PLEASURE. - In general, in classical usage it indicates the "joy" of the senses when they are satisfied and therefore also the physical well-being that derives from it (cf. Aristotle, De partibus anim., II, 17, 660 b 9). In a broader sense it means the "feeling" of satisfaction that spreads from the sensory sphere to the psychic sphere and thence even to the spiritual sphere as the subject's response to the attainment of a desired good. Hence St. Thomas's definition: "Delectatio nihil aliud est quam quietatio appetitus in bono" (Sum. Theol., 1a-2bc, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1).
Pleasure therefore follows the scale of objects: from the more material sensible pleasures of taste and touch, ordered to the preservation and propagation of life, up to the higher senses of sight and hearing in which artistic taste is fulfilled, and to the satisfactions taken in the works of the intellect and the acts of virtue. It is always the satisfaction of a suitable object, while an unsuitable object causes pain (λύπη, πόνες: Aristotle, De An., III, 7, 431 a 9 ff.; Eth. Nic., II, 4, 1105 b 33). Pleasure in finite beings therefore involves a cognitive element, which is the apprehension of a certain good, real or apparent, to be attained or already attained, and an affective element, that is, the feeling of well-being, which is the satisfaction of the emotional sphere (Sum. Theol., 1a-2bc, q. 11, a. 1 ad 3). In God, on the other hand, pleasure is the happiness of the full possession of himself, the supreme good, as a single simple and supreme joy: διὰ ὁ θεὸς καὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλήν καίρει ἠθανὴν, because pleasure consists in rest rather than in movement (Aristotle, Eth. Nic., VII, 15, 1154 b 26).
In Socrates pleasure is usually the reward of virtue as the harmony of the soul to which man must tend (Plato, Prot., 354 c, 357 a) by acting according to reason (κατὰ φρόνησιν), but when it degenerates into sensible pleasure it becomes passion (πάθος) and breaks every rule without bridle or limit (Resp., 328 d). Aristotle posits not only the distinction between good and perverse pleasures (φαυλαὶ ἠθαναί), but also between the pleasures that arise from virtue and the pleasures that are enjoyed with virtue (Eth. Nic., X, 5-7, 1175 a 18 ff.). Opposed to Aristotle are the Cyrenaics, the Cynics and the Epicureans, who made the essence of the good and of virtue consist in pleasure and therefore held it to be the rule and the highest goal of life (cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adv. mathem., VII, 199. On the Ciceronian image of Epicurean pleasure seated on a throne, served by the whole retinue of the abilities and virtues of the soul, see St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, V, ch. 20. On the Stoic doctrine and its confutation, ibid., IX, chs. 4-5; XIV, ch. 9). The Aristotelian position was also combated by the Stoics, who, going to the opposite extreme, regarded pleasure as irrational and unbecoming to the virtuous man: for Cleanthes the only pleasures of man were to have as their object the beautiful and the good (cf. Epiphanius, Adv. haer., III, 37; H. Diels, Dox. gr., 2nd ed., Berlin 1929, p. 592, 30).
According to the nature of the good to which it tends, pleasure is divided into sensible and spiritual; the latter is fulfilled in the higher sphere of consciousness and embraces every form of satisfaction in truth, goodness, beauty..., or in every value in general considered in the attraction it generates in the subject, at the moment of desire, and in the joy of possession when it is attained; sensible or bodily pleasure, on the other hand, is fulfilled in the senses that are satisfied in their cravings. Hence St. Thomas calls sensible pleasure "carnal pleasure" (or of the body), because it is fulfilled with touch, which is the most material sense, and spiritual pleasure "animal pleasure" (that is, of the soul) ("delectatio animalis... quae consummatur in sola apprehensione alicuius rei ad votum habitae; ... delectatio corporalis sive naturalis quae in ipso tactu corporali perficitur" (Sum. Theol., 1a-2bc, q. 72, a. 2). The morality of pleasure depends first of all on the nature of the object, that is, on whether or not it conforms to the norms of reason with respect to the ultimate end of the human person (ibid., 2a-2bc, q. 118, a. 6). Against therefore the excesses of rigorism and of laxism (v.), it must be held that pleasure belongs to and benefits the rational nature; first as a stimulus to move it to action and then as the fulfillment and ultimate perfection of the action itself, but the use of pleasure must be measured by reason to the end. Christian ethics moreover admonishes the necessity of penance as expiation and flight from sin.
In modern philosophy the irrational moment of pleasure has been emphasized by preference: for example, in Kant, who considers it as a "feeling bound to representation without nevertheless being knowledge" (cf. Kritik der Urtheilkraft, Einl., VII). In modern psychology attempts have been made to specify the various classes of sensible pleasures, their behavior and also the elements of the nervous system that would be their respective organs; but, as J. Ward has recognized (Psychological principles, Cambridge 1920, p. 24), the results have remained very uncertain and no great advance has been made beyond the Aristotelian theory. See also HEDONISM; UTILITARIANISM.