EVIL. — It is good (v.) and perfection of something: « Hoe est esse mali quod est privatio boni » (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ, q. 14, a. 10). In the Christian conception, which admits in God, the supreme good, the first origin of beings, e. is neither a reality in itself nor a simple « privation » (οὐκ ὄν), but indicates a qualified privation (μὴ ὄν, στέρησις), that is, the lack of a due perfection. According to the nature of this perfection, e. is physical or moral.
Physical e. is characterized by the incompleteness of being with respect to its structure and natural development; it is constituted by the impediment to attaining the due perfection; by the destruction of its perfection (the « harmful »); and, in living beings, by illnesses and death, which is the supreme e. Moral e. consists in the will’s nonconformity to the rule of action and therefore essentially in the breaking of the order of right reason (sin) and in the consequent privation of the ultimate end (punishment). E. is therefore the « falling » short of one’s ontological term, the « defect » of one’s perfection, the incongruity of one’s situation. E. is clarified and revealed as privation precisely within the sphere of being and with respect to the good; it does not, therefore, consist in the simple absence of something from something, but is constituted by a certain presence of the being to itself that does not correspond to its degree or function: « Omnis modus, in quantum modus bonus est; et sic potest dici de specie et ordine. Sed malus modus, vel mala species vel malus ordo, aut ideo dicuntur, quia minora sunt quam esse debuerunt; aut quia non his rebus accomodantur quibus accomodanda sunt; et ideo dicuntur mala quia sunt aliena et incongrua » (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ, q. 5, a. 5 ad 4).
The existence of physical and moral e. is the object of continual experience both in nature and in human life (defects, illnesses, private and collective misfortunes...). Moral e. is ambiguous in itself, because it can often present itself as an apparent good (pleasure, skill, the desire for vengeance); hence moral e., in the sphere of the life of individuals and of the history of humanity, forms the most arduous problem of our existence, whose positive or negative meaning remains dependent on the possibility of overcoming e. The definitive solution to the problem of e. is therefore found only in religion, and more precisely in revealed religion, according to its two moments of Divine Providence and salvific Incarnation.
Christian creationism teaches that everything God has created is in itself good (Gen., 1, 31), and that man too, in his origin, was endowed with a natural rectitude (Riccle, 7, 30), according to the dictates of his reason: e. therefore indicates a subsequent condition of beings, due to their defect and not to God. St. Thomas, following Pseudo-Dionysius, affirms that e. properly is not something, nor does it exist in itself (ὅτι τὸ κακὸν ἢ κακὸν οὐδὲ μίαν οὐσίαν ἢ γένεσιν ποιεῖ: De div. nom., cap. 4, 20: PG 3, 717). The first reason, or metaphysical possibility, of e. is nevertheless found in the « defectibility » inherent in the creature because of its finitude, since « perfecto universi requirit ut sint quaedam quae a bonitate deficere possint: ad quod sequitur ea interdum deficere » (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ, q. 48, a. 2). Then there is the defect inherent in proximate causes, either in themselves or through the use of an unsuitable instrument (cf. C. Gent., III, 71). E. can therefore derive from multiple defectibilities of being, whereas for the good to be attained all the principles required to form the integral causality of the effect must concur, according to the principle of Pseudo-Dionysius: τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκ τῆς μιᾶς καὶ ὅλης αἰτίας τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ μερικῶν ἐλλείψεων (De div. nom., cap. 4, § 30: PG 3, 732).
The proper origin of e. is, as faith teaches, the sin of the spiritual creature, which abuses its freedom—not in the sense that it tends toward e. as such, but insofar as it tends toward some particular good outside the order of the ultimate end. In this sense, moral e., unlike physical e., which always denotes simple privation, qualifies and, so to speak, inwardly configures the subject and thus does so in a positive manner: « Bonum et malum non sunt differentiae nisi in moralibus, in quibus malum positive aliquid dicitur, secundum quod ipse actus voluntatis denominatur malus a volito » (De Malo, q. 1, a. 1 ad 12; cf. Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ, q. 48, a. 1 ad 2). If the proper direct cause of e. is therefore always a defectible nature, there is nevertheless this difference: whereas physical e. arises as such from a halt, an impediment, or a destruction... that damages or prevents the full manifestation of the good, in the sphere of freedom proper to moral e., the acting subject itself is the principle of e. (ibid., q. 49, a. 1 ad 3). The foundation of this ontological distinction between physical and moral e. lies in the double ontological sphere: the one of being as transcendental, where the good is the perfection of act in general, whatever sphere it may belong to; the other is the sphere of the perfection of the free spirit, to which belongs the decision concerning the fulfillment of its being with respect to the ultimate end (the sphere of values). Thus one can understand how what in the first sphere may be an act and a perfection (for example, skill in theft or deception; sensual pleasure itself, etc.) constitutes true e. in the second sphere. In this sense, moral e. is denounced by the rule of « reason », which is the directing principle of action (cf. Sum. Theol. 1ᵃ-2ᵃ, q. 71, a. 2, and Pseudo-Dionysius, op. cit., § 32: PG 3, 733).
But e. has a function of its own: since God’s power is infinite, physical e. as well as moral e. serves in some way the plan of divine Providence, both as an instrument of God’s justice (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ, q. 49, a. 2), and, in an even more proper sense, insofar as a particular evil may contribute to the attainment of a greater good. It is a general fact of nature that « corruptio unius est generatio alterius » (Aristotele, De Gener. et corr., I, 3, 319 a. 21). Hence St. Thomas concludes: « Cum igitur Deus sit universalis provisor totius entis, ad ipsius providentiam pertinet ut permittat quosdam defectus esse in aliquibus particularibus rebus, ne impediatur bonum universi perfectum ». Providence thus becomes the guarantee of a higher optimism: « Si enim omnia mala impedirentur, multa bona deessent universo. Non enim esset vita leonis, si non esset occisio animalium, nec esset patientia martyrum, si non esset persecutio tyrannorum » (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ, q. 22, a. 2 ad 2). This bold Thomistic « theodicy » is inspired by St. Augustine, who is explicitly cited: « Deus omnipotens nullo modo sineret malum aliquod esse in operibus suis, nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus ut bene faceret etiam de malo » (Enchiridion, cap. 2: PL 40, 236).
Physical e. can indeed become an occasion of virtue, and moral e., through its disorder, stimulates reason to defend itself by pursuing the good. Moreover, moral e., which is sin, was, according to St. Thomas, who gathers the most constant patristic tradition, the « motive » for the greatest event in human history, namely the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, the eternal Word, who offers man spiritual riches and possibilities (Grace, virtues, gifts, glory) of drawing near to God and enjoying his presence and a greater beatitude than would have been the case had man not sinned (cf. Sum. Theol., 3ᵃ, q. 1, a. 6 ad 2).
In the dualistic conceptions of being (Manichaeism, Pythagoreanism, Gnosticism), e. is identified with matter and the material world and is considered a principle existing in its own right, like the good; it is their eternal struggle that constitutes history. For Plato too, e. is identified with matter, and therefore the “forms” as such and the world of intelligibles are exempt from it (Leg., 900 e). Plotinus transfers the doctrine of matter as the principle of e. into his religious metaphysics and writes a treatise, which would have many imitators, entitled: “Whence the origin of e.!” (Πόθεν τὰ κακά: Eun., I, 8). In it he proves that e. has a substantial existence opposed to the good (chaps. 1-5) and therefore also a necessary one (chaps. 6-7). Whereas in the first part Plotinus draws inspiration from the Pythagoreans, who attributed to matter the character of the incomplete and indeterminate infinite (ἀπειρον), in the second he relies on a passage from the Theaetetus (176 a) and the Timaeus, according to which contraries are not separable and discord and e. proceed from a prior nature, namely matter without order (Eun. I, 8, 7; ed. E. Bréhier, Paris 1924, I, 122, 6). Between Plato and Plotinus stands the Jew Philo, who, while affirming that matter was created by God, also declares that matter is formless, pre-existent to creation, and the principle of disorder, from which every e. therefore derives (De opificis mundi, 3, 22; ed. L. Cohn, Berlin 1896, I, 7, 17 ff.). Philo can thus defend God from any solidarity with e., whose principle lies in the passions of man, and especially in ὄβος (pride; In Flaccum, 11, 92; ed. Cohn-Wendland, Berlin 1905, VI, 136, 22).
Rich in theological insights but less systematic, Philo’s doctrine did not find a following in Western Christian thought, which, on the problem of e., remained in the wake of the Neoplatonism of St. Augustine and especially of Pseudo-Dionysius, brilliantly commented upon by St. Thomas. The treatment of e. became an almost obligatory subject in the later schools of Greek thought. Proclus collected the Neoplatonic tradition in the three treatises of which only William of Moerbeke’s Latin version (1280) survives: De Providentia et Fato et eo quod est in nobis; De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam; De malorum substantialis (ed. V. Cousin, Paris 1820, 2nd ed. 1864). During the Renaissance, Pomponazzi adhered broadly to the doctrine of St. Augustine, noting the difference between philosophers and theologians: whereas the latter indirectly refer e. also to God and his providence, the former lose themselves in countless opinions. In Spinoza, who gives rigorous form to G. Bruno’s metaphysical monism, both good and e. “...nihil etiam positivum in rebus in se scilicet consideratis indicant, nec aliud sunt praeter cogitandi modos, seu notiones, quas formamus ex eo, quod res ad invicem comparamus...”. After an extensive examination of the dialectical essence of e. come the definitions: 1) “Per bonum id intelligam, quod certo scimus nobis esse utile”; 2) “Per malum autem id, quod scimus impedire, quo minus boni alicuius simus compotes” (Ethica, part 4, pref.; ed. G. Gentile, Bari 1933, p. 179 ff.). In the seventeenth century, the outbreak of Jansenism raised the problem of e. in its ultimate theological sense: the possibility of liberation from sin and eternal damnation. Against the heated controversies of the theologians, Voltaire opposed his agnostic cynicism, asserting that, in order to explain the mystery of e. in man, of suffering and the passions, it is useless to resort to another mystery, namely the doctrine of sin: “Un mystère ne fut jamais une explication: c'est une chose divine et inexplicable” (Remarques sur les «Pénistes» de M. Pascal, in Oeuvres, XXXII, Paris 1785, p. 300). The Enlightenment conception of e. found its theoretical structure in critical idealism; yet within it, motives derived from the Protestant conception of sin and freedom also operate in both negative and positive forms. The systematic attempt at a rationalistic optimism with a theological and conciliatory basis for explaining e. is Leibniz’s Theodicea, whose very title indicates the theme of reconciling “la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal” (cf. especially the critique of the absolute determinism of Hobbes and Bayle: Oeuvres, ed. P. Janet, II, Paris 1900, p. 370 ff.). Modern philosophy, especially beginning with Kant, returns to the conception of Manichaeism, but in such a way as to free itself from ontological dualism; thus the situation is reversed into a rationalistic optimism in which, nevertheless, the individual remains overwhelmed and sacrificed so that universal Reason may triumph. According to Kant, man is “evil by nature,” insofar as, considered in his specific nature (in seiner Gattung betrachtet), he has an inclination toward e.; this inclination inherent in human nature Kant calls “radical e.” (radinales Böse) and it constitutes the Enlightenment substitute for the Christian doctrine of original sin, as Kant himself admits (cf. Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, part 1, chap. 2; ed. K. Vorländer, Leipzig 1937, p. 28 ff.). In idealism, e. is the necessary dialectical (negative) moment in the development of human history, in which the activity of Absolute Reason unfolds: for Hegel, the distinction between good and e. represents the so-called “unhappy consciousness” of immediate existence, a distinction that must therefore be overcome through the admission of a “necessary becoming” of Absolute Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. J. Hoffmeister, Leipzig 1937, p. 536 ff.). Accordingly, the “cosmic-historical individuals,” as the sole instruments of that Spirit, are exempt in their actions from the distinction between good and e. “They are the most enlightened and know better than anyone what must be done, and what they do is right” (Vorlesungen in die Philos. der Weltgesch., ed. G. Lasson, Leipzig 1930, p. 76). Ultimately, for Hegel, e. is the so-called liberum arbitrium of the individual subject, which seeks to assert its “particularity,” opposed to the “universality” (Allgemeinheit), which is the good (Philosophie des Rechts, §§ 139-40, ed. Gans, Berlin 1840, p. 179 ff.).
Schleiermacher, with the aim of fusing Kant’s and Spinoza’s conceptions into a unity, reduces e. in human consciousness to the influence of sensibility, which obstructs spiritual activity in the sense of Lutheran “concupiscence” (Der christliche Glaube, part 1, section 3, § 79 ff.). In opposition to rationalistic optimism, Schopenhauer sees in suffering the content and meaning of the real and of all nature, which everywhere celebrates death (“world-pain,” Weltschmerz; cf. Die Welt als Wille u. Vorst., IV, § 65; ed. Reclam, I, Leipzig, p. 467 ff.). Schopenhauer is followed by E. von Hartmann, Drews, Nietzsche, Spengler, and Klages. The various forms of anti-Christian optimism and pessimism in modern and contemporary culture (relativism, “will to power,” historicism, Freudianism, left-wing existentialism...) can be traced back to these two principal directions.
Il fondamento dogmatico della dottrina cattolica sul m. è anzitutto nella definizione della creazione unica da parte di Dio del IV Concilio Lateranense (a. 1215) contro gli Albigesi che difendevano il dualismo manicheo: «Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur quod unus solus est verus Deus... qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem... Diabolus vero et alii daemones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali. Homo vero diaboli suggestione peccavit» (Denz-U, n. 428). Il problema del m. è quindi, nella sua genesi storica, la caduta, la colpa e la pena dell'umana libertà; come ora la salvezza dal m. è il divino aiuto della Redenzione e della Grazia alla volontà indebolita che deve lottare contro la crescente tendenza al m. della concupiscenza e dell'orgoglio. V. BENE; OTTIMISMO; PESSIMISMO, e gli autori citati.