CONCUPISCENCE. — From the Latin *concupiscere* (= to desire), it etymologically signifies desire or inclination toward a pleasurable object. However, the term has a historical genesis in the philosophical and theological spheres. In Plato’s tripartite division, concupiscence occupies the third place (ἐπιθυμία). Aristotle classifies concupiscence as a faculty of the sensitive appetite, alongside θυμός (= anger), distinguishing both from the rational appetite or will (βούλησις).
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### I. DOGMATIC THEOLOGY
The Scholastics translated the data of Greek philosophy into a well-defined schema: to sensory knowledge corresponds the sensitive appetite, divided into the concupiscible (facing good and evil that are easily attainable) and the irascible (facing good and evil that are difficult to attain); to intellectual knowledge corresponds the rational appetite, which is free will.
In the psychological structure of man, concupiscence is a natural form of the sensitive appetite and, as such, has no moral value in itself. However, it may acquire moral significance insofar as it can influence the rational sphere proper to intellect and will. St. Thomas admits this possibility for concupiscence, as for all passions of the sensitive appetite, demonstrating it from the unity of the soul, which, by concentrating its energies on one faculty—e.g., concupiscence—weakens the others (reason, will); or from the fact that the intellect attains its object only through sensation, which thus conditions rational knowledge and, through it, volitional activity (Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 77). Concupiscence therefore indirectly influences the will by preceding and accompanying its function, thus contributing to the human act understood ethically, whether toward good or evil.
From a philosophical standpoint, therefore, concupiscence is not evil in itself. But on the theological level, it undergoes a further development in meaning, especially in light of the doctrine of original sin.
In Sacred Scripture, the term concupiscence (ἐπιθυμία) in a general sense denotes every desire, whether carnal or spiritual, contrary to right reason and the will of God: St. Paul speaks of a concupiscence of the flesh and a concupiscence of the spirit (Gal. 5:17), and St. John even attributes concupiscence to the devil (John 8:44). But in a more specific sense, concupiscence is the complex of passions of the flesh made rebellious to the law of the spirit, chiefly as a result and consequence of original sin. St. Paul vividly describes this conflict between flesh and spirit, which often becomes a slavery of the soul, from which one can be freed by being reborn in Christ (Rom. 6:6; 7:14 ff.; Gal. 5:19 ff. and elsewhere). In Gen. 3:7 ff., it is made sufficiently clear that our first parents, before the fall, were free from concupiscence, but after their transgression they began to feel its tyranny.
The Fathers developed these concepts, above all in their polemic against the Pelagians. St. Augustine’s thought on the relationship between original sin and concupiscence is not always clear and consistent, and has lent itself to interpretations as if original sin were identical with concupiscence. Such an identification, however, is foreign to the mind of the saintly Doctor (v. AUGUSTINE, SAINT; ORIGINAL SIN), and those who adopt it—such as some Scholastics and, worse, Luther, Calvin, and their followers—do so wrongly. St. Thomas, drawing on the best tradition, teaches (Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 82, a. 3) that just as in the state of innocence there was a formal element (the submission of the will to God by virtue of original justice, which included grace) and a material element (the subjection of the lower appetites to reason by virtue of the gift of integrity), so too in sin there is the loss of original justice with grace (formal element) and the rebellion of concupiscence (material element).
At the Council of Trent (Session V), in preparing the decree on original sin against Lutheran aberrations, much discussion centered on the nature of concupiscence, which Seripando and other Augustinians insisted on regarding as sin in itself even in the baptized. The Council, however, following the true thought of St. Augustine and the clearer teaching of St. Thomas, defined that Baptism radically removes original sin but leaves concupiscence, which is called sin because it was the effect of original sin and now serves as an occasion and incentive to actual sin; the baptized, however, can resist it and thereby acquire merit for eternal life (Denz.-U., no. 792). Against Luther, the Council thus vindicates the Christian’s responsibility in the face of sin and passion.
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### II. MORAL THEOLOGY
Moralists commonly consider concupiscence from a twofold aspect: as passion and as a foment of evil.
1. **Concupiscence as passion.** — It is the excitation of the sensibility by the representation of a good or evil. It may precede or follow the decision of the will, whence the distinction between antecedent and consequent concupiscence.
a) **Antecedent concupiscence** (e.g., a feeling, a surge of anger or hatred at the sight of an enemy) may:
1) Sometimes entirely remove the free use of reason, as in the case of anger or love that overwhelms (one is said: “I lost the light of my eyes”; “I could not see straight”), so as to commit acts or crimes that otherwise would not have been committed. In such cases, there is no imputability and hence no guilt. Yet one cannot so easily exclude indirect responsibility (and hence guilt) in these cases, either because one exposed oneself to danger without sufficient reason, or because one did not struggle with sufficient vigor against the rising passion, or did not remove those internal or external incitements that, by their presence, may lead to blindness.
2) Or it may diminish the free use of reason; and then responsibility and guilt are correspondingly diminished.
3) By the same criterion, the actions of those who are “obsessed” by an idea (kleptomaniacs, dispensers, etc.) and those who suffer from “phobias” must be judged.
b) **Consequent concupiscence** arises from the free decision of the will, either because one voluntarily accepts, cherishes, or fosters it (e.g., a sudden feeling of hatred that one takes pleasure in nurturing and intensifying by dwelling on the wounds of wrongs received), or because one intentionally provokes it (e.g., through licentious readings and spectacles, or by reviving memories more or less intensely). It never diminishes responsibility; on the contrary, it ordinarily increases it, since the sensitive emotion is stirred voluntarily, and thus the good or evil is willed with greater force and ardor.
2. **Concupiscence as a foment of evil.** — It is the propensity to evil. It must be judged according to the following criteria:
a) It is not the feeling itself that is culpable, but the consent to it; hence those sudden impulses (“outbursts”) that arise before reason has had time to pass judgment on their conformity or lack of conformity with moral law are not imputable.
b) To ward off the danger of consenting, it is not only advisable but necessary to seek ever greater mastery over our inclinations, to subject them more and more to the yoke of reason, and this in two ways: by resolutely opposing them and by performing acts of the virtues contrary to them.
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The student will feel a great desire to use them: thus he will readily traverse the path that humanity has taken centuries to cover. The pedagogy of C. is not humanistic but intellectualistic. Some of his ideas are original, many good, common patrimony of culture, in discord with his gnoseological-metaphysical system, which would lead to an absolute sensitivist subjectivism.
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**Rome 1936.**