MARÉCHAL, Joseph. - Philosopher, b. at Charleroi in Belgium on 19 July 1878, d. at Louvain on 11 Dec. 1944. He entered the Society of Jesus on 24 Sept. 1895; he graduated in natural sciences in 1905; in 1906 he became a member of the Natural Sciences Society of Brussels, and in 1932 of the Philosophical Society of Louvain. He taught in 1919 and 1920 theodicy, for three years experimental psychology, for five rational psychology: above all, the history of philosophy (1919-35).
His best-known work on the theory of knowledge, *Le point de départ de la métaphysique*, consists of five cahiers (actually volumes: I, 3rd ed., Paris 1944; II, 2nd ed., ibid. 1942; III, 2nd ed., ibid. 1942; IV, ibid. 1947; V, 2nd ed., ibid. 1949), of which especially the IIIrd is highly esteemed and remains to this day one of the best expositions of the Kantian system. The IVth, published three years after M.’s death (1947), contains an almost complete study of Kant’s posthumous writings. In the Vth cahier, Thomism is examined in its relations to critical philosophy. M., having first set forth the critical-metaphysical theory of knowledge of Thomism, also highlighting and adopting its method and epistemological value, then proceeds to treat more closely the Kantian problem: he maintains that it is possible to surpass Kant even while accepting his phenomenal starting-point and transcendental method. This surpassing would be achieved by integrating the Kantian position with the dynamic conception of knowing and willing in relation to the Absolute: once God is recognized as the term of our intentionality, it would be permissible to conclude to the realistic objectivity of human judgment, inasmuch as every particular judgment would in fact refer to God. This conception, undoubtedly original, has given rise to much discussion: in particular, in what sense, once the standpoint of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is accepted, one can speak of the ontological Absolute and of our logical intentionality with respect to the Absolute. It is commonly held that it is not helpful to resort to an initial intuition or quasi-intuition of God, which Kant would never accept, and which moreover is naturally impossible in the human intellect. Nor can recourse to practical reason be valid, since the will tends only to what is known by the intellect and therefore cannot serve to found the objectivity prior to knowing itself. Nor does it seem valid to appeal to the metaphysical principle that every natural tendency implies the real existence of its object, because, from the Kantian standpoint, this principle is called into question and cannot methodically be invoked before the legitimacy of metaphysics has been shown. The problem raised by M. seems less an initial problem than a further one. Neoscholastic thought today usually begins the epistemological process by taking a clear stand against the arbitrary starting-point of Kant, and first of all, by means of phenomenology and philosophical reflection, bringing to light the natural openness of human knowledge to being.
Van Riet, in *L’épistémologie thomiste* (Louvain 1946), sees in the thought of Rousselot and M. marked analogies, and thinks that both depend on the influence of Blondelism (pp. 263 and 300). In fact, the four letters exchanged between Blondel and M. (*Mélanges* [V. BIBLICA.], 1, pp. 338-53) show a concordia discors: nevertheless, Van Riet’s observation may serve as a starting-point for a calm and objective evaluation of M.’s vast work. In taking leave of his pupils, M. told them that the theory of his Vth cahier was not to be considered the authentic and complete expression of his thought, which was to be determined in the VIth cahier, never definitively written and still unpublished. What this thought might be cannot be determined today, but it is well to bear in mind what one of his notable disciples, Fr. A. Hayen, affirms in his careful presentation (op. cit., pp. 3-21). In any case, it can already be recognized that the Vth cahier represents to this day the most extensive comparative study between Thomism and Kantianism.