Ontologism

ONTOLOGISM. – A philosophical tendency, with varying meanings, characteristic above all of modern philosophy.

I. NOTION AND HISTORY

Many controversies have arisen concerning the term o. (from ὄν, being, λόγος, discourse), and this philosophical orientation has given rise to various and at times opposing definitions. A. Lalande (Vocab. technique et critique de la philosophie, 5th ed., Paris 1947, p. 699) assigns the term a twofold meaning. In the first sense, o. is “a tendency ontology (v.), understood as the investigation of the characteristics and nature of being in itself or of beings in themselves”; in the second sense, o. refers directly to “the doctrine of V. Gioberti [of the intuitive and immediate knowledge of the First Being], which he opposed to what he called psychologism, that is, the tendency that subordinates being to the idea.” Cuviller, in the preface to the edition of Malebranche’s Entretiens sur la métaphysique (I, Paris 1948), defines o. as “the doctrine of certain philosophers or theologians, especially Italian or Belgian, of the nineteenth century, such as Gioberti, Ubaghs, and the school of Louvain, whose fideistic and anti-intellectualist tendency is the opposite of Malebranche.” Although Cuviller’s critical observations may contain some truth, the effort of the ontologists of the nineteenth century was nevertheless to link themselves with ontologists “before the letter,” and above all with Malebranche.

A nineteenth-century ontologist (J. Sans Fiel, pseud.) states that “the fundamental idea of o. does not consist in the identification of general ideas with God, but in the immediate perception of Absolute Being” (De l’orthodoxie de l’ontologisme modéré et traditionnel, Paris 1869, p. 5), whereas Favre, himself also an ontologist, holds that “the human intellect essentially and immediately reaches Infinite Being itself (not as it is in itself or within itself) and sees in it metaphysical essences or universal ideas...” (Réponse aux lettres d’un sensualiste contre l’ontologisme, ibid. 1864). Favre further relates “the most authentic o. to s. Augustine, s. Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, Dionysius the Carthusian, Bossuet, Fénélon, Leibnitz, and Gerdil.” Gioberti, for his part, recognizes in Malebranche a typical ontologist linked to the tradition of a doctrine that goes back to s. Bonaventure and s. Augustine, and ultimately to Plato, and that subsequently finds representatives in Gerson, Ficino, Tomassin, and Gerdil. The ontologists of the nineteenth century were concerned to defend themselves against the accusation of being dangerous innovators or repeaters of ancient errors; this was the purpose served by the possibility of finding, in earlier Christian thought, indications or even premises of their speculative orientation.

The Neoplatonism (v.) is explained by the fact that o. accepted the doctrine of an intelligible world of ideas known prior to experience, which remains the center of all possible actual knowledge. The appeal to s. Augustine, and then to s. Bonaventure, Roger of Marston, Matthew of Aquasparta, Richard of Mediavilla, and John of Peckham, refers above all to the solution of the problem of knowledge, common in the medieval Franciscan school and founded on Augustinian illumination (v. AGOSTINO). But Malebranche himself, affirming (Recherche de la vérité, bk. III, chap. 6) that mutable and corruptible things are known in God, acknowledges that s. Augustine speaks only of immutable and incorruptible realities. Malebranche nevertheless holds that the Augustinian principle of illumination applies to every reality. The Malebranchian interpretation had already been rejected by s. Thomas, who referred the Augustinian knowledge “in rationibus aeternis” to the certainty and immutability of the first principles, a reflection in the human mind of God’s eternal reason (C. Gent., III, 3). Moreover, s. Augustine himself excluded every ontologist interpretation of his doctrine, denying the vision of the divine essence, granted only exceptionally to very few human beings (cf. Ep., 147 ad Paulinam and De Genesi ad litteram, chap. 27). The Augustinian texts that speak of a contemplation of God attributable to the wise are to be understood as referring to the ordinary way of knowing God, through creatures, even if by means of the ideas that proceed as truths from subsistent Truth (cf. R. Jolivet, Dieu, soleil des esprits, Paris 1934, pp. 56–77).

Gioberti states that his theory of the intuition of real Being finds a point of support in the Irinerarium mentis in Deum. In fact, Bonaventurian expressions do not speak of a personal vision of the essence of God, but rather of a “lumen” present in the human soul, which comes neither from the senses nor from the soul, but from God, insofar as the soul is his image. The vision of the mind through this “lumen” is not a vision of God, but rather of the eternal reasons, seen only as “moventes” the human intelligence: only when elevated to the beatific vision (“in suae charitatis plenitudine et fulgore”) will it be able fully to understand them (cf. also De humanae cognitioni suprema ratione). The interest directed toward various representatives of the medieval Franciscan school in relation to the interpretation they gave to the doctrine of illumination would lead to particular problems of exegetical interpretation that do not concern o. alone. Among the true ontologists of the nineteenth century, the perspective changed radically. Whereas in the attitude of Platonizing or Augustinian currents the issue was rather to delimit the relation that God has to human knowledge, this takes on an entirely different meaning in o., which makes God not merely the medium of knowledge but its first object of knowledge.

The properly ontologist movement had representatives in the nineteenth century in Belgium, Italy, and France. In Belgium it was stimulated by the publication of Gioberti’s work Introduzione alla filosofia (1850) Ubaghs (v.), one of its principal proponents, and in others such as Laforet, Lefebvre, and Boucquillon. In Italy, after Gioberti, Bertini, Puccinotti, Garzillo, and G. Romano should be remembered, as well as V. FORNARI, VITO (v.). T. della Rovere (v.) gave o. a scholastic form. Also cited as representatives of typical o. in Italy are the pp. Francesco and Gaetano Milone and the pp. Di Rignano and Vercellone. The French ontologists included, besides Jean Sans Fiel and Jules Favre, Hugonin, Branchereau, and other lesser figures. In France, o. soon became connected with theological controversies and was opposed especially by the journal Annales de philos. chrétienne and by A. Bonnety (v.).

Malebranche and Gioberti are the principal sources to which one must turn for the study of o. Malebranche’s o. (v.), according to various interpreters, is caught in a dilemma: on the one hand, he affirms that God is known when eternal truths are apprehended; on the other, he declares: “I believe I have proved well that all things are seen in God from this life onward; but this does not mean seeing God or enjoying him” (Traité de la nature et de la Grâce, II discourse, art. XVII). In reality, H. Gouhier observes (La philosophie de Malebranche, Paris 1926, p. 323), M. was unaware of the term and of the reality that one seeks to indicate by speaking of o. For Malebranche, “to see God” and “to be united to him in such a way that nothing can be known except through participation in his light are one and the same.” Proceeding from Augustinian illumination in order to extend its scope, Malebranche would not, however, assign it a meaning that would lead to the affirmation of an intuitive knowledge of God.

Gioberti (v.) ontologism instead assumes a systematized and distinctive character that clearly differentiates his position. “Intuition” is the original act of knowledge. In intuition the human spirit is completely passive. The object of intuition is constituted by the “Idea,” which is neither a concept nor any other created thing or property, but absolute and eternal truth, beyond the human mind: in intuition the union of the mind with truth in itself is achieved, and skepticism and subjectivism are consequently overcome. For this, the idea of possible being as the first object of knowledge (Rosmini) is not sufficient: intuition must therefore refer to real and absolute being. It is consequently impossible to have primitive intuition without knowing that Being is. This reality of Being appears to man as necessary and absolute, although at first in an indeterminate and confused cognition, owing to the finiteness of the spirit. Through “reflection,” not merely psychological but ontological, the object of intuition is determined. Through intuition and reflection the spirit contemplates Being not in its abstractness, but as it really is—that is, as knowing, producing existence, and externalizing its own infinite existence in finite form in its works (“the Being who creates the existent,” Introd. allo studio della filos., I, Capolago 1845, p. 135). Gioberti’s ontologism goes far beyond what has been called Malebranche’s ontologism. The latter’s requirement is above all psychological, or rather epistemological; Gioberti’s is directly metaphysical.

II. PHILOSOPHICAL MEANING

Among the presuppositions of o. (without considering its possible connection with idealism [v.] for which the coincidence of the logical order with the ontological order is essential), one must include the Cartesian derivation of the real infinite from the idea of infinity. This derivation is taken up and developed by Malebranche (Recherche de la vérité, bk. III, part 2, chs. 6 and 10, clarification; cf. H. Gouhier, op. cit., pp. 341–52). In Gioberti, the idea of being is the first and necessary among ideas, and implies existence: the intuition, therefore, of being is that of the necessary Being.

But it is not difficult to expose the inconsistency of these assertions. The idea of infinity is not primary, but derives from the finite reality given in experience; moreover, it is a concept formed through the negation of every limit in perfection and refers to a possible essence. As for the idea of being, it does not possess actual, real infinity, but merely conceptual infinity and is therefore bound to its indeterminacy. O. claims to present as “given” what is instead the fruit of demonstration, in order to avoid a demonstration regarded as superfluous or too liable to objections, given the critical premises concerning the value of human knowledge. In other words, o. presents itself as a misguided attempt to overcome the difficulties inherent in Cartesian epistemology and the objections of Kantian criticism. Certain representatives of modern thought, insofar as they speak of an experience of the divine (Schleiermacher) or of moral values (Max Scheler), resort to a kind of “moral or experiential intuition” of the divine. In this case, however, the use of the term “o.” is foreign to its more precise meaning, which entails a connection between knowledge and God, but one reached intellectually, through the mediation of the idea of Being. The positive background against which o. operates may be identified in the meaning and value possessed by knowledge of the truth as a gnoseological-metaphysical demand for the Absolute.

III. THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS

In its properly philosophical expression, o. closely concerns the rational presuppositions connected with the Revelation. On the other hand, the Church has adopted firm positions condemning o., which passed through various stages.

The principal stages were the condemnation of various works that may be supposed to have been connected with the defense therein of Malebranche’s o. (above all, his works should be recalled: De la recherche de la vérité [placed on the Index, 1680], Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion [placed on the Index, 1712]). Gioberti’s « opera omnia, quocumque idiomata exarata » were condemned (14 January 1852). Some works by Mamiani were also proscribed. The most important document concerning o., however, is the decree of the Holy Office of 18 September 1861, consisting of 7 propositions. Of these, the first five should be recalled above all: the first condemns the proposition according to which « immediata Dei cognito, habitualis saltent, intellectui humano essentialis est, ita ut sine ea nihil cognoscere possit si quidem est lumen intellegibile ». The second proposition refers to the nature of that being which is « in tutte le cose e senza del quale nulla intendiamo » as « essere divino ». The third and fourth propositions insist on the scope of that « congenita Dei tamquam entis simpliciter » cognition which implies within itself every other cognition; the fifth also returns to this point.

The negative evaluation of o. from the standpoint of theodicy is imperative, since not only is the immediate knowledge of God contrary to the teaching of the Church (the Council of Vienne and the Fourth Lateran Council), but o. also scarcely escapes a rationalization of the mystery of God’s nature. By positing intelligible things not in themselves but in God, it furthermore opens the way to pantheism, whereby God is no longer distinct either epistemologically or ontologically, but belongs to the knowledge of the soul, jointly constituting its cause and object. Finally, o. prejudices the distinction between the natural and supernatural orders, insofar as it introduces a direct knowledge of God, which is possible only in the beatific vision. V. also: CONOSCENZA; DIO; IDEALISMO; VERITÀ, etc.

O.N.U.: V. ORGANIZZAZIONE DELLE NAZIONI UNITE.