MARÉCHAL, JOSEPH. – Philosopher, born in Charleroi, Belgium, on 1 July 1878, died in Louvain on 11 December 1944. He entered the Society of Jesus on 24 September 1895; he obtained a degree in natural sciences in 1905; in 1906 he became a member of the Society of Natural Sciences of Brussels, and in 1932 of the Philosophical Society of Louvain. In 1919 and 1920 he taught theodicy, experimental psychology for three years, and rational psychology for five years; above all, he taught the history of philosophy (1919–35).
His best-known work on the theory of knowledge, Le point de départ de la métaphysique, consists of five cahiers (in fact, volumes: I, 3rd ed., Paris 1944; II, 2nd ed., ibid. 1942; III, 2nd ed., ibid. 1942; IV, ibid. 1947; V, 2nd ed., ibid. 1949), of which III is especially esteemed and remains even today one of the best expositions of the Kantian system. IV, published three years after M.’s death (1947), contains an almost complete study of Kant postumo. In cahier V, Thomism is studied in its relations with critical philosophy. Having first expounded the Thomistic critical-metaphysical theory of knowledge, while also highlighting and accepting its method and epistemological value, M. then proceeds to address the Kantian problem more closely: he maintains that it is possible to overcome Kant even while accepting his phenomenal point of departure and transcendental method. This overcoming would take place by integrating the Kantian position with the dynamic conception of knowing and willing in relation to the Absolute: once God is recognized as the term of our intentionality, it would be legitimate to conclude to the realistic objectivity of human judgment, insofar as every particular judgment would refer precisely to God. This conception, undoubtedly original, has given rise to many discussions, particularly concerning the sense in which, once the standpoint of the Critique of Pure Reason has been accepted, one can speak of the ontological Absolute and of a logical intentionality of ours in relation to the Absolute. It is commonly held that it is of no use to invoke an initial intuition, or quasi-intuition, of God, which Kant would never accept and which, moreover, is naturally impossible for the human intellect. Nor can recourse to practical reason be effective, because the will tends only toward what is known by the intellect and therefore cannot serve to ground objectivity prior to knowing itself. Nor does recourse to the metaphysical principle that every natural tendency implies the real existence of its object seem valid, because, from the Kantian point of view, this principle is called into question and cannot methodically be invoked before the legitimacy of metaphysics has been demonstrated. The problem posed by M. seems, rather than an initial problem, to be a subsequent one. Neoscholastic thought today generally begins the epistemological process by taking a clear position against Kant’s arbitrary point of departure, and first bringing to light, through phenomenology and philosophical reflection, the natural openness of human knowledge to being.
Van Riet, in L'épistémologie thomiste (Louvain 1946), sees marked analogies between the thought of Rousseler and that of M., and believes that both depend on the influence of Blondelism (pp. 263 and 300). In reality, the four passages of correspondence between Blondel and M. (Mélanges [V. BIBLICA.], I, pp. 338–53) reveal a concordia discors; nevertheless, Van Riet’s observation seems capable of serving as a point of departure for a calm and objective assessment of Maréchal’s extensive work. In taking leave of his pupils, M. told them that the theory of his cahier V was not to be regarded as the authentic and complete expression of his thought, which would have had to be worked out in cahier VI, which he was never able definitively to draft and which remains unpublished. What this thought may be cannot to date be determined, but it is useful to bear in mind what one of his distinguished disciples, Fr. A. Hayen, states in his careful presentation (op. cit., pp. 3–21). In any event, it can already be recognized that cahier V remains to date the broadest comparative study of Thomism and Kantianism.
Principal works: Le point de départ de la métaphysique: I, De l'antiquité à la fin du moyen âge. II, Le conflit du rationalisme et de l'empirisme dans la philosophie moderne. III, Le critique de Kant. IV, Le système idéaliste chez Kant et les posthantiennes. V, Le thomisme devant la philosophie critique; Études sur la psychologie des mystiques, 2 vols., Paris 1937 and 1938; Précis d'histoire sur la philosophie moderne, vol. I, De la Renaissance à Kant, Louvain 1933. Principal articles: in addition to those in Mélanges, I: A propos du sentiment de présence chez les profanes et chez les mystiques, in Rev. des questions scientifiques, 63–64 (1908), pp. 527–63; 65–66 (1909), pp. 219–49 and 376–426 (Italian translation by A. Gemelli: Dalla percezione sensibile alla intuizione mistica, Florence 1913); De la forme du jugement, d'après si Thomas d'Aquin, in Riv. di filos. neo-scol., 15 (1923), pp. 156–84; L'aspect dynamique de la méthode transcendante chez Kant, in Rev. néo-scholast. de philos., 42 (1939), pp. 341–84 (German translation by E. Wingendorf: Der dynamische Gesichtspunkt in der Entwicklung des kantischen transzendentalen Idealismus, Bonn 1940).