PESSIMISM. – It is the conception that contrasts optimism (v.) inasmuch as it affirms the predominance of evil (v.) over good (v.): thus, neither does optimism entirely deny the existence of evil, nor does pessimism absolutely exclude the presence of good, but their opposition lies in the preference or ontological preponderance that good achieves over evil or evil over good, and consequently in the positive or negative sign attributed to being. Therefore, while it has been possible to envisage an absolute optimism of the full positivity of being, it is not clear how one could conceive of an “absolute pessimism,” since with it the very possibility of the consciousness that thinks it would vanish. Pessimism, like every negative situation, presupposes the positive moment that it proposes to limit to the point of overcoming it, but never of annihilating II. In pessimism, the positive represents the stage of appearance, of immediacy, which must be surpassed through reflection and asceticism in order to reach, beyond deceptive appearances and illusory pleasures, the secret truth of negation.
The most radical pessimism is attributed to the Vedanta doctrine, which, like the other Indian systems, teaches that all individual existence is suffering, and drives man to absolute indifference toward all things through Nirvana (P. Deussen, *Allgemeine Gesch. der Philos.*, I, III, 3rd ed., Leipzig 1920, pp. 609 sq.). The situation in Greek thought appears more complicated. There is no doubt that the gradual discovery of the λόγος that it pursues affirms the preeminence of the positive over the negative, of which a quite explicit sign is the Socratic identity between knowledge and virtue, though this is vigorously contested by Aristotle (Ethic. Nic., VII, 3, 1145 b 22 sq.). Pessimism is more continuous and explicit in Greek lyricists and tragedians: Sophocles is convinced of the nothingness that is human life; for him, men are shadowy images, so that it would be better never to have been born and, once born, to depart from this world as soon as possible (cf. *Oedipus at Colonus*, vv. 1225 sq.). Euripides also insists on the insecurity of human life, on the alternation within it of happiness and unhappiness, in the manner of the meteorological changes of the physical world. All human things are reduced to shadows, and no one should be praised before death; and he too repeats the proverb that it is better never to have been born (cf. *Orestes*, V. 1604; fr. 330; *Medea*, V. 1224; *Andromache*, vv. 100 ff.). The foundation of this tragic pessimism, where the external or Apollinian harmony that dominated for so many centuries the Nietzsche (v.), who introduced the Dionysian element, is broken, is the fundamental dogma of fate (v.) or destiny (τύχη, μοίρα, σημαντική), immutable even for the gods themselves (M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, in *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, I, Munich 1941, pp. 712 and 732). This doctrine can be traced back to Homer with the observation of the continuous decline of humanity (cf. *Odyssey*, II, 276 ff.) and is widespread in the 6th century B.C., as is evident from the fragments of Mimnermus, Archilochus, Simonides of Amorgos, Alcaeus, and especially Theognis, to whom the aforementioned proverb of the desire “not to have been born” (μη φύναι) is attributed.
A new element of a more profound pessimism has been identified in the debated fragment of Anaximander (B I): “That from which things have their origin is also the term to which they return according to necessity (κατά τό χρεών); for they must make amends and be judged for their injustice according to the order of time” (H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, I, 5th ed. ed. W. Kranz, Berlin 1934, p. 89). The Orphic derivation has indeed been noted: Anaximander conceives of the indeterminate being (ἀπεφράγι) and thus posits immortal souls destined to be perfected through new reincarnations because, according to Orphic beliefs, they are afflicted by an original sin from all eternity, and the body is considered the “tomb of the soul” (σῶμα-σῆμα). From this negative conception of nature, it has been concluded that not only the natural philosophy of the Ionian philosophers but the entire Greek science strayed onto erroneous paths and failed to create a scientific physics (cf. E. Howald, *Ethik des Altertums*, in *Handbuch der Philos.*, Munich and Berlin 1926, p. 13). A vision of pessimism pervades the entire work of Herodotus, the historian of the instability of all human things: the pessimistic legacy of the earliest Greek thought was taken up in the Cyrenaic school by Hegesias, who described, in opposition to Epicureanism, the evils of life with such efficacy that he drove some of his listeners to suicide. The pessimism of the Cyrenaics (v.) arose precisely from the materialism they professed, inasmuch as pleasure is reduced to a series of fleeting single moments, and pessimism is inevitable in any conception that confines man within the finite and the temporal (excellent exposition in W. Ch. Greene, *Moira, Fate, Good and Evil*, Cambridge Mass. 1944, p. 182; cf. also E. Schwarz, *Ethik der Griechen*, Stuttgart 1951, p. 182). The profound cause of Greek pessimism lies in the conviction of the invincibility of evil, inasmuch as the cosmos is governed by the iron law of fate, from which the indifference of the divinity toward the individuals and events of this life derives, and ultimately the ontological negativity of matter and its coexistence with the divine being, which may be considered the true metaphysical principle of Greek pessimism.
In revealed religion, human history presents a double aspect: viewed from the perspective of human freedom, history seems a sequence of sin, entirely woven with crimes and miseries of which the just are victims, and above all the very Son of God; but from God’s point of view, the positive outcome of history, namely the fulfillment of the “plan of salvation” of divine Providence (v.), is absolutely certain. In Jewish religiosity, pessimism seems to prevail, in this sense, especially in the sapiential books (cf. the unknown Ecclesiastes; also Ecclesiasticus 40); yet in the end it is God who judges, punishes, and rewards (cf. Wisdom 15, 1 ff.). Christianity definitively resolves the ambiguity of the relationship between optimism and pessimism. In Greek thought, the ontological positivity of universal essences contrasted with the profound misery in which the individual found himself, at the mercy of fate and the blind forces of nature. Christianity resolves the problem in three moments:
1) essences as such are positive, and above all human nature in its spiritual part bears the very image of God (Ps. 4, 7).
2) But man fell from his perfection through sin.
Pesellino, Francesco di Stefano, known as il Pesellino – *The Holy Trinity*, London, National Gallery
3) The redemption accomplished by Christ restores to man the possibility of regaining his original dignity, though through the cross and suffering.
Thus, in Christianity, pessimism is transformed into a salutary awareness of the limits of earthly life and the need for ascetic effort, while the ultimate meaning of existence is guaranteed by the promise of eternal life.
**PESTALOZZI JOHANN HEINRICH**
**