ONTOLOGISM. - A philosophical trend of varied significance, particularly characteristic of modern philosophy.
I. NOTION AND HISTORY
Many controversies have arisen around the term *ontologism* (from the Greek *ón* [being] and *lógos* [discourse]) and the trend has given rise to different and sometimes opposing qualifications. A. Lalande (*Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*, 5th ed., Paris 1947, p. 609) assigns a twofold meaning to the term. In the first sense, *ontologism* is “a tendency of the mind favourable to ontology (q.v.), understood as the inquiry into the characteristics and nature of being in itself or of beings in themselves”; in the second sense, it refers directly to “the doctrine of V. Gioberti [of intuitive and immediate knowledge of the First Being], which he opposed to what he calls psychologism, namely the tendency that subordinates being to the idea.” Cuvillier, in the preface to the edition of *Entretiens sur la métaphysique* by Malebranche (I, Paris 1948), qualifies *ontologism* as “the doctrine of certain philosophers or theologians, especially Italian or Belgian, of the 19th century such as Gioberti, Ubaghs and the school of Louvain, whose fideist and anti-intellectualist tendency is diametrically opposed to Malebranche.”Although Cuvillier’s critical remarks may contain some truth, the efforts of 19th-century ontologists were directed toward reconnecting with “ante litteram” ontologists, first and foremost Malebranche.
A 19th-century ontologist (J. Sans Fiel, pseudonym) states that “the fundamental idea of *ontologism* does not consist in the identification of general ideas with God, but in the immediate perception of the Absolute Being” (*De l'orthodoxie de l'ontologisme modéré et traditionnel*, Paris 1869, p. 5). Favre, also an ontologist, believes that “the human intellect essentially and immediately reaches the Infinite Being itself (not as it is in itself or within itself) and sees in Him the metaphysical essences or universal ideas...” (*Réponse aux lettres d'un sensualiste contre l'ontologisme*, ibid. 1864). Favre further traces “the most authentic *ontologism* back to Augustine, St. Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, Denis the Carthusian, Bossuet, Fénelon, Leibniz and Gerdil.” Gioberti, for his part, recognizes in Malebranche a typical ontologist linked to the tradition of a doctrine that goes back to St. Bonaventure, St. Augustine, and even to Plato, later finding representatives in Gerson, Ficino, Tomassini and Gerdil. The 19th-century ontologists were concerned to defend themselves against the charge of being dangerous innovators or repeaters of ancient errors: to this end, they sought to find in earlier Christian thought indications or even premises of their speculative orientation.
The reference to Plato and Neoplatonism (q.v.) is explained by the fact that *ontologism* adopts the doctrine of a world of intelligible ideas known prior to experience, which remains the centre of all possible actual knowledge. The appeal to St. Augustine, and then to Bonaventure, Roger of Marston, Matthew of Aquasparta, Richard of Middleton, John of Peckham, refers above all to the solution of the problem of knowledge common in the medieval Franciscan school, based on Augustinian illumination (q.V. AUGUSTINE). Yet Malebranche himself, affirming (*Recherche de la vérité*, I. III, ch. 6) that mutable and corruptible things are known in God, acknowledges that St. Augustine speaks only of immutable and incorruptible realities. Nevertheless, Malebranche holds that the Augustinian principle of illumination applies to all reality. This Malebranchian interpretation was already rejected by St. Thomas, who referred the Augustinian knowledge “in rationibus aeternis” to the certainty and immutability of the first principles, as a reflection in the human mind of the eternal reason of God (*Contra Gentiles*, II, 3). Moreover, St. Augustine himself excluded any ontologist interpretation of his doctrine, denying the vision of the divine essence, which is granted only exceptionally to very few men (cf. *Ep.* 147 to Paulinus and *De Genesi ad litteram*, ch. 27). The Augustinian texts that speak of a contemplation of God referable to the wise must be understood as referring to the ordinary way of knowing God through creatures, even if by means of ideas that precede as truths from the subsistent Truth (cf. R. Jolivet, *Dieu, soleil des esprits*, Paris 1934, pp. 56-77).
Gioberti claims that his theory of the intuition of real being finds support in the *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*. In reality, Bonaventurian expressions do not speak of a proper vision of the essence of God, but rather of a “lumen” present in the human soul, which does not come from the senses or from the soul itself, but from God insofar as the soul is His image. The vision of the mind through this “lumen” is not a vision of God, but rather of the eternal reasons seen only as “moventes” of human intelligence: only when elevated to the beatific vision (“in sua charitatis plenitudine et fulgore”) will it fully understand them (cf. also *De humanae cognitionis suprema ratione*). The interest shown in various representatives of the medieval Franciscan school regarding the interpretation of cases in the doctrine of illumination would lead to particular problems of exegetical interpretation that do not concern *ontologism* alone. In the true ontologists of the 19th century, the perspective had radically changed. Whereas in the attitude of the Platonizing or Augustinian currents the question was rather one of delimiting the relationship that God has with human knowledge, in *ontologism* this takes on a quite different meaning, making God not only the means of knowledge but the first thing known.
The properly so-called ontologist movement of the 19th century had representatives in Belgium, Italy and France. In Belgium it was sparked by the publication of Gioberti’s *Introduzione alla filosofia* (1850) and found followers in Ubaghs (q.v.), one of its principal exponents, and others such as Laforet, Lefebvre and Boucquillon. In Italy, after Gioberti, mention should be made of Bertini, Puccinotti, Garzillo and G. Romano, V. Fornari (q.v.). T. Mamiani della Rovere (q.v.) gave ontologism a scholastic form. Also cited as representatives of typical ontologism in Italy are Fr. Francesco and Gaetano Milone and Frs. Di Rignano and Vercellone. Among the French ontologists, besides Jean Sans Fiel and Jules Favre, are Hugonin, Branchercau and others of lesser note. In France, ontologism was soon connected with controversies of a theological nature and was combated especially by the journal *Annales de philosophie chrétienne* and by A. Bonnetty (q.v.).
It is to Malebranche and Gioberti that one must look as the principal sources for the study of *ontologism*. Malebranche’s *ontologism* (q.v.), according to various interpreters, is caught in a dilemma: on the one hand he affirms that God is known when eternal truths are grasped, on the other he declares: “I believe I have well proved that we see all things in God even in this life; but this does not mean seeing God or enjoying Him” (*Traité de la nature et de la Grâce*, II discourse, art. XVII). In reality, as H. Gouhier observes (*La philosophie de Malebranche*, Paris 1926, p. 324), Malebranche was unaware of the term and the reality that one wishes to indicate by speaking of *ontologism*. For Malebranche, “seeing God” and “being united to Him in such a way that nothing can be known except by participation in His light” amount to the same thing. Starting from Augustinian illumination and extending its scope, Malebranche would not, however, assign to it a meaning that would lead to the affirmation of an intuitive knowledge of God.
Gioberti (v.) the author assumes instead a systematic and distinctive character that clearly differentiates his position. The intuition is the original act of knowledge. In intuition the human spirit is completely passive. The object of intuition is formed by the Idea, which is neither a concept nor any other created thing or property, but absolute and eternal truth, beyond the human mind: in intuition the union of the mind with truth in itself is realized and thus scepticism and subjectivism are overcome. The idea of possible being as the first object of knowledge (Rosmini) is not sufficient for this; therefore intuition must refer to real and absolute being. It is therefore impossible to have primitive intuition without knowing that Being is. This reality of Being appears to man as necessary and absolute, although initially in an indeterminate and confused knowledge, due to the finitude of the spirit. Through "reflection", not only psychological but also ontological, the object of intuition is determined. Through intuition and reflection the spirit contemplates the Entity not in its abstractness, but as it really is, that is, knowing, producing existence and externalizing in its finite works its own infinite existence ("the Entity that creates existence"). *Introduzione allo studio della filosofia*, I, Capolago 1845, p. 135). Gioberti's intuition goes far beyond what has been called Malebranche's intuition. The latter's requirement is primarily psychological, or rather epistemological; Gioberti's is directly metaphysical.
II. PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE
Among the presuppositions of intuition (not considering its possible connection with idealism [v.], for which the coincidence of the logical order with the ontological order is essential) must be placed the Cartesian derivation of real infinity from the idea of infinity. This derivation is taken up and developed by Malebranche (*Recherche de la vérité*, I. III, part 2, ch. 6 and 10, clarification; cf. H. Gouhier, op. cit., pp. 341-52). In Gioberti the idea of being is the first necessary among ideas, and implies existence: therefore the intuition of being is that of necessary Being.But it is not difficult to see the inconsistency of these assertions. The idea of infinity is not first, but derives from finite reality given in experience; moreover, it is a concept formed through the negation of every limit in perfection and which refers to a possible essence. As for the idea of being, it does not possess actual, real infinity, but only conceptual infinity and is therefore bound to its indeterminacy. Intuition claims to make valid as "given" what is instead the result of demonstration, and this to avoid a demonstration that is considered superfluous or too open to contestation, given the critical premises regarding the value of human knowledge. In other words, intuition appears as an off-track attempt to overcome the difficulties inherent in Cartesian epistemology and the objections of Kantian criticism. Some representatives of modern thought, inasmuch as they speak of an experience of the divine (Schleiermacher) or of moral values (Max Scheler), resort to a kind of "experimental moral intuition" of the divine. In this case, however, the use of the term "intuition" is extraneous to its more precise meaning, which involves a connection of knowledge with God, but achieved through intellectual means, through the mediation of the idea of Being. The positive background against which intuition moves can be identified in the meaning and value that the knowledge of truth has as an epistemological-metaphysical exigency of the Absolute.
III. THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS
Intuition, in its properly philosophical expression, closely involves the rational presuppositions connected with Revelation. On the other hand, the Church has taken decisive positions condemning intuition, which underwent various phases.The main stages were the condemnation of several works that can be supposed to be linked to the defence in them of Malebranche's intuition (especially of him should be noted *De la recherche de la vérité* [placed on the Index in 1680], *Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion* [placed on the Index in 1712]). Of Gioberti's works, "all his works, whatever language they are written in" were condemned (14 January 1852). Some works by Mamiani were also prescribed. The most important document relating to intuition, however, is the decree of the Holy Office of 18 September 1861, which consists of 7 propositions. Of these, the first five should be noted: the first condemns the statement according to which "immediate knowledge of God, at least habitual, is essential to the human intellect, so that without it it can know nothing, since it is the intelligible light". The second proposition refers to the nature of that being which is "in all things and without which we understand nothing" as "divine being". The third and fourth propositions insist on the scope of that "congenital knowledge of God as simply being" which implies in itself every other knowledge, and this is also reiterated in the fifth.
The negative evaluation of intuition from the point of view of theodicy is necessary, since not only is immediate knowledge of God contrary to the teaching of the Church (Council of Vienne and Fourth Lateran Council) but because intuition hardly escapes a rationalization of the mystery of the nature of God. By placing intelligible things not in themselves but in God, it moreover opens the way to pantheism, whereby God is no longer distinguished epistemologically and ontologically, but belongs to the knowledge of the soul, forming at once its cause and its object. Finally, intuition prejudices the distinction between the natural and the supernatural order by introducing a direct knowledge of God, which is possible only in the beatific vision. See also: CONOSCENZA; DIO; IDEALISMO; VERITÀ, etc.
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