MALE. - It is whatever is opposed to the good (v.) and to the perfection of something: "Hoe est esse mali quod est privatio boni" (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ, q. 14, a. 10). In the Christian conception, which admits in God, the supreme good, the first origin of beings, evil is not a reality in itself, nor a simple "privation" (οὐκ ὄν), but indicates qualified privation (μὴ ὄν, στέρησις), that is, the lack of a perfection that is due. According to the nature of that perfection, evil is either physical or moral.
Physical evil is characterized by the incompleteness of a being with respect to its structure and its natural development; it is given by the hindrance of attaining the perfection that is due; by the destruction of its perfection (the "harmful"), and in living beings by illnesses and by death, which is the supreme evil. Moral evil lies in the discordance of the will with the rule of action, and consists therefore essentially in the breaking of the order of right reason (sin) and in the consequent privation of the ultimate end (punishment). Evil is therefore the "fall" from one's own ontological term, it is the "defect" of one's own perfection, it is the incongruity of one's own situation. Evil is clarified and revealed as privation precisely within the sphere of being and in relation to the good; it does not consist, therefore, in the simple absence of something from something, but is given by a certain presence of the entity to itself that does not correspond to its degree or function: "Omnis modus, in quantum modus bonus est; et sic potest dici de specie et ordine. Sed malus modus, vel mala species vel malus ordo, aut ideo dicuntur, quia minora sunt quam esse debuerunt; aut quia non his rebus accomodantur quibus accomodanda sunt; et ideo dicuntur mala quia sunt aliena et incongrua" (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ, q. 5, a. 5 ad 4).
The existence of physical and moral evil is the object of continual experience both in nature and in the life of man (defects, illnesses, private and collective misfortunes...). Moral evil is in itself ambiguous, because it can often present itself as an apparent good (pleasure, skill, the will for revenge); therefore moral evil, in the sphere of the life of individuals and of the history of humanity, forms the most arduous problem of our existence, whose positive or negative meaning remains suspended on the possibility of overcoming evil. Hence the definitive solution of the problem of evil is found only in religion, and more precisely in revealed religion, according to its two moments of Divine Providence and of the saving Incarnation.
Christian creationism teaches that all that God has created is in itself good (Gen., 1, 31) and that man too, in his beginning, was endowed with a natural uprightness (Riccle, 7, 30) according to the dictates of his reason: evil therefore indicates a later situation of beings, due to their own defect and not to God: St. Thomas, who follows Pseudo-Dionysius, affirms that evil properly is not something, nor does it exist in itself (ὅτι τὸ κακὸν ἢ κακὸν οὐδὲ μίαν οὐσίαν ἢ γένεσιν ποιεῖ: De div. nom., cap. 4, 20: PG 3, 717). The first reason or metaphysical possibility of evil is nevertheless found in the "defectibility" inherent in the creature because of its finiteness, inasmuch as "perfetto universi requirit ut sint quaedam quae a bonitate deficere possint: ad quod sequitur ea interdum deficere" (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ, q. 48, a. 2). Then there is the defect that inheres in proximate causes, either in themselves or through an unsuitable instrument (cf. C. Gent., III, 71). Evil can therefore derive from multiple defectibilities of being, whereas for the good to exist all the principles required to form the integral causality of the effect must concur, according to the principle of Pseudo-Dionysius: τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκ τῆς μιᾶς καὶ ὅλης αἰτίας τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ μερικῶν ἐλλείψεων (De div. nom., cap. 4, § 30: PG 3, 732).
The proper origin of evil is, as the faith teaches, the sin of the spiritual creature that abuses its freedom, not in the sense that it tends toward evil as such, but insofar as it tends toward some particular good outside the order to the ultimate end. In this sense moral evil, unlike physical evil, which always denotes simple privation, qualifies and, so to speak, inwardly configures the subject, and therefore in a positive way: "Bonum et malum non sunt differentiae nisi in moralibus, in quibus malum positive aliquid dicitur, secundum quod ipse actus voluntatis denominatur malus a volito" (De Malo, q. 1, a. 1 ad 12; cf. Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ, q. 48, a. 1 ad 2). If the proper direct cause of evil is therefore always a defectible nature, there is nevertheless the difference that, whereas physical evil arises as such from an arrest, from a hindrance, from a destruction... that damages or hinders the full manifestation of the good, in the sphere of freedom, proper to moral evil, it is the acting subject itself that is the principle of the evil (ibid., q. 49, a. 1 ad 3). The foundation of this ontological distinction between physical evil and moral evil lies in the twofold ontological sphere: the one of being as transcendental, where the good is the perfection of the act in general, to whatever sphere it may belong; the other is the sphere of the perfection of the free spirit, to which belongs the decision of the fulfillment of its being with respect to the ultimate end (the sphere of values). Hence it is understood how what in the first sphere can be an act and a perfection (for example, skill in theft, in deceit; sensible pleasure itself, etc.), in the second sphere constitutes instead the true evil. In this sense moral evil has its denunciation in the rule of "reason," which is the directive principle of action (cf. Sum. Theol. 1ᵃ-2ᵃ, q. 71, a. 2, and Pseudo-Dionysius, op. cit., § 32: PG 3, 733).
But evil has its own task: since the power of God is infinite, physical evil as well as moral evil serves in some way the plan of divine Providence, both as an instrument of God's justice (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ, q. 49, a. 2), and, in an even more proper sense, insofar as a particular evil can contribute to the attainment of a greater good: it is a general fact of nature that "corruptio unius est generatio alterius" (Aristotle, De Gener. et corr., I, 3, 319 a. 21). Whence St. Thomas concludes: "Cum igitur Deus sit universalis provisor totius entis, ad ipsius providentiam pertinet ut permittat quosdam defectus esse in aliquibus particularibus rebus, ne impediatur bonum universi perfectum." Providence thus becomes the guarantee of a higher optimism: "Si enim omnia mala impedirentur, multa bona deessent universo. Non enim esset vita leonis, si non esset occisio animalium, nec esset patientia martyrum, si non esset persecutio tyrannorum" (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ, q. 22, a. 2 ad 2). This bold Thomist "theodicy" is inspired by St. Augustine, who is expressly cited: "Deus omnipotens nullo modo sineret malum aliquod esse in operibus suis, nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus ut bene faceret etiam de malo" (Enchiridion, cap. 2: PL 40, 236).
Physical evil can indeed become an occasion of virtue, and moral evil, with its disorder, stimulates reason to defend itself by pursuing the good. Moreover, moral evil, which is sin, was, according to St. Thomas, who gathers the most constant patristic tradition, the "motive" of the greatest event in human history, namely the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, the eternal Word, who offers man spiritual riches and possibilities (Grace, virtues, gifts, glory) of drawing near to God and of enjoying His presence and beatitude greater than in the case in which man had not sinned (cf. Sum. Theol., 3ᵃ, q. 1, a. 6 ad 2).
In the dualistic conceptions of being (Manichaeism, Pythagoreanism, Gnosticism) evil is identified with matter and the material world and is considered a principle standing on its own like the good, and it is their eternal struggle that constitutes history. For Plato too evil is identified with matter, and from it therefore the "forms" as such and the world of intelligibles are exempt (Leg., 900 e). Plotinus carries over the doctrine of matter as the principle of evil into his religious metaphysics and writes a treatise, which would have many imitators, entitled: "Whence the origin of evil!" (Πόθεν τὰ κακά: Eun., I, 8). In it he proves that evil has a substantial existence opposed to the good (chaps. 1-5) and therefore also a necessary one (chaps. 6-7). While in the first part Plotinus draws inspiration from the Pythagoreans, who gave matter the character of the incomplete and indeterminate infinite (ἄπειρον), in the second he attaches himself to a text of the Theaetetus (176 a) and of the Timaeus according to which contraries are not separable and discord and evil come from a prior nature, that is, matter without order (Eun. I, 8, 7; ed. E. Bréhier, Paris 1924, I, 122, 6). Between Plato and Plotinus stands the Jew Philo, who, while affirming that matter is created by God, also declares that matter is formless, pre-existent to creation and the principle of disorder, from which therefore every evil derives (De opificis mundi, 3, 22; ed. L. Cohn, Berlin 1896, I, 7, 17 ff.). Philo can therefore defend God from any solidarity with evil, which has its principle in the passions of man and especially in ὄβος (pride; In Flaccum, 11, 92; ed. Cohn-Wendland, Berlin 1905, VI, 136, 22).
Rich in theological suggestions, but less systematic, Philo's doctrine had no following in Western Christian thought, which remained, on the problem of evil, in the wake of the Neoplatonism of St. Augustine and especially of Pseudo-Dionysius, admirably commented on by St. Thomas. The treatment of evil became in the last schools of Greek thought an almost obligatory subject. Proclus gathers up the Neoplatonic tradition in the three treatises of which only the Latin version (1280) by William of Moerbeke survives: De Providentia et Fato et eo quod est in nobis; De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam; De malorum substantialis (ed. V. Cousin, Paris 1820, 2nd ed. 1864). In the Renaissance Pomponazzi adheres in principle to the doctrine of St. Augustine, noting the difference between philosophers and theologians: while the latter reduce even evil indirectly to God and to his providence, the former instead lose themselves in countless opinions. In Spinoza, who gives rigorous form to the metaphysical monism of G. Bruno, both good and evil "...nihil etiam positivum in rebus in se scilicet consideratis indicant, nec aliud sunt praeter cogitandi modos, seu notiones, quas formamus ex eo, quod res ad invicem comparamus...". After a broad examination of the dialectical essence of evil follow the definitions: 1) "Per bonum id intelligam, quod certo scimus nobis esse utile"; 2) "Per malum autem id, quod scimus impedire, quo minus boni alicuius simus compotes" (Ethica, part 4, pref.; ed. G. Gentile, Bari 1933, p. 179 ff.). In the 17th century the unleashing of Jansenism poses the problem of evil in its ultimate theological meaning of the possibility of liberation from sin and eternal damnation; to the heated controversies of the theologians, Voltaire opposed his agnostic cynicism, affirming that to explain the mystery of evil in man, of suffering and of the passions, it is of no use to have recourse to a new mystery such as the doctrine of sin: "Un mystère ne fut jamais une explication: c'est une chose divine et inexplicable" (Remarques sur les «Pénistes» de M. Pascal, in Oeuvres, XXXII, Paris 1785, p. 300). The Enlightenment conception of evil had its theoretical structure in critical idealism: in this, however, motives derived from the Protestant conception of sin and freedom also operate in a negative and positive form. The systematic attempt at a rationalist optimism with a theological background and conciliatory in the explanation of evil is Leibniz's Theodicy, which in its very title indicates the theme of reconciling "la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal" (cf. especially the critique of the absolute determinism of Hobbes and Bayle: Oeuvres, ed. P. Janet, II, Paris 1900, p. 370 ff.). Modern philosophy, especially starting from Kant, returns to the conception of Manichaeism but in such a way as to free itself from ontological dualism; thus the situation is overturned into a rationalist optimism in which, however, the individual remains swept away and sacrificed so that universal Reason may triumph. According to Kant man is "evil by nature" insofar as in his specific nature (in seiner Gattung betrachtet) he has the inclination to evil: this inclination inherent in human nature is called by Kant "radical evil" (radinales Böse) and constitutes the Enlightenment substitute for the Christian doctrine of original sin, as Kant himself admits (cf. Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, part 1, chap. 2; ed. K. Vorländer, Leipzig 1937, p. 28 ff.). In idealism evil is the dialectical (negative) moment necessary for the becoming of human history in which the activity of absolute Reason unfolds: for Hegel the distinction between good and evil represents the so-called "unhappy consciousness" of immediate existence, a distinction that must therefore be overcome in the admission of a "necessary becoming" of the absolute Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. J. Hoffmeister, Leipzig 1937, p. 536 ff.). Therefore the "cosmic-historical individuals," as the only instruments of this Spirit, are removed in their action from the distinction of good and evil. "They are the most enlightened and know better than all others what must be done, and what they do is right" (Vorlesungen in die Philos. der Weltgesch., ed. G. Lasson, Leipzig 1930, p. 76). Evil in the last instance is for Hegel the so-called liberum arbitrium of the single subject who claims to assert his "particularity," which is opposed to the "universality" (Allgemeinheit) that is the good (Philosophie des Rechts, §§ 139-40, ed. Gans, Berlin 1840, p. 179 ff.).
Schleiermacher, in his attempt to fuse the conceptions of Kant and Spinoza into a unity, reduces evil in human consciousness to the influence of sensibility, which hinders spiritual activity in the sense of Lutheran "concupiscence" (Der christliche Glaube, part 1, sec. 3, § 79 ff.). In a sense inverse to rationalist optimism, Schopenhauer sees in suffering the content and meaning of the real and of all nature, which celebrates death everywhere ("suffering of the world," Weltschmerz; cf. Die Welt als Wille u. Vorst., IV, § 65; ed. Reclam, I, Leipzig, p. 467 ff.). Schopenhauer, E. von Hartmann, Drews, Nietzsche, Spengler, Klages follow. To these two principal directions go back the various forms of anti-Christian optimism and pessimism of modern and contemporary culture (relativism, "will to power," historicism, Freudianism, left-wing existentialism...).
The dogmatic foundation of Catholic doctrine on evil lies first of all in the definition of the unique creation by God of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) against the Albigensians, who defended Manichaean dualism: «Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur quod unus solus est verus Deus... qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem... Diabolus vero et alii daemones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali. Homo vero diaboli suggestione peccavit» (Denz-U, n. 428). The problem of evil is therefore, in its historical genesis, the fall, the guilt and the punishment of human freedom; just as now salvation from evil is the divine help of the Redemption and of Grace given to the weakened will, which must struggle against the growing tendency to evil of concupiscence and pride. V. BENE; OTTIMISMO; PESSIMISMO, and the authors cited.