FREEDOM OF JESUS CHRIST. — Free will (v. LIBERTÀ) is an essential property of an intellectual or rational nature.
I. CATHOLIC DOCTRINE
It is a matter of faith (First Vatican Council, sess. III, chap. 1: Denz-U, 1783) that God enjoys full freedom with regard to creation; evidently, he cannot fail to will himself. Jesus Christ, as God, realizes these two principles in himself (v. Dio). But the question concerns the l. of G. C. insofar as he is Man. In general terms there can be no doubt: since the Word assumed an integral and perfect human nature (v. INCARNATION; HYPOSTATIC UNION), he could not lack freedom or free will, which is an essential property of that nature. But the problem becomes more complicated because of the particular conditions in which Jesus Christ finds himself: he is the very Person of the Word, who subsists in the divine nature and in the human nature. His human will and activity belong to the Word and are directed by him, and therefore cannot deviate in the slightest from the line of truth and goodness. Hence Christ’s impeccability, which is corroborated by two other sources: the fullness of sanctifying Grace and the habitual beatific vision, which prevented in him any moral imperfection, even the slightest deviation from God.Under such conditions, how could Christ enjoy that active indifference toward the object which is the characteristic of a free will? The difficulty becomes more evident and acute if one considers Jesus’ human will in relation to the precepts of natural law, and much more so in relation to the positive commandment of the Father, who willed the redemption of the world through the death on the Cross of the God-Man. That Jesus Christ was free even in the face of the Father’s commandment is a truth of faith, as is deduced from the Church’s explicit doctrine concerning the Savior’s merit (Council of Trent, sess. VI, chap. 7 and can. 10: «sua sanctissima Passione in ligno crucis nobis iustificationem meruit»), bearing in mind the other truth, opposed to Jansen, according to which internal freedom (libertas a necessitate) is necessary for merit, and that this is true freedom (the 3rd proposition of Jansen condemned by Innocent X; Denz-U, 1094).
Christ himself attributes this perfect freedom to himself in emphatic terms (Io. 10, 17 ff.): «Propterea me diligit Pater, quia ego pono animam meam ut iterum sumam eam. Nemo tollit eam a me, sed ego pono eam a meipso et potestatem habeo ponendi eam, et potestatem habeo iterum sumendi eam». The Fathers, often commenting on the text of Is. 53, 7 «Oblatus est quia ipse voluit» (whose interpretation is debated today), unanimously affirm the l. of G. C. in the face of death on the Cross. s. John Damascene echoed this (De fide orthodoxa, 3, 13), deducing from Christ’s two natures «duas naturales arbitrii libertates». These words echo the principle defined by the Church against the Monothelites (v.) at the Third Council of Constantinople (A.D. 680–81), namely, that in Christ there are two wills because there are two natures, each with its respective properties, without confusion and without division (Denz-U, 292).
II. THEOLOGICAL DISCUSSIONS
There can be no doubt about the human freedom of the Redeemer throughout his earthly life, and especially at the bloody culmination on Calvary. How this freedom is to be reconciled with the impossibility in which Christ found himself of disobeying the Father is a problem which theologians are still seeking to resolve by different paths.1. Objective approach. - This is connected with the manner of interpreting the word precept (ἐντολῆ), an evangelical term which, according to some theologians, should not be taken in its proper sense, but metaphorically, and would therefore signify not a true command of the Father, but his indeterminate good pleasure, which left Christ’s human will free to choose the precise manner of dying, a choice subsequently ratified by the Father through an absolute will (Franzelen). Others (Billot) admit that the Father’s will as good pleasure was absolute before the choice made by Christ; but since it was not expressed in the form of a genuine precept, it did not impede the l. of G. C., just as it did not compel the free will of the Jews who killed him. Others (Vásquez) maintain that the Father’s precept concerned death, but not the circumstances of place and time, which were therefore the object of free choice. Finally, others (De Lugo) believe that they preserve the l. of G. C. by saying that the precept to die was such that he could have asked the Father to be dispensed from II.
All these opinions, besides being artificial, are arbitrary and contradicted by the text and context of the Gospel, where ἐντολῆ means precept in its proper sense, whose absolute force is confirmed by Jesus as one sent by the Father (Io. 10:18; 14:31; 17:4). Moreover, these opinions do not resolve the question of the l. of G. C. in relation to the precepts of the natural law, which are true and not subject to dispensation.
2. Subjective approach. - The precept was the expression of the absolute divine will, which Jesus’ soul knew clearly through the beatific vision; nevertheless, in relation to it, as in relation to the natural law, Christ preserved his human freedom intact. This is the common opinion of the Thomists and Molinists, who differ only in the manner of resolving the fundamental difficulty, namely, the apparent contradiction between freedom and an unavoidable precept, made more acute by Christ’s impeccability, deriving from the hypostatic union, the fullness of Grace, and the beatific vision.
a) Impeccability in relation to the hypostatic union presents no great difficulty, because union with the Word did not remove from the humanity in the absolute sense the physical possibility of sinning, but absolutely required that there be no moral possibility of sinning, much less the sinful act itself. This moral impossibility of sinning, a reflection of God’s own impeccability, did not impair freedom and was already secured by the hegemony of the Word over the activity of the assumed nature. S. Tommaso, In III Sent., d. 12, q. 2, a. 1, states: «Anima eius et corpus fuerunt quasi organum Deitatis... Unde non poterat peccatum attingere ad eius animam, sicut nec Deus potest peccare». He does not, however, insist further on this motive in the Sum. Theol., 3ª, q. 15, where he discusses Christ’s impeccability. Among modern Thomists, cf. F. Diekamp, Theol. dogm. manuale, II, Paris-Rome 1933, pp. 302 ff.; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, De Christo Salvatore, Turin 1945, pp. 324 ff.; L. Molina admits no operative influence of the Word upon the assumed nature; F. Suárez and L. Lessio concede more and make the hypostatic union the root and remote, intrinsic cause of impeccability. Among modern Molinists, cf. Ch. Pesch, De Verbo Incarnato, Freiburg in Br. 1922, n. 322 ff.
b) But the proximate cause of the impeccability of Christ the Man is the fullness of Grace and of supernatural gifts. Thomists and Molinists agree in affirming that God
bestowed such abundant Grace and such assistance upon Jesus’ soul as to render sin morally impossible for it, but they disagree concerning the nature of the influence of efficacious Grace. It is known that the Molinists explain the action of Grace through simultaneous concurrence and middle knowledge, whereas the predetermination (v.); both, however, maintain that human freedom remains intact under the influence of Grace, even efficacious Grace, and apply this same solution to Christ. According to Molina and his followers, God, having decreed the death of Jesus for the Redemption, examined his human will through middle knowledge and, in its light, prepared those inspirations and impulses of Grace to which the Redeemer’s will would certainly and freely have responded, infallibly obeying the precept to die on the cross. According to s. Tommaso and his disciples, God acted through intrinsically efficacious Grace upon Christ’s human will in order to determine it infallibly to obey; under this determination, however, Christ’s will remained free, just as the will of every person moved by Grace remains free. If the Thomists are asked how freedom is preserved—freedom being active indifference ad multa—when the will is determined by God ad unum (in this case, to observe the precept to die), they resort to the celebrated distinction between divided sense and composite sense: Christ, being impeccable, could not disobey, given the Father’s precept and efficacious Grace for observing it (in the composite sense); but he could disobey, abstracting from the predetermining Grace; freedom would be secured by this power not to obey, which nevertheless could not pass into act, given the divine motion. In general, the Thomists believe that they preserve freedom even in those who are confirmed in Grace, such as the Apostles after Pentecost; like the Virgin Mary and even the blessed, provided that the object proposed to the free will is not God himself, the Supreme Good, but some particular good. And they cite s. Tommaso, Sum. Theol., 3ᵃ, q. 18, a. 4, ad. 3: «Voluntas Christi, licet sit determinata ad bonum, non tamen est determinata ad hoc vel ad illud bonum; et ideo pertinet ad Christum eligere per liberum arbitrium confirmatum in bono, sicut ad beatos». Here, however, the problem is resolved only in a general way; the difficulty returns almost in its entirety when Christ’s will is placed before the precise will of the Father (which it cannot contradict) and under the determining motion of Grace. It is true that the precept in itself, as an intrinsic element, removes only moral freedom, insofar as it limits it to doing one thing by forbidding its omission or the opposite action; but psychological freedom also seems compromised, both by the effect of the hypostatic union and, still more, by the influence of intrinsically efficacious Grace. S. Tommaso once (In III Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 2), under the weight of this precise difficulty, wrote: «Vel dicendum quod si etiam esset determinatum ad unum numero, sicut ad diligendum Deum, quod non facere non potest, tamen ex hoc non amittit libertatem aut rationem meriti sive laudis, quia in illud non coacte, sed sponte tendit et ita est actus sui dominus». These words prompted a certain modern theologian (De Baets) to think that, in order to resolve the problem of the l. of G. C., the concept of freedom must be restricted to the spontaneous and conscious movement of the will, which remains intact even under the action of efficacious Grace, because in this case the will tends infallibly toward the object, but without coercion, whether external or internal. This opinion must not be confused with the error of Jansenius, who believed that freedom could be reconciled with a psychological necessity equivalent to blind internal coercion.
c) But perhaps the greatest difficulty against the liberty of Jesus Christ arises from the beatific vision, which his soul habitually enjoyed. The blessed adhere to God indissolubly through their will, so much so that the Thomists exclude liberty from this adherence and speak of necessity. In the face of a command from the Father, it is not understood how Christ, who was in the condition of the blessed, could have been free. Various attempts have been made to resolve this grave difficulty. The Thomists distinguish in Christ two loves: one necessary, determined by the intuitive vision of the divine essence; the other free, according to the light of infused knowledge. Christ obeyed freely in the second manner (Ferrarese, Soto, Giovanni da S. Tommaso, and others). Some theologians, however, have thought it more appropriate to explain the two loves according to their object, distinguishing in God—and consequently in Jesus Christ—the love of divine goodness as the motive for loving creatures: the first of these loves is necessary; the second is free (Salmanticesi).
But it may be observed, with Billot, that the theory does not serve the purpose, because Christ’s human will is one and simple; therefore, if it is bound by the bond of necessary love, it cannot at the same time be said to be free because it is not necessarily bound to the other love. It may also be added that the comparison between the love God has for himself and for creatures and the love with which the soul of Jesus adheres to the one and to the others is out of place. In short, this solution, substantially accepted also by Molina (Concordia, q. 14, disp. 53) and his followers, fails to gain acceptance. The Scotists begin from the principle that the beatific vision does not in itself entail a necessitating amorous adherence ab intrinseco; the blessed would adhere infallibly to God through the extrinsic influence of Providence and would therefore remain intrinsically free. This is a profound opinion that brings us back to the one mentioned above concerning the concept of liberty reconciled with an infallible adherence to the object through the effect both of efficacious Grace and of the beatific vision. Others (Cano) hold that during the Passion the beatific vision in Christ underwent a suspension or at least an attenuation, which made liberty possible. But this opinion borders on the absurd.
III. CONCLUSION
The multiplicity and diversity of the attempts made to find a solution demonstrate that we are confronted with something mysterious, transcending the capacity of the human mind. It is Hypostatic Union (v.), which is reflected in every sphere of the being and activity of the God-Man. Leaving theological systems aside, it must be said that the difficulty lies not in one point rather than another, but in the complexity of the elements that converge here: the Hypostatic Union and the consequent impeccability, Grace, and the beatific vision. Above all, however, account must be taken of Christ’s singular condition, at once comprehensor and wayfarer; he must not therefore be equated with the blessed who are already in heaven. This duality of physical and psychological condition at least lessens the difficulty raised against freedom on the grounds of the beatific vision.St. Thomas states this openly (Sum. Theol., 3ᵃ, q. 19, a. 3, ad. 1): «Nec tamen per caritatem meruit (Christus) inquantum erat caritas comprehensoris, sed inquantum erat viatoris, nam fuit simul viator et comprehensoris» (ibid., q. 15, a. 18). It should also be borne in mind that, according to the same holy Doctor (Sum. Theol., 3ᵃ, q. 18, a. 4, ad. 3 cited above), every soul confirmed in goodness by Grace, and even by the beatific vision, retains the exercise of its freedom with regard to particular goods, although these stand in relation to the Supreme Good: «Et ideo pertinet ad Christum eligere per liberum arbitrium confirmatum in bono, sicut ad beatos». Finally, however efficacious it may be, divine Grace never does violence to human freedom; therefore, in the soul moved by Grace, freedom remains, not only as a pure potency (in the «divided» sense), but also as actual spontaneity and awareness of movement, even under the gentle impulse of Grace itself. Still less is this fundamental basis of freedom compromised by a precept, which, unlike Grace, acts from without. The saint, who entirely submits his will to the law of God under the mysterious yet luminous action of Grace, obeys and knows that he obeys; he follows the interior impulse with full awareness and joyful spontaneity, and thus retains mastery over his own action and is freer than one who, detached from God, blindly follows the passions along the paths of evil.