REFLECTION. – It is the act by which thought takes explicit consciousness of itself, considering the properties, activities, its own objects and contents. Reflection thus effects a “return” (reflectere, to bend back) of conscious life upon itself.
As defined, reflection is the specific activity of intellectual knowledge (cf. St. Thomas, *De verit.*, q. 1°, a. 9; only spiritual substances are “reduci ad essentiam suam reditione completa”). Nevertheless, it does not seem entirely absent from lower forms of consciousness, inasmuch as an initial reflection is conjoined with attention itself (q.v.); Leibniz precisely defines reflection as “une attention à ce qui est en nous” (*Nouv. Ess.*, pref., ed. Flammarion, Paris n.d., p. 13). Yet while in the functions of sensitive life reflection is rather the simple persistence of conscious attention upon data, it has a predominantly passive character and an objective direction, that is, turned solely toward contents, in intellectual life reflection appears as a new activity, has the character of spontaneity, and turns not only to objects but also to the structures of the subject as such. Intellectual reflection is thus qualified according to the various directions and different contents of immediate experience, which constitute its object. When it turns to the forms and processes of consciousness in order to determine psychic laws, reflection is properly called introspection (“retro-spection” if it takes into account past elements of consciousness): introspection (or psychological reflection) examines the acts and structures of consciousness: sensations, feelings, thought; the arising, evolution, and cessation of the various functions; their conditions, causes, circumstances, modalities, purposes, relationships, etc. When instead it unfolds in the direction of mental contents, reflection is called objective (cf. Ch. Wolff, *Psychologia empirica*, § 257; though the terminology is not universally consistent: some would reserve the term reflection for the bending back of consciousness upon its own acts—subjective reflection; cf. A. Lalande, op. cit. in bibliography). Objective reflection is the analysis and penetration of thought into the logical-ontological structures of objects. It investigates the elements and meaning, on the plane of being, of the data of consciousness (their value of necessity-contingency, cause-effect, existence-possibility, etc.: ontological reflection); or else the conditions and properties of mental contents as objects of thought (their value of universality-singularity, opposition, contradiction, subject-predicate, etc.: logical reflection). It is to logical reflection that the “secundae intentiones” of Scholasticism are owed, “quae non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur” (St. Thomas, *In Met. Arist.*, lect. 4°, ed. Cathala, n. 547).
Beyond its philosophical meaning, note should be taken of the common usage of reflection as a prior examination before a judgment (q.v.) or an action, to evaluate, on the practical or moral plane, its suitability, consequences, and effects. It is in this sense, primarily, that one speaks of a “reflective” character and temperament, as opposed to “impulsive.”
In the history of thought reflection has had further systematic references. In Locke (q.v.) reflection “is the knowledge that the soul acquires of its own various operations and their procedures” (*Essay*, Bk. II, ch. 1, § 4): to it are owed all ideas concerning the internal states of the subject: thinking, perceiving, doubting, etc.; more than reflection properly so called, Lockean reflection is therefore equivalent to inner experience. Hume (q.v.) calls “impressions of reflection” the states of consciousness (desire, aversion, fear, etc.) arising not from external causes but from ideas already present in us (*Treatise on Human Nature*, Part I, Sect. 2). In Kant (q.v.) reflection aims to discover the subjective conditions of knowledge: “transcendental reflection” is therefore “the act by which, comparing representations with the faculty of knowledge, one determines whether they belong to pure understanding or to sensible intuition” (*Critique of Pure Reason*, Part 2, Bk. II, ch. 3, Appendix). In Hegel (q.v.) reflection, with metaphysical meaning, is “the relation of spirit to itself,” and consciousness constitutes the degree of reflection of spirit (*Encycl.*, § 413). In Gioberti (q.v.) reflection is the second moment of human knowledge, which appropriates the object of intuition (“the entity creates the existent”), actively expresses it, and actualizes and develops it in the knowledge of things (cf. *Protologia*, I, Turin-Paris 1858, p. 153). In Husserl (q.v.) reflection is “the universal condition of the phenomenological method.” By it, inner events (*Erlebnisse*, present, past, and even future) fall under the “gaze” and observation of the ego. The entire stream of *Erlebnisse* (and reflection itself insofar as it is an *Erlebnis*) can in this way be subjected to scientific study, becomes “verifiable” and “analyzable,” and reveals itself first of all as belonging to the pure ego, inasmuch as this can direct its gaze upon it (*Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie*, I, § 3, ch. 2, § 77 ff.; Italian trans., Turin 1950, pp. 231-50).
Independent of these systematic meanings, reflection has an essential significance in the life of the spirit. It is by reflection that the actuality of the ego (q.v.) as a self-conscious subject is affirmed on the phenomenological plane: only through reflection does inner life become the object of conscious contemplation, and psychic states clarify and define themselves in their structures, meaning, relationships, entering into the active domain of the subject (immediate experience has its own intrinsic presence to the ego as its actualization and activity, but a presence not fully possessed). Reflection is therefore the path by which the spirit achieves true self-evaluation and possession of itself. It is thus an essential condition of philosophy as the science of subject and object, and of every other theoretical knowledge that goes beyond the immediacy of experience. The value of reflection in a theory of knowledge (q.v.) was already noted by St. Thomas, who relates the only possible knowledge of truth, as the conformity of thought to being, to the reflection that the intellect performs upon itself and upon the subjective-objective conditions of its acts: “secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus secundum quod supra seipsum reflectitur” (*De verit.*, q. 1°, a. 9; cf. *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 85, a. 2; q. 12, a. 2, ad 1).
With regard to action, reflection, as prior consideration and deliberation on the moral value of the act, is an element by which its very ethical-personal significance is measured. In this sense reflection thus stands, in its varying degrees of intensity and depth, as an intrinsic condition of human works. Hence also its pedagogical significance: the appeal to awareness and responsibility for one’s own acts, the basis of the human formation of the child, is nothing other than an appeal to conscious reflection on the principles of action, its conformity to the norm (q.v.), and its individual, personal, social resonances.
CATHOLIC REFORMATION. — The Catholic Reformation of the 16th century is the Church’s return to a Christian ideal of life through an inner renewal. It is the premise of the Catholic Restoration, by which the Church, inwardly renewed, turns to the external world to sustain itself against Protestantism and regain the ground lost because of II. The Protestant Reformation did not produce the Catholic Reformation, but indirectly favored it against its own will.
I. ORIGINS OF THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION
After various attempts by the Councils of Constance and Basel to achieve the reform of the Church, deemed necessary for a long time, by altering its constitution and especially by holding general councils that would have superiority over the papacy, several popes of the 15th century—Pius II, Sixtus IV, Alexander VI—ordered reforms of the Roman Curia and the Church in general, but without effect. The true Catholic Reformation did not begin at the head but in the members, therefore not from above, but from below, that is, through the self-reform of its members. Especially the Mendicant Orders worked to restore the strictness of their Rule in their convents, and since they were the great shepherds of souls, they influenced the masses through their great preachers. From the Franciscan Order came Bernardino da Siena, Giovanni da Capestrano, and Giacomo della Marca; moreover, Francesco di Paola founded the Minims; from the Dominican Congregation of San Marco came Antonino da Firenze and Savonarola; among the Germans of the same Order, popular writers like Nider and Herold had great influence; among the Augustinians, reform congregations arose at Lecceto, at San Giovanni a Carbonara, and the Lombard Congregation; among the Carmelites, the Mantuan Congregation. In the Benedictine Order, the Congregations of San Giustina, Valladolid, Chézal-Benoît, and Bursvelde were formed; among the Augustinian Canons, the Congregation of Windesheim, from which came Standonck, the reformer of Saint-Victor in Paris. All these reforms of the late medieval orders were very important for preserving the true Christian spirit both within the convents and outside them. In particular, the Charterhouse of Cologne was the starting point of the Catholic Reformation in Germany.There were also zealous bishops who worked with all their might in their dioceses against deeply rooted abuses. The Italian episcopate produced men like Lorenzo Giustiniani, Antonino da Firenze, Bertini of Foligno, and Barozzi of Padua; in France, the provincial synods of Sens in 1485 and the reformed convent of Tours in 1493 initiated the reform of the secular clergy. From the records of visits to English dioceses, it is clear that religious life there was not languishing at all; the German episcopate presents a long line of reforming bishops, such as Hewen and Randegg in Constance, Ramung in Speyer, Scherenberg in Würzburg, Zollern in Augsburg; and some German princes used papal privileges to promote the reform of the Church, for example, the dukes of Saxony for the reform of convents in 1485. The 15th century was by no means a period of religious decline, as early Protestantism sought to portray it, but a religiously vibrant, indeed restless, era. And the Protestant Reformation exploited this restlessness for its own purposes.
The *Devotio Moderna*, founded in the Low Countries by G. Groote, aimed to model religious life on the example of Christ, and from it emerged the *Fratres vitae communis*, communities of pious laity without vows, which spread through the Low Countries and northern Germany.
The renewal therefore had its origins in the supernatural foundations of the Church itself. The decisive impulse came from Italy and Spain. The terrible end of Savonarola did not prevent his call to penance from being heard by many. Independently of him, reform centers formed in Italy: Bernardino da Feltre founded in Vicenza in 1494 the oratory of San Girolamo. In Genoa, the layman Ettore Vernazza followed with the Oratory of Divine Love (v. Compagnia del divino Amore).
The Oratory at the beginning of the 16th century established itself in Rome, and from it came Gaetano da Thiene and Gian Pietro Carafa, founders of the Order of the Theatines. In Venice, a group of young nobles, almost all laymen, devoted themselves to a severely religious life; two of them, Quirini and Giustiniani, entered Camaldoli, and in 1513 they presented to Leo X a vast memorandum on reform, the most important of the period preceding the Catholic Reformation proper. Also part PATARINI (v.), who, in 1516, still a layman, wrote *De officio episcopi*, which presented the ideal of the apostolic bishop. At the opening of the Fifth Lateran Council, the Augustinian general Egidio da Viterbo maintained as the foundation of the Catholic Reformation that: *Homines per sacra immutari fas est, non sacra per homines*.
Self-sanctification and apostolate were the basic principles on which, in years of war and hardship, Girolamo Miani (v.) ZACCARIA, SANTO (v.), both still laymen, founded the Orders of the Somaschi and the Barnabites.
The Catholic Reformation flourished in Spain through the enthusiasm of the entire people, who had victoriously fought for the liberation of the country from the Moors, a victory crowned by the conquest of Granada under Ferdinand and Isabella. With Isabella’s support, Ximenes de Cisneros and Talavera displayed their reforming zeal; at Valladolid, Alcalá, and Salamanca, religious and especially scholarly studies flourished; from the school of Francisco de Vitoria emerged the great theologians whom Spain sent to Trent. The conversion of the Basque gentleman Inigo de Loyola at Manresa and his *Spiritual Exercises* were destined to give the greatest impetus to the Catholic Reformation.
II. BEGINNINGS OF THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION IN ROME (1534–63)
The individual reforms can be compared to streams flowing from various directions toward the same goal, which could not be united into a single river until the papacy, reached by them, coordinated them. From the Catholic side, reform was desired even before apostasy began in the north. Yet it is undeniable that the latter contributed to the recognition, not only in theory but also in practice, of the need for a radical reform of the Church at its very heart, in Rome. Adrian VI, full of zeal, reigned too briefly for his pontificate to bring about an effective change. Clement VII, though personally blameless, did nothing serious for the Catholic Reformation or the Council. Only Paul III incorporated reform into his program and began to implement it by appointing to the Sacred College some inflexible advocates of the reform party, such as Contarini, Carafa, Pole, Sadoleto, and later Cervini, Monone, Cortese, and others, thus initiating the transformation of the College itself. Since the Council was delayed for political reasons, the Pope, influenced by the delegation for the Catholic Reformation convened at the end of 1536 and by his *Consilium de emendanda Ecclesia*, reformed the curial authorities: though not achieving the goals desired by the best reformers, he gradually eliminated the worst abuses by greater severity, first in the selection of cardinals and bishops. The activity of Gian Matteo Giberti in Verona served as an example to other bishops; now the neglect of the obligation of residence and the accumulation of benefices were recognized as grave abuses, and though full abolition was not immediately achieved, it was nonetheless recognized as indispensable. The growth of the Catholic Reformation in the Mendicant Orders, fostered by superiors like Seripando and Audet, and especially the approval of the Society of Jesus, were further steps toward the Catholic Reformation.In the following period, the decrees of the Council of Trent concerning the Roman Curia were accelerated; in particular, the decree on the obligation of residence for bishops and parish priests (Session VI) combated a series of serious abuses, but their effect was initially limited because they did not come into force without papal confirmation. The attempts by the bishops of Spain and Portugal to spontaneously apply individual decrees, such as that on the reform of exempt chapters, led Julius III to consider enforcing the decrees of the Council of Trent with a major bull on the Roman Curia; consequently, they were to be treated as papal laws on the Roman Curia. However, Julius III died before the publication of the bull *Licet ab initio*.
The pontificate of Paul IV gave decisive impetus to the reform of the Roman Curia both in Rome itself and within the Roman Curia: the reforming element in the College of Cardinals was strengthened by the election of deeply religious men such as Ghislieri (later Pius V), Sottile, and Reumanus; the practice of dispensations was regulated more strictly, and severe measures were taken against apostates from religious orders and offenses against religion.
The reaction against Carafa’s regime under Pius IV did not jeopardize the victory of reform ideas. Pius IV continued the directives of Paul III, reconvening the Council of Trent for the third time in 1561–63.
The reform of the Roman Curia was advanced not only by the promulgation of the decrees at Trent but also by the papacy’s own efforts to ensure their execution, preventing what had occurred at the Fifth Lateran Council, where the decrees remained a dead letter.
### III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ROMAN CURIA REFORM (1563–1620)
The popes’ determination to implement the reform of the Roman Curia was evident not only in the fact that Pius IV sanctioned the decrees of the Council of Trent without alteration (with the bull *Benedictus Deus* of 26 January 1564) but also in the establishment of a congregation of cardinals charged with overseeing the execution of the decrees and providing, from 2 August 1564 onward, their authentic interpretation in cases of doubt—a prerogative previously reserved to the Holy See. Equally significant was the role of the pope’s nephew, Carlo Borromeo, whose apostolic activity as Archbishop of Milan set an example of a reforming bishop and provided, through the decrees of the provincial synods of Milan in 1565 and 1569, a model for the practical application of Trent’s decrees to the concrete needs of dioceses. The living example of Borromeo was no less important for the reform of the Roman Curia than the decrees themselves.
Pius IV’s successors, Pius V and Gregory XIII, rigorously pursued the implementation of the reform, making it a customary practice. Pius V, in particular, fulfilled the tasks entrusted by the Council to the papacy: in 1567, the *Catechismus Romanus* appeared, a dogmatic-moral manual for parish priests; in 1568, the revised *Breviarium Romanum*; and in 1570, the *Missale Romanum*—works that put an end to liturgical arbitrariness and fostered greater unity. Numerous provincial and diocesan synods in Italy, Spain, France, Germany, and Poland ensured the application of Trent’s decrees. To train priests, seminaries were established, beginning with that of Rieti in 1564, followed by the *Seminarium Romanum* in 1565; in 1584, the *Collegium Romanum* was founded, a central university directed by the Jesuits. Apostolic nuncios increasingly took on, alongside their diplomatic duties, the promotion of the reform of the Roman Curia: their numbers were increased, and the nunciatures of Cologne, Brussels, and Graz were established as a result of the reform. Alongside regular nuncios, extraordinary ones also served, such as Ninguarda and Porzia in southern Germany and Austria.
Sixtus V followed his predecessors and completed the work by reforming ecclesiastical administration—an area deliberately left untouched at Trent—and by establishing fifteen permanent congregations of cardinals as supreme administrative authorities.
While the papacy led the reform of the Roman Curia, it simultaneously gathered and coordinated all existing Catholic initiatives so that they formed a single, powerful current. This internal strengthening benefited the papacy itself, enhancing its moral authority. By 1600, at the height of the reform, the pope was far more influential and powerful than a century earlier. Rome had become the center of the Catholic world: whereas in the late Middle Ages it had attracted prebend hunters seeking ecclesiastical benefices, now young men from all nations came to prepare for the care of souls and to study in the universities and national colleges that were gradually emerging. A new flowering of Scholasticism in Rome, Salamanca, and Coimbra—with figures like Bellarmine and Suárez—added to the early great achievements of post-Tridentine theology and Church history: V. e.g., Melchior Cano and Baronio.
Auxiliary forces of the papacy in the execution of the reform were the religious orders, led by the Society of Jesus, whose colleges spread across the entire Catholic world like a dense network and became nurseries of zealous Catholic laity; the Theatines, from whom many capable bishops emerged; the Capuchins, who worked among the masses as missionaries; and the ancient orders, now deeply renewed, which did not lag behind the new ones in zeal or success. The new spirit of the reform manifested itself in a large number of intrepid bishops, among whom Carlo Borromeo, Thomas of Villanueva, and Francis de Sales rose to the honors of the altar. Alongside them stood great spiritual directors such as Philip Neri, John of Avila, and Peter Canisius; Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross united apostolic activity with mystical contemplation. These saints infused the laws with a life-giving spirit and gave the reform of the Roman Curia doctrinal strength.
The reform of the Roman Curia remained active and influential into the 17th and 18th centuries, especially in lands affected by Protestantism. Its greatest flourishing, however, occurred in the 17th century. Strengthened internally, the Church counterattacked Protestantism and sought to reclaim territories lost to it; from the reform of the Roman Curia emerged the Counter-Reformation, often also called the Catholic Restoration.