MALE. — It is that which opposes the good (v.) and the perfection of anything: “Hoc est esse mali quod est privatio boni” (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 14, a. 10). In the Christian conception, which admits in God, the supreme good, the first origin of beings, evil is not a reality in itself, nor a mere “privation” (οὐκ δή), but denotes a qualified privation (μη δή, σφέργιος), that is, the lack of a due perfection. According to the nature of such perfection, evil is either physical or moral.
Physical evil is characterized by the incompleteness of being with respect to its structure and natural development; it arises from the impediment to attaining the due perfection, from the destruction of its perfection (noncivo), and in living beings, from sickness and death, which is the supreme evil. Moral evil consists in the disharmony of the will with the rule of action and thus essentially involves the rupture of the order of right reason (sin) and the consequent privation of the ultimate end (punishment). Evil, therefore, is the “fall” from one’s ontological term, the “defect” of one’s perfection, the incongruity of one’s situation. Evil is clarified and revealed as privation precisely within the realm of being and in relation to the good; it does not consist, therefore, in the simple absence of something from something, but is given by a certain presence of the entity to itself that does not correspond to its degree or function: “Omnis modus, in quantum modus bonus est; et sic potest dici de specie et ordine. Sed malus modus, vel mala species vel malus ordo, aut ideo dicuntur, quia minora sunt quam esse debuerunt; aut quia non his rebus accomodatur quibus accommodanda sunt; et ideo dicuntur mala quia sunt aliena et incongrua” (Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 5, a. 5 ad 4).
The existence of physical and moral evil is the object of continual experience both in nature and in human life (defects, sickness, private and collective misfortunes...). Moral evil is in itself ambiguous, for it can often present itself as an apparent good (pleasure, skill, desire for vengeance); hence moral evil in the sphere of individual life and the history of humanity forms the most arduous problem of our existence, whose positive or negative meaning remains suspended upon the possibility of overcoming evil. Therefore, the definitive solution to the problem of evil is found only in religion and more precisely in revealed religion, according to its two moments of Divine Providence and salvific Incarnation.
Christian creationism teaches that all that God has created is in itself good (Gen., 1, 31) and that even man in his beginning was endowed with a natural rectitude (Eccles. 7, 30) according to the dictates of his reason: evil therefore indicates a subsequent situation of beings due to their own defect and not to God. St. Thomas, following Pseudo-Dionysius, affirms that evil properly is not something, nor does it exist per se (ὅτι τὸ κακὸν ἢ κακὸν οὐδὲ μὴ οὐδενὶ ἢ γένεσιν πῶς! De div. nom., cap. 4, 20: PG 3, 717). The first metaphysical reason or possibility of evil, however, is found in the “defectibility” inherent in the creature by reason of its finitude, inasmuch as “perfectum universi requirit ut sint quaedam quae a bonitate deficere possint: ad quod sequitur ea interdum deficere” (Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 48, a. 2). Then there is the defect that inheres in proximate causes either in themselves or through an inadequate instrument (cf. C. Gent., III, 71). Evil can therefore derive from multiple defectibilities of being, whereas for the good to obtain, all the first principles required to form the integral causality of the effect must concur, according to the principle of Pseudo-Dionysius: τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκ τῇ μιᾷς καὶ ὅλης αὐτῆς τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ μερικῶν ἐλλείψεων (De div. nom., cap. 4, § 30: PG 3, 732).
The proper origin of evil, as faith teaches, is the sin of the spiritual creature that abuses its freedom, not in the sense that it tends to evil as such, but inasmuch as it tends to some particular good outside the order to the ultimate end. In this sense moral evil, unlike physical evil which always signifies simple privation, qualifies and so to speak configures the subject interiorly and thus positively: “Bonum et malum non sunt differentiae nisi in moralibus, in quibus malum positve aliquid dicitur, secundum quod ipse actus voluntatis denominatur malus a volito” (De Malo, q. 1, a. 1 ad 12; cf. Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 48, a. 1. ad 2). If the proper direct cause of evil is therefore always a defectible nature, there is nevertheless the difference that whereas physical evil arises as such from an arrest, an impediment, a destruction... that damages or prevents the full manifestation of the good, in the sphere of freedom, proper to moral evil, it is the agent subject itself that is the principle of (ibid., q. 49, a. 1 ad 3). The foundation of this ontological distinction between physical and moral evil lies in the twofold ontological sphere: one of being as transcendent, where the good is the perfection of act in general, to whatever sphere it may belong; the other is the sphere of the perfection of the free spirit to which belongs the decision regarding the fulfillment of its being with respect to the ultimate end (sphere of values). Hence it is understood how what in the first sphere may be an act and a perfection (e.g., skill in theft, in deceit; even sensual pleasure, etc.) constitutes in the second sphere true evil. In this sense moral evil is denounced by the rule of “reason,” which is the directive principle of action (cf. Sum. Theol., 1a-2a, q. 71, a. 2, and Pseudo-Dionysius, op. cit., § 32: PG 3, 733).
Yet evil has its role: since the power of God is infinite, even physical evil as well as moral evil serves in some way the plan of divine Providence, both as an instrument of God’s justice (Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 49, a. 2), and, in a still more proper sense, inasmuch as particular evil can contribute to the attainment of a greater good: it is a general fact of nature that “corruptio unius est generatio alterius” (Aristotle, De Gener. et corr., I, 3, 319 a 21). Hence St. Thomas concludes that: “Cum igitur Deus sit universalis provisor totius entis, ad ipsius providentiam pertinet ut permittat quosdam defectus esse in aliquibus particularibus rebus, ne impediatur bonum universi perfectum.” Providence thus becomes the guarantee of a higher optimism: “Si enim omnia mala impedirentur, multa bona deessent universo. Non enim esset vita leonis, si non esset occisio animalium, nec esset patientia martyrum, si non esset persecutio tyrannorum” (Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 22, a. 2 ad 2). This “theodicean” air of Thomism is inspired by St. Augustine, who is expressly cited: “Deus omnipotens nullo modo sineret malum aliquod esse in operibus suis, nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus ut bene faceret etiam de malo” (Enchiridion, cap. 2: PL 40, 236).
Physical evil can indeed become an occasion for virtue, and moral evil with its disorder stimulates reason to defend itself by pursuing the good. Moreover, moral evil, which is sin, has been, according to St. Thomas, who follows the most constant patristic tradition, the “motive” for the greatest event in human history, namely the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, the eternal Word, who offers man spiritual riches and possibilities (grace, virtues, gifts, glory) of drawing nearer to God and enjoying His presence and beatitude to a greater degree than would have been the case had man not sinned (cf. Sum. Theol., 3a, q. 1, a. 6 ad 2).
In dualistic conceptions of being (Manichaeism, Pythagoreanism, Gnosticism), evil is identified with matter and the material world and is regarded as a principle in itself, like the good, and their eternal struggle constitutes history. Even for Plato, evil is identified with matter, and from it the "forms" as such and the world of intelligibles are exempt (Leg., 900 e). Plotinus transfers the doctrine of matter as the principle of evil into his religious metaphysics and writes a treatise, which will have many imitators, entitled: "Whence the origin of evil?" (Πλῆντα τὰ κακὰ: Enn., I, 8). In it, he proves that evil has a substantial existence opposed to the good (opp. 1-5) and therefore also necessary (opp. 6-7). While in the first part Plotinus draws inspiration from the Pythagoreans, who attributed to matter the character of an incomplete and indeterminate infinity (ἀπεφαν), in the second he adheres to a passage from the Theaetetus (176 a) and the Timaeus according to which contraries are not separable and discord and evil derive from a prior nature, namely unordered matter (Enn. I, 8, 7; ed. E. Bréhier, Paris 1924, I, 122, 6). Between Plato and Plotinus stands the Jew Philo, who, while affirming
that matter is created by God, also declares that matter is formless, pre-existent to creation, and the principle of disorder from which all evil derives (De officiis mundi, 3, 22; ed. L. Cohn, Berlin 1896, I, 7, 17 ff.). Philo can therefore defend God from any solidarity with evil, which has its principle in human passions and especially in φύσις (pride; In Flaccum, 11, 92; ed. Cohn-Wendland, Berlin 1905, VI, 136, 22).
Rich in theological insights but less systematic, Philo’s doctrine found no following in Western Christian thought, which remained, on the problem of evil, in the wake of Neoplatonism as interpreted by St. Augustine and especially by Pseudo-Dionysius, admirably commented upon by St. Thomas. The treatment of evil became in the later schools of Greek thought an almost obligatory subject. Proclus gathers the Neoplatonic tradition in three treatises, of which only the Latin version (1280) by William of Moerbeke survives: De Providentia et Fato et eo quod est in nobis; De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam; De malorum subsistentia (ed. V. Cousin, Paris 1820, 2nd ed. 1864). In the Renaissance, Pomponazzi essentially adheres to the doctrine of St. Augustine, noting the difference between philosophers and theologians: while the latter indirectly reduce evil to God and His providence, the former lose themselves in countless opinions. In Spinoza, who rigorously formulates the metaphysical monism of G. Bruno, both good and evil “...indicate nothing positive in things considered in themselves, nor are they anything other than modes of thinking, or notions, which we form from comparing things with one another...” After a broad examination of the dialectical essence of evil, the following definitions follow: 1) “By good I understand what we certainly know to be useful to us”; 2) “By evil, however, that which we know to hinder us from possessing some good” (Ethica, part 4, preface; ed. G. Gentile, Bari 1933, p. 179 ff.). In the 17th century, the unleashing of Jansenism posed the problem of evil in its ultimate theological sense: the possibility of liberation from sin and eternal damnation. To the heated controversies of the theologians, Voltaire opposed his agnostic cynicism, affirming that to explain the mystery of evil in man, of suffering and of the passions, recourse to another mystery such as the doctrine of sin is of no avail: “A mystery was never an explanation: it is a divine and inexplicable thing” (Remarques sur les Pensées de M. Pascal, in Œuvres, XXXII, Paris 1785, p. 300). The Enlightenment conception of evil found its theoretical structure in critical idealism; yet within it, both negatively and positively, motives derived from the Protestant conception of sin and freedom also operate. The systematic attempt at a rationalist optimism with a theological and conciliatory background in the explanation of evil is Leibniz’s Theodicy, which in its very title indicates the theme of reconciling “the goodness of God, the freedom of man and the origin of evil” (cf. especially the critique of absolute determinism in Hobbes and Bayle: Œuvres, ed. P. Janet, II, Paris 1900, p. 370 ff.). Modern philosophy, especially from Kant onward, returns to the conception of Manichaeism but in a way that frees itself from ontological dualism; thus the situation is reversed into a rationalist optimism in which, however, the individual is overwhelmed and sacrificed so that universal Reason may triumph. According to Kant, man is “evil by nature” inasmuch as in his specific nature (in seiner Gattung betrachtet) he has an inclination to evil: this inclination inherent in human nature is called by Kant the “radical evil” (radikales Böse) and constitutes the Enlightenment substitute for the Christian doctrine of original sin, as Kant himself admits (cf. Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, part 1, ch. 2; ed. K. Vorländer, Leipzig 1937, p. 28 ff.). In idealism, evil is the necessary dialectical (negative) moment for the becoming of human history in which the activity of Absolute Reason unfolds: for Hegel, the distinction between good and evil represents the so-called “unhappy consciousness” of immediate existence, a distinction that must therefore be overcome in the admission of a “necessary becoming” of Absolute Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. J. Hoffmeister, Leipzig 1937, p. 536 ff.). Thus, the “world-historical individuals,” as the sole instruments of this Spirit, are absolved in their actions from the distinction between good and evil: “They are the most enlightened and know better than anyone what must be done, and what they do is right” (Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, ed. G. Lasson, Leipzig 1930, p. 76). For Hegel, evil is ultimately the so-called liberum arbitrium of the individual subject that claims to assert its “particularity,” which is opposed to the “universality” (Allgemeinheit) that is the good (Philosophie des Rechts, §§ 139-40, ed. Gans, Berlin 1840, p. 179 ff.).
Schleiermacher, in his attempt to unite the conceptions of Kant and Spinoza, reduces evil in human consciousness to the influence of sensibility, which hinders spiritual activity in the sense of Lutheran “concupiscence” (Der christliche Glaube, part 1, sect. 3, § 79 ff.). In a direction opposite to rationalist optimism, Schopenhauer sees in suffering the content and meaning of the real and of all of nature, which everywhere celebrates death (“world-pain,” Weltschmerz; cf. Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, IV, § 65; ed. Reclam, I, Leipzig, p. 467 ff.). Following Schopenhauer are E. von Hartmann, Drews, Nietzsche, Spengler, Klages. To these two main directions are added the various forms of anti-Christian optimism and pessimism in modern and contemporary culture (relativism, will to power, historicism, Freudianism, left-wing existentialism...).
The dogmatic foundation of Catholic doctrine on evil is first found in the definition of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) against the Albigensians, who defended Manichaean dualism: “Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur quod unus solus est verus Deus... qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem... Diabolus vero et alii daemones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali. Homo vero diaboli suggestione peccavit” (Denz-U, no. 428). The problem of evil is therefore, in its historical genesis, the fall, the guilt, and the punishment of human freedom; just as now salvation from evil is the divine aid of Redemption and Grace to the weakened will that must struggle against the growing tendency toward evil through concupiscence and pride. V. GOOD; OPTIMISM; PESSIMISM, and the authors cited.