Concupiscence

CONCUPISCENCE. - From the Latin concupiscere (= to crave), it means etymologically desire, an inclination toward a pleasant object. But the term has a historical genesis on philosophical and theological ground. In the Platonic trichotomy, concupiscence holds the third place (ἐπιθυμία). Aristotle makes concupiscence a faculty of the sensitive appetite together with the θυμός (= anger), distinguishing from the one and the other the rational appetite or will (βούλησις).

I. DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

The Scholastics translate the data of Greek philosophy into a well-defined schema: to sense knowledge corresponds the sensitive appetite, distinguished into the concupiscible (in the face of good and evil that is easy) and the irascible (in the face of good and evil that is difficult); to intellectual knowledge corresponds the rational appetite, which is the free will.

In the psychological structure of man, c. is a natural form of the sensitive appetite and therefore has no moral value in itself, but it can have one insofar as it can influence the rational sphere proper to the intellect and the will. St. Thomas admits this possibility for c. as for all the passions of the sensitive appetite, and he demonstrates it from the fact of the unity of the soul, which, by concentrating its energies in one of its faculties, e.g., in c., causes the weakening of the others (reason, will); or from the fact that the intellect attains its object only through sensation, which therefore conditions rational knowledge and, through it, volitional activity as well (Sum. Theol., 1st-2nd, q. 77). C., then, influences the will indirectly, anticipating and accompanying its function and thus contributing to the human act ethically understood, whether for good or for evil.

Accordingly, from the philosophical point of view, c. is not an evil in itself. But on theological ground c. undergoes another development of meaning, especially because of the requirements of the doctrine concerning original sin.

In Sacred Scripture the term c. (ἐπιθυμία) in a generic sense is every desire, carnal or spiritual, contrary to right reason and to the will of God: St. Paul speaks of a c. of the flesh and a c. of the spirit (Gal. 5:17), and St. John attributes c. even to the devil (8:44). But in a more specific sense c. is the complex of the passions of the flesh made rebellious against the law of the spirit, principally as a consequence and by virtue of original sin. St. Paul describes in vivid colors this contrast between the flesh and the spirit, which often becomes a slavery of the soul, from which it can free itself by being reborn in Christ (Rom. 6:6; 7:14 ff.; Gal. 5:19 ff. and elsewhere). In Gen. 3:7 ff., it emerges quite clearly that the first parents, previously immune from c., begin to feel its tyranny after the fall.

The Fathers develop these concepts, more than all others St. Augustine in his polemic against the Pelagians. His thought concerning the relationship between original sin and c., not always clear and consistent, has lent itself to false interpretations, as if that sin were identified with c. Such an identification, however, is alien to the mind of the holy Doctor (v. AGOSTINO AURELIO, saint; PECCATO ORIGINALE) and those who will adopt it, such as certain Scholastics and, worse, Luther and Calvin with their followers, will appeal to him wrongly. St. Thomas, gathering the best tradition, teaches (Sum. Theol., 1st-2nd, q. 82, a. 3) that just as in the state of innocence there was a formal element (the subjection of the will to God by virtue of original justice, which included Grace) and a material element (the subjection of the lower appetites to reason by virtue of the gift of integrity), so too in sin there is the loss of original justice together with Grace (formal element) and the rebellion of c. (material element).

At the Council of Trent (sess. V), in the preparation of the decree on original sin against the Lutheran aberrations, there was much discussion about the nature of c., which Seripando and other Augustinians stubbornly insisted on considering as sin in itself even in the baptized. But the Council, reconnecting itself to the true thought of St. Augustine and to the clearer thought of St. Thomas, defined that Baptism radically removes original sin but leaves c., which is called sin because it was an effect of original sin and is now an occasion and stimulus to actual sin; the baptized person, however, can resist it and acquire merits for eternal life (Denz-U, n. 792). Against Luther the Council thus vindicates the Christian's responsibility in the face of sin and the passions.

Pietro Parente

II. MORAL THEOLOGY

Moralists usually consider concupiscence under a twofold aspect: as passion and as an incentive to evil.

1. Concupiscence as passion

It is the excitation of the senses at the representation of a good or an evil. It can precede or follow the decision of the will, whence the distinction between antecedent and consequent concupiscence. a) Antecedent concupiscence (for example, a feeling, a movement of anger or hatred at the sight of an enemy) can: 1) sometimes entirely remove the free use of reason, as in the case of a rage or a love that blind a person (one commonly says: "I lost the light of my eyes"; "I could no longer see"), to the point of causing actions or crimes that otherwise would not have been committed. And then it is not imputable and therefore there is no fault. In these cases, however, an indirect responsibility (and hence guilt) is not to be excluded so easily, whether because one exposed oneself to the danger without sufficient reason, or because one did not struggle with sufficient vigor against the rising passion, or did not remove those internal or external incitements which, by their presence, can lead to blindness. 2) Or diminish the free use of reason; and then responsibility and guilt are diminished in the same measure. 3) By the same criterion are to be judged the actions of one who is "obsessed" by an idea (kleptomaniacs, dipsomaniacs, etc.) and of one who suffers from "phobias." b) Consequent concupiscence derives from the free decision of the will, either because one voluntarily accepts, cherishes, fosters it (for example, a feeling of sudden hatred, which one takes pleasure in holding onto and aggravating, irritating the wounds of wrongs received) or because one intentionally provokes it (for example, with licentious readings and spectacles, with memories revived more or less intensely). It never diminishes responsibility; on the contrary, it ordinarily increases it; because the sensory emotion is precisely stimulated voluntarily and therefore the good and the evil are willed with greater force and ardor.

2. Concupiscence as incentive

It is the propensity to evil. It is to be judged according to these criteria: a) the fault is not in feeling, but in consenting; therefore those movements ("impulses") that arise before reason has been able to issue a judgment on their conformity or non-conformity with the moral law are not imputable. b) In order to remove ever further the danger of consenting, it is not only fitting but necessary to seek to gain an ever stronger dominion over our inclinations, to submit them ever more to the yoke of reason, and this in two ways: by resolutely blocking their path, and by performing acts of the virtues contrary to them.

Celestino Testore