PIACERE. – In general, in classical usage it indicates the “joy” of the senses when they are satisfied and hence also the physical well-being that derives from this (cf. Aristotle, De partibus anim., II, 17, 660 b 9). In a broader sense it means the “feeling” of satisfaction that spreads from the sensory sphere to the psychic sphere and then even to the spiritual sphere itself, as the subject’s response to the attainment of a desired good. Hence the definition of s. Tommaso: “Delectatio nihil aliud est quam quietatio appetitus in bono” (Sum. Theol., 1a-2bc, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1).
P. therefore follows the scale of objects: from the more material sensible pleasures of taste and touch, ordered to the preservation and propagation of life, up to the higher senses of sight and hearing, in which artistic taste is fulfilled, and to the satisfactions derived from works of the intellect and acts of virtue. It is always the satisfaction afforded by a suitable object, whereas an unsuitable object causes pain (λύπη, πόνες: Aristotle, De An., III, 7, 431 a 9 ff.; Eth. Nic., II, 4, 1105 b 33). P. in finite beings therefore entails a cognitive element, which is the apprehension of a certain good, real or apparent, to be attained or already attained, and an affective element, that is, the feeling of well-being, which is the satisfaction of the emotional sphere (Sum. Theol., 1a-2bc, q. 11, a. 1 ad 3). In God, on the other hand, p. is the happiness of the full possession of himself, the supreme good, as a single, simple, and supreme joy: διὰ ὁ θεὸς καὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλήν καίρει ἠθανὴν, because p. consists in repose rather than in movement (Aristotle, Eth. Nic., VII, 15, 1154 b 26).
In Socrates, p. is usually the reward of virtue as the harmony of the soul toward which man must strive (Plato, Prot., 354 c, 357 a), acting according to reason (κατὰ φρόνησιν); but when it degenerates into sensible p., it becomes passion (πάθος) and breaks every rule without restraint or limit (Resp., 328 d). Aristotle posits not only the distinction between good and wicked p. (φαυλαὶ ἠθαναί), but also between p. that arise from virtue and p. that are enjoyed with virtue (Eth. Nic., X, 5-7, 1175 a 18 ff.). Opposed to Aristotle were the Cyrenaics, the Cynics, and the Epicureans, who made the essence of the good and of virtue consist in p. and therefore regarded it as the rule and highest goal of life (cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adv. mathem., VII, 199. On Cicero’s image of Epicurean p. seated on a throne and served by the entire retinue of the abilities and virtues of the soul, V. s. Agostino, De Civitate Dei, V, chap. 20. On Stoic doctrine and its refutation, ibid., IX, chaps. 4-5; XIV, chap. 9). The Aristotelian position was also opposed by the Stoics, who, going to the opposite extreme, considered p. irrational and unbecoming to the virtuous man: for Cleanthes, the only pleasures of man were to have the beautiful and the good as their objects (cf. Epiphanius, Adv. haer., III, 37; H. Diels, Dox. gr., 2nd ed., Berlin 1929, p. 592, 30).
According to the nature of the good toward which it tends, p. is divided into sensible and spiritual; the latter is fulfilled in the higher sphere of consciousness and embraces every form of satisfaction derived from truth, goodness, beauty..., or from every value in general, considered in the attraction it generates in the subject, at the moment of desire, and in the joy of possession when it is attained; sensible or bodily p., on the other hand, is fulfilled in the senses, which are satisfied by their desires. Therefore s. Tommaso calls sensible p. “carnal p.” (or of the body), because it is fulfilled through touch, which is the most material sense, and calls spiritual p. “animal p.” (that is, of the soul) (“delectatio animalis... quae consummatur in sola apprehensione alicuius rei ad votum habitae; ... delectatio corporalis sive naturalis quae in ipso tactu corporali perficitur” (Sum. Theol., 1a-2bc, q. 72, a. 2). The morality of p. depends above all on the nature of the object, that is, on whether or not it conforms to the norms of reason with respect to the ultimate end of the human person (ibid., 2a-2bc, q. 118, a. 6). Against the excesses of rigorism and laxism (v.), therefore, one must hold that p. belongs to and benefits rational nature: first as a stimulus that moves it to action, and then as the completion and ultimate perfection of the action itself; but the use of p. must be proportioned by reason to the end. Christian ethics also admonishes the necessity of penance as expiation for and flight from sin.
In modern philosophy, preference has been given to emphasizing the irrational moment of p.: for example, in Kant, who considers it a “feeling linked to representation without nevertheless being cognition” (cf. Kritik der Urtheilkraft, Einl., VII). In modern psychology, attempts have been made to specify the various classes of sensible p., their behavior, and also the elements of the nervous system that would constitute their respective organs; but, as J. Ward recognized (Psychological principles, Cambridge 1920, p. 24), the results have remained very uncertain, and no great advance has been made beyond Aristotelian theory. V. EDONISMO; UTILITARISMO.