TRADIZIONALISMO. — This is the philosophical-religious doctrine according to which a primitive revelation was absolutely necessary for the human race, not only in order to acquire knowledge of truths belonging to the supernatural order, but also of supersensible truths, that is, of the fundamental truths of the metaphysical, moral, and religious order: the existence of God and the concept of being, the spirituality and immortality of the soul, the future life, the obligatory moral law, etc. This revelation reaches every person through tradition, that is, through oral and social instruction, which must be accepted by faith: society is the organ of primitive revelation. Independently of divine revelation, human beings can have no true knowledge (cf. A. Bonnetty, in Ann. de phil. chrét., 3rd series, 30 [1845], p. 464).
1. fideism (v.), it cannot be said with certainty when and by whom the term t. was first used. In fact, whereas no one wished to be designated a “fideist” or “supernaturalist,” all traditionalists took pride in being such (cf., for example, A. Bonnetty, ibid., 4th series, 42 [1851], p. 7). T. developed above all after the French Revolution, under the influence of Kant’s critical philosophy and as a reaction to the exaggerated rationalism of the eighteenth century, although its precursors may be found, at least as a tendency, already in Tatian and Tertullian for apologetic reasons, among Protestants (especially the Berians) for theological reasons, and among the Catholics P. D. Huet (De imbecillitate mentis humanae) and B. Pascal for reasons that were both philosophical and theological (v. FIDEISMO). It was of particular importance in France, where the archbishop of Paris himself, D. A. Affre, the bishop of Amiens, A. de Salinis, Cardinal T. J. Gousset, and many other prominent figures were traditionalists, at least for a certain period. In Belgium, G. C. Ubaghs and the entire school of Louvain adhered to t.; in Germany, M. Klee, G. B. Hirscher, and von Drey; in Italy, G. Ventura and V. Gioberti; in Spain, D. Cortés, etc.
It is not always possible to distinguish the strict traditionalists, also called supernaturalists, from the mitigated or semitraditionalists, both because of the system’s inherent lack of logic and because of the controversies that sometimes forced the same authors to moderate their claims, even if only temporarily (cf. A. Bonnetty, in Ann. de phil. chrét., 4th series, 41 [1850], p. 86; 42 [1851], p. 10; 44 [1852], p. 185). The clearest distinction is the one made by Mons. V. Gasser, relator at the First Vatican Council: strict traditionalists or fideists are those « qui dicunt... communicationem... debere fieri per doctrinam... revelatam et proinde hominem debere in se suscipere ideam Dei et existentiae
ipsius fide divina... »; mitigated traditionalists are those who « communicationem hanc non derivant ex ipsa doctrina... revelata, saltem non proxime, sed generatim ex idea Dei in societate humana iam existente; et proinde sufficere, quod homo fide humana ideam Dei in se suscipiat, et dein efformet argumenta ex ratione pro existentia Dei » (Coll. Lac., cited in the bibliography, VII, col. 129 a).
The principal representatives of t., L. De Bonald, F. de Lamennais (v.), A. BONNETTY, AUGUSTIN (v.), and L. E. BAUTZEN (v.), differ according to the philosophical foundations they give the system, the use they make of it, and the social and apologetic consequences they draw from II. The most serious attempt to provide t. with a philosophical foundation and exposition was made by the School of Louvain, whose guiding spirit was Arnold Tits and whose most prominent representative was Gerard Casimir Ubaghs (cf. J. Henry, op. cit. in the bibliography). The scholars of Louvain all maintain a virtual innatism concerning the origin of ideas, whereas the French reject it, at least outwardly. The stimulating influence is not supplied by sensory perception (Descartes), but by « commerce social », whence the school’s two fundamental theses: « Les principes des vérités rationnelles métaphysiques et morales ont été mis dans l'esprit humain par le créateur. Mais... l'homme a besoin d'un enseignement intellectuel pour... acquérir une connaissance distincte de Dieu et des vérités morales » (N. J. Laforêt, Dogmes cath., I, Bruxelles 1855, p. 467). The first man had to receive this instruction from God through revelation, which for Laforêt is natural, for E. Lonay natural in its object and supernatural in the manner in which it is acquired by human beings, and for Ubaghs both natural and supernatural at the same time. The relations between faith and science are thus established by Ubaghs through a distinction between the acquisition and the demonstration of a truth: « ... In moralibus et metaphysicis, spectato ordine acquisitionis..., fides naturaliter prior est scientia, ut nemo ad hanc perveniat, nisi illa quomodocumque praecesserit; etsi in ordine demonstrationis, ex quo certitudo ratiocinata gignitur, scientia fidem antecedere soliat » (Logicae seu philosophiae rationalis elementa, 6th ed., Louvain 1860). Whereas for French t. tradition is the source and principle of ideas and certainty, for the school of Louvain, both before and after 1850 (when it adopted ontological doctrines), it is merely an explanation of the origin of ideas. The foundation of certainty, on the other hand, is the rational nature of human beings (E. Hoedez, Hist. de la théol. au XIXe siècle, II, Bruxelles 1952, p. 103).
From a philosophical point of view, t. is mistaken because, by assuming a priori the inability of human reason to provide human beings with certain knowledge of truth, it resolves the critical problem in an extrinsicist manner. It is an effort to prove historically the absolute impotence of human nature to construct by itself a logical and satisfactory system of intellectual and social institutions, and to oppose to it the authority of Christian tradition. Even if this is historically true and demonstrable, it does not follow absolutely, as the system maintains, that human reason lacks the power to demonstrate rationally the truths at issue. The error lies in failing to distinguish the phenomenological order from the ontological order, that is, between a faculty and its use, between the physical power of knowing and the exercise of that power, and consequently in having exaggerated the dependence of reason on language, education, society, and revelation. T. thus fell into the error of proposing a non-rational solution (blind faith) to a philosophical problem that can admit only a rational answer: or into the contradiction of wishing to provide reasons for accepting the fact, content, and organ of a revelation precisely while repudiating rational proofs. The merit of t., besides that of reminding human reason, in response to the historical moment, to respect the authority of traditions and society, is that it placed human reason in its natural environment, drawing attention to certain concrete conditions in the development of human intellectual life.
The Church immediately reacted against blind faith, lacking the necessary antecedent convictions and rational knowledge, as it was defended by t. At first there were a number of isolated theologians and bishops, polemicists, and philosophers (among them P. M. A.
Chastel), and also theologians of distinction such as P. G. Perrone (Praelect. théol., II, Rome 1842). There followed the encyclicals: Mirari vos, of 15 Aug. 1832; Singulari nos, of 25 June 1834, against Lamennais, by then an apostate; Qui pluribus, of 9 Nov. 1846; and the allocution Singulari quadam, of 9 Dec. 1854, which recalled the Church’s common mentality. Bautain and Bonnetto were required to sign several propositions concerning the use of reason before faith and the possibility of rational knowledge of God’s existence, containing expressions that were at times very forceful (Denz-U, 1622-27, 1649-52). The S. Congregation of the Index addressed, on 3 June 1845 and 8 Aug. 1844, certain « Observaciones » to Ubaghs’s Theodicea and Logica (cf. Acta Sanctae Sedis, 32 [1897], pp. 206-207). Moreover, from 1845 to 1869, especially in France, very numerous provincial councils were held, unanimously condemning the doctrine of the traditionalists (Conc. Burdigalensis, in Coll. Lac., cited above, vol. IV, col. 842).
The First Vatican Council dealt with t. apropos of the possibility of natural knowledge of God’s existence, setting aside any conditions that might be required. There can be no doubt about the condemnation of the most rigid form of t., as a doctrine that undermines the very foundation of faith (Denz-U, 1785, 1806). Mitigated t., on the other hand, must acknowledge that « in hominis natura rationali potentiam esse Deum per res creatas certo cognoscendi » (Coll. Lac., cited above, col. 79, c-d), and must therefore avoid requiring revelation and the corresponding supernatural faith for knowledge of God; but it is not affected by the Council so long as it requires the assistance of the idea of God existing in society, provided that this idea has been reached by natural means. With regard to certain knowledge of the fact of divine revelation, the Council again raises only the question of right and solely from the objective point of view (cf. ibid., VII, cols. 86-87, 1615). That is to say, it affirms that revelation presents itself accompanied by external facts which, joined to the interior assistance of the Holy Spirit, render it « rationi consentanea » (chap. 3 De fide cf. Denz-U, 1790, 1791). There can be no true assent of supernatural faith unless it is preceded by certain knowledge that the truth in question is credible because it has been revealed by God.
The Church also had t., or at least its spirit, in view in the encyclical Pascendi (7 Sept. 1907) and in the « anti-Modernist oath » (1 Sept. 1910); more recently, the encyclical Humani generis (12 Aug. 1950), removing every ambiguity and clarifying at certain points the teaching of the First Vatican Council itself, strongly reaffirmed Catholic principles concerning the capacity of human reason, without the aid of revelation, to know the existence of God and the natural law, and to establish the foundations of the Christian faith.