MARÉCHAL, JOSEPH. - Philosopher, b. at Charleroi in Belgium on 1 July 1878, d. at Louvain on 11 Dec. 1944. He entered the Society of Jesus on 24 Sept. 1895; he took his degree in natural sciences in 1905; in 1906 he was a member of the Society of Natural Sciences of Brussels, in 1932 of the Philosophical Society of Louvain. In 1919 and 1920 he taught theodicy, for three years experimental psychology, for five rational psychology: above all the history of philosophy (1919-35).
His best-known work on the theory of knowledge, Le point de départ de la métaphysique, consists of five cahiers (in effect, volumes: I, 3rd ed., Paris 1944; II, 2nd ed., ibid. 1942; III, 2nd ed., ibid. 1942; IV, ibid. 1947; V, 2nd ed., ibid. 1949), of which the third is especially esteemed, and it remains today one of the best expositions of the Kantian system. The fourth, published three years after M.'s death (1947), contains an almost complete study on Kant postumo. In cahier V Thomism is studied in its relations with critical philosophy. M., having first expounded the Thomistic critical-metaphysical theory of knowledge, also bringing out its method and epistemological value and accepting them, then proceeds to treat the Kantian problem more closely: he affirms that it is possible to go beyond Kant even while accepting his phenomenal starting point and his transcendental method. This going beyond would come about by integrating the Kantian position with the dynamic conception of knowing and willing in regard to the Absolute: once God is recognized as the term of our intentionality, it would be legitimate to conclude to the realistic objectivity of human judgment, inasmuch as every particular judgment would refer precisely to God. This conception, undoubtedly original, has given rise to many discussions: particularly, in what sense, once the standpoint of the Critique of Pure Reason is accepted, one can speak of the ontological Absolute and of a logical intentionality of ours in regard to the Absolute. It is commonly held that it is of no avail to have recourse to an initial intuition or quasi-intuition of God, which Kant would never accept, and which moreover is not naturally possible in the human intellect. Nor can recourse to the practical reason avail, because the will tends only to what is known by the intellect and therefore cannot serve to ground objectivity prior to knowing itself. And neither does recourse to the metaphysical principle that every natural tendency implies the real existence of its object seem valid, because, from the Kantian point of view, this principle is called into question and one cannot methodically have recourse to it before having shown the legitimacy of metaphysics. The problem posed by M. seems, more than an initial problem, a further problem. Neo-Scholastic thought today usually begins the epistemological process by taking a clear stand against the arbitrary Kantian starting point, and by bringing out first of all, with phenomenology and philosophical reflection, the natural openness of human knowledge to being.
Van Riet in L'épistémologie thomiste (Louvain 1946), sees marked analogies in the thought of Rousseler and of M., and thinks that both depend on the influence of Blondelism (pp. 263 and 300). In reality the four passages of correspondence between Blondel and M. (Mélanges [v. bibl.], I, pp. 338-53) show a concordia discors: nevertheless it seems that Van Riet's observation can be a starting point for a serene and objective evaluation of the vast Maréchalian work. In taking leave of his pupils, M. used to tell them that the theory of his cahier V was not to be considered as the authentic and complete expression of his thought, which was to have been determined in cahier VI, which he was never able to draft definitively and which is still unpublished. What this thought is, it is not given to determine to this day, but it is useful to keep in mind what one of his notable disciples, Fr. A. Hayen, affirms in his careful presentation (op. cit., pp. 3-
21). In any case one can recognize even now that cahier V represents to this day the most extensive comparative study between Thomism and Kantianism.
Principal works: Le point de départ de la métaphysique: I, De l'antiquité à la fin du moyen âge. II, Le conflit du rationalisme et de l'empirisme dans la philosophie moderne. III, Le critique de Kant. IV, Le système idéaliste chez Kant et les posthantiennes. V, Le thomisme devant la philosophie critique; Études sur la psychologie des mystiques, 2 vols., Paris 1937 and 1938; Précis d'histoire sur la philosophie moderne, vol. I, De la Renaissance à Kant, Louvain 1933. Principal articles: besides those of the Mélanges, I: A propos du sentiment de présence chez les profanes et chez les mystiques, in Rev. des questions scientifiques, 63-64 (1908), pp. 527-63; 65-66 (1909), pp. 219-49 and 376-426 (Italian trans. by A. Gemelli: Dalla percezione sensibile alla intuizione mistica, Florence 1913); De la forme du jugement, d'après s. Thomas d'Aquin, in Riv. di filos. neo-scol., 15 (1923), pp. 156-84; L'aspect dynamique de la méthode transcendante chez Kant, in Rev. néo-scholast. de philos., 42 (1939), pp. 341-84 (German trans. by E. Wingendorf: Der dynamische Gesichtspunkt in der Entwicklung des kantischen transzendentalen Idealismus, Bonn 1940).
Bibliography
Francesco Morandini