BAGHS, GERHARD CASIMIR. - Belgian philosopher, b. at Berg-le-Jaquemont on 26 Nov. 1800, d. at Louvain on 15 Feb. 1875.
Ordained a priest, he first taught in the minor seminary of Rodule, then (1834) at Louvain. From 1846 he directed, together with Arnold Tits and Lonay, the Revue catholique, which became the organ of ontologism (v.), to which B. adhered in 1850.
Principal works: Logicae elementa (Louvain 1834; 6th ed. 1860); Ontologiae... elementa (ibid. 1835; 5th ed. 1864); Theodiceae... elementa (ibid. 1841, 4th ed. 1863); Anthropologiae philosophicae elementa (ibid. 1848); De realisme en théologie et en philosophie (ibid. 1856); Essais d'idéologie ontologique (ibid. 1860). B.’s thought, like that of the traditionalists in general, is a reaction against Enlightenment rationalism and aims to reconcile ideas and reason, so that reason may be guaranteed its own existence by virtue of the former (Log. elem., 3rd ed. 1839, p. 161). Distinctions are drawn between notions and ideas; notions, which relate to sensibility, have only relative universality; ideas pertain to truths of a moral and metaphysical order (natural moral law, the existence of God, etc.) and are innate. This innatism (v.) is of a Leibnizian type (ibid., pp. 17-18 and 124). The development of these ideas is made possible by social teaching, understood as any form of assistance derived from social life: even articulated language, as a means of expression and communication, has a social origin (ibid., pp. 144-48 and 167). But such teaching is traditional and indispensable to man; it in turn presupposes a first divine teaching in the form of natural revelation. It is in this sense that B. speaks of a «primitive faith» (ibid., p. 161), to which he also assigns the task of correcting psychologism (v.), guaranteeing the communication of the subject with the object beyond representation (cf. Théol. elem., p. 84). The foundation of certainty lies in the very nature of man as a rational being, which is expressed in common sense (v.). Ultimately, every individual is bound to his contemporaries and predecessors, and derives from teaching the use of reason, even though, once ideas and principles have been received from tradition, reason is capable of understanding them (Log. elem., pp. 128-29).
As regards the idea of God, it is an original datum of reason; God is therefore indemonstrable. Proofs and demonstrations are merely clarifications and explanations. Hence the adherence to ontologism as the only solution to the difficulties of intermediarism. Ideas are posited as «the same truth to be known, identical with the intelligible perceived immediately»; absolute truths existing in reality and independently of any operation of the human mind; and finally as «the being which is pure act and which is none other than the Divine Being» (Essais d'idéologie ontologique, pp. 33, 75, 78). The natural presence of God to the mind must not, however, be confused with the beatific vision, which has as its object the divine essence in itself and is proper only to the separated soul (ibid., p. 58).
The doctrine aroused sharp controversy. After a warning in 1843 regarding five of his propositions, the Congregation of the Inquisition condemned (18 Sept. 1861) a series of propositions concerning ontologism (Denz-U. nn. 1659-65). B., after submitting (Henry, op. cit. in bibl., pp. 113-49), left teaching.