EQUITY. - One cannot speak of e. without referring back to the classical Aristotelian theory contained in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Art of Rhetoric.
Aristotle affirms that there is no opposition between the equitable and the just, but e. (epicheia) is a concrete justice, that is, to put it with a formula of a common sort, the justice of the individual case. The function of e. consists in correcting and completing the law; which is an actualization of the just, but is, by its nature, universal and, being unable to foresee everything, must limit itself to providing for what happens in the majority of cases; hence the deficiencies of the objective expression of justice, in which the law consists, deficiencies that are eliminated by e., which, therefore, to use other Aristotelian terms, is that just which is not comprised in the written law. To remain more closely adherent to Aristotle's thought, it will be well to paraphrase his language. He observes that when the law speaks in universal terms, and there occurs in individual cases what falls outside the universal, then it is right, for that part in which the work of the legislator is deficient, to correct the defect of the law; which is what the legislator himself would do, if he were present, and would thus have legislated had he foreseen it: like the Lesbian rule, which bends according to the shape of the stone and is by its very nature flexible, so the concrete norm must run after the mutability of cases. In a passage of the Art of Rhetoric, speaking of the office of equitable men, Aristotle says, among other things, that the office of the equitable man is to be indulgent toward the frailty of men, to keep his eye not only on the law but also on the legislator, not on his words but on his intention, not on what the man has done but on what he intends to do. For Aristotle e. is not only a force placed at the service of the fulfillment of justice, to remedy the inevitable deficiencies of the written law, but has also a very high ethical and social significance.
Thus conceived by one of the greatest representatives of Greek philosophical speculation, e. had its most superb affirmation in Roman jurisprudence, which saw in it the informing principle of law: law is equitable insofar as it is not reduced to obstructions, more or less corresponding to universal principles, but expresses itself in formulas such that they reveal themselves, in the reality of life, as the actualization of practical principles suited to satisfying the manifold concrete exigencies that individual relationships bring to light. Law has reason to exist insofar as it is adequate to all the moments of the case under consideration. Therefore the aequitas naturalis must be transformed into aequitas constituta or civilis in order to avoid a ius iniquum, according to what Cicero affirms, who, after having spoken of the e. quae paribus in causis paria iura desiderat, notes that the peculiar mark of the ius civile is that of being aequabile (neque enim aliter esset ius), that the lex is fons aequitatis, that the iudicium must actualize the aequitas.
Along the same line of Aristotelian thought runs that of Thomism. St. Thomas, after having observed that humani actus de quibus leges dantur, in singularibus contingentibus consistunt, quae infinitis modis variari possunt and that, therefore, non fuit possibile aliquam regulam institui, quae in nullo casu deficeret since legislatores attendunt ad id quod in pluribus accidit, secundum hoc legem ferentes, affirms that to observe the law in some cases est contra aequalitatem iustitiae et contra bonum commune quod lex intendit and therefore, in these cases, malum est sequi legem positam, bonum autem est, praetermissis verbis legis, sequi in quod poscit iustitiae ratio et communis utilitas. Et ad hoc ordinatur epikeia quae apud nos dicitur aequitas.
The profound Aristotelian intuition, which the Angelic Doctor made his own, transmitting it to all later doctrine, which, even when it speaks through the mouth of supreme theologians like Suárez, adds nothing substantially new, provides the elements necessary and sufficient, substantial and terminological, for determining the concept and the function of e.
The juridical norm, as the objective expression of justice, has inherent in it the characteristics of generality or universality and of abstractness, which constitute the guarantee of the certainty of law, being the presuppositions of the objectivity of the norm with respect to the concrete cases of life. Given these characteristics, the norm is inadequate for the satisfaction of all concrete interests, which present themselves in all the richness of their manifold life, precise in their unmistakable individuality.
Through the mediation of the principle of e. there is brought about the adaptation of the abstract norm to the single, concrete case, one might almost say a plastic adherence between the one and the other. Whence it is that e. has rightly been called the justice of the individual case, to signify precisely that it constitutes the concrete mediation between the abstract principle of justice, expressed in the norm, and the exigencies of individual cases and concrete interests: by means of e. there is a calling back in concreto, that is, with reference to the individual case, of the principle of justice, which is one and the same with the principle of juridicality that informs the norm. It has been observed that, if one calls justice the system of judgments of abstract juridical evaluation, and the moment of the spirit that corresponds to it, one calls with equal propriety e. the system of judgments of concrete juridical evaluation, and the moment of the spirit that corresponds to it: e. is a specification of justice, an objectification of juridical values, a degradation of abstract juridical evaluations to concrete form and aspect; the principle of e. constitutes the concrete moment of the principle of the just. These concepts and these terms correspond substantially to the Aristotelian concepts and terms recalled above.
Within the ambit of which one still remains when it is said that by means of e. there is accomplished an ascertainment of the substantial aptitude of the norm to satisfy the concrete interests in which the relationship abstractly foreseen and regulated by it is made precise, and that e. has an integrative and corrective function with respect to the norm, according as the judgment of concrete evaluation, in which e. consists, brings to light the absence and inadequacy or indeed the incompatibility of the positive discipline with respect to the concrete case, in such a way that e., besides being a sentiment, is a living and operative force that acts at the moment of the interpretation and application of the norm in order to satisfy the irrepressible exigencies of the principle of concrete justice and to bring it about that law is not reduced to rigid abstract formulas but truly corresponds to the definition that the Roman jurist gave of it, ars boni et aequi.
A particular importance, even while the Aristotelian intuitions retain their value, which became so many Thomistic propositions, jealously guarded by later doctrine, is assumed by e. in the canonical order. It has rightly been observed that between the canonistic conception and the civilistic conception of aequitas there may be seen reproduced, under a particular aspect, the spiritual contrast between the orders of ecclesiastical provenance and the orders of lay provenance, and it has likewise been noted that the fact that e. in canon law is properly aequitas canonica means that the elementum correctivum iuris does not consist in abstract or arbitrary principles, but in the very principles that are at the basis of the canonical system and constitute its specific structure (Del Giudice).
The references to the ius naturale, to the divina lex when one speaks of aequitas, are extremely frequent in canonical doctrine and most significant. The principles of divine law, natural and positive, constitute the supreme criteria by which the system of canonical legislation of all times is inspired and with which all Christian ethics is likewise permeated. And the term ius naturale, while in secular legal orders it encloses a concept that is extremely vague and uncertain and eludes any concrete determination (hence the discredit into which the doctrine of natural law has fallen), in the canonical order represents a well-determined concept, given the definition contained in Gratian's Decretum: ius quod in lege et evangelio continetur, and subsequently definitively consolidated in the canonical and theological schools. These, when they speak of natural law, intend to refer to the supreme norm in which, in the final analysis, the entire canonical order is resolved.
It has been said with perfect reason that in canonical aequitas this nature of the order clearly manifests itself — that of resolving itself entirely into a norm from which all norms are born; that here aequitas is profoundly called canonical, almost as if to accentuate its unmistakable peculiarity, because it in fact represents and expresses this order in what is most proper to it; that canonical aequitas is the manner in which the supreme norm asserts its sovereignty over all the determinations of itself, which are the other norms; that canonical aequitas comes to ensure the application of the norm in every case, since all the indications and prescriptions of particular norms are necessarily referred back to it, whether in application they coincide, or whether they do not coincide or even contradict it, since the contradiction is eliminated and the supreme norm is realized; that in this sense canonical aequitas truly brings out, makes explicit, the supreme norm that every particular norm holds enclosed within itself, and at the same time makes manifest and identifiable the true dimensions and true contents of the order; that canonical aequitas is the positive and, one might almost say, technical manner in which the profound and universal content of the supreme norm is realized and applied at every moment; that it, in short, as the identification of its content with natural law, quod in lege et evangelio continetur, testifies, is nothing other than the expression of the supreme norm and therefore of all the laws that it contains and applies, the explicit and textual affirmation of the sovereignty, universality and inderogability of the fundamental norm; that canonical aequitas, rich as it is with all the contents of the supreme norm, but univocal as it is with the univocity and unity of that norm itself, is of an absolute simplicity, renewing the complications of normative systems, and giving place to a single exigency and a single norm, inasmuch as it responds to the essential and universal imperative of the entire order, and applies this secundum simplicitatem canonicam to all the cases of life and of law; hence the essentially dynamic nature that the canonical order borrows from the society to which it inheres; hence the fundamental position that in this order belongs to the mediating function exercised by the legislator, by the superior, by the judge, by the interpreter, between the concrete situation, the particular norm and the supreme norm (Capograssi).
It is in consideration of the supreme end of the canonical order that aequitas canonica comes into operation. When the periculum animarum is at stake, the ecclesiastical judge has not only the power but also the duty to have recourse to it. With regard to the expression, so effective and significant, with which Henry of Susa replied to those who, like Bulgarus and John of Bassano, did not look favorably upon the spirituales opiniones and upon aequitas canonica — sed velint nolint hanc aequitatem de iure necesse habent sequi, ubicumque agitur de periculo animarum — it has been observed that to say ubicumque agitur de periculo animarum means to say: every time that the very order of its object is in question, in its profound and summarizing unity, the embodying of the Christian society, only in which the salus animarum is accomplished and the periculum animarum is overcome, that is, every time that it is a matter of realizing, of asserting, of safeguarding the supreme norm in which the order is resolved; since salus animarum or periculum animarum are holistic expressions, ways of speaking by which one seeks to grasp, through the overall effect of the entire order, precisely the order in its totality (Capograssi).
Hence it is that, even if in the CIC there were no provision such as that of can. 20, according to which si certa de re dexit expressum praescriptum legis sive generalis sive particularis, norma sumenda est... a generalibus iuris principiis cum aequitate canonica servata, in conformity with what is read in c. 11, XI, 36: In his vero, super quibus ius non invenitur expressum, precedas, aequitate servata, semper in humaniorem partem declinando, recourse would nevertheless have to be had to canonical aequitas in order to supply the silence of the legislator, since this principle is inherent in the canonical order, as the supreme norm that is realized through it. And when the judge, in order to supply the silence of the legislator, has recourse to that principle, which rises to the rank of a formal source of law, he issues a sentence that formally is a jurisdictional act in the strict sense, but substantially is a legislative act.
Given the intimate and inseparable connection between the principle of aequitas canonica and the consideration of the salus animarum and of the periculum animarum, understood in the aforementioned sense, the opposition of the canonical conception of aequitas to the civil-law conception appears most manifest, so much so that one can say — as has been said — that canonical aequitas is the opposite of the aequitas of civil orders: the former is the entire order in its most profound positive exigencies being realized, the latter is at the very least a setting aside of the positive order and a giving place to other norms that have come aliunde (Capograssi). Nor could the fact that those which are designated as legal definitions of aequitas in Roman law are found substantially repeated by certain canonists lead one to think differently; this must not be misleading, since, as has been observed in general, the true concept of every institution and its scope are usually, as regards medieval doctrine, opposed to the definitions that are given of it (Ruffini). Now, the meaning and the function that properly and profoundly in the canonical order is qualified as canonical are peculiar to this order and, as the preceding considerations demonstrate, find no counterpart in any other legal order.
BIBLI: V. Scialoja, Del diritto positivo e dell'e., Camerino 1882; P. Viazzi, L'e. nella filosofia e nella storia, Milano 1892; J. Hering, Die Lehre von der Epithe, in Theologisch-probittische Quartalsdorff, 32 (1890), pp. 579-600, 796-810; B. Donati, Sul principio di e., in Annali della Facoltà di giurisprudenza della Università di Perugia, 1913, pp. 337-66; P. Gery, Methode d'intersezione, Parigi 1919, I, n. 19; II, n. 163; G. Maggiore, L'e. e il suo valore nel diritto, in Diritto internazionale di filosofia del diritto, 13 (1923), pp. 256-57; V. Del Giudice, Privilegio, dispensa ed epidicia nel diritto canonico, in Annali della Facoltà di giurisprudenza della Università di Perugia, 7-8 (1926), pp. 48-55; S. D'Angelo, De aequitate in Codice iuris canonici, in Periodica da re annali, canonica, liturgica, 16 (1927), pp. 210-211; id., De aequitate in Codice iuris canonici, Excursio ad can. 20, in Apollinaris, 1 (1928), pp. 365-83; E. Hugon, De epidicia et aequitate, in Angelicum, 3 (1928), pp. 349-67; V. Ragusa, Diritto ed equità, in Archivio giuridico, 117 (1930), pp. 87, 114, 224 sgg.; A. Giannini, L'equitò, ibid., 118 (1931), p. 45 sgg.; E. Wohlbaupter, Aequitas canonica, Faderborn 1931; P. Fedele, Generalia iuris principio cum aequitate canonica servata, in Studi ordinari, 10 (1936), pp. 31-111; C. Lefebvre, Les pouvoirs du juge en droit canonique, Parigi 1938, pp. 163-212; id., La théorie du domicile et l'équité canonique, in Ephemerides Theologiques 1-ocaniennes, 12 (1948), pp. 111-33; id., Equité canonique et consentement matrimonial, in Mélanges de science religieuse, 3 (1946), pp. 125-126; 135-56; id., Théorie des preuves et équité canonique, in Ephemerides iuris canonici, 3 (1946), pp. 282-312; G. Capograssi, La certezza del diritto nell'ordinamento canonico, ibid., 3 (1946), pp. 9-30. Il tema dell'e. canonica è diffusamente trattato nelle seguenti trattazioni generali: A. Van Hove, De legibus ecclesiastici, Malmes-Roma 1930, p. 274 sgg.; A. G. Cicognani-D. Staffa, Commentarium ad librum primum Codicis iuris canonici, I, ivi 1939, p. 297 sgg.; G. Michiels, Normae generales iuris canonici, I, Parigi-Tournai-Roma 1949, p. 557 sgg.
Pio Fedele