ERROR. — From the Latin errare, to wander, to go astray, it is, in the broad sense, a departure from truth in thought and action; in the proper and restricted sense pertaining to knowledge, it is an objectively false judgment or assertion. Accepting the definition of truth as «conformity between thought and being», error is therefore the mental affirmation or negation positively at variance with reality. From this original subjective sense there derives the objective one, according to which error sometimes serves as a synonym for false proposition: thus, for example, one speaks of errors contained in a doctrine or in a system. As a mental affirmation positively at variance with reality, error, in the proper sense, must be essentially distinguished from purely negative error, by which one usually indicates the simple inadequacy and incommensurability of human knowledge with the real.
The problem of error, because of its connection with that of truth and the embarrassing aporias to which it seems to give rise, has from antiquity onward been an object of interest and inquiry on the part of philosophy. Protagoras, on the basis of the subjectivist principle («man is the measure of all things», Theaet., 152 A), denied the reality of error (Euthyd., 286 C). Plato, who considered the problem extensively and brought its difficulties to light, while affirming that error consists in judgment, insofar as judgment can unite two notions that ought to be distinguished, nevertheless did not arrive at an adequate determination of the causes of error, whose explanation was made more difficult by the theory of knowledge as the intuitive recollection of ideas. This indeterminacy concerning the genesis and causes of erroneous assent remains in Aristotle, who generally considers judgment more as an objective composition of concepts than as a synthetic-perceptive mental act. In any case, Aristotle establishes the fundamental principle that truth and falsity are found only in the proposition, insofar as it is an affirmation corresponding or not corresponding to reality, and therefore in the thought that expresses it (cf. Met., IV, 7, 1011 b 25). Aristotle also highlights the illusions of the senses and likewise alludes to the influence exerted on correct judgment by the will and temperament. Voluntarism in the problem of error—a highly complex voluntarism, insofar as it is connected with the question of original sin and its consequences—becomes more pronounced in St. Augustine: error, «falsi pro vero approbatio» (Contra Acad., I, 4, 11), is not attributable to the intellect; illuminated by divine light, the intellect would not in itself fall into error if the ill-disposed will and sensory impressions did not prevent the soul from purely seeing the truth (cf. De Gen. ad litt., XII, 14, 29; De vera rel., 33, 62). St. Thomas, having established the clear distinction between ignorance and error, takes up the Augustinian definition (De malo, q. 3, a. 7), and affirms with Aristotle that error is not found in simple intellectual apprehension (simplex apprehensio) but only in judgment (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 17, a. 3), as dependent on the illusions of sensory knowledge (De verit., q. 1, a. 11). Moreover, the Angelic Doctor’s doctrine of assent as a formally intellectual act, and the determining power attributed to the will when the object lacks intrinsic evidence (Sum. Theol., 1ª-2ª, q. 17, a. 6), leads to the conception of error as assent to a non-evident proposition, determined by the influence of the will upon the intellect.
ERRICO, GAETANO, venerable — Portrait of the ven. G. E., by R. Spand, preserved in the Mother House of Secondigliano.
In modern philosophy, Descartes’ strictly voluntarist position is well known: having affirmed assent to be essentially an act of the will, he places all error upon the will, which, broader and more extensive than the intellect, exceeds in assent the limits of intellectual perception (Med., IV, Italian translation by A. Tilgher, I, Bari 1928, pp. 124–133; cf. Princ. philos., I, 33). Bacon (v.) in the Novum organum (I, 39 ff.) makes a careful examination of the causes of error, reducing it to the innumerable prejudices and psychological propensities (idola) that disturb and impede the objectivity of judgment. Spinoza conceives error in a purely negative sense, as a defect and limitation in knowledge (Eth., II, 35). In Kant the problem becomes more acute because of the particular subjectivist conception of truth inherent in his system: having affirmed truth as the agreement of the cognitive act with the laws of thought, the author of Criticism asserts that error is not, in itself, possible either in the intellect or in the senses; error, which is found only in judgment, arises from the unnoticed influence of sensibility upon the intellect, whereby the subjective principles of judgment become mixed with the objective principles (cf. Critica d. ragion pura, Italian translation by G. Gentile and G. Lombardo-Radice, I, Bari 1940, pp. 277–78).
In post-Kantian absolute idealism, once reality is denied as a transcendent position to which thought must conform, one arrives logically at the denial of error in its classical meaning of knowledge at variance with reality. In Gentile, error, as a positive act of the spirit, is impossible: the concept, insofar as it realizes itself in its eternal self-creative process, is necessarily true; nevertheless, insofar as in this process of becoming the concept has its own negation as an essential moment, it perpetually involves error as its non-being, eternally overcome in the act. Hence, not «error and truth, but error in truth» (Teoria gen. dello spirito, 5th ed., Florence 1938, pp. 233–37).
The problem of error, if it is accepted in its traditional value—the specific position of idealism shares the fate of the system’s general principles—presents two principal questions toward which historical inquiry has also generally been directed: a) at which moments of knowledge it takes place; b) what the causes are by which it becomes possible and intelligible. As for the locus of error, strictly speaking it is not found in essentially passive forms of knowledge, such as pure sensation and simple intellectual apprehension. The senses are not, properly speaking, subject to error in the apprehension of their object—not in the sense that they always report or must necessarily report material reality as it is in itself, but insofar as the external object is always given to them as it necessarily becomes determined in the relation between its objective conditions and the subjective structure of the sense; and this both in normal and in abnormal cases. The same holds, analogously, for simple intellectual apprehension, if one grants that it can be psychologically realized without a judgment, at least an implicit one. Error is possible only where a spontaneous and active evaluation on the part of the knowing subject intervenes, that is, a judgment, whether initial and concrete (in a certain sense, every perception and complex subjective construction of sensibility is such), or, principally, conceptual and pure (judgment, in the proper sense, of the intellect).
The possibility of e. at these moments in human knowledge can readily be understood if one bears in mind the nature of judgment and the various psychological factors it entails. Judgment, although formally an act of thought, very often nevertheless takes on the characteristics of an integral psychological function in which the various psychic coefficients constituting the personality are engaged. In the selection and evaluation of objective data for assertive synthesis, man brings his temperament, his character, his habits, inclinations, tendencies, prejudices, passions, and all the particular conditions of mentality and culture in which his spirit has gradually been formed. If one adds to this the various illusions arising from sensibility (external senses, imagination, memory), the limits of experience, and the essential inadequacy of human knowledge—the ultimate metaphysical root of the possibility of e.—it is not difficult to understand how judgment may frequently fail to correspond to the objective being of things. The totality of the factors enumerated contributes, on the one hand, to the object’s presenting itself under an inadequate and sometimes illusory aspect, or, on the other, to polarizing intellectual perception toward a more or less partial and insufficient sense of reality, obstructing the free and integral gaze of thought. And this occurs all the more frequently the more complex the truth is and the more it interferes with the tendencies, needs, and commitments of the person and of life.
As for the role of the will in e., the doctrine that makes the will directly responsible for erroneous judgment, attributing to free will the power to determine assent beyond the limits permitted by the reasons of a cognitive order present to thought, does not seem acceptable. For even if such an influence of the will were possible, in this case consciousness of the possibility of e. would remain in thought and therefore e. itself, as an absolutely negative attitude of the spirit, would thereby disappear: one is not in error when one is conscious that one’s affirmation may be erroneous. The direct influence of the will, if it exists in e., by its very nature requires that it be unnoticed and unconscious. The will, however, as a fundamental factor of the personality, retains a broad indirect influence in e., insofar as, through the general moral conditions it realizes in the human person and through its particular determinations to action, it disposes the intellect, positively or negatively, toward knowledge of the truth. For this reason, e., like any other expression of human activity, sometimes remains voluntary—but only in a causal sense—and hence also, to the extent that the remote conditions that determined it are moral and free, imputable.
BBL.: V. BROUGHTON, RICHARD, De l'erreur, 5ª ed., Parigi 1897; M. D. Roland-Gostelin, La théorie thomiste de l'erreur, in Mélançes thomistes, 3 (1923), pp. 253-74; J. Henri, L'imputabilité de l'erreur d'après St Thomas, in Revue néo-soci., 27 (1925), pp. 225-42; J. De Tonquédec, La critique de la connaissance, Parigi 1929, pp. 208-18; A. Levi, Il problema dell'e. nella filosofia dell'inmananza, in Archivio di fine, 8 (1932), pp. 17-27; L. W. Keeler, The problem of error from Plato to Kant, Roma 1934; B. Schwarz, Der Irrtum in der Philosophie, Münster 1934; A. Brunner, La connaissance humaine, Parigi 1943, passim (v. ind., p. 426); A. Gusto, L'io e la ragione, Brescia 1947, pp. 54-60. Ugo Viglino
IN LAW. — The divergences and disagreements found in philosophy regarding the concept and definition of e. do not, in practice, alter the terms in which the phenomenon must be considered from the juridical standpoint, where the problem—essentially directed toward evaluating the effects of e. on human acts—is posed chiefly in relation to the positive provisions of the various legal systems. Juridically, e. means a false judgment or representation, that is, a judgment or representation that does not correspond to reality. Starting from this definition—which substantially reproduces the more concise one according to which e. is “the disagreement between knowledge and reality”—we may, setting aside every different philosophical conception, determine on the concrete level of law what influence e. exercises on human actions, whether in the formation of a juridical transaction or in the activity productive of a crime. Indeed, e. is taken into consideration by law insofar as it determines the formation or declaration of a will that would not have been formed or declared without the false judgment or false representation of reality in which e. consisted.
Ignorance is also sometimes included within the juridical concept of e.; but it seems more accurate to say that, although these are concepts that are in themselves clearly distinct (inasmuch as e. is a positive disagreement between thought or knowledge and its object, whereas ignorance is merely a negative disagreement, or, in other words, the former is inaccurate knowledge, while the latter is a lack of knowledge), this distinction is juridically irrelevant, since, with regard to the actions with which law alone is concerned, ignorance can influence the will only insofar as it is connected with an e. This is because, as St. Thomas explains well, “actus voluntatis praesupponit aestimationem sive iudicium de aliquo in quod fertur: unde si est ibi ignorantia, oportet ibi esse errorem” (Sum. Theol., 3ª, q. 51, a. 1 ad 1).
Legal doctrine distinguishes e. in juridical transactions from various points of view. While the traditional distinction between e. of law and e. of fact has lost importance—in connection with which the general principle that e. of law is irrelevant (in homage to the principle ignorantia iuris neminem excusat) ceases to apply in cases where the fact of the absence of knowledge itself is taken into consideration—the distinction between proper and improper e. remains fundamental. Proper e. is that which, by itself alone, is the efficient cause of the defect in the transaction: once the existence of all the essential elements of the act is presupposed, it vitiates consent and, for this reason, under certain conditions, renders the act itself voidable, thus giving the person in error the right to challenge its validity. Improper e., on the other hand, is that which concerns an essential element of the transaction: for example, the existence of the object (I sell a ship, unaware that it has perished in a shipwreck), or its identity (I sell property A, while the buyer intends to purchase property B), or the juridical nature of the act (I give a sum to Titius as a loan, while he receives it as a donation). In the first case the sale is nonexistent, because the object is lacking; in the other two there is a total absence of consent, and consequently here too the act is nonexistent. It is obvious that in all these cases e. is not the efficient cause of the nonexistence of the transaction, but only its occasioning cause.
Another, more recent distinction, corresponding only in part to the one just stated, is that between e. of motive or accidental e., or vitiating e. (erreur-nullité), and essential or obstructive e. (erreur-obstacle). The former concerns the motives determining the volition and vitiates the will insofar as it influences its motives; the latter determines a declaration different from the will, so that one declares that one wills what in fact one does not will. A distinction has also been made between e. caucum dunc (which concerns the existence of the juridically necessary premises of acts and is the occasional, not the efficient, cause of nullity) and e. incident (the e. of fact that concerns the direct object of the juridical act, that is, the act considered in its constitutive elements); between excusable and inexcusable e., etc.; but obviously the practical usefulness of all these classifications, apart from their systematic value, is subordinate to the norms of the individual positive legal systems, to which, as we have said, the juridical study of the phenomenon must be referred.
In the legislative systems of the various States, e. is considered in different ways, both in civil law, with regard to its influence on the various juridical transactions, and in criminal law, and it constitutes one of the most delicate and debated subjects of jurisprudence. In the law of the Church, moreover, the regulation of e. is of particular interest because of the importance that, in canon law and also in relation to moral theology, is attributed to the voluntaristic element. (v. IGNORANZA).
For the evaluation of e. and ignorance (which here are practically equated) in relation to the activity of subjects within the juridical sphere, canon law first lays down certain fundamental norms. In these, after establishing that no ignorance of invalidating or incapacitating laws ordinarily exempts one from their application (can. 16), the legislator, for the purpose of ethically evaluating the subject’s state of mind, adopts the following legal presumptions: ignorance or e. concerning the law or the penalty is not presumed, nor is it presumed with regard to one’s own act or another person’s notorious act; it is presumed, however, when the matter concerns another person’s non-notorious act. In every case contrary proof is admissible (can. 16 § 2).
Considering more particularly disturbances of the will or intellect with regard to their effects on juridical acts, the general rule applicable in this matter is that e. concerning the substance of the act or affecting a sine qua non condition juridically invalidates the act itself, except where particular legal provisions establish otherwise. In contracts, however, e. may give rise to an action for rescission in accordance with the law (can. 102). In other words, acts performed through e. concerning the substance of the act or an essential condition are null, whether the e. concerns the transaction or the motives, provided that it was such as to determine the will. Contracts concluded through e., on the other hand, are valid but voidable when their rescindability is established either by canon law (as in the case of lesion ultra dimidium: can. 1682 § 2) or by the territorial civil law (cf. can. 1529).
A particular body of regulations governs e. in Matrimony, which is the subject of a group of norms (cann. 1082-85) independent of the general principles set out above. In evaluating e. in the process of forming and determining matrimonial consent, the distinction between e. of law and e. of fact remains fully relevant.
The former is a cause of invalidity only when it concerns the essence of the contract-Sacrament; that is, for its validity it is required that the contracting parties be not ignorant at least (although after puberty such ignorance is not presumed) that Matrimony is a permanent society between man and woman for the procreation of children. E. of law, however, concerning the unity or indissolubility of Matrimony, or its sacramental dignity, even if it gives rise to the contract, does not, according to canon law, constitute a defect in matrimonial consent. This is a principle of obvious importance for the validity of the Matrimony of infidels and non-Catholics. Likewise, matrimonial consent is not excluded by e. of law consisting in the belief that Matrimony is null (for example, the erroneous belief that a diriment impediment exists), just as consent is not excluded by knowledge of its actual nullity.
The e. of fact may concern the physical identity of the person or that person’s qualities. Error concerning physical identity, where there is properly a discrepancy between the manifestation of the will and the real will (in it one would see a typical case of e. ostativo) and hence an absolute lack of consent, renders the Matrimony invalid. On the other hand, error concerning a person’s quality does not, as a general rule, affect the validity of the Matrimony, even if it caused the contract, except when it concerns: a) an error about a quality that results in an e. of person, that is, a quality serving to identify the person and taken exclusively into consideration by the contracting party (but this is a concept difficult to define precisely and much discussed); b) an error concerning servile condition, that is, the state of slavery (servitus proprie dicta) of the other contracting party. It should be noted, however, that although e. concerning other personal qualities (health, virginity, nobility, economic status, etc.) has no effect in itself on the validity of consent, the existence or non-existence of those qualities, like that of any other past or present circumstance, may be decisive for the validity or invalidity of the Matrimony when consent has been made dependent upon it by positing it as a condition (can. 1092, n. 4).
From the penal point of view, e. (also equated here in its effects with ignorance; can. 2202 § 3) may be taken into consideration for the purpose of assessing imputability and applying penalties. Canon law, here clearly departing from the state penal codes that have accepted the maxim ignorantia facti, non iuris excusat, regards ignorance of the law, when inculpable, among the causes that exclude imputability—insofar as they remove moral imputability itself, the basis of penal imputability, because they suppress the subjective (voluntary) element; otherwise, imputability is diminished to a greater or lesser degree in relation to the culpability of the ignorance. Ignorance of the penalty alone does not remove imputability but diminishes II. The same rules apply to e. (can. 2202). Causes that wholly exclude imputability, and thereby exclude its gravity—and consequently also e.—likewise exempt from the penalty (can. 2218 § 2). As regards the penalties latae sententiae (v. PENSA), the law considers, in addition to invincible ignorance, which entails no imputability of the agent and therefore excludes every penalty, three other cases of ignorance: affected ignorance, that is, knowingly willed, which never excuses from the penalty; vincible, crass and supine ignorance, which exempts from the penalty only when it is imposed by a law that expressly requires full and mature knowledge and deliberation; and vincible ignorance that is neither crass nor supine, and therefore entails a lesser degree of imputability (simpliciter: vincible), which also exempts—in addition to penalties imposed by a law as above—from medicinal penalties imposed by other laws, but not from vindictive penalties latae sententiae (can. 2220 §§ 1, 3, n. 1e).
As regards e. against the Faith, V. ERESIA; for the theory of common e., V. GIURIDIZIONE. For e. in moral theology, V. IGNORANZA.