SPERGIURO. –
1. Concept and morality
In the specific sense, s. is only the sinful oath defective in truth in its object, that is, an oath concerning what is false; irrespective of whether or not other moral deficiencies are present.In this sense—the only one of interest here—s. is always a grave offense against the virtue of religion (v.), even if the lie which one sought to confirm by the oath is in itself a venial offense against the virtue of truthfulness. Indeed, the irreverence shown to God when he is invoked as witness to a lie is always grave.
The gravity of the irreverence is evident at least in one who truly intended to call God as witness to his assertion and consciously affirmed what was false. There is the case of one who—especially under another’s provocation—recited the formula of an oath concerning what was false, but without the interior intention of invoking God as witness to his lie, in which case he pronounced a simulated oath. This too is a case of s., according to the common opinion among Catholics, for the following reason. The worship that rises to God from every oath derives not so much from the will of the person who swears as from the fact that those who hear an oath formula pronounced are necessarily led to recognize in it—whatever the interior intention of the person pronouncing it—a public profession of faith in God’s absolute truth and veracity; and this profession of faith, objectively connected with every oath formula, when it is recited concerning what is false, constitutes a form of simulated idolatry (v.). And this is always a grave offense. So true is this that anyone who discovered the falsehood would not hesitate to see in that oath formula a grave insult to God, without asking at all what the intention of the person who swore falsely had been. That formula blasphemy (v.), which is always a grave offense. Whoever, foreseeing another person’s s., nevertheless provokes that person to swear, also sins by s., on account of cooperation in another’s offense; unless he is compelled to demand the oath either by an obligation of office or for a proportionately grave reason: his cooperation is then merely material.
2. Object and effects
The object of s. is what is false, not in the objective sense of error, but in the subjective sense of a lie. Thus an oath concerning a false assertion that is believed to be true is not s.; conversely, an oath concerning a true assertion that is believed to be false and sworn to as a lie is s. When, because it is necessary to conceal one’s own thought from others, the use of mental reservation is lawful, it is likewise lawful to confirm it by oath. Clearly, since there is then no lie, there can be no s. either. The degree of certainty required for an assertion to be sworn to must be proportionate to the gravity of the reasons prompting the oath. In general, however, for an oath as well, the moral certainty sufficient for the security of ordinary human relations is enough. In a promissory oath, truth consists solely in the existing intention to fulfill the obligations arising, by justice or fidelity, from the sworn promise. Their actual fulfillment, according to the common opinion against the view of a few authors, does not form part of II. If, however, this does not constitute s., there remains the offense against religion on account of the violated oath.By virtue of the juridical principle iuramentum sequitur naturam actus cui adicitur (can. 1318), obligations also arising solely from religion, and only to the extent that obligations of justice or fidelity arise from the promise, proceed from s. But if s. is also a simulated oath, it produces no religious obligation, without in any way affecting the effects of the promise. In every case, moreover, even when, because of the absence of some element required ad validitatem, neither oath nor promise produces the corresponding obligations, by virtue of the natural law that forbids injuring another’s interests in any way, any resulting damage must be repaired; where fraud is involved, such damage is to be interpreted according to can. 1321.
The canonical penalties against s. in general are sanctioned in can. 2323; for judicial s., in can. 1743 § 3. Under Italian criminal law, s. is a relevant offense only on the part of the parties to judicial proceedings, pursuant to art. 371.
SPERONE D'ORO (Pontifical Order of the Golden Militia): V. ORDINI EQUESTRI PONTIFICI.