**FLOGGING** — From Latin *fustigatio*, a punishment involving the use of rods, switches, or whips made of leather strips. It consists of striking the offender with rods or sticks to punish a crime or to extract a confession. Along with flagellation, it belongs to the category of temporal, corporal punishments (*poenae temporales debellantes*), which are less severe than those that cause permanent harm, such as mutilation or burning, and were never employed by the Church.
For punitive and corrective purposes, flogging was used either as an exercise of magisterial coercion or, under the Empire, as both an independent penalty and an accessory punishment. Mentioned by St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 4:21 alongside other temporal penalties, it was applied in the Church especially after the 7th century due to Roman and barbarian influence. It was even practiced against clerics and monks (cf. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 19, 17; 21, 11; Council of Venice [a. 165], canon 13; Council of Agatho [a. 567], canon 41; Council of Germany [a. 742], canon 6). It is also addressed in the Decree (8, D. 45; 6, C. 11, q. 1) and in the Decretals (1, X, 5, 2). However, canonists in their doctrine and the Church in its practice progressively restricted its use over time, until it fell into disuse after the Council of Trent and virtually disappeared from civil legislation following the French Revolution.
As a form of torture employed by judicial authorities to extract confessions from accused persons, flogging was commonly applied by the Greeks and Romans, particularly against slaves, to compel truthful statements. In the Middle Ages, it was widely practiced across European states. It also found its way into ecclesiastical practice, as it was routinely used in secular tribunals. St. Augustine praised the tribunal of Marcellinus for resorting to flogging to obtain confessions from the Donatists (*Ep. 133*; PL 32, 509). Nevertheless, the Church consistently sought to eliminate such a barbaric method in criminal proceedings, as evidenced by a response of Pope Nicholas I to the Bulgarians (*F. Labbé, Concilia*, VIII, col. 544) and by the decree of Gratian cited above. However, the revival of Roman law studies in the 13th century led jurists to advocate the use of torture, and this practice was reintroduced into ecclesiastical tribunals. It was Innocent IV who, with the bull *Ad extirpanda* (15 May 1252), permitted a milder form of torture—consisting of flogging and beating (*flagellatio et fustigatio*)—to extract confessions and denunciations, citing the urgent necessity of effectively and swiftly eradicating heresy, which had become a grave danger to the Church and society. Yet, no civilized people could (at least in theory) resort to such measures to compel truth. The *Codex Iuris Canonici* now stipulates that an offender cannot be forced to confess his crime (*can. 1473 § 1*).
The historical use of such penalties to extract confessions, even in ecclesiastical tribunals, is explained by the mentality and exigencies of the times, for it is not intrinsically evil. Moralists hold that such a means, however violent and perilous, may be licit when the public good demands the condemnation of the accused, and when the evidence against him, though insufficient to prove his guilt with certainty, renders it sufficiently probable.
However, such methods are no longer permissible when positive law excludes them; hence, even police forces, which are bound to observe the law, cannot continue to employ them. The same applies to flogging as a penalty. When certain nations have abolished it or have subscribed to international conventions against corporal punishments, they may not continue to use such penalties within their territories.
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