SUSPICIONE. – Suspicio, s., suspicion generally indicate a doubt or judgment, not entirely proven but founded on serious indications, concerning some fact. In the CIC the term is used in criminal matters, heresy (v.) in certain cases (cann. 2315 ff., 2319 ff., 2332, 2340, 2371); the “suspect” person, after being admonished, must “purge” the suspicion by removing its grounds, in order to avoid incurring the penalties inflicted on formal heretics.
The matter is more immediately relevant in judicial proceedings. The dignity of the judge—a public person—the requirements of the utmost objectivity and independence in administering justice, so that the parties to the case may accept the verdict without its substance being undermined, require that persons against whom objective and well-founded doubts of impartiality in judgment exist should have no part in the trial; when such doubts exist, there is legitimate suspicion.
A judge may not refuse his office to anyone who requests it; and if he refuses, he is liable for damages (CIC, cann. 1608, 1625; Ital. Code of Civil Procedure, art. 55). But in a case of suspicion he has the duty to abstain, transferring the task to others (cann. 1613 ff.; arts. 51–54, 73, 78). In the earlier canonical and civil discipline there was no legal obligation to abstain; only practice prevailed, or else the parties to the case had to raise the objection of suspicion (challenge the judge).
According to the CIC, the judge (the promoter of justice and the defender of the bond are assimilated to him) must abstain, issuing a reasoned decree to that effect, in the following cases: a) kinship; b) guardianship or curatorship; c) intimacy or habitual association in life; d) great personal animosity; e) a substantial interest in gain or loss in the case; f) having taken a position because, in the same case, he has previously acted as advocate or procurator. Some regard the enumeration as illustrative, others, more reasonably, as exhaustive; the irritant clause is lacking, however. Civil legislation, with greater specificity, substantially admits the same grounds of suspicion.
The parties may also raise against the judge and those assimilated to him other grounds of suspicion; and against the other members of the tribunal, including the advocate and procurator (cf. can. 1663 ff.), the grounds mentioned above and other objective grounds. But in order to prevent the parties from abusing this objection by prolonging matters or excluding a judge whom they realize is unfavorable to them during the proceedings, the law requires that the objection of suspicion be raised, in principle, before the joinder of issue (in civil cases, before the hearing or the trial of the case), except where the grounds of suspicion emerge subsequently. Moreover, the challenge must be substantiated by grounds admitted by law, under penalty of the party’s being ordered to compensate the damages incurred because of this incidental proceeding.
The same law determines who is to judge the objection raised by the parties; when the objection is declared well founded, the Ordinary has the right to substitute other persons free from suspicion. If the party challenges the Ordinary himself on grounds of suspicion, both the adjudication (unless the Ordinary abstains from the case) and any substitution of the person fall to the immediately superior judge.
Given the nature of suspicion, it must be determined as soon as possible, after hearing the interested parties—including, therefore, the person challenged on grounds of suspicion—and, if necessary, other persons at the judge’s discretion; nor is an appeal available against the decree. It is then disputed whether procedural acts possibly performed by the person challenged on grounds of suspicion before the decree, including those in his own favor, are to be considered valid or not.