodox, such as Alan of Lille (Distinctiones dictionum theologicarum: PL 210, 971), Alexander of Hales, Hugh of St. Cher, the Quaestio duacensis (cf. H. F. Dondaine, L'objet et le medium de la vision béatifique chez les théologiens du XIIIe siècle, in Rech. de théol. anc. et méd., 19 [1952], pp. 60-130). This current of thought clashed around 1240 with the common tradition and provoked the following year the condemnation, by the bishop of Paris, of the following proposition: "Divina essentia in se nec ab homine nec ab angelo videtur et videbitur." St. Thomas constantly recalls this theory, which he takes care to refute thoroughly (e.g., in De veritate, q. 8, a. 1; cf. Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 12, a. 1iii).
This doctrinal deviation reappeared in the West in the 14th century, when Benedict XII condemned in 1341 the 3rd error attributed to the Armenians (cf. F. Jansen, La cinquième erreur arménienne, in Eph. theol. Lovan., 16 [1939], pp. 94-100).
3. Definitions of the Church
The erroneous personal opinion of John XXII (v. JUDGMENT OF GOD), according to which the beatific vision would be deferred for the souls of the just until the resurrection of the flesh, was in part shared by the Friars Minor, but was violently attacked by the Dominicans, especially by the Englishman Thomas Waleys, who for this suffered trials and imprisonment (cf. Th. Käppeli, Le procès contre Thomas Waleys O. P. Études et documents Rome 1936). Benedict XII issued in 1336 the dogmatic constitution Benedictus Deus, in which is contained the clearest definition concerning the beatific vision: "By apostolic authority we define that the souls of all the Saints... even before the resurrection of the bodies and the final judgment, were, are and will be in heaven... and see the divine essence, a vision intuitive and face to face, no creature mediating in the manner of an object seen, but the divine essence immediately showing itself to them nakedly, clearly and openly" (Denz-U, 530); a definition substantially repeated by the Council of Florence in 1439 (Denz-U, 633), by Gregory XIII (ibid., 870), and by Benedict XIV (ibid., 875). Pius XII in the encyclical Mystici Corporis (29 June 1943) inserted a notable passage concerning the object of the beatific vision: "It will be granted to contemplate the Father, the Son and the Divine Spirit with the eye of the mind, activated by a heavenly light, and through the processions of the Divine Persons to rejoice forever and ever in closest proximity to and in the most similar joy to that with which the blessed and Most Holy and undivided Trinity is blessed" (AAS, 35 [1943] p. 232).
II. ESSENCE OF THE BEATIFIC VISION
1. Essential beatitude
Beatitude is that state in which, through the presence of every good, man reaches his perfection (cf. Boethius: "Status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus". De consolatione philosophiae, III, 2), fulfilling his every desire (cf. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 2, a. 8: "bonum perfectum, quod totaliter quietat appetitum"). None of created things can constitute man's beatitude; therefore man's happiness must be placed in God (beatitudo obiectiva, cf. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 2, aa. 1-8).
Man reaches beatitude when, by acts corresponding to his nature, he is united irrevocably with God (cf. Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 26, a. 3; 1a-2ae, q. 3, a. 4). Since man is essentially intellect and will, only in the actualization of these spiritual powers (cf. Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 3, a. 3) can he realize his union with God (beatitudo subiectiva). Therefore at the moment when, actualizing the vital dynamism of his spiritual being, he knows God intuitively and loves him with a love proportionate to that full knowledge, rejoicing intimately in such possession, man is blessed. Accordingly knowledge (visio), love (dilectio) and enjoyment (fruitio) are the essential moments of man's subjective happiness, elevated to the supernatural order (cf. Sum. Theol., 1a-2a, q. 4, a. 3).
For centuries it has been debated which of these three acts is the principal one, almost the "formal constituent" of beatitude. Peter Auriol gave preference to fruitio (cf. M. Siuri, Theologia scholastica de novissimis, Valencia 1707, tr. 3, cap. 4), St. Bonaventure (III Sent., d. 31, a. 3, q. 4, cf. F. Rauti, Dottrina della beatitudine in s. Bonaventura, Rome 1949) and Scotus (IV Sent., d. 49, q. 5) to dilectio, St. Thomas to visio (Sum. Theol., 1a-2a, q. 3, a. 4; q. 4, a. 1-2; cf. Dante, Paradiso, XXVIII, 106-11; T. Cucchi, Se la beatitudine sia operazione dell'intelletto o della volontà, Rome 1889). The holy Doctor in the admirable Expositio in Evang. Johannis, cap. 17, lect. 1., gives this speculative formulation of his doctrine: "Among all vital operations the highest is that of the intellect (altius est opus intelligentiae), that is, understanding; therefore the intellectual act is the most perfect form of life... Since intelligence is life and understanding is living, it follows that to understand (intelligere) an eternal thing is to live the eternal life. Therefore the Lord says that eternal life consists in seeing God (haec est vita aeterna ut cognoscant), that is, principally, as in its essence (principaliter secundum totam suam substantiam). Love, on the other hand, impels toward the vision and is also a complement of it; indeed from the complacency that derives from the divine fruitio produced by charity, there emanates as it were a complement and an ornament of beatitude, which formally however consists in the vision: "videbimus sicuti est". Even as a young man (In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2) he had proposed another no less profound reason: "Since God is the ultimate end not immanent in the human will, it is not possible that an act of the will be intrinsic to the end; rather that act will be intrinsic to the end by means of which for the first time such a relationship with God is established, whereby the will reaches its full satisfaction. This act is the intellectual vision of God, since through it there is realized as it were a contact of God with the intelligence; indeed every thing known is in the knower insofar as it is known."
The doctrine of St. Thomas is founded in Sacred Scripture, which frequently identifies happiness and eternal life with the vision of God. The Fathers too emphasize the intellectualistic character of eternal happiness (St. Augustine: "Man's beatitude consists in having the highest contemplation (of God)" [Contra Julianum, I, III, n. 88: PG 76, 627]). Reason confirms and clarifies these elements; indeed beatitude essentially cannot be placed anywhere but in that act by which the possession of the Supreme Good, which makes one happy, is obtained directly and for its own sake. Since love, from which fruitio emanates, although it is an act that of itself tends to the union of the beloved reality, is nevertheless not capable of making it present, one must concede the primacy to the act of vision, which immediately and inseparably joins the human intellect with God, the summum intelligibile; from this union in the apex of the mind there follow, as necessary effects, dilectio and gaudium. Such immediate conjunction of the intellect with God comes about through an elevation of all the elements (cognitive power, act of knowledge, object known), from which the noetic structure of man emerges.
a) The "lumen gloriae". — It is a supernatural power that strengthens the cognitive faculty, making it capable of fixing upon and penetrating intentionally into the infinite essence of God. The necessity of the lumen gloriae was defined by the Council of Vienne (1311) against the Beghards, who asserted "quod quaelibet intellectualis natura in seipsa naturaliter est beata, quodque anima non indiget lumine gloriae ipsam elevante ad Deum videndum et eo beate fruendum" (Denz-U, 745). From the solemn condemnation of this proposition it follows that the Church presents as a truth of faith the existence of the lumen gloriae in the beatific vision. This truth is implicitly contained in Sacred Scripture: "claritas Dei illuminabit eam... Deus illuminabit illos" (Rev. 21, 23); "Similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est" (I Jn. 3, 2); there is an allusion to a deiformitas (similes erimus) as a disposition elevating the intellect to the vision of the divine essence (videbimus sicuti est); Ps. 35, 10 (in lumine tuo videbimus lumen) and Ps. 55, 13 (ut placeam coram Deo in lumine viventium) were much exploited by the Fathers and the Scholastics.
The patristic tradition developed the seeds contained in the Bible and arrived at a clearer formulation of the truth, for example: Origen, De principiis, I, 1: PG 11, 121: "What else is the light of God (lumen Dei) than a divine power, by which whoever is illuminated knows thoroughly the truth of things, indeed knows God himself, that is, absolute truth?" (cf. also St. Epiphanius, Haeres., 70: PG 42, 349; St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 55, n. 20: PL 36, 661). It was St. Thomas who, availing himself of these elements and of the timid attempts of his predecessors, constructed a definitive doctrinal synthesis. Any being elevated to produce an effect that surpasses the possibility of its nature is necessarily prepared for this by a proportionate strengthening. Since no created intellect has a natural aptitude for seeing the essence of God, this capacity must be conferred upon it by an interior and supernatural increase of intellectual power, which constitutes an interior light, called the light of glory (cf. Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 12, a. 5). Accordingly the lumen gloriae is a permanent quality communicated by God which, intrinsically modifying the intelligence, perfects it, elevates it and renders it capable of seeing intuitively the intimate nature of God (ibid., a. 2). It must not therefore be conceived as an increase of visual power determined by an external instrument, but as an interior strengthening that perfects and elevates the optic nerve, so that it may better see and penetrate knowable reality. By St. Thomas it is called "fortificatio" (Contra Gentes, III, 53) and "confortatio" (ibid., cap. 54; Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 12, a. 2 and a. 5, ad 2) of the intellect, that is, an ontological invigoration and therefore intrinsic to the intellectual power itself, whereby this power attains to contact and intentional union with the divine essence, as with an infinite "forma intelligibilis" (cf. De verit., q. 10, a. 11), so that the blessed become deiform (Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 12, a. 5).
In the light of these limpid principles, the various theories advanced by other theologians over the course of the centuries vanish as insufficient or exaggerated. Certainly excessive are the explanations of Hugh of St. Victor (an act of uncreated vision communicated intrinsically to the created intellect, cf. I. Kathschaler, Eschatologia, Regensburg 1878, p. 129), of Henry of Ghent (transformation of the soul into God, in such a way that it becomes capable of receiving his essence intrinsically: Quodlibet 13, q. 12), of Thomassin (the person of the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as, uniting itself in a manner analogous to the hypostatic union with the minds of the blessed, penetrates them and irradiates them with divine light: De Deo, I, VI, cap. 16).
Against these excesses Petavius reacted, identifying the lumen gloriae with the divine essence insofar as it manifests itself to the intellect of the blessed (De Deo, I, VI, cap. 16); an explanation, however, that errs by defect, since the Council of Vienne distinguishes between the lumen gloriae and the divine essence (Denz-U, 475). Moreover, the best theological tradition has always considered the light of glory as a created supernatural reality and therefore distinct from God.
b) The absence of intelligible species in the beatific vision. — In natural knowledge there are two representations of the known object, called the impressed species and the expressed species. The impressed species is a similitudo which the res cognoscenda impresses upon the cognitive power, by which this power is fecundated and rendered capable of knowing the object that has thus become present to it (cf. Contra Gentes, II, 77; 4, 11; Quodlibet, 7, q. 1, a. 1). The expressed species, on the other hand, is the inner word (verbum mentale), which the intellect forms in knowing and in which it contemplates the known object. Accordingly the impressed species is the similitudo of the object insofar as it is knowable, the expressed species is the similitudo of the same object insofar as it is known. In the beatific vision the impressed species is absolutely superfluous (and therefore does not occur), because God is supremely present to the blessed soul and perfectly knowable (Sum. Theol., 3a, q. 9, a. 3, ad 3; 1a, q. 12, a. 2; cf. Contra Gentes, I, 46; Compendium theologiae, II, 9); it is furthermore impossible, because it is repugnant that the infinite essence of God be qualitatively represented by a finite similitudo (Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 12, a. 2). For the same reason the impressed species is impossible in the beatific vision. Not for this reason, however, is the verbum mentis excluded, insofar as it is the vital, interior and conscious act by which the intellect, almost "per contractum," unites itself immediately with the divine essence, without implying or producing any intermediate representation. The divine essence therefore, present through itself and united ut forma intelligibilis to the mind of the blessed, eminently supplies every impressed and expressed species (Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 12, a. 2, ad 3; Compendium theologiae, II, 9).
c) The object of the beatific vision. — All the blessed see what is formally and necessarily found in the Supreme Being, that is, God in his unity of nature and trinity of persons (Council of Florence: Denz-U, 588); they know thoroughly the divine attributes and their intimate reconciliation in the eminentia deitatis (primary object).
Everything that is found in God virtually (existing and possible creatures) and freely (the decrees of his will concerning creatures) can be the secondary object of the beatific vision. Contrary to Vásquez (De Deo, disp. 50), who excludes any knowledge of realities that are not formally and necessarily divine, and to those theologians who affirm that the blessed know all real and possible creatures and all the free divine decrees, St. Thomas holds that the elect see only what has a relationship to them, insofar as they can be considered: a) as individuals in the supernatural order: they therefore know all the mysteries of the faith (Incarnation, Church, Sacraments, Grace), the ways that Providence has followed to lead them to salvation, and whatever is granted with this act of sovereign benevolence; b) as public and social persons: each one sees everything that was connected with his own activity carried out on earth: thus a pope knows clearly whatever pertains to the whole Church, a Saint founder of an Order knows whatever concerns the development and life of his institute, parents know whatever relates to their own children, etc.; c) as parts of the universe: the blessed therefore know the intimate reality of all created things, from the nature of an Angel to the essence of a flower, that is, of everything that relates to the harmony of the visible and invisible universe (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 89, a. 8; 1ª-2ªe, q. 10, a. 2; Contra Gentes, III, 59; cf. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XX, 21: PL 41, 621; St. Bernard, Sermo de triplici genere bonorum, 7: PL 183, 583; L. Lessius, De perfectionibus moribusque divinis, I, II, cap. 9). However extensive, the knowledge of the elect is nevertheless limited. In the 4th century Aetius (cf. X. Le Bachelet, Aëtius, in DThC, I, coll. 516-17) and Eunomius (cf. id., Eunomius, ibid., V, coll. 1501-14) affirmed the perfect knowability of God even in the natural order; the author of the Summa Sententiarum (1, 16), Giovanni di Ripatransone (against whom Capreolus [III Sent., d. 14, q. 1] and Cajetan [In Sum. Theol., 3ª, q. 9, a. 1] polemicized) and Agostino Favaroni (cf. G. Ciolini, Agostino di Roma e la sua cristologia, Florence 1944, pp. 61-78) attributed to the soul of Jesus Christ and to the blessed the full "comprehensio" of the essence of God. The Church has condemned the twofold assertion (the Vatican Council defined that God is "incomprehensible" [Denz-U, 1782], and the Council of Basel proscribed the following proposition of Agostino di Roma: "Anima Christi videt Deum tam clare et intense, sicut Deus seipsum"), since Scripture (Job 11, 7-9: "forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes? Excelsior caelo... profundior inferno... longior terra... et altior mari": cf. Ps. 144, 3; Eccli. 43, 32, 35; Jer. 33, 19; Rom. 11, 33, I Cor. 2, 10), the Fathers, especially those who attacked the error of Eunomius (St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Epiphanius; typical is the text of St. Augustine: "attingere aliquantulum mente Deum magna beatitudo est, comprehendere omnino impossibile" [Serm., 117, 3: PL 38, 683]), explicitly assert that it is impossible for the human mind, even in the state of glory, to know God in such a way as to exhaust all his knowability. In St. Thomas the apodictic demonstration: "Unumquodque cognoscibile est inquantum est ens et verum; esse autem divinum est infinitum, similiter et veritas eius. Infinite igitur Deus cognoscibilis est. Nulla autem creatura infinite cognoscere potest, etsi infinitum sit quod cognoscit. Nulla igitur creatura Deum videndo comprehendere potest" (Compendium Theologiae, I, 216; cf. Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 12, a. 7; 1ª-2ªe, q. 4, a. 3, ad 1; Contra Gentes, III, 55; cf. St. Bonaventure, Quaestiones disputatae de novissimis, q. 6, ed. P. Glorieux, Paris 1950, p. 57: finito modo). And he adds that God is incomprehensible not only "quod numerum scibilium" (which constitute the secondary object of the beatific vision), but also "secundum claritatem cognitionis" with respect to the primary object (Sum. Theol., 3ª, q. 10, a. 2, ad 3). He therefore holds that God "non propter hoc incomprehensibilis dicitur, quasi aliquid eius sit, quod non videatur, sed quia non ita perfecte videtur sicut visibilis est" (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 12, a. 7, ad 2; cf. Compendium Theologiae, 2, 9); hence the theological principle commonly admitted: "beati vident totum Deum sed non totaliter": not totaliter both because they do not know all the resources of the divine exemplarity and omnipotence, and above all because they do not see with perfect clarity what is intrinsically and formally proper to the divine essence and persons; the beatific vision is therefore limited extensively and intensively.
2. Accidental beatitude
It consists in the "gaudium de bono creato" (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 95, a. 4), that is, in the joy of the perfect union of all the members with their head, Jesus Christ (cf. John 14, 3; I Thess. 4, 16; II Cor. 5, 8), in the affectionate companionship with the Virgin and with the Angels, in the sublimation and strengthening of the bonds of kinship and friendship (cf. St. Cyprian, De mortalitate, 26: PL 4, 624; St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XXII, 29: PL 49, 797), in the exercise of perfect and universal charity (Dionysius the Carthusian, De quatuor hominis novissimis, Paris 1555, p. 154; cf. De imitatione Christi, I, III, cap. 9, n. 6; E. Mérie, L'altra vita, II, Italian trans., Turin 1927, pp. 172-220; H. De Lubac, Catholicism. Social Aspects of Dogma, Italian trans., Rome 1948, pp. 95-99).
Certain categories of Saints have a special motive for glory, with reference to an extraordinary victory won over the world (the martyrs: Matt. 10, 32; Apoc. 7, 14), over error (the doctors, Dan. 12, 3), over the flesh (the virgins: Apoc. 14, 3-4): this particular perfection of accidental beatitude, called the "aureole" (Sum. Theol., Suppl., q. 96, a. 1; cf. aa. 5-7), consists in a special enjoyment of the blessed spirit, which after the resurrection of the body will overflow upon the body (ibid., a. 10). All the blessed are free from every present evil and from any disturbance and danger for the future (Apoc. 7, 16-17 and 21; II Cor. 5, 1; St. John Chrysostom, Ad Theodorum Lapsum 1, 11: PG 47, 291).
III. PROPERTY OF THE BEATIFIC VISION
1. Supernatural
This follows from what has been said and is a truth defined against the Beguines (Council of Vienne, Denz-U, 475), Baius (ibid., 1002-1007) and Frohschammer (Pius IX, ep. Gravissimas, of 1862 to the Archbishop of Munich), founded on many explicit texts of Scripture (Mt. 11, 27; Jn. 6, 46; 1, 18; I Cor. 2, 9; I Tim. 6, 16).
2. Eternal
A truth defined in the Creeds (Denz-U, 6, 9, 14, 16, 40), by the Fourth Lateran Council (ibid., 429), by Benedict XII (ibid., 530), by the Council of Trent (ibid., 809), asserted in numerous biblical texts (Mt. 25, 46; Jn. 16, 22; I Cor. 9, 25; II Cor. 4, 17; I Pt. 5, 4) and by all of tradition (cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XIII, 8: «Nullo modo esse poterit vita veraciter beata, nisi fuerit sempiterna»). The blessed therefore will adhere forever to the good they know, in the happy incapacity to sin (against Origen, De principiis, I, 5: PL 11, 161, who held that further waverings between good and evil were possible in the elect). The intrinsic reason for the impeccability of the blessed is masterfully illustrated by St. Thomas (Contra Gentes, IV, 92).
3. Unequal
The inequality of eternal beatitude does not concern the object known, which is the same for all, but the more or less perfect manner of knowing it, which differs in individual blessed souls, according to the greater or lesser degree of perfection attained on this earth.
This truth, denied by Jovinian (v.) on account of the well-known Stoic theory of the equality of all human actions and by the Protestants (Lutherans and Calvinists) on account of the theory of justification by faith alone, which equally saves all, is a dogma of faith defined by the Council of Florence (Denz-U, 693; cf. ibid., 842), and clearly affirmed by Scripture (Mt. 17, 27; I Cor. 3, 8; II Tim. 4, 8; cf. Jn. 14, 2; I Cor. 15, 41) and by the Fathers, especially on the occasion of the exegesis of the parable of the laborers, who receive the same reward (cf. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 40, 20; PG 36, 384; St. Augustine, Sermo 137, 19; PL 38, 533; St. Gregory the Great, Hom. 19 in Evang.; PL 76, 1155-57). The intimate reason for this difference is the diversity of the degree of charity to which the elect attained in this life: to that degree the lumen gloriae is proportioned, and on its greater or lesser perfection depends the greater or lesser clarity of the vision (Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 12, a. 6; cf. IV Sent., d. 40, q. 2, a. 4; In Evang. Io. expositio, ch. 14, lect. 1).
This inequality will not be a cause of envy, because the elect are fully subject to the will of God («E'n la sua volontà è nostra pace»: Dante, Paradiso, III, 64-102), and further because each will be content to see as much as is within his capacity and his merit. All therefore will be equally happy: a small chalice or a large chalice are equally full of liquid, nor can one say that the one is fuller than the other (P. Parente, Dio e l'uomo, Rome 1946, p. 398).
Julian of Toledo (Prognosticon futuri saeculi, 2: PL 96, 475-96), Peter Lombard (IV Sent. d. 45, c. 1), St. Albert the Great (In IV Sent. d. 49, a. 11), St. Bonaventure (In IV Sent. d. 49, pars 2, sect. 1, a. 1) and the young St. Thomas (In IV Sent. d. 49, q. 1, a. 4) held that after the resurrection of the bodies the souls of the elect would have had an intensive increase of essential glory. St. Thomas, in his maturity, rejected this idea (Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 4, a. 5, ad 4) and was followed by the majority of theologians (cf. F. Padalino, L'aumento intensivo della beatitudine essenziale, Agrigento 1953).
Bibliography23 works
Antonio Piolanti