NATURA PURA. - A theological expression used at least from the sixteenth century onward, signifying the hypothetical state in which God could have created and left man, had He not from the beginning elevated him, as He actually did, to the supernatural order (v.).
Theologians customarily distinguish five states or conditions of human nature: 1) The state of n. p., that is, of nature in its own order, with its essential faculties, its properties and capacities, and the end proportionate to them. 2) The state of natura integra, that is, human nature enriched with preternatural gifts (for example, infused knowledge or bodily immortality), which perfect it within its own order. 3) The simply supernatural state, when nature is ordered to the supernatural end (eternal life = beatific vision) and is enriched with the means proportionate to that end (Grace). 4) The state of innocence or original justice, which comprises together the preternatural and supernatural gifts of the second and third states. 5) The state of fallen nature, original sin (v.), which may be considered before or after the Redemption.
Of these states, only the fourth and fifth are historically real, whereas the others, especially the first, are hypothetical. Nevertheless, that of n. p. is regarded by theologians as a necessary hypothesis for demonstrating the gratuitousness of the supernatural order. For if that state were not possible, one would logically be led to affirm the necessity of man's elevation to the supernatural order, which consequently would no longer be gratuitous. Such a conclusion is in full contradiction with the meaning of Revelation and the magisterium of the Church.
Therefore, the possibility of n. p. is not merely a working hypothesis or a postulate of a theological system, but a precise requirement of the dogma of the perfect gratuitousness of the supernatural order, to which man has no right whatever, but only an obediential potency, in the sense that his elevation to that order is the gift and work of God.
The Church has clearly manifested its thought on this subject on several occasions: in the bull Auctorem fidei of Pius VI against the Jansenist Synod of Pistoia (Denz-U, 1516), in the encyclical Pascendi of Pius X against the modernists (Denz-U, 2103), and recently in the encyclical Humani generis of Pius XII, who among the aberrations points out that of those who «gratuitatem ordinis supernaturalis corumpunt», since in this way they come to deny that God can create men without destining them to the beatific vision.
Historically, the question of n. p. is rather complex, because it is connected with the other, very delicate question of the natural order and the supernatural order and of their mutual relationship. Those who tend to eliminate or mitigate the distinction between the one and the other order (the Augustinian-Scotist current, defended by Noris and Berti in the eighteenth century and in our day by de Lubac) are opposed to the concept of n. p., reducing it to a sixteenth-century scholastic superstructure, used as a weapon of defense against Baianism and gradually accredited through a humanistic influence upon theology. But in reality, even if the expression «n. p.» began with Gaetano, its content is much older. Boyer (Morale et surnaturel, in Gregorianum, 29 [1948], pp. 540-541) finds it already in s. Agostino; but it appears more clearly in s. Tommaso (In II Sent., 4, 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; Quodlib., 1, a. 8; De malo, q. 4, a. 1, ad 14; q. 5, a. 1, ad 15); his doctrine concerning the twofold end is readily reducible to the same concept (one natural and the other supernatural: Sum. Theol., 1°, q. 62, a. 1; De Verit., q. 14, a. 2 e q. 27 a. 2 and elsewhere), concerning the capacity to love God without Grace (Sum. Theol., 1°-2°, q. 109, a. 3), and concerning the condition of children who die without Baptism (II Sent. 1, 33, q. 2, a. 2). While admitting God (v.), he firmly maintains the principle of a distinction between nature and the supernatural (De malo, q. 5, a. 2; Sum. Theol., 1°-2°, q. 109, a. 3; q. 114, a. 2 and elsewhere).
It is true, however, that the thought of s. Tommaso received a more explicit and precise formulation in later scholastics, from Gaetano onward. It is likewise true that the error of Baio contributed to the development and refinement of the doctrine of n. p., adopted and deepened not only by the Thomists, but also by Molina, Bellarmino, and Suárez, who so strongly insisted upon the gratuitousness of Grace and of the supernatural order as to exclude from human nature every requirement that was not only juridical but also ontological. This position is definitive, and it was not shaken by the attempt of the eighteenth-century Augustinians (Noris, Berti), who maintained that, although by virtue of His absolute power God could create man in the state of n. p., according to His ordained power (the harmony of the various divine attributes) He could not but elevate him to the supernatural order. With the return to these attempts, there is inevitably the danger of slipping toward the position of Baio.
Finally, it is necessary to recall the disputes, from the sixteenth century onward, concerning the relation between hypothetical n. p. and nature after sin: some theologians tend to equate the two states (the optimistic current followed especially by the Molinists); others, on the contrary, emphasize the inferiority of the present state of nature wounded by original sin in comparison with the state of n. p. (the moderate pessimistic current, connected with the Augustinian formula: «homo expoliatus supernaturalibus, vulneratus in naturalibus»). According to sounder theology, fallen nature must be held to be in a worse state than n. p.; for after original sin man is in a state of privation, whereas in n. p. there would have been only an absence of the supernatural. Now privation creates a distress that is not felt in mere absence: such is the case of one who is born poor and one who becomes poor. Nevertheless, in the state of n. p. there would have been the psychological conflict between body and soul, and it is not known what means Divine Providence would have provided for man in order to make life less harsh for him (v. DESIDERIO NATURALE DI DIO; PECCATO ORIGINALE; SOPRANNATURALE, ORDINE).