Freedom of Jesus Christ

FREEDOM OF JESUS CHRIST. - Free will (v. LIBERTÀ) is an essential property of an intellectual or rational nature.

I. CATHOLIC DOCTRINE

It is of faith (Vatican Council, sess. III, chap. 1: Denz-U, 1783) that God enjoys full freedom with regard to creation; evidently he cannot not will himself. Jesus Christ as God realizes these two principles in himself (v. Dio). But the question arises concerning the freedom of Jesus Christ insofar as he is Man. In principle there can be no doubt: since the Word assumed an integral and perfect human nature (v. INCARNAZIONE; UNIONE IPOSTATICA), it could not lack freedom or free will, which is an essential property of that nature. But the problem becomes complicated by the particular conditions in which Jesus Christ finds himself: he is the very Person of the Word, who subsists in the divine nature and in the human nature. His will and his human activity are proper to the Word and directed by it, and therefore it is impossible that they should deviate in the slightest from the line of the true and the good. Hence the impeccability of Christ, which is corroborated by two other sources: the fullness of sanctifying Grace and the habitual beatific vision, which prevented in him any moral imperfection, even the slightest deviation from God.

In such conditions, how could Christ enjoy that active indifference with respect to the object, which is the characteristic of a free will? The difficulty becomes more evident and more acute if one considers the human will of Jesus with respect to the precepts of the natural law and much more with respect to the positive precept of the Father, who willed the redemption of the world through the death on the Cross of the God-Man. That even before the precept of the Father, Jesus Christ was free, is a truth of faith, as is deduced from the explicit doctrine of the Church concerning the merit of the Savior (Council of Trent, sess. VI, chap. 7 and can. 10: «sua sanctissima Passione in ligno crucis nobis iustificationem meruit»), taking into account the other truth, opposed to Jansenius, according to which in order to merit, internal freedom is necessary (libertas a necessitate), which is the true freedom (3rd proposition of Jansenius condemned by Innocent X; Denz-U, 1094).

This perfect freedom Christ himself attributes to himself in energetic terms (Io. 10, 17 ff.): «Propterea me diligit Pater, quia ego pono animam meam ut iterum sumam eam. Nemo tollit eam a me, sed ego pono eam a meipso et potestatem habeo ponendi eam, et potestatem habeo iterum sumendi eam». The Fathers, often commenting on the text of Is. 53, 7 «Oblatus est quia ipse voluit» (whose interpretation is debated today), unanimously affirm the freedom of Jesus Christ with respect to death on the Cross. St. John Damascene echoed this (De fide orthodoxa, 3, 13), who from the two natures of Christ deduced «duas naturales arbitrii libertates». In these words resounds the principle defined by the Church against the Monothelites (v.) in the Third Council of Constantinople (years 680-81), namely that in Christ there are two wills because there are two natures, the one and the other with their respective properties, without confusion and without division (Denz-U, 292).

II. THEOLOGICAL DISCUSSIONS

The human freedom of the Redeemer throughout his earthly life, and especially in the bloody epilogue of Calvary, cannot be called into doubt. How this freedom is to be reconciled with the impossibility in which Christ found himself of disobeying the Father is a problem that theologians, even today, seek to resolve by various paths.

1. Objective path

This is bound up with the way of interpreting the word precept (ἐντολή), a Gospel word which, according to some theologians, is not to be taken in its proper sense but in a metaphorical sense, and therefore would signify not a true command of the Father but his indeterminate good pleasure, which left to Christ's human will the choice of the precise manner of dying, a choice later ratified by the Father with absolute will (Franzelin). Others (Billot) admit that the Father's will as good pleasure was absolute before the choice made by Christ, but since it was not expressed in the form of a true and proper precept, it did not impede the freedom of Jesus Christ, just as it did not constrain the free will of the Jews who killed him. Others (Vásquez) maintain that the Father's precept concerned death but not the circumstances of place and time, which were therefore the object of free choice. Others finally (De Lugo) believe they save the freedom of Jesus Christ by saying that the precept to die was such that he could have asked the Father to be dispensed from it.

All these opinions, besides being artificial, are arbitrary and contradicted by the text and context of the Gospel, where ἐντολή means precept in the proper sense, whose absolute value is confirmed by Jesus as the Father's envoy (John 10:18; 14:31; 17:4). On the other hand, such opinions do not resolve the question of the freedom of Jesus Christ in the face of the precepts of the natural law, which are true and cannot be set aside.

2. Subjective path

The precept was the expression of the absolute divine will, which the soul of Jesus knew clearly through the beatific vision; yet in the face of it, as in the face of the natural law, Christ preserved his human freedom intact. This is the opinion common to Thomists and Molinists, who differ only in the way they resolve the fundamental difficulty, namely the apparent contradiction between freedom and an ineluctable precept, made more acute by Christ's impeccability, deriving from the hypostatic union, from the fullness of grace and from the beatific vision.

a) Impeccability in relation to the hypostatic union does not pose great difficulty, because union with the Word did not take away from the humanity the absolute physical possibility of sinning, but absolutely required that there be no moral possibility of sinning, and much less a sinful act. This moral impossibility of sinning, a reflection of God's own impeccability, did not impair freedom and was already assured by the hegemony of the Word over the activity of the assumed nature. St. Thomas, In III Sent., d. 12, q. 2, a. 1 states: «Anima eius et corpus fuerunt quasi organum Deitatis... Unde non poterat peccatum attingere ad eius animam, sicut nec Deus potest peccare». On this motive, however, he no longer insists in the Sum. Theol., 3ª, q. 15, where he speaks of Christ's impeccability. Among modern Thomists, cf. F. Diekamp, Theol. dogm. manuale, II, Paris-Rome 1933, p. 302 ff.; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, De Christo Salvatore, Turin 1945, p. 324 ff.; L. Molina does not admit any operative influence of the Word on the assumed nature; F. Suárez and L. Lessius concede more and make the hypostatic union the root and remote, intrinsic cause of impeccability. Among modern Molinists, cf. Ch. Pesch, De Verbo Incarnato, Freiburg im Br. 1922, n. 322 ff.

b) But the proximate cause of the impeccability of Christ as Man is the fullness of grace and of the supernatural gifts. Thomists and Molinists agree in affirming that God bestowed so much grace and so much aid upon the soul of Jesus as to render sin morally impossible for it, but they disagree on the nature of the influence of efficacious grace. It is well known that Molinists explain the action of grace by simultaneous concurrence and middle knowledge, while Thomists explain it by physical predetermination (v.); both, however, maintain that human freedom remains intact under the influence of grace, even efficacious grace, and they adopt this same solution with regard to Christ. According to Molina and his followers, God, having decreed the death of Jesus for the Redemption, explored his human will with middle knowledge and in the light of it prepared those inspirations and impulses of grace to which the Redeemer's will would certainly and freely correspond by infallibly obeying the precept to die on the cross. According to St. Thomas and his disciples, God influenced Christ's human will with intrinsically efficacious grace so as to determine it infallibly to obey; under this determination, however, Christ's will remained free, as does that of every man moved by grace. If Thomists are asked how freedom, which is an active indifference ad multa, is preserved when the will is determined by God ad unum (in this case: to observe the precept to die), they have recourse to the celebrated divided sense and composed sense: the impeccable Christ could not disobey, given the Father's precept and the efficacious grace to observe it (in the composed sense); but he could disobey, prescinding from predetermining grace; freedom would remain assured by this power not to obey, which, however, could not pass to act, given the divine motion. As a rule Thomists believe they preserve freedom even in those who are confirmed in grace, such as the Apostles after Pentecost, as also in the Virgin Mary and even in the blessed, provided that the object proposed to the free will is not God himself, the Supreme Good, but some particular good. And they cite St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., 3ᵃ, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3: «Voluntas Christi, licet sit determinata ad bonum, non tamen est determinata ad hoc vel ad illud bonum; et ideo pertinet ad Christum eligere per liberum arbitrium confirmatum in bono, sicut ad beatos». But here the problem is resolved in a generic way; the difficulty returns almost in its entirety when Christ's will is placed before the precise will of the Father (which it cannot contradict) and under the determining motion of grace. It is true that the precept in itself, as an intrinsic element, removes only moral freedom, inasmuch as it limits one to doing one thing by forbidding its omission or the doing of the contrary; but psychological freedom as well seems compromised, both through the effect of the hypostatic union and, much more, through the influence of intrinsically efficacious grace. St. Thomas once (In III Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 2), under the weight of this precise difficulty, wrote: «Vel dicendum quod si etiam esset determinatum ad unum numero, sicut ad diligendum Deum, quod non facere non potest, tamen ex hoc non amittit libertatem aut rationem meriti sive laudis, quia in illud non coacte, sed sponte tendit et ita est actus sui dominus». These words have given occasion to a certain modern theologian (De Baets) to think that in order to resolve the problem of the freedom of Jesus Christ one must limit the concept of freedom to the spontaneous and conscious movement of the will, which remains intact even under the action of efficacious grace, because in this case the will tends infallibly toward the object, but without coercion, whether extrinsic or intrinsic. This opinion is not to be confused with the error of Jansenius, who believed he could reconcile freedom with a psychological necessity equivalent to a blind internal coercion.

c) But perhaps the greatest difficulty against the freedom of Jesus Christ comes from the beatific vision, which his soul habitually enjoyed. The blessed adhere to God with their will indissolubly, so much so that the Thomists exclude freedom from this adherence and speak of necessity. In the face of a precept of the Father, it is not understood how Christ, who was in the condition of the blessed, could have been free. Various attempts have been made to resolve this grave difficulty. The Thomists distinguish in Christ two loves, one necessary, determined by the intuitive vision of the divine essence, the other free, according to the light of infused knowledge. Christ obeyed freely in the second mode (Ferrarese, Soto, John of St. Thomas and others). Some theologians, however, have believed it more fitting to explain the two loves according to their object, distinguishing in God, and therefore in Jesus Christ, the love of the divine goodness as a motive for loving creatures: the first of these loves is necessary; the second is free (Salmanticenses).

But one may observe, with Billot, that the theory does not serve the purpose, because Christ's human will is one and simple, and therefore if it is bound by the bond of necessary love, it cannot at the same time be said to be unbound by the fact that it is not necessarily bound by the other love. And one may also add that the comparison between the love God has for himself and for creatures and the love with which the soul of Jesus adheres to the one and to the others is out of place. In short, this solution, substantially accepted also by Molina (Concordia, q. 14, disp. 53) and by his followers, fails to win the understanding. The Scotists start from the principle that the beatific vision does not of itself entail a necessitating loving adherence ab intrinseco; the blessed one would adhere to God infallibly through the extrinsic influence of Providence, and therefore would remain intrinsically free. A profound opinion, which leads back to the one emphasized above concerning the concept of freedom reconciled with an infallible adherence to the object through the effect both of efficacious Grace and of the beatific vision. Others (Cano) hold that during the Passion the beatific vision in Christ underwent a suspension or at least an attenuation, which made freedom possible. But this opinion borders on the absurd.

III. CONCLUSION

The multiplicity and diversity of the attempts made to find a way of solution demonstrate that one is faced with something mysterious, which transcends the capacity of the human mind. It is the mystery of the Hypostatic Union (v.), which is reflected in all the sectors of the being and activity of the God-Man. Setting aside theological systems, it must be said that the difficulty lies not in one point rather than another, but in the complexity of the elements that concur therein: Hypostatic Union and consequent impeccability, Grace, beatific vision. But above all account must be taken of the singular condition of Christ, comprehensor and wayfarer at once, and therefore he must not be equated with the blessed who are already in heaven. This duality of physical and psychological condition at least attenuates the difficulty raised against freedom by reason of the beatific vision.

St. Thomas says so openly (Sum. Theol., 3ᵃ, q. 19, a. 3, ad. 1): «Nec tamen per caritatem meruit (Christus) inquantum erat caritas comprehensoris, sed inquantum erat viatoris, nam fuit simul viator et comprehensoris» (ibid., q. 15, a. 18). Let it be further borne in mind that, according to the same St. Doctor (Sum. Theol., 3ᵃ, q. 18, a. 4, ad. 3 cited above), every soul confirmed in good by Grace, and even by the beatific vision, retains the exercise of its freedom with regard to particular goods, even though these are in relation to the Supreme Good: «Et ideo pertinet ad Christum eligere per liberum arbitrium confirmatum in bono, sicut ad beatos». Finally, however efficacious it may be, divine Grace never does violence to human freedom, and therefore in the soul moved by Grace there remains freedom, not only as pure potency (in the «divided» sense), but also as actual spontaneity and consciousness of movement, even though under the gentle impulse of Grace itself. Much less is this fundamental reason for freedom compromised by a precept, which, unlike Grace, acts from without. The saint, who submits his will entirely to the law of God, under the mysterious but luminous action of Grace, obeys and knows that he obeys, follows the interior impulse with full consciousness and joyful spontaneity, and therefore preserves the mastery of his own action and is freer than one who, detached from God, blindly follows the passions along the paths of evil.

Pietro Parente