INTELLECTUALISM. – In a generic sense, every conception of truth that admits the superiority of intelligence over the sensory faculties and over the rational and irrational impulses of the appetite may be called i. In the proper sense, every philosophy that attributes to intelligence the exclusive primacy in attaining and determining truth is to be termed i.: in this sense, i. is precisely opposed to voluntarism, for which the intellectual function has the value first of preparation and then of reflection with respect to the truth that the will attains and possesses.
Greek philosophy is predominantly intellectualist in orientation, although to differing degrees according to the various schools: the good is identified with the true, morality with knowing the good, and the decision of the individual does not come to guarantee personal immortality. The ideal of Greek culture is the θεωρητικός βίος in the full deployment of rational activities in this life, and it is reserved for heroes and philosophers: the freedom of individuals, whenever it is explicitly affirmed (Aristotle, the Stoics), is always related to the finite and does not assume an orientation toward transcendence, because the destiny of being is what has been established by fate.
In Christianity, man acquires responsibility and therefore personal freedom before God because temporal life is preparation for eternal life (Hebr. 13, 14); Christianity is therefore voluntarist in this sense: it requires reason to submit itself to faith (obsequium fidei) and considers the value of the life of the spirit not in terms of the gifts of the intellect but of the exercise of the will. Since, in the exercise of freedom, every human being without distinction has radically the same possibility, Christianity, despite the diversity of intellects, offers a genuinely universal criterion of salvation (freedom, in this case). This does not prevent one from observing, within this common faith, tendencies in both the patristic age and the Middle Ages that incline either toward i. or toward voluntarism; while the Alexandrian school accentuates i., s. Augustine exalts the emotional and volitional factors. In the Middle Ages s. Thomas expressly teaches the superiority of the intellect over the will and attributes to the intellect the formal act of beatitude (Sum. Theol., 1°, q. 82, a. 3; in the sed contra he cites: Aristotle, Eth. Nic., X, 7, 1077 a 20 ff.); the Franciscan school, on the other hand, especially beginning with Scotus, maintains the primacy of the will. Nevertheless, the same Angelic Doctor noted the principal function of the will, although subordinated to the intellect: indeed, if in the Commentary on Aristotle he declares that happiness «principalius consistit in vita contemplativa quam activa et in actu rationis vel intellectus quam in actu appetitus ratione regulati» (In X lib. Ethic., ed. Pirotta, Torino 1934, n. 126), when commenting on the Gospel he goes on to specify the meaning of the Aristotelian principle, declaring that «secundum philosophum ad hoc quod actus contemplativi faciant beatum, duo requiruntur: unum substantialiter, scilicet quod sit actus altissimi intelligibilis, quod est Deus. Aliud formaliter, scilicet amor et delectatio» (Exp. super Ec. Matth., cap. 5, lect. 1; ed. Parm., X, p. 49 b). The Franciscans rejected the Thomistic exegesis, maintaining that in the cited texts Aristotle intended to affirm the superiority of the intellectual sphere (intellect and will together) over the sensory sphere, and not that of the intellect over the will (cf. R. Marston, Quaest. disputatae, 6, in Bibl. Fr. schol. medii aevi, VII, Quaracchi 1932, p. 348). The proper reason, however, for the supremacy of the intellect over the will, according to s. Thomas, is that the intellect is rational by essence, whereas the will is rational by participation; it is therefore through the intellect that man comes into possession of the truth, for which reason «secundum intellectum [quod homo] divinam similitudinem participat», so that speculative life «comparatur ad vitam moralem sicut divina ad humanam» (In X Ethic., ed. cit., n. 2106; cf. n. 2109). This difference in the orientation of the Catholic schools concerning the metaphysics of intellectual life has a direct effect on the most vital questions of theology (controversies concerning the act of faith, divine motion, etc.). In modern philosophy, the meaning of i. depends on the varying immanence (v.) and it is not always easy to arrive at clear distinctions: thus, while the great pre-Kantian rationalist systems may fall within i., Kant is at once an advocate of i. (pure reason) and of voluntarism (practical reason), as well as of a philosophy of intuition (critique of judgment); the same, and even more so, may be said of idealist systems, insofar as absolute reason is active and creative
and not merely contemplative. Scientific i. is professed by positivism and neo-positivism, for which everything that cannot have a precise concept is devoid of meaning. V. INTELLETTO; INTUIZIONISMO; IRRAZIONALISMO; RAZIONALISMO.