INTENTION. — St. Bonaventure (In IV lib. Sent., D. 6, p. 2, a. 2) defines intention as “a reflected (ratiocinata) will insofar as it directs itself to an end.” St. Thomas, deriving the etymology from *tendere* (to tend toward something), specifies that intention is an act of the will that moves the individual to act toward an end, developing the relevant energies (Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 12, a. 1). This occurs especially in the tendency toward the ultimate end; yet it is found in all actions, according to the principle that *omnis agens agit propter finem* (ibid., a. 2), namely, that in every action the rational being is moved by a purpose. In this sense, intention coincides with the end of the agent, which, first in intention, is last in execution. Subjectively, therefore, intention is the movement of the will toward an object; objectively, it is the object toward which the will tends.
**Summary:**
I. General Notions
II. Intention and the morality of human activity
III. Whether it is lawful to act with the intention of sensual pleasure
IV. Intention and merit
V. Intention and observance of the law
VI. Intention in the minister of the Sacraments
VII. Intention in the subject of the Sacraments
VIII. Intention in civil and penal matters.I. GENERAL NOTIONS
As an act eminently of the will, intention is connected with the voluntary. There is, therefore, an actual intention when the agent, during the operation, is conscious of what he is doing and of the purpose for which he acts. Intention is instead virtual when the agent, not long before, formed the intention on the basis of which he acts, without, however, reflecting on that intention during the course of the action. Finally, there is habitual intention when it was formed long ago and, even if never revoked, is not operative, as the virtual intention is, at the moment the action unfolds. The agent is then moved to act by other motives; and even if questioned during the course of his action, he might renew the intention once formed, or he might not. Each form of intention—actual, virtual, and habitual—can in turn be either explicit or implicit: in the first case, the agent knows or knew and formed that particular intention; in the second, he formed a distinct intention that, however, by its nature includes the intention in question. An act of love for God, for example, necessarily implies other acts of faith and hope. Some add a fourth form of intention, the interpretative, when the manner of acting of an individual or the circumstances in which he finds himself lead to the presumption of a certain intention in the agent, which in fact may never have existed. Intention can also be absolute or conditional, according to whether the agent performs the act without or with some restriction, subordinating the efficacy of his will to the occurrence of some circumstance.It is not necessary that in a single action there be only one intention; various intentions can concur, one subordinated to another or united by the agent, or held distinct, provided they are not opposed.
II. INTENTION AND THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTIVITY
Intention coincides with what theologians call the end of the agent (*finis operantis*), to distinguish it from the end inherent in the object of the action or omission itself (*finis operis*). Now, while the human act necessarily receives its moral quality—whether good or bad—directly from the object willed, inasmuch as the agent cannot but will what he wills and cannot alter its moral essence, it is also certain that the same act is invested with moral quality by the intention (the end of the agent), since it is this that moves the agent to act. The Angelic Doctor forcefully states that “the end is the form of the will” (In III lib. Sent., D. 40, q. 1, a. 1). In the voluntary act, two aspects must be noted: the internal, that is, the act of the will, and the external, that is, the execution. Both receive their moral character from their proper object. The execution receives its individual moral character from the object pursued by the action; the internal act, in turn, from the end as its proper object. What proceeds from the will must be considered as the formal element with respect to the external act; the will, in acting, uses the other faculties as instruments, and external acts possess no moral quality unless they are voluntary (ibid., a. 6).Morality is the result of two elements (apart from circumstances), one objective (the thing willed), the other subjective (the intention, the movement of the will).
The various combinations of these two elements give rise to different cases, which can be summarized as follows, taking as the basic principle the philosophical axiom “*bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quovis defectu*.” 1) An act good in itself receives greater goodness from a good intention; sometimes, indeed, it acquires a new goodness. He who gives alms to expiate his sins performs an act of both mercy and religion. — 2) If the intention is totally and gravely evil, the good act is completely vitiated. He who gives money to a poor man to make him apostatize does not perform an act of mercy but of seduction. — 3) When a good act in itself is joined to a gravely (though not totally) evil intention, the act, according to the more common opinion, does not lose its objective goodness; yet it is gravely sinful on account of the intention. — 4) An objectively evil act joined to an evil intention increases its malice; sometimes it assumes two or more species of malice; for example, while seducing. — 5) When an evil act is joined to a good intention, the act, however much it may be rendered more excusable, remains evil, except in the case of good faith on the part of the agent, since one must not do evil that good may come (Rom. 3:8). This holds true both for grave and light malice. A lie (venial, for example) is not only sinful because of the harm it does to one’s neighbor; it is intrinsically disordered; hence its use is illicit even to prevent harm (Sum. Theol., 2a-2ae, q. 26, a. 4; q. 110, a. 3). — 6) In the case of indifferent things, the morality of the act is entirely given by the intention, always apart from circumstances; dressing, eating, and so on are good acts if done with a good intention, at least an implicit one. — 7) A good action joined to a slightly evil intention, provided that this is not the total cause of the act, remains substantially good, albeit with diminished goodness.
III. WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO ACT WITH THE INTENTION OF SENSUAL PLEASURE
The teaching of reason and faith can be summarized in three propositions: 1) sensual pleasure posited as the adequate and complete end of activity is contrary to reason; 2) if the limits of propriety imposed by reason are observed and the higher end is not excluded, it is lawful to seek sensual pleasure as the formal object of a particular action; 3) the pursuit of pleasure in all actions, avoiding renunciation, weakens the moral nature of man; hence reason imposes the exercise of temperance.The Angelic Doctor observes that pleasure is natural to man; man is by nature (and thus by God) inclined toward desirable objects, and this for the good of the individual and of society, in defense and development of life. Pleasure thus comes to have the character of a means or an intermediate end, and in a certain way is the first reward of action. It is, however, to be condemned when it is the fruit of a bad act or when, though arising from indifferent things, it is intended as the complete and adequate end of activity; in this way man is reduced to mere matter, without ends higher than sense and time. Reason condemns every kind of Epicureanism whereby pleasure in itself is good, and hence all pleasures are good. The error here consists in not distinguishing between the good in itself and the good that receives its goodness from a good agent (Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 34, a. 4; and qq. 31-35). Sacred Scripture openly condemns this theory (Wis. 2:1-9; Is. 22:13; 56:10 ff.; 1 Cor. 15:32; Luke 12:15-21; 16:19 ff.).
It may be understood directly that sensible pleasure can be the proximate end of activity, provided it is kept within the limits imposed by reason, as has already been partly explained. Man is not pure spirit; he is body as well. When St Paul affirms that the flesh has desires contrary to the spirit and that Christians must crucify their flesh (Gal. 5:17, 24), this must not be taken in an absolute sense. The practice and doctrine of Christ and the Apostles explain the Pauline texts. Jesus attends the wedding at Cana, the table of Simon the leper, and has the Last Supper prepared (cf. also Lk. 15 ff.; Mk. 2:19). There are, as the Angelic Doctor says, good pleasures, “ita tamen quod nulla (delectatio) sit summum bonum.” The discriminating rule cannot be pleasure itself; good and bad people experience the same pleasure in the use of the same things; the difference lies in the fact that the good taste according to the measure of right reason.
Man, in providing for the needs or comforts of the body, can act either with regard only to his animal nature or with regard to it in the unity of spirit and body (Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 34, a. 4).
Two principles may therefore be accepted: 1) he who in acting seeks pleasure as granted for the exercise of duty acts rightly; in fact he is not led by the exclusive pursuit of pleasure; 2) he who seeks sensible pleasure as permitted to reasonable nature, not setting it as the purpose of life but of a given good or indifferent action, also acts honestly. In the first case pleasure is the end; but without excluding, even implicitly, the higher end, it does not subordinate spirit to sense. The delightful does not contradict the honest, nor is the subordination of flesh to spirit removed.
Is it then permissible deliberately to seek pleasure alone in all actions, avoiding all renunciations? Supposing that one fulfils all moral and social duties, without exposing oneself to the proximate danger of failing in them, the hypothesis becomes impossible; if nothing else, the idea of pleasure is operative in the idea of duty. Reduced to these terms, the question can theoretically be answered in the affirmative.
Theology, psychology and history, however, warn that our nature is not only limited but also inclined to evil; less noble instincts make their influence felt. On the other hand, duty often imposes renunciations. This should not lead to the conclusions of Stoicism, which affirms pleasure to be evil in itself, but it must be admitted that frequent sacrifice is necessary. The New Testament moreover is a programme of renunciations, summed up in the figure of the Crucified, to which the Christian must conform. The craving for pleasure, finally, paralyses the best energies.
IV. INTENTION AND MERIT
It is important not only to consider human actions in respect of their natural goodness, but above all in relation to the ultimate end, under what conditions and to what extent they are deserving of reward from God. Merit is properly the quality inherent in an action by which the agent is entitled to a recompense. In the human sphere it is enough that the action have natural goodness; but in view of the ultimate end, for supernatural merit it must have in itself a new quality by which God is in some way bound to reward II. If the divine reward is based on motives of fitness and goodness, the merit is called *de congruo*; if on infallible motives (God’s veracity and solemn promise) it is said to be *de condigno*.Supernatural merit *de condigno* requires in the object goodness, in the agent goodness and the state of grace, and on God’s part a solemn promise.
Here again there are interferences between the state of grace and intention, and between intention and merit. Some theologians for supernatural merit demand formal intention, at least implicit and supernatural, which refers the work to God. Others, and with good reason, teach that actual and virtual intention are praiseworthy and useful but not necessary, habitual intention being sufficient. The nature of an action is judged by its operative principle; proceeding from a being in grace, it is thereby clothed with grace. Frequent and fervent renewal of good intention, however, increases merit, strengthens the will and purifies the love of God (cf. St Thomas, In II lib. Sent., D. 40, a. 5). This holds for one who lives in grace: acts performed with natural goodness are not susceptible of merit unless performed by one in grace; in one devoid of grace they are indifferent to merit and demerit (ibid.). This is absolutely true of merit *de condigno*; but for merit *de congruo* God grants many actual graces so that the sinner may attain repentance. The sinner who, moved by the desire for grace, performs good acts with good intention merits the preparatory graces for justification; only thus are explained the Scriptural exhortations to repentance. Whereas in the just habitual intention suffices for merit, in the sinner at least virtual and supernatural intention is required, since for supernatural merit the motion of an actual grace is required.
Connected with this is the question of the quantity of merit. Intention is the quality of the work; the same cannot be said of quantity, which in fact is proportionate to the intensity and perfection of the volitive act, informed by greater or lesser charity, by the greater or lesser nobility of the intention itself, and by the actual holiness of the agent, not by words.
V. INTENTION AND OBSERVANCE OF THE LAW
Three questions may be raised: 1) whether intention is necessary for the observance of the law; 2) whether it is at least necessary for merit; 3) whether intention can be excluded while observing the law, by performing the prescribed work.1) If the law is affirmative (e.g., attending Mass) it is observed by performing the work in a human way (awareness of what one is doing) and with at least virtual intention of achieving the intrinsic goodness of the work (in the case cited, participation in the Sacrifice). Habitual intention or one opposed to the substance of the work is not sufficient: being asleep in church, or going solely to hear the music. Where real performances are concerned (e.g., paying a debt) no intention is required, nor does an opposed intention do harm. A negative law (e.g., not working on feast days) is observed by not performing the prohibited work, even if the assent is unconscious, involuntary or forced. At most one can sin entirely. For merit, however, at least virtual intention of not performing the prohibited action for a good motive is required. He who does not work on Sunday does not sin; for merit he must abstain for a motive of religion or obedience. — 2) For merit under the conditions stated nothing more is required; the legislator wants the work. One therefore merits even by acting without thinking of the law or by performing the work with a different intention. Intention to achieve the end intended by the law (*fines operis*) is not required for observance, unless this is the essence of the law. — 3) If the agent performs the prescribed work with the express intention of not observing the law, perhaps deferring it to another time, he fulfils the law even if afterwards he abstains from the work without motive. The exception is the case of an obligation freely assumed, e.g., by vow; in this case an opposed intention is effective.
For the bibliography see at the end of the article. Sistino da Romallo
VI. INTENTION IN THE MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENTS
When administering the Sacraments the Pope and Bishops do not act by their own or original or derived authority, as when they enact a law, but simply as “delegates,” “vicars” of Jesus Christ.Legally, their action has the same value as it would have if it were performed by Jesus Christ Himself. The same is true when the minister of the sacrament is merely a priest or even not a priest (as in the case of Baptism and Matrimony). “There is only one and the same victim [in the sacrifice of the Cross and in the Holy Mass]; one and the same is the offering which was then immolated [in a bloody manner], and is now immolated through the priests” (Council of Trent, sess. XXII, cap. 2; Denz-U, 940). “Jesus Christ, as priest, offered Himself and continues to offer Himself perpetually as a victim for sins” (Pius XI, encyc. *Quas primas* of 11 Dec. 1925: Denz-U, 2195. Cf. also Council of Florence, *Decretum ad Armenos*: Denz-U, 689, and Council of Trent, sess. XIV, cap. 5; Denz-U, 899). Of Baptism St. Augustine said: “If Peter baptizes, it is He [Christ] who baptizes; if Paul baptizes, it is He [Christ] who baptizes; if Judas baptizes, it is He [Christ] who baptizes” (*In Io.*, tr. 6, n. 7: PL 35, 1482). In the language of his philosophy, St. Thomas expresses the same thought by saying that he who baptizes is merely an instrument in the hand of Jesus Christ (*In IV Sent.*, d. 5, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 2.3). What the cited texts explicitly affirm of the Holy Eucharist and of Baptism holds true for every sacrament. The author of every sacrament is always Jesus Christ. The bishop, the priest, or he who baptizes—in theological terminology, the “minister” of the sacrament—acts as the “representative,” the “vicar” of Jesus Christ. And since the “minister” of the sacrament is a person, that is, a free being capable of acting as the “representative” or “vicar” of Jesus Christ, but also capable of acting on his own behalf, for his own purposes, it follows that the rite is not a sacrament merely because it possesses all the essential elements of a rite instituted by Jesus Christ, but because it is the rite instituted by Jesus Christ and because it is performed by one who can and intends to act as the representative of Jesus Christ. If the intention to act as the vicar of Jesus Christ were lacking, the rite, even if perfect in its external ceremonial aspect, would not be a sacrament.
Here, the *intention* is the will to act as the representative of Jesus Christ. Its necessity is usually expressed by saying that the minister of the sacrament must have the will *to do what the Church does*. This is the form in which the principal explicit documents affirm its absolute necessity for the valid administration of every sacrament: Council of Trent, sess. VII, can. 11 (Denz-U, 762); the profession of faith prescribed for the Waldensians by Innocent III (1208; Denz-U, 424); the questionnaire prescribed for the Hussites by the Council of Constance (Denz-U, 672); and the *Decretum ad Armenos* of the Council of Florence (1439; Denz-U, 695).
1. **The Object of the Intention.** — The intention to act as the representative of Jesus Christ is sufficiently present whenever the minister performs the sacramental action, directing it to the end for which Jesus Christ instituted it, that is, to the end willed by the Church (for the Church wills only what Jesus Christ wills). In other words, the minister must act intending to perform the rite instituted by Jesus Christ as He instituted it, or, in the case of Baptism administered by an unbeliever or an infidel, intending to perform that rite which Christians perform, as Christians perform II. In all such cases, the minister of the sacrament consciously and freely intends a result that surpasses his natural powers and can be achieved only by exercising the powers received from Jesus Christ. Unbelief or ignorance may prevent the unbeliever or infidel from understanding the nature of the action he performs, but since they are authorized by Jesus Christ to administer Baptism (Jesus Christ willed that every human person be a valid minister of this sacrament necessary for eternal salvation), and since they intend to perform that rite which Christians perform, as Christians perform it, what they do is perfectly identified and is the Christian sacrament.
To further clarify the object of the minister’s intention, it must be noted that the effect of the sacrament—the grace (and the character in Baptism, Confirmation, and Holy Orders)—is one thing, while the sacramental rite that constitutes the sacrament is another. Certainly, the sacrament is present when, in performing the rite instituted by Jesus Christ, the minister intends to achieve the end for which Jesus Christ instituted it, or for which the Church administers the sacrament. Doubt may arise, however, regarding the presence of the sacramental intention in the minister when he intends merely to perform the sacramental rite. The rite can indeed be performed under the prescribed circumstances of place and time for the administration of the sacraments, but it can also be performed in other circumstances—for example, in a liturgical school, before a group of doctors or nurses to teach them how to baptize, or even by profaners in derision.
The Reformers of the 16th century asserted that the sacrament is present whenever the sacramental rite is performed, even if the one performing it does so not seriously and with the intention of administering a sacrament, but in jest. This doctrine is condemned by the Church: prop. 12 of M. Luther (Denz-U, 752), Council of Trent, sess. XIV, cap. 6 (Denz-U, 902), sess. VII, can. 11 (Denz-U, 762).
Some Catholic theologians have asserted that the sacrament is valid if the minister performs the sacramental rite seriously and correctly, even if he does not intend to achieve the end for which the sacrament was instituted, or even if he does not intend to administer the sacrament at all. For validity—though not for liceity—it is sufficient that the minister of the sacrament intends to perform the rite seriously. This is the opinion of the so-called *external intention* (i.e., an intention that is limited to willing the external sacramental rite). Ambrogio Catarino (v. POLITI LANCELOTTO) and A. Salmeron are erroneously cited as the principal authors of this opinion. It is an uncertain opinion, to be abandoned in practice and not followed in theory. Alexander VIII condemned the proposition of Fr. Farvacques: “Baptism is valid when administered by a minister who observes exactly the external rite and the baptismal form, but in his heart says: ‘I do not intend to do what the Church does’” (Denz-U, 1318).
It is the common teaching of theologians that the minister of the sacrament must intend to administer the sacrament. This intention may be more or less explicit, but it must be real. It is not necessary that the minister intend the end of the sacrament, but it is not sufficient to intend merely to perform the external rite, even if done seriously and with dignity. In the minister of the sacrament, an *internal intention* is required (i.e., one that is not limited to willing the external rite but penetrates its inner meaning and wills it as a sacrament). Precisely because the sacramental rite can be performed on various occasions and for various purposes, the rite alone does not specify in whose name and by whose authority it is performed. Something more must intervene that at least implies in the minister the will to act as a priest (Jesus Christ), to perform that rite as Jesus Christ instituted II.
2. **The Actuality of the Sacramental Intention.** — The intention necessary in the minister of the sacrament must be such as to direct his action in fact toward the performance of the sacrament. It must therefore be at least virtual. Habitual intention is not sufficient, because it does not influence the action. Actual intention is not strictly necessary and will often be difficult to have, since the formulas that the minister must recite and the prescribed ceremonies he must perform will easily absorb his attention.
The doctrine on sacramental intention emphasizes that the sacramental rite is not a magical rite (the rite alone is not a sacrament, is ineffective, and as if it did not exist) and that the Christian priest is neither an automaton nor a mere functionary who saves appearances by meticulously performing the external rite while withholding the best part of himself from his office. He is a minister of Jesus Christ because he performs the prescribed rites with a sense of obedience to Jesus Christ, making his own the ideals of sanctification and salvation of his divine Master.
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VIII. INTENTION IN THE RECIPIENT OF THE SACRAMENTS
a) In infants and those assimilated with regard to the sacraments of which they are capable (Baptism, Confirmation; Eucharist and Holy Orders, excluding these two under current discipline), no personal intention is required for validity; the Church supplies it: Innocent III (c. 3, X, 3, 42, cf. *Sum. Theol.*, III, q. 68, a. 9).b) In adults endowed with the use of reason: in general, habitual intention, whether explicit or at least implicit, is required for validity (cf. Innocent III, loc. cit.), the Council of Trent (sess. VI; Denz-U, 798 sqq.), and the CIC (canons 745, 752, with the unanimity of theologians).
Given the principle *Sacramenta propter homines*, sometimes one may proceed with only interpretative intention in the subject, at least under condition; canon 752 requires in the baptismal candidate, deprived of the senses, explicit habitual intention; but theologians admit the possibility of baptizing even with only interpretative intention. This applies even more to Extreme Unction, absolution, and Viaticum: one who, at the point of death, wishes to be saved thereby ipso facto desires the relevant sacraments. One who, at the point of death, refuses the sacraments not out of contempt but merely through the idea of not being at death’s door, is entitled to the sacraments, even if he lived somewhat tepidly.
In one who in life was opposed to religion, two hypotheses may arise: either he could not manifest any will before losing his senses, and he must be judged benignly as if he were not opposed out of malice but only through ignorance; or he manifested immediately beforehand a will contrary to any act of religion. In the first case, some sacraments may be administered to him, provided scandal is removed; not so in the second.
Penance, Communion, Matrimony, and Ordination require freedom, but their nature and manner of conferral.
It may happen that an intention, expressed at any time, regarding a specific action, may come into conflict with another expressed at a different time; which is to be considered effective? No general answer can be given; often the virtual or even habitual intention prevails over the actual one, since the actual intention is present only in appearance. The stronger prevails; that is, the one which, at the moment of its expression, the agent intended to prevail.
Delicate applications arise in Matrimony in the conflict between the *intentio contrahendi*, *obligandi*, or *non adimplendi* (v. MATRIMONIO), the application of the Mass (v.), in matters of contracts involving error (v. CONTRATTO), whether substantial or in the conditions attached (v. CONDIZIONE).
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VIII. INTENTION IN CIVIL AND PENAL MATTERS
Intention corresponds to the classical Roman terms *animus* and *dolus* in matters of contracts and crimes; the former has a general sense, while the latter signifies evil intention (v. DOLO). The laws on this subject deal directly with intention insofar as it may vitiate a juridical act (v.).In penal matters, the malice of an action depends on the intention of the agent; fortuitous event (v.), force majeure (v.), inculpable ignorance (v.), and mental deficiency (v. MENTALI, INFIRMITÀ) are causes that remove or diminish responsibility. Italian penal law (1930) distinguishes various types of violations (v. DELITTO) according to the intention of the agent: intentional crimes, preterintentional crimes, and negligent crimes, as well as intentional or negligent contraventions (art. 39, 42 et seq.).
The CIC, however, recognizes only dolus (v.) and culpa (v.) (can. 2199). The CIC also establishes as a presumption (notably) that, once a violation is verified in the external forum, dolus is presumed in intention (can. 2200 § 2). In every action, it is presumed that the agent exercised due attention and freedom. If personal or external conditions prevented the exercise of attention and freedom, it is admitted that the individual may prove their existence and influence; sometimes the judge must weigh them ex officio (cf. can. 2202-2206; 2229 et seq.). A case of malicious intention presumed only after one month is found in can. 644.