Political Freedoms

POLITICAL FREEDOMS. — These are the most immediate practical applications of the principle of freedom in a truly democratic State, that is, one which recognizes the right of all citizens to participate in the government of public affairs through representatives.

1. Individual freedom, whereby no one may be arrested or brought to trial except in the cases provided for by law, and in the forms prescribed by II. 2. Freedom of domicile. No search of a home by the public forces may take place except within the limits indicated above. 3. Freedom of movement. Every citizen may change domicile, move about, and travel as he wishes, provided that he respects public order. 4. Freedom of petition. Every citizen has the right to address the Chamber by presenting individual or collective petitions, in the forms regulated by law. 5. Freedom of election. The formalities for electing the representatives of the people must be established by law, and citizens’ security in proceeding with complete freedom to make their choice must be guaranteed. It is clear that one of the best safeguards is the secret ballot. Public discussion on the matter and propaganda must also be free. 6. Freedom of assembly and association. Citizens may assemble peacefully and without weapons, in the forms required by public order. They may form associations among themselves, provided that these are not secret. This right is annulled if the purpose pursued by the associations is immoral and contrary to the fundamental principles of the State’s constitution; or if it appears that the members abuse their association, lawful in itself, for unlawful purposes. Judgment in this matter should be given not by the ordinary courts, but by the Supreme Court established to safeguard the essential rights of citizens against possible violations by the power of the State. An example of the inconsistencies of governmental liberalism in the last century was the suppression and dispersal of the religious Orders, in which one of the very rights most loudly proclaimed by liberalism itself was violated, namely, the freedom to associate for lawful purposes: nothing was more lawful than to associate for the purpose of one’s sanctification. Governments sought to justify themselves by appealing to the State’s right to grant or withdraw juridical personality according to its own criteria, that is, at its own discretion; they failed to see that it was precisely in such uncontrolled discretion that the absence of true liberalism lay.

7. Freedom of thought and of the press. Citizens exercise their intelligence without depending on the State in their various cultural, scientific, and philosophical activities, and they may not be disturbed in the exercise of such activities or in their expression, orally or in print, except by the ordinary laws protecting morality and public order and by particular laws intended to repress specific abuses of the press. This freedom, like the freedom of religious propaganda, may constitute a danger to the detriment of

truth, which in its private and public manifestations is thereby reduced to the same level as error. The danger is highlighted by the Syllabus, no. 79, and it would be foolish to deny II. To maintain that the State has the same obligations toward error as toward truth would be absurd; but in practice this kind of freedom is understood as a toleration, a permission of something that in itself may be an evil, in view of a greater good: the greater good would be to avoid the danger of despotism on the part of a human authority, such as the State, and to stimulate the spontaneous forces of good to combat and conquer evil by themselves, without placing too much reliance on governmental assistance. The risk always remains, and it is generally inherent in the system of freedoms. For a more accurate examination of freedom of the press and its concrete implementation in Italy, V. STAMPA, libertà di.

8. Freedom of education (v. MUTUO INSEGNAMENTO).

9. Freedom of conscience and worship

Individual convictions concerning religion, the profession of one faith or another, and the practice of one form of worship or another may not constitute an impediment to the possession and exercise of all civil and political rights recognized by the Constitution. This principle is accepted by modern States, which therefore are no longer “confessional,” even if they officially declare that a given religion is the “religion of the State.” If this were interpreted as approving “indifferentism” toward the various religions, as though they were all equally good, one would fall under the condemnation of the Syllabus (nos. 77, 78, and 79). But this principle may be understood only as the State’s abstention from examining and judging the consciences of individuals, something altogether inadvisable in the present historical circumstances and always dangerous, as past experience demonstrates. Nevertheless, the State remains obliged not only to guarantee the true freedom of the individual citizens’ religious profession, but also to promote, by means within its competence, religious action as a factor in the spiritual elevation of individual human persons and of the entire nation. The State must not “ignore,” under the pretext of freedom, the religion of its citizens; rather, in legislation and government, it must ensure that it does nothing that could violate their religious conscience, as happens when it claims to impose civil marriage as true marriage upon Catholics, whereas for them it is an article of faith that the only true marriage is the Sacrament. Freedom of worship also has limits, insofar as the State cannot tolerate rites contrary to natural morality, such as sacred prostitution and human sacrifice.