Beatific Vision

BEATIFIC VISION. – It is the intuitive knowledge of God, reserved for souls who have passed into the next state of Grace (v.) and have been completely purified of every imperfection (v. PURGATORIO).

(from V. JALABERT, LOUIS, Les livres d'Heures mss. de la bibliothèque Nationale, Paris 1887, vol. 11)
VISIONE BEATIFICA — The b. V. Book of Hours, according to the liturgical use of Paris (15th century) — Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, ms. lat. 9471, fol. 143r.
I. EXISTENCE OF THE B. V. —

1. Documents of Revelation

In the Old Testament there is only a distant preparation for the doctrine of the intuitive vision of God, reserved for perfect souls (A. Van Hove, Praeparatur in V. T. revelatio degmatis Visionis beatificae, in Collectanea Mechlinensis, 35 [1950], pp. 177–180); in the New Testament, on the other hand, it is fully stated: « Beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt » (Mt. 5:8). « Angeli eorum semper vident faciem Patris mei, qui in caelis est » (Mt. 18:10), since later (Mt. 22:30) Jesus, asserting that at the time of the resurrection the elect will be like the Angels, implicitly affirms their elevation to the intuitive knowledge of God.

The classical text is I Cor. 13:9–12: « For now we see through a mirror, in an enigma, but then we shall see face to face; now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I have been known ». S. Paul here affirms that charity will never cease, even in eternal life, whereas knowledge, although charismatic (προφητεῖαι, γλῶσαι, γνῶσις), will cease. Indeed, the knowledge of the future life will be absolutely superior to that of the present life, since while present knowledge is partial (τὸ ἐκ μέρους), mediated (ἐν ἐσώτερον), and obscure (ἐν αἰνίγματι), future knowledge will be total (τὸ τέλειον), face to face (πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον), that is, immediate and clear (cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum [a Deo]; cf. also II Cor. 5:7 ff.).

I Io. 3:1–2 is extremely clear: « Beloved, we are already children of God, and it has not yet been manifested what we shall be. We know that when it is manifested, we shall be like him (God), because we shall see him as he is » (videbimus eum sicuti est: « ὅτι ὁψόμεθα αὐτὸν καθὼς ἐστιν »).

Despite the differing exegetical nuance concerning apparuerit (understood by some as referring to the parousia of Jesus Christ, by others to the full manifestation of adoptive sonship: cf. F. Ceuppens, Theologia Biblica: De Deo Uno et Trina, Roma 1938, p. 120; P. De Ambroggi, Le Epistole cattoliche, Roma 1949, pp. 245–47), the text offers the most precise testimony concerning the intuitive vision of the divine essence (sicuti est). And in the Apocalypse: « He showed me the holy city Jerusalem... having the glory of God » (21:11): « Et videbunt faciem eius (ὄψονται τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ) et nomen eius in frontibus eorum » (22:4).

Tradition follows this luminous path. S. Ignatius of Antioch desires martyrdom in order to reach God (Ὅκοῦ ἐπιτυχεῖν: Rom. 4:1) and therefore entreats the faithful of Rome not to prevent his death, through which he will obtain « purum lumen » (καθαρὸν φῶς: Rom. 6:2). Theophilus of Antioch assures Autolycus that, once the corruption of the body has been laid aside, he will see God, according to the merits acquired in life (Ad Autolicum, I, 7: PG 6, 1036). S. Irenaeus presents a first precise and complete doctrinal synthesis: « Those who see God are in God and share in his splendour. Those, therefore, who see God are made participants in life. Now this participation consists in the V. of God and in the enjoyment of his goodness » (Adv. Haeres., IV, 20: PG 7, 1032).

Clement of Alexandria (Paedagogus, I, 6: PG 8, 280) adds an important clarification: through baptismal illumination one will be able to contemplate (ἐποπτεύεται) the holy and saving light, which will enable one to see God, in a manifestation « face to face (col. 292). From this point onward Christian teaching is focused on the « visio Dei »; individual authors merely express the same concept in different ways (Origen, In Io., I, 116: PG 14, 49); s. Cyprian (De zelo et livore, 18: PL 4, 460); s. Basil (Ep., 8, 7: PG 32, 257); s. Gregory Nazianzen (Oratio, 28, 17: PG 36, 48); s. Hilary (In Ps. 118, 58: PL 9, 555); s. Ambrose (De bono mortis, 11: PL 14, 562); s. Augustine (Ep. 147, 8: PL 33, 605).

2. Deviations and errors

After Eunomius (d. ca. 395) affirmed the perfect intelligibility of God, even in this life and through natural faculties alone: « Tam Deum novi quam meipsum, immo non tam meipsum quam Deum » (s. Epiphanius, Haeres., 76: PG 13, 516; cf. X. Le Bachelet, Eunomius, in DThC, V, cols. 1507–11), a current of anti-Eunomian polemicists arose among the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers of the East. Insisting on the Pauline text « (Deum) nullus hominum vidit, nec videre potest » (I Tim. 6:16), they held that even in the future life the V. of the divine essence is impossible and therefore asserted that all biblical and patristic expressions referring to a « visio Dei » must be interpreted as a V. God, just as the human eye, unable to gaze upon the sun, can endure only its ray. The first to open this path seems to have been s. John Chrysostom. Although, outside any polemical context, he repeatedly affirmed the intuitive vision of God by the blessed (cf. Ad Theodorum, 1, 11: PG 47, 292; Hom. 15 in Io. 1, 118: PG 59, 99), nevertheless, in the celebrated Hom. 3 de incomprensibili, 3: PG 48, 722, arguing against Eunomius, he asserted: « Cur obvelant (Angeli) facies suas alasque protendunt (Is., 6, 2)? Cur, inquam, nisi quia fulgur a throno progrediens, radiosque illos ferre non possunt? Atque non ipsa sine temperamento (συγκατάβασις) lucem, neque ipsam puram substantiaum videbant, sed quae videbantur temperamentum erat ». Whereas Chrysostom, with these ambiguous phrases, probably alluded only to the « incomprehensibility » of God’s nature on the part of all creatures, both angels and human beings, Theodoret clearly opposed the V. of the substance of God to that of the divine glory and therefore explicitly affirmed that the angels do not contemplate God’s essence, but a certain splendour adapted to their nature (ἀλλὰ δόξαν τινὰ τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει συμμετρομένην, Eranistes, 1: PG 83, 49). Various Eastern authors followed him, establishing a doctrinal current parallel and opposed to the orthodox one: Basil of Seleucia: PG 85, 454; Anastasius Sinaita, Ὀδηγός, c. 7: PG 89, 132; Oecumenius, In I Io. 3, 2: PG 119, 648; followed by Gregory Palamas (v.),

who, on the basis of the distinction between the divine essence and the splendour of the essence (the Taboric light), created an entire theological system that deeply disturbed the Greek Church in the fourteenth century (cf. M. Jugie, Palamas [in DThC, XI, cols. 1735–76; id., Palamite (controverse), ibid., XI, cols. 1777–1818]).

The error also penetrated the West. S. Gregory had already noted it (Moralia, 18, 54; PL 76, 93). But the doctrinal deviation gained greater following after Ilduinus and Scotus Eriugena translated the Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite in the ninth century. In De divinis nominibus, chap. 1, § 2 (PG 3, 588–89), he accentuates, with evident exaggeration, the transcendence of God, considered absolutely unattainable by any nature. Areopagitic and Greek tendencies are found in otherwise orthodox authors such as Alan of Lille (Distinctiones dictionum theologicarum: PL 210, 971), Alexander of Hales, Hugh of S. Caro, and the Quaestio duacensis (cf. H. F. Dondaine, L'objet et le medium de la vision béatifique chez les théologiens du XIIIe siècle, in Rech. de théol. anc. et méd., 19 [1952], pp. 60–130). This current of thought came into conflict with the common tradition around 1240 and led, in the following year, to the condemnation by the bishop of Paris of the following proposition: « Divina essentia in se nec ab homine nec ab angelo videtur et videbitur ». S. Thomas consistently recalls this theory, which he takes care to refute thoroughly (e.g., in De veritate, q. 8, a. 1; cf. Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 12, a. 1iii).

This doctrinal deviation reappeared in the West in the fourteenth century, when Benedict XII condemned in 1341 the third error attributed to the Armenians (cf. F. Jansen, La cinquième erreur arménienne, in Eph. theol. Lovan., 16 [1939], pp. 94–100).

3. Definitions of the Church

The erroneous personal opinion of Giovanni XXII (v. GIUDIZIO DI DIO), according to which the beatific vision would be deferred for the souls of the just until the resurrection of the flesh, was partly shared by the Friars Minor, but was vehemently attacked by the Dominicans, especially by the Englishman Tommaso Waleys, who on this account suffered trials and imprisonment (cf. Th. Käppeli, Le procès contre Thomas Waleys O. P. Études et documents Roma 1936). In 1336 Benedict XII issued the dogmatic constitution Benedictus Deus, which contains the clearest definition concerning the beatific vision: “By apostolic authority we define that the souls of all the Saints... even before the resurrection of their bodies and the final judgment, were, are, and will be in heaven... and see the divine essence, in an intuitive and face-to-face vision, nothing intervening by way of an object seen, « visi se habente sed divina essentia, immediate se nude, clare et aperte eis ostendente » (Denz-U, 530); a definition substantially repeated by the Council of Florence in 1439 (Denz-U, 633), by Gregory XIII (ibid., 870), and by Benedict XIV (ibid., 875). Pius XII, in the encyclical Mystici Corporis (29 June 1943), inserted a notable passage concerning the object of the beatific vision: « Fas erit Patrem, Filium Divinumque Spiritum mentis oculo, superno lumine actis, contemplari, divinarum Personarum processionibus aeternum per aevum proxime ad göstere ac simillimo illi gaudio beari, quo beata et Sanctissima et indivisa Trinitas » (AAS, 35 [1943] p. 232).

II. ESSENCE OF THE beatific vision

4. Essential beatitude

Beatitude is that state in which, through the possession of every good, man attains his perfection (cf. Boethius: « Status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus ». De consolatione philosophiae, III, 2), fulfilling every desire of his (cf. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 2, a. 8: « bonum perfectum, quod totaliter quietat appetitum »). None of created things can constitute man’s beatitude; therefore man’s happiness must be placed in God (beatitudo obiectiva, cf. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 2, aa. 1-8).

Man attains beatitude when, through acts corresponding to his nature, he unites himself irrevocably with God (cf. Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 26, a. 3; 1a-2ae, q. 3, a. 4). Since man is essentially intellect and will, he can realize his union with God only through the actualization of these spiritual powers (cf. Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 3, a. 3). Therefore, at the moment when, actualizing the vital dynamism of his spiritual being, he knows God intuitively and loves him with a love proportionate to that full knowledge, inwardly rejoicing in such possession, man is blessed. Thus knowledge (visio), love (dilectio), and enjoyment (fruitio) are the essential moments of man’s subjective happiness, raised to the supernatural order (cf. Sum. Theol., 1a-2a, q. 4, a. 3).

For centuries there has been discussion as to which of these three acts is the principal one, almost the “formal constituent” of beatitude. Pietro Aurcolo gave preference to fruitio (cf. M. Siuri, Theologia scholastica de novissimis, Valencia 1707, tr. 3, cap. 4), St. Bonaventure (III Sent., d. 31, a. 3, q. 4, cf. F. Rauti, Dottrina della beatitudine in s. Bonaventura, Roma 1949) and Scotus (IV Sent., d. 49, q. 5) to dilectio, and St. Thomas to visio (Sum. Theol., 1a-2a, q. 3, a. 4; q. 4, a. 1-2; cf. Dante, Paradiso, XXVIII, 106-11; T. Cucchi, Se la beatitudine sia operazione dell'intelletto o della volontà, Roma 1889). The holy Doctor, in the remarkable Expositio in Evang. Johannis, cap. 17, lect. 1., gives the following speculative formulation of his doctrine: “Among all vital operations, the highest is that of the intellect (altius est opus intelligentiae), that is, understanding; therefore the intellectual act is the most perfect form of life... Since intelligence is life and understanding is living, it follows that to understand (intelligere) an eternal thing is to live eternal life. Therefore the Lord says that eternal life consists in seeing God (haec est vita aeterna ut cognoscant), that is, principally, as in his essence (principaliter secundum totam suam substantiam). Love, on the other hand, moves toward the vision and is also its complement; for from the delight that proceeds from the fruitio divina produced by charity there emanates, as a complement and ornament of beatitude, something which formally, however, consists in the vision: «videbimus sicuti est». While still young (In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2), he had proposed another no less profound reason: “Since God is the ultimate end not immanent in the human will, it is impossible for an act of the will to be intrinsic to the end; rather, that act will be intrinsic to the end by means of which a relationship with God will first be established, whereby the will will attain its full satisfaction. This act is the intellectual vision of God, since through it there is realized, as it were, a contact of God with the intellect; for everything known is in the knower insofar as it is known.”

The doctrine of St. Thomas is founded on Sacred Scripture, which frequently identifies happiness and eternal life with the vision of God. The Fathers, too, emphasize the intellectual character of eternal happiness (St. Augustine: “Man’s beatitude consists in possessing the highest contemplation [of God]” [Contra Julianum, I, III, n. 88: PG 76, 627]). Reason confirms and clarifies these elements; for beatitude essentially can be placed only in that act by which one directly and in itself obtains possession of the Supreme Good, which makes one happy. Since love, from which fruitio proceeds, although it is an act that in itself tends toward union with the beloved reality, is nevertheless incapable of making it present, primacy must be granted to the act of the vision, which unites the human intellect immediately and inseparably with God summa forma intelligibilis; from this union in apice mentis there follow, as necessary effects, dilectio and gaudium. This immediate conjunction of the intellect with God takes place through an elevation of all the elements (cognitive power, act of knowledge, known object), from which the noetic structure of man emerges.

a) The «lumen gloriae». — This is a supernatural virtue that strengthens the cognitive faculty, making it capable of fixing itself intentionally upon and penetrating the infinite essence of God. The necessity of the lumen gloriae was defined by the Council of Vienne (1311) against the Beghards, who maintained «quod quaelibet intellectualis natura in seipsa naturaliter est beata, quodque anima non indiget lumine gloriae ipsam elevante ad Deum videndum et eo beate fruendum» (Denz-U, 745). From the solemn condemnation of this proposition it follows that the Church presents the existence of the lumen gloriae in the beatific vision as a truth of faith.

This truth is implicitly contained in Sacred Scripture: «claritas Dei illuminabit eam... Deus illuminabit illos» (Apoc. 21, 23); «Similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est» (I Io. 3, 2); reference is made to a deiformitas (similes erimus) as a disposition elevating the intellect to the vision of the divine essence videbimus sicuti est; the Fathers and Scholastics made extensive use of Ps. 35, 10 (in lumine tuo videbimus lumen) and Ps. 55, 13 (ut placeam coram Deo in lumine viventium).

The patristic tradition developed the seeds contained in the Bible and arrived at a clearer formulation of the truth, e.g.: Origen, De principiis, I, 1: PG 11, 121: “What else is the light of God (lumen Dei) than a divine power, by which anyone who is illuminated deeply knows the truth of things, indeed knows God himself, that is, absolute truth?” (cf. also St. Epiphanius, Haeres., 70: PG 42, 349; St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 55, n. 20: PL 36, 661. It was St. Thomas who, drawing on these elements and on the tentative efforts of his predecessors, constructed a definitive doctrinal synthesis. Whatever being is elevated to produce an effect that surpasses the possibility of its nature must necessarily be prepared for this by a proportionate strengthening. Since no created intellect has a natural aptitude for seeing the essence of God, it must be granted this capacity through an interior and supernatural increase of intellectual strength, which constitutes an interior light, called the light of glory (cf. Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 12, a. 5). Thus the lumen gloriae is a permanent quality communicated by God which, by intrinsically modifying the intellect, perfects and elevates it and renders it capable of intuitively seeing the intimate nature of God (ibid., a. 2). It must therefore not be conceived as an increase in visual power determined by an external instrument, but as an interior strengthening that perfects and elevates the optic nerve, so that it may see and penetrate knowable reality more fully. St. Thomas calls it the “fortificatio” (Contra Gentes, III, 53) and “confortatio” (ibid., cap. 54; Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 12, a. 2 and a. 5, ad 2) of the intellect, that is, an ontological strengthening and therefore one intrinsic to the intellectual power itself, through which it reaches contact and intentional union with the divine essence, as with an infinite “forma intelligibilis” (cf. De verit., q. 10, a. 11), whereby the blessed become deiform (Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 12, a. 5).

In the light of these clear principles, the various theories put forward by other theologians over the centuries vanish as insufficient or exaggerated. The explanations of Hugh of St. Victor (an uncreated act of vision communicated intrinsically to the created intellect, cf. I. Kathschaler, Eschatologia, Ratisbona 1878, p. 129), of Henry of Ghent (the transformation of the soul into God, so that it may be intrinsically capable of receiving his essence: Quodlibet 13, q. 12), and of Thomassin (the person of the Holy Spirit, who, by uniting himself analogously to the hypostatic union with the mind of the blessed, penetrates and irradiates it with divine light: De Deo, I, VI, cap. 16) are certainly excessive.

Petavius reacted against these excesses, identifying the lumen gloriae with the divine essence insofar as it manifests itself to the intellect of the blessed (De Deo, I, VI, cap. 16); this explanation, however, errs by deficiency, since the Council of Vienne distinguishes between lumen gloriae and the divine essence (Denz-U, 475). In any event, the best theological tradition has always regarded the light of glory as a created supernatural reality and therefore as distinct from God.

b) The absence of intelligible species in the

V. b

In natural knowledge there are two representations of the known object, called the impressed species and the expressed species. The impressed species is a similitudo, which the res cognoscenda impresses upon the cognitive power, thereby fecundating it and rendering it capable of knowing the object thus made present (cf. Contra Gentes, II, 77; 4, 11; Quodlibet, 7, q. 1, a. 1). The expressed species, on the other hand, is the inner word (verbum mentale), which the intellect forms in knowing and in which it contemplates the known object. Thus the impressed species is the similitudo of the object insofar as it is knowable, while the expressed species is the similitudo of the same object insofar as it is known. In the V. b. the impressed species is entirely superfluous (and therefore is not present), because God is supremely present to the blessed soul and perfectly knowable (Sum. Theol., 3ª, q. 9, a. 3, ad 3; 1ª, q. 12, a. 2; cf. Contra Gentes, I, 46; Compendium theologiae, II, 9); moreover, it is impossible, because it is contradictory that the infinite essence of God should be qualitatively represented by a finite similitudo (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 12, a. 2). For the same reason, the impressed species in the V. b. is impossible. This does not, however, exclude the verbum mentis, insofar as it is the vital, interior, and conscious act by which the intellect, almost “per contractum,” is immediately united with the divine essence, without implying or producing any intermediate representation. The divine essence, therefore, present in itself and united ut forma intelligibilis to the mind of the blessed, eminently takes the place of every impressed and expressed species (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 12, a. 2, ad 3; Compendium theologiae, II, 9).

c) The object of the

V. b

All the blessed see what is formally and necessarily found in the Supreme Being, namely, God in the unity of his nature and the Trinity of his persons (Council of Florence: Denz-U, 588); they deeply know the divine attributes and their intimate reconciliation in the eminentia deitatis (primary object).

All that exists in God virtually (existing and possible creatures) and freely (the decrees of his will concerning creatures) can be the secondary object of the V. b. Contrary to Vasquez (De Deo, disp. 50), who excludes any knowledge of realities that are not formally and necessarily divine, and to those theologians who affirm that the blessed know all real and possible creatures and all the free divine decrees, s. Thomas holds that the elect see only what bears a relation to them, insofar as they may be considered: a) as individuals in the supernatural order: they therefore know all the mysteries of the faith (Incarnation, Church, Sacraments, Grace), the ways Providence has followed in leading them to salvation, and whatever is granted through this act of sovereign benevolence; b) as public and social persons: each one sees everything that was related to his activity on earth: thus a pope clearly knows whatever concerns the entire Church, a Saint who founded an Order, whatever concerns the development and life of his institute, parents whatever pertains to their children, etc.; c) as parts of the universe: the blessed therefore know the intimate reality of all created things, from the nature of the Angel to the essence of the flower, that is, of everything related to the harmony of the visible and invisible universe (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 89, a. 8; 1ª-2ªe, q. 10, a. 2; Contra Gentes, III, 59; cf. s. Agostino, De Civitate Dei, XX, 21: PL 41, 621; s. Bernardo, Sermo di triplici genere bonorum, 7: PL 183, 583; L. Lessio, De perfectionibus moribungus divinis, I, II, cap. 9). However extensive it may be, the knowledge of the elect is nevertheless limited. In the fourth century Aëtius (cf. X. Le Bachelet, Aëtius, in DThC, I, cols. 516-17) and Eunomius (cf. id., Eunomius, ibid., V, cols. 1501-14) asserted that God was perfectly knowable even in the natural order; the author of the Summa Sententiarum (1, 16), Giovanni di Ripatransone (against whom Capreolus [III Sent., d. 14, q. 1] and Gaetano [In Sum. Theol., 3ª, q. 9, a. 1] argued), and Agostino Favaroni (cf. G. Ciolini, Agostino di Roma e la sua cristologia, Florence 1944, pp. 61-78) attributed to the soul of Jesus Christ and to the blessed the full «comprehensio» of the essence of God. The Church condemned this twofold assertion (the Vatican Council defined that God is «incomprensibile» [Denz-U, 1782], and the Council of Basel proscribed the following proposition of Agostino di Roma: «Anima Christi videt Deum tam clare et intense, sicut Deus seipsum»), since Scripture (Iob 11, 7-9: «forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes? Excelsior caelo... profundior inferno... longior terra... et altior mari»: cf. Ps. 144, 3; Eccli. 43, 32, 35; Ier. 33, 19; Rom. 11, 33, I Cor. 2, 10), and the Fathers, especially those who attacked the error of Eunomius (s. Basilio, s. Gregorio Nisseno, s. Epifanio; typical is the text of s. Agostino: «attingere aliquantulum mente Deum magna beatitudo est, comprehendere omnino impossibile» [Serm., 117, 3: PL 38, 683]), explicitly assert that it is impossible for the human mind, even in the state of glory,

to know God in such a way as to exhaust all his knowability. In s. Thomas there is the apodictic demonstration: «Unumquodque cognoscibile est inquantum est ens et verum; esse autem divinum est infinitum, similiter et veritas eius. Infinite igitur Deus cognoscibilis est. Nulla autem creatura infinite cognoscere potest, etsi infinitum sit quod cognoscit. Nulla igitur creatura Deum videndo comprehendere potest» (Compendium Theologiae, I, 216; cf. Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 12, a. 7; 1ª-2ªe, q. 4, a. 3, ad 1; Contra Gentes, III, 55, cf. s. Bonaventura, Quaeriones disputatae de novissimis, q. 6, ed. P. Glorieux, Paris 1950, p. 57: finito modo). And he adds that God is incomprehensible not only «quod numerum scibilium» (which constitute the secondary object of the V. b.), but also «secundum claritatem cognitionis» with respect to the primary object (Sum. Theol., 3ª, q. 10, a. 2, ad 3). He therefore holds that God «non propter hoc incomprehensibilis dicitur, quasi aliquid eius sit, quod non videatur, sed quia non ita perfecte videtur sicut visibilis est» (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 12, a. 7, ad 2; cf. Compendium Theologiae, 2, 9); hence the commonly accepted theological principle: «beati vident totum Deum sed non totaliter»: not totally, both because they do not know all the resources of divine exemplarity and omnipotence, and above all because they do not see with perfect clarity what is intrinsically and formally proper to the divine essence and persons; the V. b. is therefore limited both extensively and intensively.

5. Accidental beatitude

It consists in the «gaudium de bono creato» (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 95, a. 4), that is, in the joy of the perfect union of all the members with their head, Jesus Christ (cf. Io. 14, 3, I Tess. 4, 16; II Cor. 5, 8), in affectionate fellowship with the Virgin and the Angels, in the elevation and strengthening of the bonds of kinship and friendship (cf. s. Cipriano, De mortalitate, 26: PL 4, 624; s. Agostino, De Civitate Dei, XXII, 29: PL 49, 797), in the exercise of perfect and universal charity (Dionigi Cortosino, De quatuor hominis novissimis, Paris 1555, p. 154; cf. De imitatione Christi, I, III, cap. 9, n. 6; E. Mérie, L'altra vita, II, Italian trans., Turin 1927, pp. 172-220; H. De Lubac, Cattolicismo. Aspetti sociali del dogma, Italian trans., Rome 1948, pp. 95-99).

Certain categories of Saints have a special reason for glory, in reference to an extraordinary victory won over the world (the martyrs: Mt. 10, 320; Apoc. 7, 14), over error (the doctors, Dan. 12, 3), or over the flesh (the virgins: Apoc. 14, 3-4): this particular perfection of accidental beatitude, called «aureola» (Sum. Theol., Suppl., q. 96, a. 1; cf. aa. 5-7), consists in a special enjoyment of the blessed spirit, which after the somatic resurrection will overflow upon the body (ibid., a. 10). All the blessed are free from every present evil and from every disturbance and danger in the future (Apoc. 7, 16-17 and 21, II Cor. 5, 1; s. Giovanni Crisostomo, Ad Theodorum Iapsum 1, 11: PG 47, 291).
III. PROPERTIES OF B. V. —

6. Supernatural

This follows from what has been said and is a truth defined against the Beguards (Council of Vienne, Denz-U, 475), Baius (ibid., 1002-1007), and Frohschammer (Pius IX, ep. Gravissimas, of 1862 to the archbishop of Munich), founded on numerous explicit texts of Scripture (Mt. 11, 27; Io. 6, 46; 1, 18; I Cor. 2, 9; I Tim. 6, 16).

7. Eternal

A truth defined in the Symbols (Denz-U, 6, 9, 14, 16, 40), by the Fourth Lateran Council (ibid., 429), by Benedict XII (ibid., 530), and by the Council of Trent (ibid., 809), asserted in numerous biblical texts (Mt. 25, 46; Io. 16, 22; I Cor. 9, 25; II Cor. 4, 17; I Pt. 5, 4) and by the whole of tradition (cf. s. Augustine, De Trinitate, XIII, 8: «Nullo modo esse poterit vita veraciter beata, nisi fuerit sempiterna»). The blessed, therefore, will adhere forever to the good that they know, in the happy incapacity to sin (against Origen, De principiis, I, 5: PL 11, 161, who held that further wavering with regard to good and evil was possible in the elect). The intrinsic reason for the impeccability of the blessed is masterfully illustrated by s. Thomas (Contra Gentes, IV, 92).

8. Unequal

The inequality of eternal beatitude does not concern the object known, which is the same for all, but the more or less perfect manner of knowing it, which differs among the individual blessed according to the greater or lesser degree of perfection attained on this earth.

This truth, Gioviniano (v.) on account of the well-known Stoic theory of the equality of all human actions, and by Protestants (Lutherans and Calvinists) on account of the theory of justification sola fide, which likewise saves all equally, is a dogma of faith defined by the Council of Florence (Denz-U, 693; cf. ibid., 842), and clearly affirmed by Scripture (Mt. 17, 27; I Cor. 3, 8; II Tim. 4, 8; cf. Io. 14, 2; I Cor. 15, 41) and by the Fathers, especially in connection with the exegesis of the parable of the laborers, who receive the same recompense (cf. s. Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio 40, 20; PG 36, 384; s. Augustine, Sermo 137, 19; PL 38, 533; s. Gregory the Great, Hom. 19 in Evang.; PL 76, 1155-57). The inner reason for this difference is the diversity of the degree of charity to which the elect attained in this life: the lumen gloriae is proportionate to that degree, and upon its greater or lesser perfection depends the greater or lesser clarity of the V. (Sum. Theol., 1°, q. 12, a. 6; cf. IV Sent., d. 40, q. 2, a. 4; In Evang. Io. expositio, cap. 14, lect. 1).

This inequality will not be a cause of envy, because the elect are fully subject to the will of God («E'n la sua volontà è nostra pace»: Dante, Paradiso, III, 64-102), and also because each will be content to see that which lies within his capacity and corresponds to his merit. All, therefore, will be equally happy: a small cup or a large cup is equally full of liquid, nor can it be said that one is fuller than the other (P. Parente, Dio e l'uomo, Rome 1946, p. 398).

Giuliano di Toledo (Prognosticon futuri saeculi, 2: PL 96, 475-96), Pietro Lombardo (IV Sent. d. 45, c. 1), s. Alberto Magno (In IV Sent. d. 49, a. 11), s. Bonaventura (In IV Sent. d. 49, pars 2, sect. 1, a. 1), and the young s. Tommaso (In IV Sent. d. 49, q. 1, a. 4) held that after the resurrection of the bodies the souls of the elect would receive an intensive increase of essential glory. In his maturity, s. Tommaso rejected this idea (Sum. Theol., 1°-2°, q. 4, a. 5, ad 4), and was followed by the majority of theologians (cf. F. Padalino, L'aumento intensivo della beatitudine essenziale, Agrigento 1953).

BIBL.: J. Kirschkamp, Gnade und Gloria, Würzburg 1878; J. Bautz, Der Himmel, Mainz 1881; J.-A. Chollet, La psychologie des élus, 3rd ed., Paris 1924; J. V. Walshe, The Vision beatific, New York 1926; A. Sartori, La visione beatifica. La dottrina e la controva. nella storia, Turin 1927; J.-B. Terric, La Grâce et la gloire, II, 2nd ed., Paris 1931, pp. 141-239; A. Michel, Intuitivo (vision), in DTHC, VII, cols. 2351-94; id., La vie éternelle, ibid., XV, cols. 2956-73; P. Bernard, Ciel, ibid., II, cols. 2473-2511; id., Ciel, in DFC, I, cols. 531-36; A. Michel, Les fins dernières, 2nd ed., Paris 1932, pp. 109-31; N. Camilleri, De natura actus vis. beat. apud theolog. postident., Chieri 1944; Antoine de Jésus, L'au-delà béatifique, Paris-Tournai 1947; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, L'altra vita, Brescia 1947, pp. 152-88; J. P. Müller, La thèse de Jean Quidort sur la béatitude formelle, in Mél. A. Pelzer, Louvain 1947, pp. 493-511; id., Les critiques de la thèse de Jean Quidort sur la béatitude formelle, in Rech. de théol. anc. et méd., 15 (1948), pp. 151-70; F. Cumont, Lux perpetuo, Paris 1949, pp. 142-89; G. de Broglie, De fine ultimo humanae vitae, I, Paris 1948, pp. 31-100; P. Glorieux, St Thomas et l'accroissement de la béatitude. Etude sur la Somme 1°-2°, q. 4, a. 5, ad 5, ibidem, 17 (1950), pp. 121-25; J. Paquin, La lumière de gloire selon Jean de Saint-Thomas, Montréal 1950; J. Goubert, L. Cristiani, Les plus beaux textes sur l'au-delà, Paris 1950, pp. 331-402; A. Piolanti, De noctuimus, 3rd ed., Rome 1950, pp. 79-110; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Sintesi tomistica, Brescia 1953, pp. 94-95. Antonio Piolanti
Cite this article

“VISIONE BEATIFICA.” Enciclopedia Cattolica, vol. XII (1954), p. 937. Azione Romana digital edition, https://azioneromana.com/article/visione-beatifica.