Voluntas

VOLONTÀ. – It is the faculty of tending toward the universal good, proper to spiritual creatures.

I. PHILOSOPHY

Once known by the intellect, universal good or happiness becomes the object and principle of the v., which sets the other faculties and itself into operation for its attainment through a series of acts whose fulcrum freedom (v.).

The originality of the V. and its emergence have been contested by materialist philosophy in its various forms, insofar as it reduces voluntary aspirations to associative processes of elementary instincts, phenomena of social pressures, etc. The introspective investigations of Denkpsychologie deserve the credit for having demonstrated the irreducibility of volitional functions to lower tendential functions and for having regarded them as the autogenous nucleus in the formation of personality (cf. A. Willwohl, Seele und Geist, in Mensch, Welt, Gott, part 4, Freiburg im Br. 1938, pp. 139 ff.). Just as intelligence is the faculty of truth, that is, of judgment concerning the objective reality of things in themselves, so the V. good, or rather the tendential principle that moves the spiritual being toward the conquest of values, toward what constitutes the perfection (real or supposed) of being itself, with a view to its ultimate fulfillment, which is perfect happiness or absolute good. The dynamism of the spiritual being therefore belongs to the v.; just as instinct and sensitive appetite are the propulsive principles in lower life, so the V. is so for the intellectual sphere, insofar as it is spiritual appetite and the supreme principle of the subject’s perfection (cf. Sum. Theol., 1°, 16, 1). The third moment of the dynamism of the V. is the “communication” or diffusion beyond itself of the good possessed and enjoyed, by which the spiritual being inserts itself and its own life into the world, affirming values within the limits of its own sphere and possibilities (ibid., 1°, 16, 2). This dynamism of the V. is stimulated (in man) first by the sensitive appetite and its passions, and then, from above, by the intellect, which proposes the ultimate end and the proportion of the means to the end that ought to be pursued for the real attainment of the end itself, because the object of the V. is good as it is in reality (ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν: Aristotle, Metaph., VI, 4, 1027b 25).

The correspondence of intellect and V. in the complete human act follows this itinerary: 1) Acts concerning the end, a) the “simplex boni apprehensio” is followed by the “simplex boni volitio”; b) the “iudicium proponens finem” by the “intentio finis.” 2) Acts concerning the means, a) the “consilium proponens media” by the “consensus”; b) the “consilium discretivum mediorum” by the “electio.” 3) Acts concerning execution, a) the “imperium” by the “usus activus”; b) the “usus passivus potentiarum usque ad adeptionem finis” by the final “fruitio” (cf. Sum. Theol. 1°-2°, spec. 99. 8-17). In the structure of human action, if the intellect is the finalizing principle insofar as it conceives good as the ultimate end and apprehends the means and orders them toward the attainment of the end, so that “totius radix libertatis est in ratione constituta” (St. Thomas, De ver., q. XXIV, a. 2), it is to the V. that the function of efficient principle belongs, “eo quod voluntas comparatur ad res secundum quod in seipsis sunt,” and “agere et moveri convenit rebus secundum esse proprium quo in seipsis subsistunt”; and finally because the V. is therefore, like every appetite, the principle of movement that binds things according to the inclination proper to it, in order to realize and attain the good of the subject (ibid., q. XXII, a. 12). Finally, it is through the V. that the total cycle of being is completed, insofar as, while in the static-formal order the intellect embraces and comprehends the V. good, the V. in turn, in the dynamic-effective order, can move and dominate the same intellect together with the other powers and even itself (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ, q. 82, a. 4; De ver., loc. cit.). Indeed, when examining the intimate requirement arising from the presence of absolute good as perfect happiness and its radical appeal to the finite spirit, one must admit a certain priority of a transcendental nature of the V. intelligence, even though intelligence offers it in concrete terms the principles and the actual framework of its striving: for, if “omnis actus voluntatis procedit ab aliquo actu intellectus, aliquis tamen actus voluntatis est prior quam aliquis actus intellectus; voluntas enim tendit in finalem actum intellectus qui est beatitudo” (Sum Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 4, a. 4 ad 2; cf. q. 9, a. 1 ad 3). From this it can be understood how, from the dynamic point of view, the most adequate and complete form of spiritual immanence is that of the v., insofar as it contains within itself the principle, the means, and the term of its own action, as well as of the other faculties subject to consciousness. Thus its own activity as a tendency toward the good, in the actual determination of the ultimate end and in the choice of the means, cannot suffer any violence, constraint, or imposition from anyone whatsoever, even though it may be impeded in the external use of such means (ibid., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 6, a. 4). In the fullness of its dominion over the tendency toward the end, the V. of the finite spirit is moved directly by God as by the first cause through a “divine instinct,” according to the saying of Aristotle (Eth. Eudem., VII, 14, 1248 a. 14, cited in Sum. Theol., loc. cit., q. 9, a. 4), insofar as God, who is being and goodness by essence, must at the same time be the first cause and the ultimate end of whatever possesses being and goodness by participation (ibid., a. 6). It is clear that this first motion of the V. God, who moves “scut universalis motor ad universale obiectum voluntatis quod est bonum et sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle,” must be distinguished from the second motion (or “application” of the secondary cause to concrete action), which concerns the particular choice when “homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc illud vel quod est vere bonum vel apparens bonum,” and above all must be distinguished from the special motion, which belongs properly to the supernatural order of Grace (ibid., ad 3 and finally: q. 109, a. 6; q. 112, a. 1).

È chiaro pertanto che il «volontario» (ἐκούσιον) non è riducibile a semplice spontaneità biologica (determinismo naturalistico) e neppure a mera esecuzione del giudizio dell'intelligenza (determinismo razionalista) come affermò Socrate riducendo il peccato ad ignoranza (cf. Aristotel, Eth. Nic., VII, 3, 1145 b. 25), ma scaturisce dal dominio attivo che la V. esercita, come facoltà della persona umana integrale, sopra l'essere in vista del conseguimento del fine: perciò la V. si attua in forma originale nella «scelta» (ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται: Eth. Nic., III, 4, 1111 b. 6), pur tenendo fermo il principio: ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλεσις γίνεται (De an., III, 9, 432 b. 5). Mi nella posizione aristotelica, in questo distacco dall'intellettualismo socratico, rimane l'incertezza di riconoscere fino in fondo l'originalità della V. in quanto in essa rimase incerto se attribuire la decisione (imperium) all'intelletto oppure alla V. (διό ἡ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὀρεξις διανοητικὴ [Eth. Nic., VI, 2, 1139 b. 4)). Un notevole progresso nella terminologia e nella stessa dottrina è stato realizzato nella teologia del Verbo incarnato, prima con la distinzione di βούλησις e ζήτησις esposta da Nemesio (De natura hominis, attribuito dai medievali e da s. Tommaso a s. Gregorio di Nissa: cf. B. Domaski, Die Psychologie des Nemesius [Beiträge zur Gesch. d. Philos. d. Mittel., III, 1], Münster in V, 1900, p. 142 sgg.) e poi con la distinzione introdotta dal Damasceno di τέλησις e βούλησις (cf. De fide orthodoxa, I, II, cap. 22: PG 94, 944), che è la «voluntas ut natura» e la «voluntas ut ratio» di s. Tommaso (cf. Sum Theol. 3ᵃ, q. 18, a. 3). Se quindi il momento costitutivo della V. (voluntas ut natura) è quello della tendenza al bene universale qual'è appreso libertà (v.) è dato dall'indifferenza della V. rispetto al bene particolare finito (voluntas ut ratio), in realtà la V. comporta un'emergenza reale su ambedue i momenti. Anzitutto nella tendenza al fine, in quanto precisamente ad essa compete l'aspira-

zione alla «felicità» o bene supremo che è la prima ragione del desiderare (...τάγαθόν, οὐ παντ' ἐγείτεται: Eth. Nic., I, 1, 1094 a. 3) come anche dell'agire (ὡς οὐ ἕνεκα: Aristotele, Metaph., V, 2, 1013 a. 33); poi, nell'atto stesso della «scelta», in quanto l'indeterminazione dell'ultimo giudizio dell'intelletto circa il bene particolare non è superata o vinta che per l'iniziativa della V. libera come impegno e responsabilità personale rispetto a quei beni il cui conseguimento dipende «da noi», onde c'è precisamente una scelta (τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Cf. Eth. Nic., III, 4, 1111 b. 30; 6, 1113 a. 9), nell'alternativa dell'attrazione contrastante del bene e del male (cf. Eth. Nic. III, 7, 1113 b. 15). Sembra allora che per Aristotele, a differenza della tradizione posteriore aristotelica e di alcune interpretazioni dello stesso tomismo, la V. rivendichi rispetto all'intelletto l'originalità completa della propria iniziativa in quanto nella sfera tendenziale essa ha il principio (prossimo) dell'azione in se stessa come facoltà della tendenza del fine (cf. M. Wittmann, Die Ethik des Aristoteles, Regensburg 1920, p. 97 sgg.).

In questo senso l'intellettualismo socratico ricompare nell'etica stoica che identifica l'essere con l'esistente, mentre Epicuro, riprendendo la προαίρεσις aristotelica introduce la «declinazione» degli atomi per salvare la V. dalla necessità del fato: come per Aristotele, anche per Epicuro, esiste la contingenza così che di due proposizioni contrarie, relative al futuro, non è vero che l'una debba considerarsi vera e l'altra falsa (De interpr., 9, 18 a. 28 sgg.; cf. Aristotele, Eth. Nic., III, 3, 1111) perché ambedue restano in sé contingenti. Di qui lo spinglio aperto per Epicuro della «declinazione», grazie all'iniziativa della V. com'è celebrata da Lucrezio: «...fatis avulas voluntas. Declinamus item motus nec tempore certo Nec regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens» (II, 261 sgg.; cf. C. Diano, La psicologia di Epicuro e la teoria delle passioni, Firenze s. d., p. 87 sgg.).

Le controversie sulla V. nel pensiero medievale e moderno acuiscono la contesa sull'essenza della libertà e dipendono, con maggiore consapevolezza che non nel pensiero greco, dalla concezione dell'essere spirituale considerato nel suo rapporto a Dio e impegnato per risolvere il problema della sua origine come dell'esodo finale del suo essere.

BIBLI: A. Michel, s. V. in DThC., XV, coll. 3322-87; R. Eister, s. V. in Wörterb. a. philos. Begr., III, 4ᵃ ed., Berlino 1930, p. 551 sgg.; L. Schütz, s. V. in Thomas-Lexikon, 2ᵃ ed., rist., Nuova York 1947, p. 880 sgg.; J. Deferrari-M. I. Barry-J. Mc Guinness, s. V. in A Lex. of st. Thomas A., Baltimore 1949, p. 1179 b. sgg. Per il problema psicologico: H. Münsterberg, Die Willenshandlung, Friburgo in Br. 1888; W. Wundt, Grundzüge d. physiol. Psychol., 4ᵃ ed., Lipsia 1911, parte 3ᵃ, p. 221 sgg.; J. Lindworsky, Der Wille, 2ᵃ ed., ivi 1923 (con ricca bibl.). Per la scuola gestaltista: W. D. Ellis, A source book of gestalt. psychol., Londra 1938, p. 283 sgg. (studi di K. Lewin e B. Zeigarnik. Cf. C. Fabro, La fenomenologia della percen., Milano 1941, p. 302 sgg.); W. Metzger, Psychologie, Dresda e Lipsia 1941, pp. 186 sgg., 226 sgg., 279 sgg.; M. Pradines, Traité de psychol. générale, II, II, Parigi 1948, p. 342 sgg. Esposiz. della dottrina tomista: A. Sertillanges, St. Thomas d'A., II, 4ᵃ ed., Parigi 1925, p. 206 sgg.; J. Rehmke, Das Wollen, Greifswald 1926; M. Wittmann, Die Ethik des Hl. Thomas V. A., Monaco 1933, pp. 73-162; M. Reding, Philosoph. Grundlegung der kath. Moraltheol., in Handb. d. Moraltheol., I, Monaco 1953, p. 26 sgg. Storia: J. Nep. Espenberger, Grund u. Gewissheit des übern. Glaubens in d. Hoch-u. Spätscholastik, in Forsch. z. christl. Liter. u. Dogmengesch., XIII, 1, Paderborn 1913, spec. pp. 6-71; O. Dietrich, Gesch. der Ethik, 3 voll., Lipsia 1926, cf. s. V. nei rispettivi indici di ciascun vol.; E. Gilson, L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale, II, Parigi 1932, p. 65 sgg.; trad. it., Brescia 1947, p. 186 sgg.; O. Lottin, Psychologie et morale au XIIᵉ et XIIIᵉ siècle, I, Lovanio 1942 e III, ivi 1949, passim; Th. Steinbüchel, Existentialismus u. christliches Ethos, Heidelberg 1948; Th. Haecker, Metaphysik des Fühlen, Monaco 1950; E. Schwartz, Ethik der Griechen, ed. W. Richter, Stoccarda 1951.

II. PATHOLOGY OF THE V

With regard to the v., rather than a genuine psychological process, what is involved is the dynamic potential that translates thoughts and feelings into acts, following deliberation and decision by the intellect; it is impossible to conceive and describe the V. as an isolated function without correlation and integration with the other psychic activities. The V. intervenes in the totality of conscious human life as a free and determined spiritual choice; upon it depends the acceptance or rejection of the influence exerted by certain tendencies, representations, or feelings upon our activity. Human dignity, responsibility, and freedom must be sought exclusively in the fact that man can adopt a different position in relation to phenomena in the endothemic sphere, and in relation to experiences of a pathic character (Ewald’s biotone), restraining or inhibiting some of them and allowing others to reach complete development: this is possible because man is endowed with thought and with a V. Here lies the entire anthropological significance of willing, when it is understood as a faculty granted exclusively to man, by virtue of which he is distinguished from animals, which possess only instincts and lack responsibility.

In the exercise of the v., quantitative and qualitative disturbances may be distinguished schematically and only in certain respects.

1. Quantitative disturbances: a) Diminution of the V. (hypobulia, abulia): these may affect all or some of its qualities and processes. In ordinary language, the word «abulia» (v.) denotes something very general and imprecise: laziness, doubt, and indecision in the execution of acts; slowness, insecurity, and ideational apraxia; lack of inhibition in the face of automatic reactions. In other words, any diminution in the individual characteristics of the V. term, which thereby loses its precise psychopathological value. One may distinguish, with sufficient approximation, a constitutional abulia (v. PSICOPATICHE PERSONALITÀ) and an acquired one: the latter is often consecutive to states of organic weakness (exhaustion), as occurs in convalescents, or to lesions of certain cerebral centers, as is frequently observed in postencephalitic patients and those with cranial trauma. Constitutional abulia, on the other hand, is observed in those psychopathic personalities described as «weak-willed» and «devoid of will» (the properly so-called abulics [K. Schneider]): these are subjects who, while retaining intact intelligence and ideation, show a more or less marked deficiency in the various volitional processes: the individual knows what he ought to will and desires what he ought to desire, but cannot will and does not decide to do anything, generally dominated by feelings of shyness and inferiority. Compulsion, anancasm, and obsession might, at first sight, appear to be disturbances of the v.; in reality, they constitute a typical disturbance of thought, recognized as parasitic and absurd, from which the subject cannot free himself however hard he tries (v. PSICOSI OSSESSIVA). Of very complex origin, but already closer to a disturbance, sensu lato, of the v., is the impulsive act (impulse to move, act, or speak), which, experienced by many even under entirely normal psychic conditions, may become the principal characteristic of certain abnormal personalities, precisely called impulsive. The familiar schizophrenic abulia consists rather in a special form of apathy, arising from an absence of interest in the external world, blunting of affectivity (athymia), and autism (v. SCHIZOFRENIA). Various classifications of the abulias have been attempted; but this specific symptom complex is difficult to reduce to a unified conception. The inadequacy of the best-known of these classifications, that of P. Janet (v.), is evident, for example; he distinguishes systematized, localized, and generalized forms. Systematized abulia would be the impotence of the V. with reference to a particular act, e.g., getting up or writing; localized abulia would indicate the inability to perform certain particular movements, e.g., raising the head or an arm; generalized abulia would refer to any execution of volitions, whether motor or involving thought (slowness in execution, insufficient discipline of thought, superficiality of judgment).

b) Increase of the v.; this is called hyperbulia and refers to an increase in tendencies and impulses, rather than to the energy of the V. in carrying out acts. In certain cases, the increase in tendencies and inclinations drives the subject’s V. to the performance of rash acts, without there being any increase in rational volition. An increase in the energy of the V. proper, although constitutional in certain personalities, is generally the result of education rather than a pathological characteristic. Some understand hyperbulia as the result of excitation of all cerebral functions, as observed in psychomotor excitation, oneiroid deliria, and other analogous morbid states; episodic increases in volitional impulses, leading to explosive acts or violent, disordered activity, are sometimes observed in certain acute psychoses, owing to the pathological increase of the feeling of power.

2. Qualitative disturbances: a) Volitional ambivalence is said to occur when the normal oscillations of deliberation are pathologically increased, constantly arising for trivial reasons and manifesting themselves in absolute indecision.

b) The term executive abulia is used, albeit improperly, when the subject is perfectly aware of his desire but finds it enormously difficult to set the voluntary executive mechanisms in motion.

c) Bradibulia: this is typically observed in postencephalitic states; it consists in a marked slowness of the v., which proceeds in parallel with general bradypsychism: volitional impulses are greatly attenuated and slow to unfold, but once the initial resistance has been overcome, the patient can perform the act, especially if muscular rigidity is absent. Continuous stimulation is necessary.

d) Negativism, a symptom characteristic of catatonic syndromes, is regarded by many as a disturbance of the v., dependent upon the fact that a pathological countercommand, much more powerful, is associated with the motor impulse; in reality, it is a disturbance in the psychophysical transformation of «erleben» (Bormann), an alteration of psychomotor integrations. A distinction is made between active negativism, in which the patient does the opposite of what he is ordered to do, and passive negativism, in which the blocking of the V. inability, mutism, sitophobia, immobility, absence of spontaneity, and failure to obey commands. Clearly distinct from negativism must be the so-called opposition, which is a symptom characteristic of anxious states and refers to images and affects that can be influenced by persuasion; according to some (Nàgera), opposition would originate in pantophobia; it is evident, however, that this is not a primary disturbance of the V. A typical form of opposition is that of certain hallucinated melancholics who do not wish to free themselves from their sadness in response to hallucinatory commands.

e) Schizophrenic dissociation has, debatably, been subsumed by some under the so-called volitional ataxia: the patient acts in a manner different from or contrary to what he wants; this disturbance, in relation to Stranski’s intrapsychic ataxia, seems rather to belong among those complex disturbances of psychophysical transformations recently studied by Bormann.

f) Classical is the influencing of voluntary action, that sense of «artifice», of something unnatural, which accompanies the diminution or disappearance of the feeling of the self, the phenomenological expression of the schizophrenic disturbance of depersonalization.

g) Ad esso si può parzialmente riallacciare l'obbedienza automatica: il soggetto esegue immediatamente gli atti ordinati, per esagerata suggestionabilità, senza intervento della libera spontaneità delle volizioni. Secondo alcuni si tratterebbe di un disturbo più affettivo che volitivo; c'è comunque un indice di influenzabilità suggestiva variabile individualmente e per molti fattori esterni (v. IPNOTISMO; SUGGESTIONE).

Tra i disturbi della v., sensu lato, si può anche annoverare la cosiddetta doppia V. degli isterici: una v., chiaramente cosciente, vuole guarire, ed è degna di fede; l'altra v., senza alcun rapporto con la prima, resiste con tutte le sue forze (Kretschmer). Si parla anche di V. verso

la malattia, come di una tendenza epitimica allo sviluppo dei sintomi, per raggiungere uno scopo più o meno cosciente (v. PSICONZUSOSI [da indennizzo]).

Un problema di grande importanza per le sue conseguenze morali e giuridiche è quello riguardante la libera determinazione della V. delinquente; si tratta in realtà di una questione di fatto empirica, che non può essere giudicata e risolta secondo convenzionali regole fisse. Una diagnosi di psicopatia, come tale, non potrà mai escludere la libera determinazione della v., che potrà essere stabilita solo con l'analisi individuale del fatto (Rauch), analisi che va condotta con «esprit de finesse» e non con «esprit de géométrie», sia dal giudice che dal confessore.

III. EDUCATION OF THE WILL

The subject and the sound choice of suitable means for the education of the will acquire a quite particular importance from the fact that today people are not accustomed to speak so much of “duties”—which would nevertheless constitute a constant and vigorous stimulus to the strengthening of the volitional energies—as rather of “rights,” independence, and autonomy, which generally mature into allowing oneself to be carried along by the current, a feverish search for the minimum of effort, with the fatal consequence of a more or less total passivity in facing the impact of the unfortunately real difficulties of life, and of creating persons too weak to renounce even one of their desires.

And the danger receives a disastrous impetus from the flaunting of high-sounding principles: enthusiasm for an intense life, an impulse toward a life lived fully and recklessly; when, in reality, these principles are nothing other than a thin coating covering the lack of will, its submissiveness before external stimuli and even more before internal ones, which are more lively and pulsating, especially during the period of development.

Instead of surrendering to one’s own ego, one must acquire and preserve mastery over it, following it when it tends toward the good and denying it when it yearns for what is bad or harmful. This is not easy, as is generally thought, but imperatively demands effort and courage, to the point of saying with V. Alfieri: «Volli, sempre volli, fortissimamente volli», without, however, following him in having oneself tied to a chair so as not to yield and evade a difficult and boring study.

To educate the will fruitfully, one must begin from two observations: as a power of choice, free will entails the concept of indivisibility: one either chooses or does not choose; however, if one considers the circumstances accompanying the negative or positive choice, and the effort presupposed by it, both because of the intrinsic difficulty of the action to be performed and because of the free agent’s innate or acquired tendencies, one observes that choice may be more or less facilitated or rendered difficult, and therefore that an infinity of degrees may be found both in the sphere of ease and in that of difficulty.

On these considerations is based the method of the education of the will, which, besides being profoundly studied by psychological pedagogues, was insinuated into the asceticism of Christianity.

2. WILL AND INTELLIGENCE

Since the will always presupposes the work of the intelligence, which presents to it the motives favorable and contrary to action, weighs them, and invests them with attractiveness or repulsiveness, it is clear that intelligence can strongly influence the use of free will, enlarging or restricting its field. Indeed, one chooses only what one knows and to the extent—whether exact or erroneous—to which one knows II. The child is less responsible than the adult precisely because he possesses only rudimentary knowledge; besides, how often do we reproach ourselves: if I had known, I would not have acted thus!

The will can therefore be educated if the intelligence is accustomed to recollect itself, to consider things well and inwardly, and to assign them their proper value. This meditative reflection leads the intelligence to a gradual victory over suggestions and tendencies, to formulate and strengthen the guiding principles of conduct, forming the person who knows what he wants and is conscious in every act of its end and means. Nor does this encourage that habitual indecision which forms part of abulia; for meditative reflection must be rapid and ready. When, in fact, one says, “reflect before acting,” this does not mean that the mind should linger in doubt and postpone action, but that the mind must acquire the habit of reflection, so that this may rapidly conclude the synthesis of the motives that form the antecedent of the action.

3. WILL, FEELINGS, AND TENDENCIES

Whoever wishes to opt decisively and consistently for duty must not merely know it and see its compelling favorable motives, but must also love it and make all the strength of his feelings, all the propulsive force of his tendencies and inclinations, converge toward it; the greater the flame thus kindled, the more energetic the decision will be. Light and warmth are therefore necessary; the former illuminates, the latter kindles and gives wings; for this reason one also speaks of the feeling of duty and not only of the idea of duty. If duty is understood coldly as the imperative of an absolute and categorical maxim, it is difficult to embrace it, and opportunities to avoid it are more readily sought; or at least it requires a will already firmly constituted and exercised, and consequently an intellectual development sufficient to make one feel, always and in every circumstance—even when one might get away with it—that mastery of oneself and obedience to the universal law are matters of human dignity; in short, it requires mental maturity. Yet duty must be practiced even before such maturity has been attained, or when it is lacking; hence the necessity of resorting to various feelings and relying on various tendencies capable of being transformed into propulsive forces (e.g.: the feeling of healthy self-esteem, of proper emulation, of honor, of love for the family and the homeland, of reward—above all, eternal reward and supernatural happiness; the tendency to excel, the ambition to succeed, etc.).

4. WILL AND HABIT

The great law of habit has an extraordinary influence on the education of the will. One learns to will by willing; one increases one’s tendency toward duty and the ease of carrying it out by observing II. “Learn to will” is the most effective maxim to inculcate. The effectiveness of exercise is acknowledged in all other fields: in school instruction, physical education, the study of music and languages; but in the field of volitional energy people are reluctant to admit it, contrary to the positive results of experience itself. This is a serious error, sometimes having irreparable consequences, and it leads to an abulic, empty life, unbearable for the subject himself and often also to crime because of the more or less total lack of control over the passions.

This treatment of the will may be direct or indirect, and both are absolutely necessary. For direct treatment, the maxim applies—so strongly inculcated by Christian asceticism—that offense is the best defense. Whoever passively awaits the assault of natural impulses and evil tendencies cannot help but succumb.

to their impetuous and virulent force. Borders are defended with weapons at the ready: likewise, the lowest self within us, that is, the self of instincts and passions, must be prepared to obey the higher and spiritual self through decisive interventions and by undertaking voluntary exercises that stimulate self-mastery, even in the spheres of what is lawful and honorable. For example: the instinct for thirst, food, and sweets offers numerous opportunities for self-command through abstinence, and it is easy to inspire even children with enthusiasm for this kind of emancipation and transcendence, demonstrating to them that this victory is transformed into a higher life and greater energy, prepares them to endure the various vicissitudes of life worthily, and above all increases their strength to the point of heroism. Why should parents, teachers, and educators not introduce their children and pupils to the secrets of this holy war of emancipation, and, as the occasion arises, encourage them to give up a favorite food, generously overcome laziness, endure pain, cold, and discomfort; to break bad habits so that they may learn to regard as a noble tradition of their own organism, to be kept ever alive and intact, the principle that the spirit must compel the body and its desires to obey? Likewise, the energies of the V. are effectively strengthened by practicing the maintenance of order in one’s belongings, silence, rising early, sincerity in speech, consistency in one’s actions, absolute respect for the property of others, and the exact performance of unpleasant tasks or duties that others seek to avoid. In addition, gymnastics, sports, and games played together train one in promptness of movement, decisiveness, and vigilance; the very rules of etiquette, when observed always and with amiable ease, constitute a constant exercise in the most effective self-mastery.

Foerster calls attention to the fact that even among primitive peoples similar exercises of the V. are regarded as an essential part of adolescents’ preparation for their passage into the ranks of adult warriors, after puberty. Since the laws governing relations between the sexes are strict and complicated and therefore require great self-mastery, young people are trained for several months in serious renunciations of every kind and in the control of their desires: for example, they must be content with meager and ordinary food, keep a knife, bow, and arrows beside them, but not use them even when prey is within reach; they must endure various sufferings, even atrocious ones, without showing signs of pain. This is a sign that nature itself teaches them the unmistakable tendency not to abandon the natural impulse to itself, but to prepare it in good time for observance of the moral law (cf. The education of the v., in Pedagogia e vita, 14 [1953], pp. 337–343).

Consequently, the best practice is that suggested by W. James: “Keep alive in yourselves the faculty of effort through a small, harmless daily exercise; that is, be systematically heroic every day in small, unnecessary things; every two or three days do something for the sole and simple reason that it is difficult and you would prefer not to do it, so that when the grim hour of danger and need strikes, it will not find you enervated and ill-prepared” (op. cit. in the bibliography, p. 180).

Naturally, in order that these exercises may produce their full effect, they must be founded upon judgments of value that take hold of the subject according to age, environment, and character. This is precisely the task of the indirect treatment of the v., which, as has already been mentioned, acts upon the intellect and the feelings: furnishing the mind with clear and accurate ideas, removing every confused and base feeling from the heart, cultivating healthy affections and generous, disinterested tendencies, and finally forming a high conception of our responsibility toward the family, the country, and our neighbor, by reflecting that our actions follow us and leave serious consequences in ourselves and in others.

In this sphere the Christian religion reaches the highest peaks, because it teaches not only that every act of renunciation strengthens the power of the V. for the moment of trial; those individual acts of asceticism also possess a value all their own: in fact, in the supernatural order they acquire an infinite value, which is transformed into merit, mercy, and good for the person who performs them and for all humanity. Hence the pedagogical importance of the so-called “little bouquets.”

But what of “intense life,” “life in its fullness”? Modern literature continually proclaims, under the pretext of strengthening personal life, an exaggerated cult of pure and simple natural individuality and an abhorrence of every renunciation, as though it were a diminishment and an impediment to full flourishing. But this is contrary to every sound pedagogy, as well as to daily experience, because it neglects the true element of personal life, which is the transcendence of natural individuality through the struggle against instincts and evil tendencies. This is, ultimately, the admonition of Jesus Christ to his disciples: “If the grain of wheat, placed in the earth, does not die, it does not produce the ear that will gladden the table.” One cannot develop what is truly worthy in man unless one masters and subdues what he carries within himself that is unworthy. The two exercises—that of the centers of movement and that of the centers of inhibition—are equally necessary and of the greatest importance, because only in this way does man, from the center of his nature, react to the stimulus of temptation and succeed in becoming the master rather than the mastered by peripheral excitations. For this reason, in speaking of education of the v., one cannot remain silent about the Spiritual Exercises of s. Ignatius of Loyola, which, in the final analysis, do nothing other than put to the test the actual strength of the V. acquired through exercise.