TRADITIONALISM. – It is the philosophical-religious doctrine according to which a primitive revelation was absolutely necessary for the human race, not only to acquire knowledge of truths of a supernatural order, but also of truths that are supersensible, that is, the fundamental truths of a metaphysical, moral, and religious order: the existence of God and the concept of being, the spirituality and immortality of the soul, future life, the obligatory moral law, etc. This revelation reaches every man through tradition, that is, through oral and social teaching, which must be accepted by faith: society is the organ of primitive revelation. Independently of divine revelation, man cannot have any true knowledge (cf. A. Bonnett, in Ann. de phil. chrét., 3rd series, 30 [1845], p. 464).
I. Unlike fideism (v.), it cannot be said with certainty when and by whom the term traditionalism was first used. In fact, while no one wished to be designated a “fideist” or “supernaturalist,” all traditionalists gloried in being called such (cf., e.g., A. Bonnett, in Ann. de phil. chrét., 4th series, 42 [1851], p. 7). Traditionalism developed especially after the French Revolution, under the influence of Kant’s critical philosophy and as a reaction to the exaggerated rationalism of the 18th century, although its forerunners, at least as a tendency, can be found already in Tacian and Tertullian for apologetic reasons, among Protestants (especially the Berengarians) for theological reasons, and among Catholics P. D. Huet (De imbecillitate mentis humanae) and B. Pascal for mixed philosophical and theological reasons (v. F. de Riemso). It particularly interested France, where even the Archbishop of Paris, D. A. Affre, the Bishop of Amiens, A. de Salinis, Cardinal T. J. Gousset, and many other prominent figures were at least for a time traditionalists. Traditionalism was adhered to in Belgium by G. C. Ubaghs and the entire school of Louvain; in Germany by M. Klee, G. B. Hirscher, von Drey; in Italy by G. Ventura and V. Gioberti; in Spain by D. Cortés, etc.
It is not always possible to distinguish rigid traditionalists, also called supernaturalists, from mitigated or semi-traditionalists, both because of the lack of logical consistency in the system itself and because the polemics it provoked sometimes forced the same authors to mitigate their assertions, even if only temporarily (cf. A. Bonnett, in Ann. de phil. chrét., 4th series, 41 [1850], p. 86; 42 [1851], p. 10; 44 [1852], p. 185). The clearest distinction is that made by the monists. V. Gasser, rapporteur at the Vatican Council: rigid traditionalists or fideists are those “qui dicunt... communicati... debere fieri per doctrinam... revelatam et proinde hominem debere in se suscipere ideam Dei et existentiae ipsius fide divina...”; mitigated traditionalists “communicati” also have ideas not derived from revealed doctrine... at least not proximately, but generally from the idea of God already existing in human society; and therefore it suffices that man accept the idea of God in himself by human faith, and then form arguments from reason for the existence of God” (Coll. Lac., cited in bibl., VII, col. 129 a).
The principal representatives of traditionalism, L. De Bonald, F. de Lamennais (v.), A. Bonnett (v.), L. E. BAUTZEN (v.), are distinguished by the philosophical foundations they give to the system, by the use they make of it, and by the social and apologetic consequences they draw from II. The most serious attempt to provide traditionalism with a philosophical foundation and exposition was made by the School of Louvain, of which Arnold Tits was the guiding spirit and Gerard Casimir Ubaghs its most prominent representative (cf. J. Henry, op. cit. in bibl.). The Louvain school all uphold a virtual innatism regarding the origin of ideas, while the French reject this at least outwardly. The extraordinary influence is not given by sensory perception (Descartes) but by “commerce social,” whence the two fundamental theses of the school: “Les principes des vérités rationnelles métaphysiques et morales ont été mis dans l'esprit humain par le créateur. Mais... l'homme a besoin d'un enseignement intellectuel pour... acquérir une connaissance distincte de Dieu et des vérités morales” (N. J. Laforêt, Dogmes cath., I, Brussels 1855, p. 467). The first man must have received this teaching from God through revelation, which for Laforêt is natural, for E. Lonay is natural in its object and supernatural in the mode of its acquisition by man, and for Ubaghs is at once natural and supernatural. The relationship between faith and science is thus fixed by Ubaghs, distinguishing between the acquisition and the demonstration of a truth: “... In moralibus et metaphysicis, spectato ordine acquisitionis..., fides naturaliter prior est scientia, ut nemo ad hanc perveniat, nisi illa quomodo cumque praecesserit; etsi in ordine demonstrationis, ex quo certitudo ratiocinata gignitur, scientia fidem antecedere soleat” (Logicae seu philosophiae rationalis elementa, 6th ed., Louvain 1860). While for French traditionalism tradition is the source and principle of ideas and certainty, for the School of Louvain, both before and after 1850 (when it adopted ontologistic doctrines), it is only an explanation of the origin of ideas. The foundation of certainty, instead, is the rational nature of man (E. Hoedez, Hist. de la théol. au XIXe siècle, II, Brussels 1952, p. 103).
From the philosophical point of view, traditionalism was weak because, by supposing a priori the incapacity of human reason to give man certain knowledge of the truth, it resolved the critical problem in an extrinsicist manner. It was an effort to prove historically the absolute impotence of human nature to construct by itself a logical and satisfactory system of intellectual and social institutions, and to oppose to this the authority of Christian tradition. If this is historically true and demonstrable, it does not follow absolutely, as the system claims, that human reason does not have the power to demonstrate rationally the truths in question. The error lies in not having distinguished the phenomenological order from the ontological order, that is, between faculty and the use of the faculty, between the physical power of knowledge and the exercise of that power, and thus in having exaggerated the dependence of reason on language, education, society, and revelation. Traditionalism thus fell into the error of proposing a non-rational solution (blind faith) to a philosophical problem that can only admit a rational answer: either in the contradiction of wanting to give reasons for admitting the fact, content, and organ of a revelation, precisely while rejecting rational proofs. The merit of traditionalism, beyond that owed to the historical moment of recalling human reason to respect the authority of tradition and society, is to have placed human reason in its natural environment, recalling some concrete conditions of the evolution of human intellectual life.
The Church reacted immediately against blind faith, lacking the necessary antecedent rational convictions and knowledge, as it was sustained by traditionalism. At first, isolated theologians and bishops, polemicists, and philosophers reacted (among whom P. M. A.
Chastel), and also theologians of value such as P. G. Perrone (Praelect. théol., II, Rome 1842). Later came the encyclicals: Mirari vos, of 15 Aug. 1832; Singulari nos, of 25 June 1834, against Lamennais; Qui pluribus, of 9 Nov. 1846, and the allocution Singulari quadam, of 9 Dec. 1854, which recall the common mentality of the Church. Bautain and Bonnetty had to sign several propositions on the use of reason before faith and on the possibility of rational knowledge of the existence of God containing at times very strong expressions (Denz-U, 1622-27, 1649-52). The Sacred Congregation of the Index addressed on 3 June 1843 and 8 Aug. 1844 some “Observations” to the Theodicea and to the Logica of Ubaghs (cf. Acta Sanctae Sedis, 32 [1897], pp. 206-207). Furthermore, from 1845 to 1869, especially in France, numerous provincial councils were celebrated, which unanimously condemned the doctrine of traditionalism (Conc. Burdigalensis, in Coll. Lac., cit., vol. IV, col. 842).
The Vatican Council dealt with traditionalism, with regard to the possibility of natural knowledge of the existence of God, disregarding any eventual conditions required. There is no doubt about the condemnation of the most rigid form of traditionalism, as a doctrine that undermines the very foundation of faith (Denz-U, 1785, 1866). Instead, mitigated traditionalism must take into account “in hominis natura rationali potentiam esse Deum per res creatas certo cognoscendi” (Coll. Lac., cit., col. 79, c-d) and therefore avoid requiring revelation and the corresponding supernatural faith for the knowledge of God; but it is not touched by the Council as long as it requires the aid of the idea of God that exists in society, provided it is attained by natural means. With regard to the certain knowledge of the fact of divine revelation, the Council poses only the question of law and solely from the objective point of view (cf. ibid., VII, cols. 86-87, 1615). It is affirmed, namely, that revelation presents itself accompanied by external facts such that, united with the internal aid of the Holy Spirit, they render it “rationi consentane” (cap. 3 De fide: cf. Denz-U, 1790, 1791). There cannot be a true assent of supernatural faith unless preceded by a certain knowledge that the truth in question is credible, because revealed by God.
The Church had still in view traditionalism, or at least its spirit, in the encyclical Pascendi (7 Sept. 1907) and in the “anti-Modernist oath” (1 Sept. 1910); recently, then, the encyclical Humani generis (12 Aug. 1950), removing every ambiguity and clarifying in some points even the Vatican Council itself, strongly recalled the Catholic principles on the possibilities of human reason, without the aid of revelation, regarding the knowledge of the existence of God, of the natural law, and the establishing of the foundations of Christian faith.
§hxny φύλαξον), avoiding profane novelties of speech and the oppositions of a pseudo-science (I Tim. 6, 20; cf. II Tim. 1, 13-14; 2,1-2).
In the teaching of the Fathers, from the sub-apostolic times, tradition (t.) is held in the highest esteem. In the course of time, then, there arose a true and proper theology of tradition, of which three successive phases can be distinguished: a) at first there was not yet a clear distinction between written and oral teaching (Apostolic Fathers) and teaching in general was related to the undisputed authority, always alive, of the Church, whether particular or universal: first were the wandering Apostles, the prophets, the doctors, and finally the monarchical episcopate, and above all the Church of Rome; b) in the 3rd century (St. Irenaeus, Tertullian) a clear distinction began to be made between Scripture and tradition as separate sources of Revelation, giving preference to the latter; c) in the 4th and 5th centuries (the Cappadocians in the East, St. Augustine in the West) the concept of tradition was further deepened in its organs of transmission (teaching Church, Fathers, councils) with the criteria for investigating the true apostolic tradition.
In particular, it must be noted that the attitude of the Apostolic Fathers regarding oral tradition is indicated by Papias (c. 130): “If anyone came who had followed the presbyters, I would seek from them the words of the presbyters: what Andrew or Philip or Thomas or James or John or Matthew or any other disciple of the Lord had said... For I was convinced that I would profit not so much from what I learned from books as from the living and permanent voice” (Eusebius, Hist. eccl., III, 39: PG 20, 297). It should be noted that Papias was not ignorant of the written Gospels, at least those of St. Matthew and St. Mark. For St. Clement of Rome (c. 101) the preaching of the Apostles and of the bishops constituted by them is the rule of our tradition” (πῆς παραδόσεως ἡμῶν κανόν: I Cor. 7, 2). According to St. Irenaeus (d. 202), the Church teaches, preaches, and hands on the same things “as if it had but one mouth. For although there are different languages in the world, yet the power of tradition is one and the same. Nor do the Churches founded in Germany believe differently, nor do they preach differently” (Adv. haer, I, 10, 2: PG 7, 553). Living tradition is superior even to the Bible: “If the Apostles had not left anything in writing, one would still have to follow the order of the tradition delivered by them to the heads of the Church. This method is followed by many barbarian peoples who believe in Christ. Without paper and without ink they have written on their hearts salvation through the Holy Spirit: they carefully preserve the ancient tradition” (ibid., III, 4, 2: PG 7, 855). Tertullian (d. 222-23), after enumerating some doctrines and customs not mentioned in the Bible (rite of Baptism, prayers for the dead, etc.), writes: “If you ask for the authority of Scripture for these and other similar disciplinary practices, you will read none. Instead, tradition will present itself as authority, custom confirms it, and faith observes it” (De corona, 3-4: PL 2, 98-99; cf. also De praescript., 21: PL 2, 33). It should be noted that some examples adduced by Tertullian are true dogmatic traditions, not merely disciplinary ones.
Thus St. Basil (d. 379), also cited by the Council of Trent (De Spiritu Sancto, 66: PG 32, 188); St. John Chrysostom: “And do not seek more” (In II ad Thes., Hom. 4, 2: PG 62, 488); St. Augustine (d. 430), who systematically employed the argument of tradition against heretics, for example against the Donatists: “When the whole Church holds a thing, we do not institute councils, but what has always been held, what has been handed down by apostolic authority, is most rightly believed” (De Bapt., 4, 24: PL 43, 174); St. Vincent of Lérins (5th cent.), who formulated the famous rule for recognizing, among many, the true apostolic tradition: “In the Catholic Church itself, great care must be taken to hold what has been believed everywhere, always, and by all” (Commonit., 2: PL 50, 640). The idea of tradition had so penetrated the minds of the faithful that in the 4th and 5th centuries compilations or patristic florilegia began to be compiled for dogmatic use. One such patristic collection was presented by St. Cyril of Alexandria to the Council of Ephesus (431) in defense of the divine maternity of Mary.
From these texts, beyond the existence of tradition, some indispensable clarifications can be deduced for a precise evaluation of the subject: 1) both in Scripture and among the Fathers, the concept of tradition is always linked to the assistance of the Holy Spirit: without the Spirit of truth, even oral teaching, despite all human precautions, could not fail to be mixed with inevitable errors. It was on this point that Protestantism erred. 2) The concept of tradition is inseparable from the living magisterium of the Church: a tradition, even from the 1st or 2nd century, not attested by the Church today, might serve as historical documentation, but would not constitute a dogma of faith: mere second-hand material fallen by the wayside and nothing more. Therefore, the full sense of tradition can only be grasped on the condition that the two aspects—subjective-formal and objective-material—are held together, the former being the more important. Hence, between the magisterium of the Church and tradition in the full sense, we can only posit an inadequate distinction: we hold, that is, that the Church is like a teacher who almost incorporates within herself Sacred Scripture and tradition.
III. Monuments of Tradition
According to what has been said, it is clear that, in itself, the Catholic Church as it presents itself today is the sole granite monument of tradition. There is no need to interrogate the past when one is at the school of a teacher whose living voice is the faithful echo and, as it were, the recording of the centuries gone by. In fact, however, this living voice, as the centuries have passed, has also been entrusted and, as it were, inscribed in written documents or customs.When speaking of “monuments of tradition,” therefore, we mean “all those means, apart from the living oral magisterium, by which, over the course of the centuries, one can reread and reconstruct the truths currently professed by the Catholic Church.” Through these monuments, the theologian and the scholar can reconstruct the history of dogmas. This history, however, unlike all others, does not seek or claim to discover in the past truths unknown to us, but only to confirm the antiquity and primordial character of the faith now professed, which is not a human invention but a divine one.
The documents or monuments of tradition, thus understood, can be: a) written (professions of faith, definitions, councils, works of the Fathers, doctors, theologians, etc.); b) artistic-epigraphic (sculptures, paintings, monuments in general, tombs, inscriptions, etc.); c) simply customary (religious beliefs of the faithful, rites, ceremonies, various liturgical or paraliturgical usages [V. LITURGIA]).
Even the “sensus christianus” of the faithful is an excellent instrument for the preservation, transmission, and penetration of revealed truths. It can be defined as “a spontaneous affective impulse of the Christian people, which, under the influence of the habit of faith and the gifts of the Holy Spirit (especially understanding, knowledge, and wisdom), with the guidance of the magisterium, adheres to certain truths, engaging the teaching Church.” The sensus fidelium lies in the affective sphere, but its ultimate roots are of an intellectual order, even if not currently perceived. St. Thomas explains it as a kind of “connaturality” with supernatural realities, not yet well defined, yet toward which intellect and heart feel a need and to which the devotion of the simple naturally inclines (Sum. Theol., 2, 2, q. 45, a. 2). It has had notable influence especially in the field of Marian theology, as Pius XII explicitly affirms in the constitution Munificentissimus Deus (AAS, 42 [1950], p. 758).