SUSPICION. – *Suspectio*, s., suspicion, generally indicating a doubt or a judgment, not fully proven but based on serious evidence, regarding some fact. In the *Codex Iuris Canonici* it is used in penal matters, especially for suspicion of heresy (q.v.) in certain cases (can. 2315 ff., 2319 ff., 2332, 2340, 2371); the person “suspected,” having been warned, must “purge” the suspicion by removing its grounds, so as to avoid incurring the penalties inflicted upon formal heretics.
Of greater contemporary relevance is the subject in judicial proceedings. The dignity of the judge—being a public person—the requirements of maximum objectivity and independence in administering justice, so that the parties in a case accept the verdict without undermining its substance, demand that no one involved in the process be subject to objective and well-founded doubts of partiality; if such doubts arise, legitimate suspicion exists.
The judge cannot refuse his office when requested to do so; and if he refuses, he is liable for damages (CIC, cann. 1608, 1625; Italian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 55). But in case of suspicion, he has a duty to abstain, transferring the task to another (can. 1613 ff.; arts. 51-54, 73, 78). In earlier canonical and civil discipline there was no legal obligation to abstain; only practice prevailed, or the parties had to raise the exception of suspicion (recusing the judge).
According to the *Codex Iuris Canonici*, the judge (likewise the promoter of justice and the defender of the bond) must abstain, issuing a reasoned decree to that effect in the following cases: a) relationship by blood or marriage, b) guardianship or curatorship, c) close intimacy or habitual association, d) great personal animosity, e) substantial interest in gain or loss in the case, f) having previously acted as advocate or procurator in the same case. Some consider this enumeration demonstrative, others, with better reason, exhaustive; however, there is no irritating clause. Civil legislation, with greater specification, substantially admits the same grounds for suspicion.
The parties may then raise, against the judge and those assimilated to him, other grounds for suspicion; and against the other members of the tribunal, not excluding the advocate and procurator (cf. can. 1663 ff.), the grounds listed above and other objective ones. But to prevent the parties from abusing this exception, dragging out proceedings or excluding a judge they realize is unfavorable to them during the course of the case, the law requires that the exception of suspicion be lodged, in principle, before the joinder of issue (in civil cases, before the hearing or the discussion of the case), unless grounds for suspicion arise subsequently. Moreover, the challenge must be grounded in causes recognized by law, under penalty of the party being condemned to compensate for damages arising from this incidental matter.
The same law determines who should judge the exception raised by the parties; once the exception is declared well-founded, the Ordinary has the right to substitute other persons free from suspicion. If a party challenges the Ordinary himself for suspicion, both the judgment (unless the Ordinary abstains from the case) and any possible substitution of the person belong to the judge immediately superior.
Given the nature of suspicion, it must be resolved as soon as possible, after hearing the interested parties—thus also the person challenged for suspicion—and, if necessary, other persons at the judge’s discretion; nor is there any appeal from the decree. It is then debated whether the procedural acts possibly performed by the person challenged for suspicion before the decree—even if in his favor—should be considered valid or not.