FATE. — It is the lot, the destiny that weighs upon something or someone according to a process of causes whose unfolding is necessary and whose final outcome is inevitable. The Greek term εἰμαρμένην means the conjunction and connection that the series of causes have in their unfolding over time (Psellus, *De omnifaria doctrina*, ch. 78: PG 122, 736 B). The Latin (understood as *εἰμαρμένην* from *fando*, cf. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, V, 9, 3) refers to the original decrees pronounced by the divinity.
In classical Greek thought, εἰμαρμένην had predominantly a cosmological meaning. Among the pre-Socratics, especially in Heraclitus, it is cosmic necessity (ἀνάγκη), the universal law that penetrates the essence of all things, the energy of the "eternal body" (fire) that governs the course of events (Heraclitus, *Fragments*, ed. R. Walzer, fr. A 8, p. 23). In Plato, the division between the intelligible world and sensible appearance placed the former under the rational governance of providence (πρόνοια) and abandoned the latter entirely to fate, the irrational and lawless. The cosmological meaning regained full ascendancy with the Stoics. Stobaeus informs us that Chrysippus, in agreement with Plato, distinguished providence from fate (Ed., I, 5, 15; H. Diels, *Dox. gr.*, 2nd ed., 322 a). Indeed, in Stoic doctrine, things were said to come about in four ways: by necessity, by fate, by choice (freedom), and by chance (Stobaeus, loc. cit.; Diels, op. cit., 326 a). This multiplicity of causes was, however, more apparent than real, for in this philosophy, which more consciously revived the pre-Socratic "physical" universe, the only reality was corporeal and the force operating everywhere was the energy of cosmic heat (δύναμις πνευματικὴ). Thus, on the metaphysical plane, there was perfect equivalence between nature, necessity, providence, Zeus, and fate, explicitly affirmed in the Stoic compilation *De mundo* (7, 404 b 9 ff.) attributed to Aristotle and echoed repeatedly by Seneca (*De beneficiis*, IV, 8, 3; *De providentia*, V, 7).
The efforts of the Aristotelians, Epicurus, and the Neoplatonists aimed to free human existence from the determinism into which previous philosophy had cast II. Hence the flourishing of treatises on fate that appeared in later centuries. The most notable is that of Alexander of Aphrodisias (v.), who directly confronted the Stoic theory by first removing from fate free actions and those physical events that occur through art or chance. Moreover, he admitted that even those physical phenomena deemed necessary (nature) could, in their unfolding, be hindered by subsequent causes, so that natural phenomena are fundamentally contingent in their outcome (ἐνάγκη). Plotinus criticized both the Stoic and the Aristotelian solution of Alexander (*Enneads*, III, 1, 8-9) and founded human freedom on the independence of individual souls. In the late Neoplatonism of Proclus, there was an attempt to emphasize the revival of primitive Platonism filtered through Orphic doctrines. There are three causes of order: nemesis (ἀντάπεισις), necessity (ἀνάγκη), and fate (εἰμαρμένη). The first is intelligible, the second supracosmic, and the third intracosmic. The Demiurge is nourished by the first, subsists in the second, and generates the third: just as nemesis is the plexus of laws in the world of divine things, so fate is the plexus of laws of the material world that the Demiurge inscribes in souls and above all in the "World Soul" (Proclus, *In Timaeum*, 41 E, ed. E. Diehl, III, p. 274).
Nevertheless, after the apparent serenity of the Stoic theory, the Neoplatonic solution best expressed the Greek mindset, which, though aware that there was no salvation for the individual, still nurtured lofty aspirations by extolling the ideal, the fullness, and the happiness of universal causes. For the individual, however, fate is inexorable. Hector, before his encounter with Achilles in which he would meet his death, seeks to console Andromache, urging her not to weep excessively since no one can escape fate (Homer, *Iliad*, VI, 487). Above all, death is fated for all, and it avails nothing to supplicate the gods, as Euripides’ chorus sings to Admetus weeping for his beloved Alcestis (985-87). Even the gods themselves do not escape fate nor can they act against it: "Sunt fata deum, sunt fata locorum" ( Statius, *Thebaid*, III, 1, 11); "Fata irrevocabiliter ius suum peragunt nec ulla commovetur prece" (Seneca, *Quaestiones naturales*, II, 35). Poets and panegyrists of the Empire wished to portray gods, princes, the most excellent men, and even philosophers as escaping the cruel grip of fate (F. Cumont, *Les Mages hellénisés*, II, Paris 1938, p. 244), but these were redundant voices that could not dispel the dark fatalism that enveloped all Greco-Roman paganism. From the philosophers, the people had taken the representation of the Fates (Μοῖραι), daughters of Necessity, charged with dispensing the span of human life: Atropos for the past, Clotho for the present, and Lachesis for the future (Ps.-Aristotle, *De mundo*, 7, 401 b 18 ff.). Against this backdrop of fatalism, from which pagan civilization never definitively detached itself, must be set the practice of oracles and the enormous development of the mystery religions into which the decadent Greco-Roman world flung itself with desperate frenzy at the advent of Christianity.
For Christians, the pagans’ fate is an empty name—an invention of the devil to deceive men and to cover the errors of false oracles, as even a pagan philosopher (Alexander of Aphrodisias) demonstrated, as Eusebius of Caesarea notes with satisfaction (*Praeparatio evangelica*, VI, 9; PG 21), drawing freely on both pagan and Christian sources. In particular, the doctrine of fate directly contradicts the cornerstones of Christian life: divine Providence, human freedom, and the efficacy of prayer to God and correction for the formation of individual conscience (cf. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 256; Lampridius and Nemesius, *De natura hominis*, ch. 35 ff.: PG 40, 747 ff.). Therefore, having rejected the doctrine, some Fathers wished to reject the very term (St. Gregory the Great). Those who retained it, such as St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, understood it to mean the series of finite causes as they are preordained by God for the attainment of a given effect, and in which is included the possibility that God may act whenever He wills in any sector of being and at the moment that His wisdom deems opportune (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 116, a. 1-4).
In the spirit of Hegelian philosophy, fate is identified with historicity and interpreted as the "unity of necessity or rationality and of contingency or irrationality in becoming," once logic becomes nature and nature becomes spirit (Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, III, § 573). The "amor fati" and the theory of the "eternal return," which Nietzsche adopted as the formula of his Heracliteanism, are the product of the radical aestheticism to which his troubled and anti-Christian genius succumbed (*Also sprach Zarathustra*, part 3: "Von der schauenden Seele und dem Rätsel," ed. A. Baeumler [in *Die Unschuld des Werdens*], II, Leipzig 1931, p. 447).
In the nature of Hegelian philosophy, fate is to be identified with the historicity of the idea and thus interpreted as the "unity of necessity or rationality and of contingency or irrationality in becoming," once logic becomes nature and nature becomes spirit (Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, III, § 573). The "amor fati" and the theory of the "eternal return," which Nietzsche adopted as the formula of his Heracliteanism, is the product of the radical aestheticism to which his turbid and anti-Christian intellect succumbed (*Also sprach Zarathustra*, part 3: *Of the Vision and the Riddle*, ed. A. Baccucher [De Unschuld des Werdens], II, Leipzig 1931, p. 447).
In the nature of Hegelian philosophy, fate is to be identified with the historicity of the idea and thus interpreted as the "unity of necessity or rationality and of contingency or irrationality in becoming," once logic becomes nature and nature becomes spirit (Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, III, § 573). The "amor fati" and the theory of the "eternal return," which Nietzsche adopted as the formula of his Heracliteanism, is the product of the radical aestheticism to which his turbid and anti-Christian intellect succumbed (*Also sprach Zarathustra*, part 3: *Of the Vision and the Riddle*, ed. A. Baccucher [De Unschuld des Werdens], II, Leipzig 1931, p. 447).
In the nature of Hegelian philosophy, fate is to be identified with the historicity of the idea and thus interpreted as the "unity of necessity or rationality and of contingency or irrationality in becoming," once logic becomes nature and nature becomes spirit (Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, III, § 573). The "amor fati" and the theory of the "eternal return," which Nietzsche adopted as the formula of his Heracliteanism, is the product of the radical aestheticism to which his turbid and anti-Christian intellect succumbed (*Also sprach Zarathustra*, part 3: *Of the Vision and the Riddle*, ed. A. Baccucher [De Unschuld des Werdens], II, Leipzig 1931, p. 447).
Nell'indole della filosofia hegeliana è d'identificare il f. con la storicità dell'idea e d'interpretarlo quindi come la "unità di necessità o razionalità e di casualità o irrazionalità in divenire" una volta che la logicità diventa natura e la natura spirito (Hegel, Enciclopedia, III, § 573). L'"amor fati" e la teoria dell'"eterno ritorno che Nietzsche prese come formola del suo eraclitismo è il prodotto dell'estetismo radicale a cui si abbandonò il suo ingegno torbido e anticristiano (Also sprach Zarathustra, parte 3: Della visione e dell'enigma, ed. A. Baccucher [De Unschuld des Werdens], II, Lipsia 1931, p. 447).
Nell'indole della filosofia hegeliana è d'identificare il f. con la storicità dell'idea e d'interpretarlo quindi come la "unità di necessità o razionalità e di casualità o irrazionalità in divenire" una volta che la logicità diventa natura e la natura spirito (Hegel, Enciclopedia, III, § 573). L'"amor fati" e la teoria dell'"eterno ritorno che Nietzsche prese come formola del suo eraclitismo è il prodotto dell'estetismo radicale a cui si abbandonò il suo ingegno torbido e anticristiano (Also sprach Zarathustra, parte 3: Della visione e dell'enigma, ed. A. Baccucher [De Unschuld des Werdens], II, Lipsia 1931, p. 447).
Nell'indole della filosofia hegeliana è d'identificare il f. con la storicità dell'idea e d'interpretarlo quindi come la "unità di necessità o razionalità e di casualità o irrazionalità in divenire" una volta che la logicità diventa natura e la natura spirito (Hegel, Enciclopedia, III, § 573). L'"amor fati" e la teoria dell'"eterno ritorno che Nietzsche prese come formola del suo eraclitismo è il prodotto dell'estetismo radicale a cui si abbandonò il suo ingegno torbido e anticristiano (Also sprach Zarathustra, parte 3: Della visione e dell'enigma, ed. A. Baccucher [De Unschuld des Werdens], II, Lipsia 1931, p. 447).
In the nature of Hegelian philosophy, fate is to be identified with the historicity of the idea and thus interpreted as the "unity of necessity or rationality and of contingency or irrationality in becoming," once logic becomes nature and nature becomes spirit (Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, III, § 573). The "amor fati" and the theory of the "eternal return," which Nietzsche adopted as the formula of his Heracliteanism, is the product of the radical aestheticism to which his turbid and anti-Christian intellect surrendered (*Also sprach Zarathustra*, part 3: *Of the Vision and the Riddle*, ed. A. Baccucher [De Unschuld des Werdens], II, Leipzig 1931, p. 447).
In the nature of Hegelian philosophy, fate is to be identified with the historicity of the idea and thus interpreted as the "unity of necessity or rationality and of contingency or irrationality in becoming," once logic becomes nature and nature becomes spirit (Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, III, § 573). The "amor fati" and the theory of the "eternal return," which Nietzsche adopted as the formula of his Heracliteanism, is the product of the radical aestheticism to which his turbid and anti-Christian intellect surrendered (*Also sprach Zarathustra*, part 3: *Of the Vision and the Riddle*, ed. A. Baccucher [De Unschuld des Werdens], II, Leipzig 1931, p. 447).
In the nature of Hegelian philosophy, fate is to be identified with the historicity of the idea and thus interpreted as the "unity of necessity or rationality and of contingency or irrationality in becoming," once logic becomes nature and nature becomes spirit (Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, III, § 573). The "amor fati" and the theory of the "eternal return," which Nietzsche adopted as the formula of his Heracliteanism, is the product of the radical aestheticism to which his turbid and anti-Christian intellect surrendered (*Also sprach Zarathustra*, part 3: *Of the Vision and the Riddle*, ed. A. Baccucher [De Unschuld des Werdens], II, Leipzig 1931, p. 447).
Nell'indole della filosofia hegeliana è d'identificare il f. con la storicità dell'idea e d'interpretarlo quindi come la "unità di necessità o razionalità e di casualità o irrazionalità in divenire" una volta che la logicità diventa natura e la natura spirito (Hegel, Enciclopedia, III, § 573). L'"amor fati" e la teoria dell'"eterno ritorno che Nietzsche prese come formola del suo eraclitismo è il prodotto dell'estetismo radicale a cui si abbandonò il suo ingegno torbido e anticristiano (Also sprach Zarathustra, parte 3: Della visione e dell'enigma, ed. A. Baccucher [De Unschuld des Werdens], II, Lipsia 1931, p. 447).
Nell'indole della filosofia hegeliana è d'identificare il f. con la storicità dell'idea e d'interpretarlo quindi come la "unità di necessità o razionalità e di casualità o irrazionalità in divenire" una volta che la logicità diventa natura e la natura spirito (Hegel, Enciclopedia, III, § 573). L'"amor fati" e la teoria dell'"eterno ritorno che Nietzsche prese come formola del suo eraclitismo è il prodotto dell'estetismo radicale a cui si abbandonò il suo ingegno torbido e anticristiano (Also sprach Zarathustra, parte 3: Della visione e dell'enigma, ed. A. Baccucher [De Unschuld des Werdens], II, Lipsia 1931, p. 447).
Nell'indole della filosofia hegeliana è d'identificare il f. con la storicità dell'idea e d'interpretarlo quindi come la "unità di necessità o razionalità e di casualità o irrazionalità in divenire" una volta che la logicità diventa natura e la natura spirito (Hegel, Enciclopedia, III, § 573). L'"amor fati" e la teoria dell'"eterno ritorno che Nietzsche prese come formola del suo eraclitismo è il prodotto dell'estetismo radicale a cui si abbandonò il suo ingegno torbido e anticristiano (Also sprach Zarathustra, parte 3: Della visione e dell'enigma, ed. A. Baccucher [De Unschuld des Werdens], II, Lipsia 1931, p. 447).
In the nature of Hegelian philosophy, fate is to be identified with the historicity of the Idea and is thus interpreted as the "unity of necessity or rationality and of contingency or irrationality in becoming," once logic becomes nature and nature spirit (Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, III, § 573). The "amor fati" and the theory of the "eternal return," which Nietzsche adopted as the formula of his Heracliteanism, is the product of the radical aestheticism to which his turbid and anti-Christian intellect surrendered (*Also sprach Zarathustra*, part 3: "Of the Vision and the Riddle," ed. A. Baccucher [De Unschuld des Werdens], II, Leipzig 1931, p. 447).
In the nature of Hegelian philosophy, fate is to be identified with the historicity of the Idea and is thus interpreted as
a prodigious work of St. Paul; and they are indissolubly linked with dogma only extrinsically, in the sense that the defense and explanation of dogma are intimately connected with them, as, for example, the ecumenicity of the Vatican Council, the legitimacy of an election, such as that of Pius IX, or the heterodoxy of a writing condemned by the Church’s magisterium with a definitive judgment. It is to this second category of facts that theologians generally allude when speaking of *fatti dogmatici*. The *fatti dogmatici* are therefore more a purely human, albeit ecclesiastical, fact, even if not having a direct relation to dogma, and less so than a revealed fact to be believed by divine faith. As it were, between the one and the other, as theological conclusion stands between revealed doctrine and natural doctrine.
Since the time of the Jansenist controversy, by *fatti dogmatici* is meant the orthodoxy or lack thereof of a text, a formula, or a religious book. And this continues to be the prevailing meaning even today in technical language.
The Catholic theology concerns itself with *fatti dogmatici* with the intent of proving that they fall within the scope of the Church’s infallible magisterium, constituting its secondary and indirect object (v. INFALLIBILITY).
The Jansenists were the first to deny that the Church’s infallible magisterium extended also to *fatti dogmatici*. The debate flared up following the condemnation, by Innocent X, of five propositions extracted from Jansenius’ *Augustinus*. The supporters of the latter, in order to evade the condemnation, affirmed that the five propositions of Jansenius, if worthy of condemnation in themselves, were not so at all *in sensu ab auctore intellecto*, that is, considered within the context of the work of which they were a part, and that the *Augustinus* was therefore perfectly orthodox. They further argued that the Church’s magisterium, if infallible *in quaestione invitis*, that is, in judgments concerning the orthodoxy or lack thereof of a doctrine, was by no means infallible *in quaestione facti*, that is, in judgments concerning the orthodoxy or lack thereof of a text, a book, or a writing.
Alexander VII, on 16 October 1656, defined that the three propositions extracted from Jansenius’ book had been condemned *in sensu ab eodem Cornelio [Jansenio] intellecto* (Denz-U, 1098), and subsequently (15 February 1664) imposed upon the Jansenists the strict obligation of subscribing to a formulary of submission expressing full adherence to his previous constitution and to that of Innocent X, and a formal reprobation, with sincere heart and under oath, of the five propositions of Jansenius (Denz-U, 1099). Since the Jansenists equivocated, claiming that the two papal constitutions implied not the obligation of full adherence but only that of an *obsequiosum silentium*, that is, a deferential abstention from any further discussion, Clement XI, with the apostolic constitution *Vincam Domini* of 16 July 1705, declared that obedience to the two constitutions of the Holy See was not satisfied by deferential silence but that the sense condemned in the five propositions of Jansenius’ book, naturally emerging from the words used therein, had to be rejected and condemned as heretical by all the faithful, not only in word but also in heart. The Church, therefore, by claiming on the one hand the authority to judge the orthodoxy of a book and on the other the authority to impose its judgment upon all the faithful, was indirectly attributing to itself infallibility with regard to *fatti dogmatici*, since only one who considers himself infallible can seriously lay claim to the right to impose his judgment upon others.
The purpose of the infallibility which, even according to the Jansenist thesis, the Church indisputably possesses in judgments concerning the orthodoxy of a doctrine, is to effectively prevent the spread of doctrines at variance with orthodoxy. Now, such a purpose would be completely frustrated if the Church were not infallible even with regard to *fatti dogmatici*.
Even before the controversy with the Jansenists, indeed from the earliest centuries of Christianity, many writings were approved or condemned by the Church with definitive judgments, that is, with the manifest intention of obliging all the faithful to accept its verdict. Thus, the First Council of Nicaea (325) condemned the book by Arius entitled *Thalia* (PG 67, 78 and 962 ff.), the Council of Ephesus (431) approved the writings of Cyril and condemned those of Nestorius (Denz-U, 113 ff.); the Second Council of Constantinople (553) condemned the Three Chapters, that is, the writings of Theodore, Theodoret, and Ibas (Denz-U, 224-228); the Council of Constance (1414-1418) decreed that the writings and books of John Wyclif, John Hus, and Jerome of Prague were to be considered condemned by every Catholic (Denz-U, 659-661); Leo X condemned extracts from the works of Luther (Denz-U, 711-712); Pius V condemned propositions from Baius (Denz-U, 1001 ff.). This means that at all times the Church, implicitly and equivalently, proclaimed itself infallible with regard to *fatti dogmatici*.