SENECA, LUCIUS ANNAEUS. — Roman philosopher, son of Annaeus Seneca the orator, born at Corduba in Spain between 4 and 8 A.D., died at Rome in 65. He came early to the city and studied philosophy under the Stoics Attalus and Sotion, from whom he acquired a taste for the austere life. Devoting himself to political life, he attained the rank of quaestor; but a speech delivered in the Senate nearly cost him his life. Involved in a political plot by Messalina, he was accused by her of complicity in the amours of her niece Julia Livilla and banished to Corsica in 41, where he wrote a *Consolatio ad Polybium*, unworthily flattering to the emperor Claudius. After Messalina’s death, he was recalled to Rome and appointed by Agrippina as tutor to Nero; becoming his chief minister in 54 after Claudius’ death, he remained at Nero’s side even when his continued presence, now useless, might have seemed dishonest compliance with the emperor’s crimes. His retirement from political life was fruitful for three years in works and reflections. But in 65, falsely accused of complicity in the conspiracy led by Calpurnius Piso, he was ordered to take his own life.
Many of his works are lost. Under the inappropriate title *Dialogorum libri*, there survive: *De consolatione ad Marciam* and *De ira*, the earliest of the preserved works; the *Consolatio ad Polybium* and *Consolatio ad Helviam matrem*, written during his exile in Corsica; *De brevitate vitae*, composed perhaps around 48 A.D.; *De constantia sapientis* and *De vita beata*, dating from the period between 55 and 60; *De providentia*, belonging to the last years of his life; *De otio* and *De tranquillitate animi*, for which no chronological indications exist. Outside the collection of the *Dialogues* are the *De clementia*, written in 55 and surviving incomplete; the *De beneficiis*, perhaps dating from 60–61; and the *Epistularum moralium libri ad Lucilium*, composed between 61 and 65. Also noteworthy are the nine tragedies (*Hercules furens*; *Troades*; *Phoenisae*; *Medea*; *Phaedra*; *Oedipus*; *Agamemnon*; *Thyestes*; *Hercules Oetaeus*), which exerted a singular influence on Renaissance and Elizabethan drama; the *Naturalium quaestionum libri*, composed after 60, one of the few scientific works of the Roman world; and the *Ludus de morte Claudii* (*Apocolocynthosis*).
Still the nine tragedies (*Hercules furens*; *Troades*; *Phoenisae*; *Medea*; *Phaedra*; *Oedipus*; *Agamemnon*; *Thyestes*; *Hercules Oetaeus*), which exerted a singular influence on Renaissance and Elizabethan drama; the *Naturalium quaestionum libri*, composed after 60, one of the few scientific works of the Roman world; and the *Ludus de morte Claudii* (*Apocolocynthosis*).
Seneca is one of the greatest moralists of all time. In many respects he belongs to Stoicism (v.), whose metaphysical and moral motifs he accepts in no small measure. In reality, his thought springs rather from direct knowledge of the soul and human affairs, as well as from an unprejudiced understanding of other inquiries. He writes: “I can argue with Socrates, doubt with Carneades, find serenity with Epicurus, surpass human nature with the Stoics, and transcend it with the Cynics” (*De brevitate vitae*, XIV, 2). With the Stoics he admits the division of philosophy into three parts: physics, logic, and ethics. Stoic is his naturalistic monism (v.): no distinction between the corporeal and the incorporeal. The universe is composed of a passive principle, matter, and an active principle, God; but these principles are the two inseparable and correlative aspects of a single reality (*Epist.*, 65, 12). God is the soul of the universe, reason diffused in all things, the immanent source of life (*Nat. quaest.*, I, 13–14): He is the Destiny that binds all events in a chain of causes and conditions the organic unity of the cosmos; He is the Providence that sustains and preserves every being (*De benef.*, IV, 4): He is the great All that we see, the support of all things and sufficient unto Himself (*Nat. quaest.*, II, 45–46). Yet his vivid sense of moral interiority carries Seneca beyond pantheistic naturalism and dictates thoughts that seem to herald a personalistic theological demand: God is near us, with us, within us; *sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos* (*Epist.*, 41, 1–5). In the final analysis, God is incomprehensible (*Nat. quaest.*, I, 1, 1–5). The problems of metaphysics (v.) are not the most pressing object of his inquiry: his solutions, not univocal, reveal the oscillations of a thought as far removed from systematic dogmatism as it is daunted by the unknowns of being. Uncertain is the fate of the soul, obscure the problem of its freedom in the face of Destiny, insoluble the question of the afterlife. Seneca struggles within the constraints of Stoic naturalism and seems to demand personal immortality (*Epist.*, 120, 14–16: “the day you fear as your last is the birthday of eternity”) against the omnipresence of death, the freedom of the soul from the bonds of inexorable Destiny, and the personality of the spirit in the face of the impersonal order of the world.
S. is the philosopher of individual freedom and salvation: in the corrupt and mad society of his time he taught man how it is possible not to desert society and concrete human duties while at the same time preserving one’s inner independence amidst the crowd. He is the master of the few, or rather of whoever wishes to rise above the anonymous multitude in order to save himself. And yet, there is no distrust in him toward man, no pessimism (v.), no appeal to supernatural grace. The sad tone that accompanies his pages does not arise from a metaphysical attitude, but is the feeling of one who has had the misfortune to be born outside his own time. He believes in human nature: if God is the immanent reason of the universe and the absolute condition of cosmic harmony, He is likewise immanent in the human soul and the first condition of universal solidarity. This is the foundation of virtue and at the same time of freedom. Every man is free because every man is capable of virtuous actions. S.’s unconditional struggle against slavery, that is, against the effects of conventions and positive law, is unrelenting: «quid est enim eques Romanus aut libertinus aut servus? nonne ex ambitione aut ex iniuria nata. Subsilere in caelum ex angulo licet» (Epist., 31, 11). «Servi sunt. Immorbi» (ibid., 47, 1). Human equality is a matter of natural right: solidarity finds its foundation therein. In society man must realize that unity of nature of which God is the absolute condition; and he must realize it through love. «Age, infelix, ecquando amabis?» (De ira, III, 28): «an urgent call that seems Christian.» One must love even enemies and render good for evil: «si offendatur, da et ingratis beneficia: nam et sceleratis solvitur» (De benef., IV, 24; cf. Mt. 5, 44-45), since the law of love is the law of nature (Epist., 95, 52). For the sake of love of neighbor man must even endure the gravest evils of life and renounce suicide, which is nonetheless the supreme liberation: «hoc quoque imperet sibi animus, ubi utilitas suorum exigit... Ingentis animi est aliena causa ad vitam reverti» (ibid., 104, 3). It cannot be said, however, that S. places the ultimate end of morality in social life. Society does indeed constitute a duty and an opportunity for the exercise of moral activity, but it is also a recurring threat to the interiority of the individual and to his spiritual independence. «Meliores erimus singuli» (De otio, I, 1). Even solidarity and love are thus an aspect of inner coherence. The ultimate end of moral life is in fact the autonomy (v.) of the person in the face of men and events, the freedom of the spirit from all that can profane the divine serenity of the soul. At the center is the individual (v.), thirsting for salvation. In his tendency to realize in himself the very condition of the Absolute, the individual rejects all those contingent and relative characteristics that belong to inferior activity: pleasure, utility, rewards, fame... The sage gives, like God, out of the overflow of his being, freed from the results of his actions, heedless of the gratitude of men: «beneficii ratio simplex est: tantum erogatur... Ego illud dedi, ut darem» (De benef., I, 2); «conscentiae satis fiat, nihil in famam laboremus» (De ira, III, 41). Virtue is a value so complete in itself that it requires nothing beyond itself: «contentus eris te teste: alioqui non bene facere delectat, sed videri bene fecisse... Haec enim beneficii inter duos lex est: alter statim oblivisci debet dati, alter accepti numquam» (De benef., II, 10). Thus the sage acts not in order to become worthy of God, but indeed to conform to Him. The absoluteness of the act identifies itself with the revolution of intention that constitutes its value: «non videtur dedisse beneficium, qui a malo animo profuit; casus enim beneficium est, hominis iniuria» (De benef., II, 19); «exercetur et aperitur opere nequitia, non incipit» (ibid., V, 14). Although he affirms that «bonus vir sine deo nemo est» (Epist., 41, 2), although he founds the law on nature, S.’s morality wishes to be the celebration of the autonomy of human reason and the exaltation of pure activity: in this respect it announces Kant’s second Critique.
From the same attitude arises S.’s unconditional aversion to national polytheism: he combats external rites, religious fanaticism, the cult of tradition in the name of an entirely interior piety, made of knowledge and good works: the temple of God is in the human heart; no offerings or blood of victims are needed, but the sacrifice of passions and hatred; to the inconsolable Divinity we can approach only with a pure soul (Epist., 31, 10; and in Lactantius, Inst., VI, 25, 3). It is no wonder, then, that there has been talk of a Senecan Christianity and of a supposed correspondence between S. and St. Paul. In reality, the substance of the moral doctrine of the pagan philosopher is far removed from Christianity. The sapiens, in S.’s ideal, although he does not forget God nor disavow love (v.), is alone with his heroic will and the pride of his untouchable freedom; he does not engage in personal dialogue with God, nor does he aim to build the civitas Dei on earth; the self-sufficiency of God is his self-sufficiency; his virtue, if it does not dissolve into the force of determinism that threatens every moral value, declares itself to be absolutely human and valid only as human. His perennial consciousness of death, which renders him lucidly aware of his fleeting condition and leads him to the brink of nothingness in order to recover the sense of moral duty, performs no religious function, as Christianity understands it: it does not kindle faith or hope; it leaves him within his human dimensions. In many respects he is a Heideggerian ante litteram, even when he adheres against the anonymous crowd and finds his authenticity in affirming his unconditional autonomy. «Non te qua populus, sed, ut sidera contrarium mundi iter intendunt, ita hic (sapiens) adversus opinionem omnium vadit» (De const. sap., XIV, 4). The moral doctrine of S. goes well beyond the metaphysical premises that should justify it: born not so much from theoretical prejudices as from the very dialectic of life and from a vivid sense of inner freedom, it announces the problematic of modern ethics.
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN S. AND ST. PAUL – Collection of 14 apocryphal letters, 8 by the philosopher and 6 by St. Paul.
The work, by reason of its poverty of ideas, not only appears absolutely unworthy of the Apostle, but is also unbecoming to the elegance and seriousness of St. Jerome. The letters, in fact, have as their subject matter the beginning. St. Jerome is concerned to advise Paul on greater linguistic propriety (Ep. VII), indeed he sends him a veritable stylistic model entitled *De verborum copia* (Ep. IX). Paul shows himself concerned about the reaction of the Emperor Nero to the reading of some of his writings (Ep. VIII), while St. Jerome dwells upon examples of pagan fortitude to console Paul and the Christians persecuted after the fire of Rome (Ep. XI).
The apocryphal work enjoyed an undeserved diffusion in the late Middle Ages and contributed to the formation of the legend of meetings between Paul and St. Jerome and of his secret conversion to Christianity. According to some, the work would have originated around the 8th century and should therefore be distinguished from the collection of letters already known to St. Jerome (*De viris ill.*, 12: PL 23, 662) and to St. Augustine (*Epist.*, 153, 14: CSEL, 44, 412). But such a distinction does not seem necessary, even if it is somewhat surprising that the two great Doctors gave their approval, not entirely unqualified, to so insipid an apocryphon. There are no ancient translations of the work, which was written in Latin before 392, the year of the composition of Jerome’s *De viris illustribus*.
BIBL.:
E. Amann, s.V. Aborcheghe da Nuova Testi, in DBS, I, cols. 520–22;
L. Vouaux, *Les actes de Paul*, Paris 1913, pp. 332–69 (introduction, text and translation with commentary);
C. W. Barlow, *Epist. Senecae ad Paulum et Pauli ad Senecam* (quae vocantur), Rome 1938 (introduction and critical edition);
E. Franceschini, *Un ignoto codice delle Epistolae Senecae et Pauli*, in *Mélanges J. De Ghellinck*, I, Gembloux 1951, pp. 149–70.