LOCKE, JOHN. — Philosopher, born 29 Aug. 1632 at Wrington (Bristol) into a Puritan family, died 28 Oct. 1704 at Oates (Essex). He pursued his studies at Westminster College in Oxford, then devoted himself to medicine, though he did not complete his degree nor ever receive a doctorate. Meanwhile, he collaborated assiduously with the works of R. Boyle and Th. Sydenham, and subsequently maintained a close attention to the scientific, physical and physiological studies of his time. Through a bold surgical operation he appeared to save the life of Lord Anthony Ashley, who shortly thereafter became Earl of Shaftesbury. When the latter became Chancellor, he appointed Locke as his secretary, thus affording Locke practical experience in political life as well. These diverse directions of his intellectual cultivation converged in his reflective mind, and in a memorable gathering of friends during the winter of 1670–71, during a discussion on the principles of morality and religion, he conceived the idea of the necessity of a “preliminary inquiry into the powers and objects of human understanding”; from this arose his principal work, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1690). Four editions appeared during his lifetime, along with a French translation by P. Coste, made under Locke’s personal guidance. Of philosophical interest are also the treatise *Conduct of the Understanding* and the lengthy polemic contained in the *Letters to E. Stillingfleet*, Bishop of Worcester, which clarify and elaborate the fundamental points of the *Essay*. The two critical writings entitled *The Theory of Vision in God* by Malebranche also contribute to the understanding of his doctrine. From a series of letters written around 1684–85 to his friend E. Clarke, who had sought his advice on the education of his children, there emerged in 1693 the volume *Some Thoughts concerning Education*, which enjoyed immense success, with several editions appearing immediately; it is, in fact, one of the masterpieces of modern pedagogy. In the same year as the *Essay* (1690), the *Two Treatises on Government* were published, the second of which is the more important and is still widely circulated: it contains the theoretical justification of the new regime and lays the foundations of liberal political doctrine. Notable as well are the writings published between 1692 and 1693 on purely economic questions, concerning money, the interest on money, finance and commerce.
No less resonance among his contemporaries was achieved by his writings on religious questions and the relations between Churches and the State: in 1695 the essay *The Reasonableness of Christianity* appeared, followed by a lengthy controversy; and between 1685 and 1704 he wrote the four *Letters for Toleration*, the first of which, anonymous and in Latin, was published in 1689.
Locke’s epistemology is based on the principle that the mind at birth is a *tabula rasa*: everything it acquires, it acquires through experience. Locke does not deny that the soul possesses an innate faculty of disposition toward knowing in general; he merely insists that its results should not be anticipated, as in innatism. The first book is negative and serves as an introduction to the second, where the origin of ideas is examined positively. This origin is traced to only two sources: sensation and reflection. By the former, Locke means what today is properly called perception, which provides the existence of things outside us; by the latter, beyond the capacity to take the data of sensation as objects of examination (which is the more common meaning today), he includes consciousness of the acts or operations of the mind (perceiving, remembering, comparing, judging, desiring, willing, etc.). He therefore calls these two sources, one “external sense” and the other “internal sense” (a distinction retained by Kant, though for Locke sense and intellect, or rather understanding, are not two distinct faculties).
This fundamental consideration should not be overlooked: while Locke’s starting point is the concrete act of knowing (objective perception), in analyzing this act he resolves it into an aggregate or complex of ideas, which have meaning only subjectively in themselves. Hence arises a continual interplay between these two perspectives, one giving rise to a critical empiricism aimed at clarifying the proper object of experiential knowledge, the other to a subjective idealism that would find its most immediate application in Berkeley and its reduction to skepticism in Hume. Locke’s position, however, is different, and he never doubted the existence of things outside us.
A broad analysis of ideas follows, divided first into simple and complex. Simple ideas are those received either from a single sense, or from multiple senses together, or pertain to the fundamental operations of the mind, or refer to data that are both sensory and reflective. Famous in this section is the distinction between ideas of primary qualities and those of secondary qualities: the former we consider as belonging to the reality of things (extension, solidity, figure, motion, etc.), while the latter (sweet, bitter, hot, cold, etc.) are ideas dependent on our particular bodily constitution. Locke expressly declares that in this he follows the view of the physics of his time.
Complex ideas are divided into modes, substances, and relations: only the complex ideas of substances aim to refer to the reality of things outside us; ideas of modes and relations are our constructions (generally for practical reasons), independent of objective consideration of things. In this section, particular note should be taken of the critique of the idea of substance as a *quid* underlying the qualities and properties of things, which Locke seems to wish to dispense with, declaring it confused and obscure, though in reality he cannot free himself from it because it engages the very existence of things. Also noteworthy is his treatment of the ideas of space, time, cause, identity (here also that of human personality), and others, which would later be subjected to Kantian critique and indeed to all modern philosophy, so that Locke deserves credit for having highlighted them.
In Book III, Locke considers the relation of ideas to the words by which they are expressed. Here ideas, as mere “mental objects,” are all general and more or less abstract, inasmuch as they abstract, to a greater or lesser degree, from the circumstances of time, place, and other singular realities (this abstraction, since there is no intellectual faculty distinct from that of sense, differs from the scholastic notion). Locke is not a nominalist in the medieval sense (of *flatus vocis*), far from it; for him, what matters is the idea expressed by the word. Yet he accords such importance to the question that it seems as if the disparity of opinions and controversies could be reduced to the different uses made of words.
To know is not enough to have ideas: one must also perceive the relations between ideas, their connections. Hence Book IV, no less important than Book II (which is the most widely circulated). It can be divided into three parts. The first concerns absolutely certain knowledge, which occurs when the relation between two ideas is perceived either immediately (in
Locke, John — Portrait.
1. Merry Santa in Compiègne on the feast of All Saints, where an offering of food and goods is made. This feast was organized by a family of citizens who purchased the products of our city and made an offering of food and goods.
2. The feast was organized by a family of citizens who purchased the products of our city and made an offering of food and goods.
The feast was organized by a family of citizens.
He produced versions of several works; in London he purchased and restored the ancient abbey of St Ethelreda, returning its church (of the 13th century) to worship and founding there a residence of his Order.
He was the first of the “Trattariani” to convert to Catholicism, and his return to the Catholic faith made a deep impression on his friend Newman, who shortly afterwards followed his example.
He wrote many pamphlets of a popular nature; he founded and edited the Catholic Opinion, until it merged with the Tablet; noteworthy also are: The Communion of the Saints (London 1868), The Old Religion, or How Shall We Find Primitive Christianity (ibid. 1868), Life of A. Rosmini, 2 vols. (ibid. 1886; the first volume had already been published by G. S. Mc Walter [ibid. 1883]).