DOGMATIC FACTS. — In theology, by d. f. are understood those facts which, although not the object of an explicit revelation, are nevertheless necessarily connected with a revealed dogma, insofar as they are required for its formulation, defense, and concrete application. There are facts linked with dogma ab intrinseco, so to speak, in the sense that they are identified with the dogma and form an integral part of it, e.g., the fact of original sin and that of the miraculous conversion of s. Paolo; and facts indissolubly linked with dogma only ab extrinseco, in the sense that its defense and explanation are intimately connected with them, such as the ecumenical character of the First Vatican Council, the legitimacy of an election, e.g., that of Pio IX, and the heterodoxy of a writing censured by the Church’s magisterium with a definitive judgment. It is generally to this second category of facts that theologians allude when speaking of d. f. A d. f. is therefore more than a purely human fact, even if an ecclesiastical one having no relation to dogma, yet less than a fact revealed and to be believed by divine faith. It stands, so to speak, between the one and the other, just as a theological conclusion stands between revealed doctrine and natural doctrine.
From the time of the controversy over Jansenism, d. f. was understood to mean the orthodoxy or otherwise of a text, a formula, or a book dealing with a religious subject. This continues to be its predominant meaning in technical language even today.
Catholic theology deals with d. f. with the aim of proving that they fall within the sphere of the Church’s infallible magisterium, constituting its secondary and indirect object (v. INFALLIBILITÀ).
The Jansenists were the first to deny that the Church’s infallible magisterium extended also to d. f. The discussion arose following the condemnation by which Innocent X censured five propositions extracted from the Augustinus of Cornelius Jansen. The supporters of the latter, in fact, in order to escape the condemnation, asserted that the five propositions of Jansen, although deserving condemnation in themselves, were not at all so in sensu ab auctore intento, that is, when considered in the context of the work of which they formed part; that the Augustinus was therefore perfectly orthodox; and that the Church’s magisterium, although infallible in quaestione iuris, that is, in judgments concerning the orthodoxy or otherwise of a doctrine, was in no way infallible in quaestione facti, that is, in judgments concerning the orthodoxy or otherwise of a text, a book, or a writing.
Alexander VII, on 16 Oct. 1656, defined that the five propositions extracted from Jansen’s book had been condemned in sensu ab eodem Cornelio (Iansenio) intento (Denz-U, 1098), and subsequently (15 Febr. 1664) imposed upon the Jansenists the strict obligation of subscribing to a formula of submission expressing complete adherence to his preceding constitution and to that of Innocent X, together with a formal repudiation, expressed sincerely and confirmed by oath, of Jansen’s five propositions (Denz-U, 1099). Since the Jansenists equivocated, claiming that the two papal constitutions implied not an obligation of internal assent but only that of an obsequiosum silentium, that is, a deferential abstention from any further discussion, Clement XI, in the apostolic constitution Vineam Domini of 16 July 1705, declared that obedience to the two constitutions of the Holy See was not exhausted in deferential silence, but that the sense condemned in the five propositions of Jansen’s book, naturally emerging from the words employed in it, had to be rejected and condemned as heretical by all the faithful non ore sobem sed et corde. The Church, therefore, by attributing to herself on the one hand the authority to judge the orthodoxy of a book and on the other the authority to impose her judgment upon all the faithful, indirectly attributed to herself infallibility with regard to d. f., since only one who considers himself infallible can seriously claim the right to impose his own judgment upon others.
The purpose of the infallibility which, according even to the Jansenist thesis, the Church indisputably possesses in judgments concerning the orthodoxy of a doctrine is effectively to prevent the dissemination of doctrines contrary to orthodoxy. Now this purpose would be completely frustrated if the Church were not also infallible with regard to d. f.
Even before the controversy with Jansenism, indeed
from the earliest centuries of Christianity, many writings were approved or condemned by the Church with a definitive sentence, that is, with the manifest intention of obliging all the faithful to accept its verdict. Thus the First Council of Nicaea (325) condemned the book of Arius entitled Thalia (PG 67, 78 and 962 ff.); the Council of Ephesus (431) approved the writings of Cyril and condemned those of Nestorius (Denz-U, 113 ff.); the Second Council of Constantinople (553) condemned the Three Chapters, that is, the writings of Theodore, Theodoret, and Ibas (Denz-U, 224–228); the Council of Constance (1414–18) decreed that the documents and books of John Wyclif, John Hus, and Jerome of Prague were to be regarded as condemned by every Catholic (Denz-U, 659–61); Leo X condemned extracts from the works of Luther (Denz-U, 711 ff.); and Pius V condemned the propositions of Baius (Denz-U, 1001 ff.). This means that at all times the Church, implicitly and equivalently, proclaimed herself infallible with regard to d. f.
Giuseppe De Rosa