VOLONTA

VOLITION. — It is the faculty of tending toward the universal good, proper to spiritual creatures.

I. Philosophy

Once known by the intellect, the universal good or happiness becomes the object and principle of volition, which sets in motion the other faculties and itself for its attainment through a series of acts whose focal point lies in the moment of freedom (q.v.).

The originality of volition and its emergence have been contested by materialist philosophy in its various forms, inasmuch as it reduces voluntary aspirations to associative processes of elementary instincts, to phenomena of social pressures, etc. It is to the credit of the introspective investigations of Denkpsychologie that they have demonstrated the irreducibility of volitional functions to lower tendency-functions and have regarded them as the self-originating nucleus for the formation of personality (cf. A. Willi-vol, Seele und Geist, in Mensch, Welt, Gott, part 4, Freiburg in Br. 1938, pp. 139 ff.). Just as the intellect is the faculty of the true, i.e., of judgment concerning the objective reality of things in themselves, so volition is the faculty of the universal and perfect good, or rather the tendency-principle that moves the spiritual being to the conquest of values toward that which is the perfection (real or supposed) of the being itself with a view to its ultimate fulfillment, which is perfect happiness or absolute good. Volition therefore belongs to the dynamism of the spiritual being; just as instinct and sensitive appetite are the propulsive principles in lower life, so volition, in the intellectual sphere, is the spiritual appetite and the supreme principle of the perfection of the subject (cf. Sum. Theol., 1a, 16, 1). A third moment in the dynamism of volition is the communication or diffusion outside itself of the good possessed and enjoyed, by means of which the spiritual being inserts itself and its own life into the world, affirming values within the limits of its own sphere and possibilities (ibid., 1a, 16, 2). This dynamism of volition is solicited (in man) first by sensitive appetite and its passions, and then from above by the intellect, which proposes the ultimate end and the proportion of means to the end that must be followed for the real attainment of the end itself, because the object of volition is the good as it is in reality (τὸ πρᾶγμα: Aristotle, Metaph., VI, 4, 1027b 25).

The correspondence of intellect and volition in the complete human act follows this itinerary: 1) Acts concerning the end, a) to the simple good belonging to oneself, the "simplex boni volitio," b) to the "iudicium proponens finem," the "intentio finis"; 2) Acts concerning the means, a) to the "consilium proponens media," the "consensus," b) to the "consilium discretivum mediorum," the "electio"; 3) Acts concerning execution, a) to the "imperium," the "usus activus," b) to the "usus passivus potentiarum usque ad adceptionem finis," the "fruitio" (cf. Sum. Theol. 1a-2ae, esp. 9-17). In the structure of human action, if the intellect is the finalizing principle inasmuch as it conceives the good as the ultimate end and apprehends the means and arranges them for the attainment of the end, so that "totius radix libertatis est in ratione constituta" (St. Thomas, De ver., q. XXIV, a. 2), it is to volition that belongs the function of the efficient principle, and "quod voluntas comparatur ad res secundum quod in seipsis sunt" and "agere et moveri convenit rebus secundum esse proprium quo in seipsis subsistunt"; and finally because volition is, as every appetite, the principle of movement that binds things according to the inclination proper to them to realize and attain the good of the subject (ibid., q. XXII, a. 12). It is through volition, finally, that the total cycle of being is completed, inasmuch as, while in the static-formal order the intellect embraces and comprehends volition as the faculty of the good, volition in turn, in the dynamic-effective order, can move and dominate even the intellect itself with the other powers and even itself (Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 82, a. 4; De ver., loc. cit.). Indeed, scrutinizing the intimate exigency of the presence of absolute good as perfect happiness and its radical solicitation with respect to finite spirit, one must admit a certain transcendental priority of nature of volition and its proper dynamism with respect to the intellect, even if the intellect offers it in concreto the principles and the real framework of its own tending: for, if "omnis actus voluntatis procedit ab aliquo actu intellectus, aliquis tamen actus voluntatis est prior quam aliquis actus intellectus; voluntas enim tendit in finalem actum intellectus qui est beatitudo" (Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 4, a. 4 ad 2; cf. q. 9, a. 1 ad 3). Hence it is understood how, from the dynamic point of view, the most adequate and complete form of spiritual immanence is that of volition, inasmuch as it contains within itself the principle, the means, and the term of its own action, as well as of the other faculties subject to consciousness. Thus its own activity as a tendency toward the good, in the real determination of the ultimate end and in the choice of means, cannot suffer any violence, constraint, or imposition from anyone, even if its external use of such means may be impeded (ibid., 1a-2ae, q. 6, a. 4). In this fullness of its dominion in the tendency toward the end, the volition of finite spirit is moved directly by God as the first cause through a "divine instinct," according to the saying of Aristotle (Eth. Eudem., VII, 14, 1248 a 14, quoted in Sum. Theol., loc. cit., q. 9, a. 4), inasmuch as God, who is being and good by essence, must at the same time be the first cause and the ultimate end of all that has being and good by participation (ibid., a. 6). It is clear that this first motion of volition by God, who moves... "sicut universalis motor ad universale obiectum voluntatis quod est bonum et sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle," must be distinguished from the second motion (or "application" of the second cause to concrete action) that concerns particular choice when "homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud vel quod est vere bonum vel apparens bonum," and above all must be distinguished from the special motion, which is proper to the supernatural order of Grace (ibid., ad 3 and finally: q. 109, a. 6; q. 112, a. 1).

It is therefore clear that the “voluntary” (ἐκούσιος) cannot be reduced to mere biological spontaneity (naturalistic determinism) nor to the mere execution of the judgment of the intellect (rationalistic determinism), as Socrates maintained by reducing sin to ignorance (cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic., VII, 3, 1145 b 25). Rather, it springs from the active dominion that the will exercises, as a faculty of the integral human person, over being with a view to attaining its end. For this reason, the will is realized in an original form in “choice” (ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἐκούσιος μὲν φαίνεται: Eth. Nic., III, 4, 1111 b 6), while firmly maintaining the principle: ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ θούλησις γίνεται (De an., III, 9, 432 b 5). Even in the Aristotelian opinion, in this departure from Socratic intellectualism, there remains an uncertainty in fully recognizing the originality of the will, for it remains uncertain whether to attribute the decision (imperium) to the intellect or to the will (διὸ ὁ ἐκούσιος νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ φέρεσις διανοητική [Eth. Nic., VI, 2, 1139 b 4]).

A notable advance in terminology and doctrine was achieved in the theology of the Incarnate Word, first with the distinction between θούλησις and ζήτησις expounded by Nemesius (De natura hominis, attributed by the medievals and by St. Thomas to St. Gregory of Nyssa: cf. B. Domski, Die Psychologie des Nemesius [Beiträge zur Gesch. d. Philos. d. Mittelalters, III, 1], Münster in V. 1900, pp. 142 ff.), and then with the distinction introduced by John of Damascus between τέλεσις and θούλησις (cf. De fide orthodoxa, I, II, cap. 22: PG 94, 944), which corresponds to the “voluntas ut natura” and the “voluntas ut ratio” of St. Thomas (cf. Sum. Theol. 3a, q. 18, a. 3). If, therefore, the constitutive moment of the will (voluntas ut natura) is that of the tendency toward the universal good as apprehended by the intellect, and the moment of freedom (v.) is given by the indifference of the will with respect to particular finite goods (voluntas ut ratio), in reality the will entails a real emergence over both moments. First, in the tendency toward the end, inasmuch as it is precisely this tendency that aspires to “happiness” or the supreme good, which is the first reason for desiring (…τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθόν ἐστι. Eth. Nic., I, 1, 1094 a 3) as well as for acting (τὸ δὲ ἔνεκα: Aristotle, Metaph., V, 2, 1013 a 33); then, in the very act of “choice,” inasmuch as the indeterminacy of the final judgment of the intellect regarding particular goods is not overcome or defeated except by the initiative of the free will as a commitment and personal responsibility with respect to those goods whose attainment depends “on us,” whence there is precisely a choice (τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. Cf. Eth. Nic., III, 4, 1111 b 30; 6, 1113 a 9), in the alternative of the contrasting attraction of good and evil (cf. Eth. Nic. III, 7, 1113 b 15). It seems, then, that for Aristotle, unlike the later Aristotelian tradition and some interpretations of Thomism, the will claims complete originality of initiative with respect to the intellect, inasmuch as in the sphere of tendency it has the (proximate) principle of action in itself as a faculty of the tendency toward the end (cf. M. Wittmann, Die Ethik des Aristoteles, Regensburg 1920, pp. 97 ff.).

In this sense, Socratic intellectualism reappears in Stoic ethics, which identifies being with the existent, while Epicurus, taking up the Aristotelian προαίρεσις, introduces the “swerve” of the atoms to save the will from the necessity of fact: as with Aristotle, so with Epicurus, contingency exists, so that of two contradictory propositions about the future, it is not true that one must be considered true and the other false (De interpret., 9, 18 a 28 ff.; cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic., III, 3, 1111), because both remain contingent in themselves. Hence the opening for Epicurus of the “swerve,” thanks to the initiative of the will, as celebrated by Lucretius:
“…fatis avulsa voluntas.
Declinamus item motus nec tempore certo
Nec regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens”
(II, 261 ff.; cf. C. Diano, La psicologia di Epicuro e la teoria delle passioni, Firenze s.d., pp. 87 ff.).

The controversies about the will in medieval and modern thought sharpen the contention over the essence of freedom and depend, with greater awareness than in Greek thought, on the conception of spiritual being considered in its relation to God and engaged in resolving the problem of its origin as well as of its final exitus.

II. PATHOLOGY OF THE WILL — With regard to the will, more than a proper psychological process is involved; rather, it is the dynamic potential that translates thoughts and feelings into acts, following deliberation and decision by the intellect. It is not possible to conceive or describe the will as an isolated function without correlation and integration with other psychic activities. The will intervenes in the totality of human conscious life as a free and determined spiritual choice; upon it depends the acceptance or rejection of the influence of certain tendencies, representations, or feelings upon our activity. The dignity, responsibility, and freedom of man must be sought exclusively in the fact that he can adopt a different stance toward the phenomena of the endothetic sphere, toward experiences of a pathological character (biotone of Ewald), broken by an endogenous anatomy, allowing others to reach full development: this is possible because man is endowed with thought and a will. Here lies the entire anthropological significance of the will, understood as a faculty granted exclusively to man, by virtue of which he is distinguished from animals, which possess only instincts and lack responsibility.

In the exercise of the will, one can distinguish, schematically and only in certain respects, quantitative and qualitative disturbances.

1. Quantitative disturbances: a) Decrease in V. (hypokinesis, abulia): these may affect all or some of the qualities and processes of volition. In common language, the word “abulia” (q.v.) is used to denote something very generic and imprecise: laziness, doubt and indecision in the execution of acts; slowness, insecurity and poverty of ideation; lack of inhibition in the face of automatic reactions. In other words, any downward fluctuation in the individual characteristics of V. may be significant under this term, which thus loses its precise psychopathological value. One can distinguish, with sufficient approximation, constitutional abulia (q.V. PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY) and acquired abulia: the latter is often consecutive to states of organic weakness (exhaustion), as occurs in convalescents, or to lesions of certain cerebral centers, as is frequently observed in post-encephalitic patients and in those with cranial trauma. Constitutional abulia, on the other hand, is observed in those psychopathic personalities described as “weak-willed” and “without volition” (properly speaking abulics [K. Schneider]): these are subjects who, while retaining intact intelligence and ideation, show a more or less marked deficiency in the various volitional processes. The individual knows what he ought to will and desires what he ought to desire, yet he cannot will and does not decide to do anything, generally dominated by feelings of shyness and inferiority. Compulsion, anankasm, and obsession may seem, at a superficial glance, to be disturbances of v.; in reality, they are a typical disturbance of thought, recognized as parasitic and absurd, yet from which the subject cannot free himself no matter how much effort he makes (q.V. OBSESSIVE PSYCHOSIS). Closely related to these, though already closer to a disturbance, without a doubt, of v., is the impulsive act (impulse to move, to act, to speak), which, experienced by many even in entirely normal psychic conditions, can become the principal characteristic of certain abnormal personalities, called impulsive. The well-known schizophrenic abulia consists rather in a special type of apathy, arising from a lack of interest in the external world, from flattening of affect (athymia), and from autism (q.V. SCHIZOPHRENIA). Various classifications of abulias have been attempted; but this nonspecific symptomatological complex can hardly be reduced to a unitary view: it is evident, for example, the inadequacy of the best-known such classification, that of P. Janet (q.v.), who distinguishes systematized, localized, and generalized forms. Systematized abulia would be the impotence of V. with reference to a particular act, e.g., getting up; localized abulia would indicate the impotence to execute certain particular movements, e.g., raising the head or an arm; generalized abulia would refer to any execution of volitional acts, both motor and of thought (slowness of execution, insufficiency of thought discipline, superficiality of judgment).

b) Increase in v.: this is called hyperbulia and refers to the increase of tendencies and impulses rather than to the energy of V. for the execution of acts. In certain cases, the increase of tendencies and inclinations drives the subject’s V. to the execution of unusual acts, without there being an increase in rational volition. An increase in the energy of V. proper, although constitutional in certain personalities, is generally, however, the result of education rather than a pathological characteristic. Some understand hyperbulia to mean the result of the excitation of all cerebral functions, as observed in psychomotor excitement, in grandiose delusions, and in other analogous morbid states; episodic increases of volitional impulses, leading to explosive acts or to disordered activity, are sometimes observed in certain acute psychoses, due to the pathological increase of the feeling of power.

2. Qualitative disturbances: a) One speaks of volitional ambivalence when the normal oscillations of deliberation are pathologically increased, constantly arising from trivial motives and manifesting in absolute indecision.

b) One speaks, albeit improperly, of executive abulia when the subject is fully aware of his desire but finds it normally difficult to activate the executive volitional mechanisms.

c) Bradybulia: this is typically observed in post-encephalitic states; it consists in a marked slowness of v., which goes hand in hand with general bradypsychism: the volitional impulses are very attenuated and slow to unfold, but once the initial resistance is overcome the patient can execute the act, especially if there is no muscular rigidity. Continuous stimulation is necessary.

d) Negativism, a symptom proper to catatonic syndromes, is considered by many to be a disturbance of v., arising from the fact that a pathological counter-impulse, much more powerful, is associated with the motor impulse; in reality, it is a disturbance of the psychophysical transformation of experience (Bormann), an alteration of psychomotor integration. One distinguishes active negativism, in which the patient does the opposite of what is ordered, and passive negativism, in which the blockage of V. manifests in impassivity, mutism, astasia, immobility, lack of spontaneity, and failure to obey commands. Clearly distinct from negativism must be the so-called opposition, which is a symptom proper to anxious states and is related to images and affects that can be influenced by persuasion; according to some (Nàgera), opposition would have its origin in pantophobia; it is evident, however, that this is not a primary disturbance of V. A typical opposition is that of certain hallucinated melancholics who do not wish to free themselves from their sadness at hallucinatory commands.

e) Schizophrenic dissociation has been, somewhat questionably, linked to the so-called volitional ataxia: the patient acts in a manner different from or contrary to what he wills; this disturbance, in relation to Stranski’s intrapsychic ataxia, seems rather to be traced back to those complex disturbances of psychophysical transformations, recently studied by Bormann.

f) Classic is the influencing of voluntary action, that sense of “made” or “artificial” which accompanies the decrease or disappearance of the feeling of the self, a phenomenological expression of the schizophrenic disturbance of depersonalization.

g) To this can be partially linked automatic obedience: the subject immediately executes the acts ordered, due to exaggerated suggestibility, without the intervention of the free spontaneity of volition. According to some, this would be a disturbance more affective than volitional; there is, in any case, a variable individual and external suggestibility (q.V. HYPNOTISM; SUGGESTION).

Among the disturbances of v., in the broad sense, one may also include the so-called double V. of hysterics: one v., clearly conscious, wishes to be cured and is worthy of belief; the other v., having no relation to the first, resists with all its strength (Kretschmer). One also speaks of V. toward illness, as an epitimic tendency toward the development of symptoms, to achieve a more or less conscious goal (q.V. PSYCHONEUROSIS [from compensation]).

A problem of great importance for its moral and legal consequences is that concerning the free determination of the will; in reality, it is a question of empirical fact that cannot be judged and resolved according to conventional fixed rules. A diagnosis of psychopathy, as such, can never exclude the free determination of the will, which can only be established through individual analysis of the act (Rauch), an analysis that must be conducted by experts of finesse rather than experts of geometry, both by the judge and by the confessor.

III. EDUCATION OF THE WILL

The subject and the careful selection of means suited to the education of the will assume particular importance from the fact that today one tends to speak less of duties, which would otherwise constitute a constant and vigorous stimulus to the strengthening of volitional energies, and more of rights, independence, and autonomy. These latter, however, generally foster a drifting with the current, a feverish search for the least effort, with the inevitable consequence of a more or less total passivity in facing the unfortunately real difficulties of life and of creating people too weak to renounce even a single one of their desires.

The danger is given a disastrous impetus by the flaunting of high-sounding principles: enthusiasm for intense living, a drive for a life lived fully and recklessly; when, in reality, these principles are nothing more than a thin veneer covering the lack of will, its yielding to external stimuli and even more to internal ones, which are more vivid and pulsating, especially during the period of developmental age.

Instead of yielding to one’s own ego, one must acquire and maintain mastery over it, following it when it tends toward good and renouncing it when it yearns for what is evil or harmful. This is not easy, as is generally thought, but it absolutely demands effort and courage to the point of being able to say with V. Alfieri: “I willed, always willed, most strongly willed,” without, however, following him in having oneself tied to a chair to avoid yielding and escaping a difficult and tedious study.

To educate the will fruitfully, one must start from two observations: as a power of choice, free will implies the concept of indivisibility: one either chooses or does not choose. However, if one considers the circumstances surrounding the positive or negative choice and the effort that this presupposes—whether due to the intrinsic difficulty of the action to be performed or to the innate or acquired tendencies of the free agent—one observes how the choice can be more or less facilitated or rendered difficult. Thus, one can discern an infinite gradation both in the realm of ease and in that of difficulty.

These considerations form the basis of the method of educating the will, which has been deeply studied and instilled in Christian asceticism as well as by psychological educators.

1. Will and intelligence

Since the will always presupposes the work of the intelligence, which presents it with the motives favorable and unfavorable to action, weighs them, and invests them with attraction or repulsion, it is clear that intelligence can strongly influence the use of free will, expanding or restricting its scope. Indeed, one chooses only what one knows, and to the extent (whether exact or erroneous) that one knows II. The child is less responsible than the adult precisely because he has only rudimentary knowledge; how often, moreover, do we reproach ourselves: “If I had known, I would not have acted that way!”

Thus, one can educate the will if one accustoms the intelligence to collect itself, to consider things thoroughly and deeply, and to assign them their proper value. This meditative reflection leads the intelligence to a gradual victory over suggestions and tendencies, to formulate and strengthen the guiding principles of conduct, forming the person who knows what he wants and is conscious of the end and means in every act. Nor does this foster that habitual indecision which is part of cowardice; for meditative reflection must be swift and ready. When, in fact, one says, “Reflect before acting,” one does not mean that the mind should linger in doubt and postpone action, but that the mind must acquire the habit of reflection so that it may rapidly conclude the synthesis of the motives that form the antecedent of the action.

2. Will, feelings, and tendencies

He who wishes to opt with determination and constancy for duty does not suffice by merely knowing it and seeing its compelling favorable motives; he must also love it, directing toward it the full force of his feelings and the propulsive strength of his tendencies and inclinations. The greater the flame thus kindled, the greater the energy of the decision. Light and heat are therefore necessary: the former illuminates, the latter kindles and gives wings. For this very reason, one speaks of the feeling of duty as well as the idea of duty. If duty is understood coldly as the imposition of an absolute and categorical maxim, it is difficult to embrace it, and one more readily seeks all occasions to avoid II. At the very least, a firmly established and exercised will is required, along with an intellectual development sufficient to make one feel—always and in every circumstance, even when one might get away with it—as a matter of human dignity the mastery of oneself and obedience to the universal law. In short, a certain mental maturity is demanded. And yet, duty must be practiced even before such maturity is attained or when it is lacking; hence the necessity of resorting to various feelings and relying on various tendencies capable of transforming themselves into propulsive forces (e.g., the feeling of healthy self-love, of upright emulation, of honor, of love for family and country, of reward—especially eternal reward and supernatural happiness; the tendency to excel, the ambition to succeed, etc.).

3.

V. and habit

The great law of habit exerts an extraordinary influence on the education of the will. One learns to will by willing; the tendency toward duty and the facility to perform it are increased by observing II. “Learn to will” is the most effective maxim to inculcate. We believe in the efficacy of practice in all other fields: in scholarly intelligence, in physical education, in the study of music and languages; but in the field of volitional energy we are reluctant to admit it, despite the positive results of experience itself—an error with grave consequences, sometimes irreparable, leading to an abulic, empty, and unbearable life for the subject, and often even to crime due to a more or less total lack of control over passion.

This training of the will can be direct or indirect, both of which are absolutely necessary. For direct training, the maxim so often inculcated by Christian asceticism holds: that offense is the best defense. Whoever passively awaits the assault of natural impulses and evil tendencies cannot help but succumb to their impetuous and virulent force. Borders are defended with arms at the ready; likewise, the lowest self within us—the self of instincts and passions—must be prepared to obey the higher, spiritual self through decisive interventions and by performing voluntary exercises that stimulate self-mastery, even in matters that are licit and honest. For example: the instinct for thirst, food, and sweets offers many occasions for self-mastery through abstinence, and it is easy to inspire even children with enthusiasm for this kind of emancipation and self-overcoming by showing them that this victory translates into a higher life and greater energy, preparing them to worthily endure life’s vicissitudes, and above all, increasing their strength to the point of heroism. Why not introduce, parents, teachers, and educators, your children and students to the secrets of this holy war of emancipation, encouraging them, as occasion arises, to renounce a favorite food, generously overcome laziness, endure pain, cold, and discomfort, and break bad habits so that they may learn to regard the preservation of life—life itself—as a noble tradition of their organism, compelling the spirit to subject the body and its desires to obedience? Thus, too, the energies of life are effectively strengthened. Exercising oneself in maintaining order in one’s affairs, in silence, in rising early, in sincerity of speech, in coherence of action, in absolute respect for others’ property, and in the exact fulfillment of tedious tasks that others seek to avoid. Furthermore: gymnastics, sports, and group games train quickness of movement, decisiveness, and vigilance; even the rules of etiquette, when observed always and with amiable ease, represent a constant exercise in the most effective self-mastery.

Foerster draws attention to the fact that even among primitive peoples such life exercises are considered an essential part of preparing adolescents for the transition to adult warriors after puberty. Since the laws governing relations between the sexes are strict and complex and therefore require great self-control, young people are trained for several months in severe renunciations of all kinds and in mastery over their desires: for example, they must content themselves with a sparse and ordinary diet, keep a knife, bow, and arrows at hand but not use them even when prey is within reach; and endure various sufferings, even atrocious ones, without showing pain. This is a sign that nature itself teaches them the undeniable tendency not to abandon natural impulse to itself but to prepare it in advance for obedience to moral law (cf. *L’educazione della vita*, in *Pedagogia e vita*, 14 [1953], pp. 337–343).

Therefore, the best practice is that suggested by W. James: “Keep alive in you the faculty of effort through small, harmless daily exercises; that is, be systematically heroic every day in small, unnecessary things; do something every two or three days simply because it is difficult and you would prefer not to do it, so that when the grim hour of danger and need strikes, it does not find you unprepared and unfit” (*op. cit.* in bibliography, p. 180).

Naturally, for these exercises to achieve their full effect, they must be grounded in judgments of value that take hold of the subject according to age, environment, and character. This is precisely the task of indirect training of the will, which, as already mentioned, acts on the intelligence and feelings: furnishing the mind with clear and precise ideas, banishing from the heart every turbid and base sentiment, cultivating healthy affections and generous, disinterested tendencies, and finally forming a high concept of our responsibility toward family, country, and neighbor, reflecting that our actions follow us and leave grave traces of consequences in ourselves and others.

In this field, Christian religion reaches the highest peaks, for it teaches not only that every act of renunciation strengthens the force of life for the moment of trial, but that these individual acts of asceticism have a particular value: in the supernatural order, they acquire infinite value, which redounds as merit, mercy, and good for those who perform them and for all humanity. Hence derives the pedagogical importance of the so-called “little flowers” [fioretti].

But what of intense life, life in fullness? Modern literature continually proclaims, under the pretext of enhancing personal life, an exaggerated cult of pure and simple natural individuality and the rejection of every renunciation as a diminishment and impediment to full flourishing. But this is contrary to all sound pedagogy as well as to daily experience, for it neglects the true element of personal life, which is the overcoming of natural individuality through struggle against instincts and tendencies. This is, in essence, the admonition of Jesus Christ to His disciples: “Unless a grain of wheat falls into the earth and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies, it bears much fruit” (John 12:24). One cannot develop what is truly worthy in man unless he dominates and subjugates what is unworthy within him. The two exercises—that of the centers of movement and that of the centers of inhibition—are equally necessary and of the highest importance, for only thus can man, from the center of his nature, react to the stimulus of temptation and succeed in dominating rather than being dominated by peripheral excitations. For this reason, when speaking of the education of the will, one cannot remain silent about the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola, which, in the final analysis, put to the test the real strength of will that has been acquired through exercise.