TEMERARIOUS JUDGMENT. -
It is thinking ill of others without sufficient reason. It therefore includes two elements: a) the firm adherence of the mind to a proposition unfavorable to others; b) the lack of a reason authorizing one to do so. In regard to the first element, it is opposed to doubt and to temerarious suspicion; doubt, in fact (at least in the ordinary sense among the ancients), entails suspension of assent; suspicion implies an initial adherence or, at most, a non-firm adherence. In regard to the second element, t. j. is distinguished from non-temerarious judgment.
Psychologically, t. j. arises from the tendencies toward rashness and malice found in every human being, which strongly incline one to form judgments beyond the objectively ascertained facts. Both tendencies can be enormously intensified by passion and self-interest, especially when concrete and complex matters are involved. For this reason t. j. is extremely frequent in politics and religion. The well-known Latin maxims «ab uno disce omnes», «post hoc ergo propter hoc», etc., are already expressions of all this.
Natural and Christian morality condemn t. j. First of all, because they generally dissuade people from judging. They point out that the morality of an act depends above all on the degree of awareness and freedom with which the object was willed; since all this is difficult to measure, especially for outsiders, it is necessary above all that they abstain as much as possible from formulating judgments. Scripture also insists on this point (v. , e.g., Mt. 7:1; Lc. 6:37; Rom. 14:4; I Cor. 4:5; I Cor. 4:5, etc). To this general reason they add the obligation, arising from love, to interpret the conduct of others favorably insofar as possible, according to what is said in I Cor. 13 («charitas... non cogitat malum»), and the obligation, arising from justice, not to judge beyond what is established. Fi-
nally, they point out that judgments readily tend to find outward expression, thereby creating the danger of defamation.