Traditionalism

TRADITIONALISM. - It is the philosophical-religious doctrine according to which a primitive revelation was absolutely necessary for the human race, not only to acquire knowledge of truths of the supernatural order, but also of supersensible truths, that is, of the fundamental truths of the metaphysical, moral and religious order: existence of God and the concept of being, spirituality and immortality of the soul, future life, obligatory moral law, etc. Such revelation reaches every man through tradition, that is, through oral and social teaching, which must be accepted by faith: society is the organ of the primitive revelation. Independently of divine revelation man cannot have any true knowledge (cf. A. Bonnetty, in Ann. de phil. chrét., 3rd series, 30 [1845], p. 464).

1. Unlike fideism (v.), one cannot say with certainty when and by whom the term t. was first used. In fact, while no one wished to be designated a "fideist" or "supernaturalist," all traditionalists gloried in being such (cf., e.g., A. Bonnetty, ibid., 4th series, 42 [1851], p. 7). The t. developed above all after the French Revolution, under the influence of Kant's critical philosophy and as a reaction to the exasperated rationalism of the 18th century, although its precursors can be found, at least as a tendency, already in Tatian and in Tertullian for apologetic motives, in the Protestants (especially in the Bereans) for theological reasons, and in the Catholics P. D. Huet (De imbecillitate mentis humanae) and B. Pascal for mixed philosophical and theological motives (v. FIDEISM). It was of special interest in France, where the archbishop of Paris himself, D. A. Affre, the bishop of Amiens, A. de Salinis, Card. T. J. Gousset and many other prominent figures were at least for a certain period traditionalists. In Belgium G. C. Ubaghs and the whole school of Louvain adhered to the t.; in Germany M. Klee, G. B. Hirscher, von Drey; in Italy G. Ventura and V. Gioberti; in Spain D. Cortés, etc.

It is not always possible to distinguish the rigid traditionalists, also called supernaturalists, from the mitigated ones or semitraditionalists, both because of the lack of logic proper to the system and because of the polemics that sometimes forced the same authors to mitigate even if only temporarily their assertions (cf. A. Bonnetty, in Ann. de phil. chrét., 4th series, 41 [1850], p. 86; 42 [1851], p. 10; 44 [1852], p. 185). The clearest distinction is that made by Msgr. V. Gasser, relator at the Vatican Council: rigid traditionalists or fideists are those "qui dicunt... communicationem... debere fieri per doctrinam... revelatam et proinde hominem debere in se suscipere ideam Dei et existentiae ipsius fide divina..."; mitigated traditionalists "communicationem hanc non derivant ex ipsa doctrina... revelata, saltem non proxime, sed generatim ex idea Dei in societate humana iam existente; et proinde sufficere, quod homo fide humana ideam Dei in se suscipiat, et dein efformet argumenta ex ratione pro existentia Dei" (Coll. Lac., cited in bibl., VII, col. 129 a).

The principal representatives of the t., L. De Bonald, F. de Lamennais (v.), A. Bonnetty (v.), L. E. Bautain (v.), are distinguished by the philosophical bases they give to the system, by the use they make of it and by the social and apologetic consequences they draw from it. The most serious attempt to give the t. a foundation and a philosophical exposition was made by the School of Louvain, of which Arnold Tits was the soul and Gerard Casimir Ubaghs the most prominent representative (cf. J. Henry, op. cit. in bibl.). The Louvainians all uphold a virtual innatism regarding the origin of ideas, while the French reject it at least outwardly. The stimulating influence is not given by sensible perception (Descartes) but by "commerce social," whence the two fundamental theses of the school: "Les principes des vérités rationnelles métaphysiques et morales ont été mis dans l'esprit humain par le créateur. Mais... l'homme a besoin d'un enseignement intellectuel pour... acquérir une connaissance distincte de Dieu et des vérités morales" (N. J. Laforêt, Dogmes cath., I, Brussels 1855, p. 467). The first man had to receive this teaching from God through revelation, which for Laforêt is natural, for E. Lonay is natural in its object and supernatural in the manner of its acquisition by man, for Ubaghs is at the same time natural and supernatural. The relations between faith and science are thus fixed by Ubaghs, distinguishing between acquisition and demonstration of a truth: "... In moralibus et metaphysicis, spectato ordine acquisitionis..., fides naturaliter prior est scientia, ut nemo ad hanc perveniat, nisi illa quomodocumque praecesserit; etsi in ordine demonstrationis, ex quo certitudo ratiocinata gignitur, scientia fidem antecedere soliat" (Logicae seu philosophiae rationalis elementa, 6th ed., Louvain 1860). While for the French t. tradition is the source and principle of ideas and of certainty, for the school of Louvain, both before and after 1850 (when it adopted ontological doctrines), it is only an explanation of the origin of ideas. The foundation of certainty is instead the rational nature of man (E. Hoedez, Hist. de la théol. au XIXe siècle, II, Brussels 1952, p. 103).

From the philosophical point of view the t. errs because, by presupposing a priori the incapacity of human reason to give man certain knowledge of truth, it resolves the critical problem in an extrinsicist manner. It is an effort to prove historically the absolute impotence of human nature to construct by itself a logical and satisfactory whole of intellectual and social institutions and to oppose to it the authority of Christian tradition. If this is historically true and demonstrable, it does not follow absolutely, as the system would have it, that human reason does not have the power to demonstrate rationally the truths that were in question. The error lies in not having distinguished the phenomenological order from the ontological order, that is, between faculty and its use, between the physical power of knowledge and the exercise of such power, and in having therefore exaggerated the dependence of reason on language, on education, on society, on revelation. The t. thus fell into the error of proposing a non-rational solution (blind faith) to a philosophical problem that can admit only a rational answer: or into the contradiction of wanting to give reasons for admitting the fact, the content and the organ of a revelation, precisely while it repudiates rational proofs. The merit of the t., besides that, due to the historical moment, of recalling human reason to respect for the authority of traditions and of society, is that of having placed human reason in its natural environment, recalling certain concrete conditions of the evolution of human intellectual life.

The Church reacted at once against the blind faith, deprived of the necessary antecedent rational convictions and knowledge, as it was upheld by the t. At first there were some isolated theologians and bishops, polemicists, philosophers (among whom P. M. A.

Chastel), and also theologians of worth such as P. G. Perrone (Praelect. théol., II, Rome 1842). There followed the encyclicals: Mirari vos, of 15 Aug. 1832; Singulari nos, of 25 June 1834, against Lamennais, by then an apostate; Qui pluribus, of 9 Nov. 1846, and the allocution Singulari quadam, of 9 Dec. 1854, which recall the common mind of the Church. Bautain and Bonnetty had to sign certain propositions on the use of reason prior to faith and on the possibility of the rational knowledge of God's existence, containing expressions at times very strong (Denz-U, 1622-27, 1649-52). The Sacred Congregation of the Index addressed, on 3 June 1845 and 8 Aug. 1844, some "Observaciones" to the Theodicea and the Logica of Ubaghs (cf. Acta Sanctae Sedis, 32 [1897], pp. 206-207). Moreover, from 1845 to 1869, especially in France, very numerous provincial councils were held, which unanimously condemned the doctrine of the traditionalists (Conc. Burdigalensis, in Coll. Lac., cit., vol. IV, col. 842).

The Vatican Council dealt with traditionalism, in connection with the possibility of the natural knowledge of God's existence, prescinding from the eventual conditions required. There is no doubt about the condemnation of the most rigid form of traditionalism, as a doctrine that undermines the very foundation of faith (Denz-U, 1785, 1806). Mitigated traditionalism, on the other hand, must take into account that "in hominis natura rationali potentiam esse Deum per res creatas certo cognoscendi" (Coll. Lac., cit., col. 79, c-d) and therefore must avoid requiring revelation and the corresponding supernatural faith for the knowledge of God; but it is not touched by the Council so long as it requires the help of the idea of God that exists in society, provided that this idea is reached by natural means. With regard to the certain knowledge of the fact of divine revelation, the Council again poses only the question of right and from the purely objective point of view (cf. ibid., VII, coll. 86-87, 1615). That is to say, it affirms that revelation presents itself accompanied by external facts such that, united with the internal help of the Holy Spirit, they make it "rationi consentanea" (cap. 3 De fide, cf. Denz-U, 1790, 1791). There can be no true assent of supernatural faith unless it is preceded by a certain knowledge that the truth in question is credible, because revealed by God.

The Church again had traditionalism in view, or at least its spirit, in the encyclical Pascendi (7 Sept. 1907) and in the "anti-modernist oath" (1 Sept. 1910); and recently the encyclical Humani generis (12 Aug. 1950), removing every ambiguity and clarifying in some points the Vatican Council itself, strongly recalled the Catholic principles concerning the possibilities of human reason, without the help of revelation, regarding the knowledge of God's existence, of the natural law, and the establishing of the foundations of the Christian faith.

Ernesto Basadonna