PERJURY. — 1. **Notion and Morality.** — In the strict sense, perjury is only the sinful oath taken through a defect of truth in its object, namely, an oath upon a falsehood; regardless of the presence or absence of other moral deficiencies.
In this sense — the only one relevant here — perjury is always a grave fault against the virtue of religion (q.v.), even if the lie that one intended to confirm by the oath is in itself a slight fault against the virtue of veracity. Indeed, the irreverence shown to God is always grave when He is invoked as a witness to a lie.
The gravity of the irreverence is evident at least in one who truly intended to call upon God as a witness to his statement and consciously affirmed what was false. There is the case of one who — especially under the provocation of another — recited the oath formula falsely, but without the inward will to invoke God as a witness to his statement.
2. **Object and Effects.** — The object of perjury is the false; not in the objective sense of error, but in the subjective sense of a lie. Thus, an oath upon a statement that is false but believed to be true is not perjury; conversely, an oath upon a statement that is true but believed to be false and sworn as a lie is perjury. When, out of necessity to conceal one’s thought from others, the use of mental reservation is licit, it is likewise licit to confirm it with an oath. Clearly, since there is then no lie, there can be no perjury. The degree of certainty required, so that a statement may be sworn, must be proportionate to the gravity of the motives inducing the oath. But in general, even for an oath, that moral certainty is sufficient which suffices for the security of ordinary human relations. In a promissory oath, truth consists solely in the existing will to fulfill the obligations arising, by justice or fidelity, from the sworn promise. Their actual fulfillment, according to the common opinion against the view of a few authors, is not part of II. Yet, while it does not constitute perjury, the fault against religion remains on account of the violated oath.
By the juridical principle *iuramentum sequitur naturam actus cui adiicitur* (can. 1318), from perjury there arise obligations of religion only and to the extent that obligations of justice or fidelity arise from the promise. If, moreover, the perjury is also a promissory oath, it produces no religious obligation, without, however, affecting in any way the effects of the promise. In every case, even when, for want of some element required *ad validitatem*, neither the oath nor the promise gives rise to the corresponding obligations, by natural law which forbids injuring the interests of others in any way, any damages that may have occurred must be repaired; if deceit was involved, they are to be assessed according to can. 1321.
The canonical penalties against perjury in general are set forth in can. 2323; for judicial perjury in can. 1743 § 3. Under Italian penal law, perjury is a relevant offense only on the part of parties in litigation, pursuant to Article 371.
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**SPEAR OF GOLD (Pontifical Order of the Golden Militia):** q.V. **CHIVALROUS ORDERS, PONTIFICAL**.