Intellectualism

INTELLECTUALISM. - In a generic sense, any conception of truth that admits the superiority of the intellect over the sensitive faculties and over the rational and irrational impulses of the appetite can be called i. In a proper sense, every philosophy that attributes to the intellect the exclusive primacy in the attainment and determination of truth must be qualified as i.: in this sense i. stands in precise opposition to voluntarism, for which the intellectual function has the value of a preparation, first, and then of a reflection, with respect to the truth that the will attains and possesses.

Greek philosophy is predominantly intellectualist in orientation, though in different degrees depending on the various schools: the good is identified with the true, morality with knowing the good, and the decision of the individual does not come to guarantee personal immortality. The ideal of Greekness is the θεωρητικός βίος in the full unfolding of rational activities in this life, and it is reserved for heroes and philosophers: the freedom of individuals, when it is explicitly affirmed (Aristotle, Stoics), always relates to the finite and does not assume an orientation of transcendence because the destiny of being is what is established by fate.

In Christianity man obtains responsibility and therefore personal freedom before God because the life of time is a preparation for eternal life (Hebr. 13, 14); therefore Christianity is in this sense voluntarist: it demands that reason subject itself to faith (obsequium fidei) and considers the value of the life of the spirit not as a function of the gifts of the intellect but of the exercise of the will. Since in the exercise of freedom every man without distinction radically has the same possibility, thus, despite the diversity of talents, Christianity offers a criterion of salvation (freedom, in this case) that is truly universal. This does not prevent the fact that, within this common faith, tendencies are noticeable both in the patristic age and in the Middle Ages that lean either toward i. or toward voluntarism; while the Alexandrian school emphasizes i., St. Augustine exalts the emotional and volitional factors. In the Middle Ages St. Thomas expressly teaches the superiority of the intellect over the will and attributes to the intellect the formal act of beatitude (Sum. Theol., 1°, q. 82, a. 3; in the sed contra is cited: Aristotle, Eth. Nic., X, 7, 1077 a 20 ff.); the Franciscan school, on the other hand, especially starting from Scotus, maintains the primacy of the will. Nevertheless the Angelic Doctor himself has pointed out the principal function of the will, though subordinate to the intellect: in fact, if in the Commentary on Aristotle he declares that happiness «principalius consistit in vita contemplativa quam activa et in actu rationis vel intellectus quam in actu appetitus ratione regulati» (In X lib. Ethic., ed. Pirotta, Turin 1934, n. 126), commenting on the Gospel he goes on to specify the meaning of the Aristotelian principle by declaring that «secundum philosophum ad hoc quod actus contemplativi faciant beatum, duo requiruntur: unum substantialiter, scilicet quod sit actus altissimi intelligibilis, quod est Deus. Aliud formaliter, scilicet amor et delectatio» (Exp. super Ec. Matth., cap. 5, lect. 1; ed. Parm., X, p. 49 b). The Franciscans rejected the Thomist exegesis, maintaining that Aristotle in the cited texts intends to affirm the superiority of the intellectual sphere (intellect and will together) over the sensitive sphere and not of the intellect over the will (cf. R. Marston, Quaest. disputatae, 6, in Bibl. Fr. schol. medii aevi, VII, Quaracchi 1932, p. 348). The proper reason, however, for the supremacy of the intellect over the will, according to St. Thomas, is because the intellect is rational by essence and the will is rational by participation, and it is therefore through the intellect that man comes into possession of the truth for which «secundum intellectum [quod homo] divinam similitudinem participat», so that the speculative life «comparatur ad vitam moralem sicut divina ad humanam» (In X Ethic., ed. cit., n. 2106; cf. n. 2109). This diversity of orientation among Catholic schools on the metaphysics of the intellectual life has direct repercussions in the most vital questions of theology (controversies on the act of faith, on divine motion, etc.). In modern philosophy the meaning of i. depends on the varying interpretation of the principle of immanence (v.) and it is not always easy to arrive at clear distinctions: thus if the great pre-Kantian rationalist systems can fall within i., Kant is at one and the same time a supporter of i. (pure reason) and of voluntarism (practical reason), as well as of a philosophy of intuition (critique of judgment); the same, and even more so, may be said of the idealist systems insofar as absolute reason is active and creative and not merely contemplative. Positivism and neo-positivism profess a scientific i., for which everything that cannot have a precise concept is devoid of meaning. V. INTELLETTO; INTUIZIONISMO; IRRAZIONALISMO; RAZIONALISMO.

Cornelio Fabro