Intention

INTENZIONE. – S. Bonaventura (In IV lib. Sent., D. 6, p. 2, a. 2) defines intention as: “Reflected (ratiocinata) will insofar as it is directed toward the end.” S. Tommaso, deriving the etymology from tendere (toward something), specifies that intention is an act of the will which moves the individual to act toward an end, bringing the relevant energies into play (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᶜ, q. 12, a. 1). This occurs especially in the inclination toward the ultimate end; but it is found in all actions, according to the axiom omnis agens agit propter finem (ibid., a. 2), that is, in every action the rational being is moved by a purpose. In this sense intention coincides with the end of the agent, which, first in intention, is last in execution. Subjectively, therefore, intention is the movement of the will toward an object; objectively, it is the object toward which the will tends.

SUMMARY:

I. General notions

II. Intention and the morality of human activity

III. Whether it is licit to act with the intention of sensible pleasure

IV. Intention and merit

V. Intention and observance of the law

VI. Intention in the minister of the Sacraments

VII. Intention in the subject of the Sacraments

VIII. Intention in civil and criminal matters.

I. GENERAL NOTIONS

As an act eminently of the will, intention is connected with the voluntary act. Thus there is an actual intention when the agent, during his action, is conscious of what he is doing and of the purpose for which he acts. Intention is instead virtual when the agent, at a relatively recent time, formed the intention on the basis of which he proceeds to act, without, however, reflecting during its course on the intention previously formed. Finally, there is habitual intention when it was formed at a very remote time and, moreover, although it has never been revoked, is nevertheless not operative, as the virtual intention is, at the moment when the action unfolds. The agent is then moved to action by other motives; and even if questioned during the course of his activity, he might renew the intention once formed, just as he might not renew II. Each form of intention—actual, virtual, and habitual—may in turn be explicit or implicit; in the first case, the agent knows or knew and formed that particular intention; in the second, he formed a distinct intention which, by its nature, nevertheless also contains the intention in question. An act of love of God, for example, necessarily entails other acts of faith and hope. Some add a fourth form of intention, the interpretative intention, when an individual’s manner of acting or the circumstances in which he finds himself lead one to presume a particular intention in the agent, although in fact it may never have existed. Intention may also be absolute or conditional, according as the agent performs his act with or without some restriction, making the efficacy of his will subordinate to the occurrence of some circumstance.

It is not necessary that there be only one intention in an action; various intentions may concur, one subordinate to another or united by the agent, or kept distinct, provided that they are not opposed.

II. INTENTION AND THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTIVITY

Intention coincides with what theologians call the end of the agent (finis operantis), to distinguish it from the end inherent in the object itself of the action or omission (finis operis). Now, although the human act necessarily receives its quality of being morally good or bad directly from the willed object, insofar as the agent cannot fail to will what he wills and at the same time cannot alter its moral essence, it is equally certain that the same act is also invested with a moral element by intention (the end of the agent), since intention actually moves one to act. The Angelic Doctor says forcefully that “the form of the will is the end” (In II lib. Sent., D. 40, q. 1, a. 1). Two aspects must be distinguished in the voluntary act: the internal, that is, the act of the will, and the external, that is, the execution. Both receive their moral character from their proper object. The execution receives its moral individuation from the object pursued through the action; the internal act, in turn, from the end as its proper object. Moreover, that which proceeds from the will must be considered as the formal element with regard to the external act; in acting, the will uses the other faculties as instruments, and external acts possess no morality except insofar as they are voluntary (ibid., a. 6).

Morality is the result of two elements (apart from circumstances), one objective (the thing willed), and one subjective (intention, the movement of the will).

The various ways in which these two elements are superimposed give rise to various combinations, which may be summarized as follows, taking as the fundamental principle the philosophical axiom “bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quovis defectu.” 1) An act good in itself receives greater goodness from a good intention; sometimes, indeed, it receives a new goodness. One who gives alms in order to expiate his sins performs an act of mercy and of religion at the same time. — 2) If the intention is wholly and gravely evil, the good act becomes entirely vicious. One who offers money to a needy person in order to turn him away from the faith performs not an act of mercy but one of seduction. — 3) By joining to an act good in itself an intention that is gravely (though not wholly) evil, the act, according to the more common opinion, is not deprived of its objective goodness; nevertheless, it is gravely sinful because of the intention. — 4) An objectively evil act joined to an evil intention increases its own malice; sometimes it assumes two or more species of malice; for example, lying in order to seduce. — 5) By joining a good intention to an evil act, the act, although made more excusable, remains evil, without prejudice to the good faith of the agent, since one must not do evil in order to obtain good from it (Rom. 3, 8). This applies whether the malice is grave or slight. A lie (venial, for example) is not sinful only because of the harm it causes one’s neighbor, but is intrinsically disordered; therefore its use is unlawful even for the purpose of preventing harm (Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 26, a. 2; q. 110, a. 3). — 6) In the case of indifferent things, the morality of the act is determined entirely by the intention, always leaving circumstances aside; dressing, eating, and so forth are good acts if performed with a good intention, at least implicitly. — 7) A good action joined to a slightly evil intention, provided that this is not the total cause of the action, remains substantially good, though with diminished goodness.

III. WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO ACT WITH THE INTENTION OF SENSIBLE PLEASURE

The teaching of reason and faith may be concretized in three propositions: 1) sensible pleasure posited as the adequate and complete end of activity is contrary to reason; 2) if one observes the limits of propriety imposed by reason and does not exclude the higher end, it is lawful to seek sensible pleasure as the formal object of a particular action; 3) the pursuit of pleasure in all actions, while avoiding renunciation, weakens man’s moral nature; therefore reason imposes the exercise of temperance.

The Angelic observes that pleasure is connatural to man; man has from nature (and therefore from God) an inclination toward desirable objects, and this for the good of the individual himself and of the community, in the defense and development of life. Pleasure thus comes to have the character of a means or an intermediate end and is, in a certain sense, the first reward of action. Pleasure, on the other hand, is to be condemned when it is the fruit of a bad act or when, even though arising from indifferent things, it is intended as the complete and adequate end of activity; for in this way man is reduced to matter, without ends superior to the senses and to time. Reason condemns every form of Epicureanism according to which pleasure in itself is good, and therefore all pleasures are good. The equivocation here consists in failing to distinguish the good in itself from the good that receives its goodness from a good being (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 34, a. 4; and qq. 31-35). Sacred Scripture too openly condemns this theory (Sap. 2, 1-9; Is. 22, 13; 56, 10 sgg.; I Cor. 15, 32; Lc. 12, 15-21; 16, 19 sgg.).

That sensible pleasure may at the same time be directly intended as the proximate end of activity, while remaining within the limits imposed by reason, follows from what has already been explained in part. Man is not pure spirit; he is body; and if s. Paolo affirms that the flesh has desires contrary to the spirit and that Christians must crucify their flesh (Gal. 5, 17, 24), this is not to be understood in an absolute sense. The practice and doctrine of Christ and the Apostles explain the Pauline texts. Jesus goes to the wedding at Cana, to the table of Simone il lebbroso, and has the Last Supper prepared (cf. also Lc. 15 sgg.; Mc. 2, 19). There are, says the Angelic, good pleasures, « ita tamen quod nulla (delectatio) sit summum bonum ». The criterion of discernment cannot be pleasure itself; good and bad persons experience the same pleasure in the use of the same things; the difference lies in the fact that the good enjoy them according to the measure of right reason.

In supplying the needs or comforts of the body, man may act either by considering only its animal nature or by considering it within the unity of spirit and body (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵒ, q. 34, a. 4).

These two principles may therefore be held: 1) whoever, in acting, seeks pleasure as connected with the exercise of duty acts rightly; in fact, he is not led by the exclusive intention of pleasure; 2) whoever properly seeks sensible pleasure, insofar as it is compatible with rational nature, placing in it not the purpose of life but that of a given good or indifferent action, also acts honestly. His intention is pleasure; but, since he does not exclude, even implicitly, the higher end, he does not subordinate the spirit to the senses. The pleasurable does not contradict the honorable, nor is the subordination of the flesh to the spirit removed.

Would it then be lawful deliberately to seek only pleasure in all actions, avoiding every renunciation? Assuming that a person fulfills all his moral and social duties without exposing himself to the proximate danger of failing in them, the hypothesis becomes impossible; if for no other reason, along with the intention of pleasure the intention of duty is operative. Once the question has been reduced to these terms, it may in theory receive an affirmative answer.

Theology, psychology, and history, however, warn us that our nature is not only limited but also infirm; less noble instincts make their influence felt. On the other hand, duty often imposes renunciations. This should not lead to the conclusions of Stoicism, which asserts that delight is evil in itself, but it should lead us to acknowledge the necessity of frequent sacrifice. The New Testament, moreover, is a program of renunciations, summed up in the figure of the Crucified One, to whom the Christian must conform. Finally, the craving for pleasure paralyzes the best energies.

IV. INTENTION AND MERIT

It is important not merely to consider human actions under the aspect of their natural goodness, but above all in relation to their ultimate end: under what conditions and to what extent they are deserving of reward from God. Merit is properly the quality inherent in an action by which a recompense is due to the agent. In the human sphere, it suffices that the action possess natural goodness; but in relation to the ultimate end, for supernatural merit it must have within itself a new quality by which God is in some way bound to reward II. If divine recompense is based on considerations of fittingness and goodness, the merit is called de congruo; if on infallible grounds (the truthfulness and solemn promise of God), it is called de condigno.

Merit de condigno requires goodness in the object, good intention and the state of Grace in the agent, and the solemn promise on God’s part.

Here too there are interrelations between the state of Grace and intention, and between intention and merit. Some theologians require for supernatural merit a formal intention, at least implicit, and supernatural, which refers the work to God. Others, and with good reason, teach that actual and virtual intentions are praiseworthy and useful, but not necessary, since habitual intention suffices. The nature of an action is judged by its operative principle; proceeding from a being in Grace, it is thereby clothed with Grace. Frequent and fervent renewal of a good intention, however, increases merit, strengthens the will, and purifies the love of God (cf. s. Tommaso, In II lib. Sent., D. 40, a. 5). This applies to one who lives in Grace: acts performed with natural goodness are not capable of merit except in one who possesses Grace; in one deprived of it they are indifferent to merit and demerit (ibid.). This is absolutely true when merit de condigno is concerned; but for merit de congruo God bestows many actual graces so that the sinner may attain repentance. The sinner who, moved by a desire for Grace, performs good acts with good intention merits the graces preparatory to justification; only in this way can the exhortations of Scripture to repentance be explained. But whereas in the just habitual intention suffices for merit, in the sinner at least a virtual and supernatural intention is required, since in him supernatural merit requires the motion of an actual grace.

Connected with this is the question of the quantity of merit. Intention gives the work its quality; the same cannot be said of its quantity, which is in fact proportionate to the intensity and perfection of the volitional act, informed by greater or lesser charity, by the greater or lesser nobility of the intention itself, and by the agent’s actual holiness—not by words.
V. L'

I. E L'OSSERVANZA DELLA LEGGE

Three questions may be raised: 1) whether intention is necessary for observance of the law; 2) whether it is at least necessary for merit; 3) whether observance of the law can be excluded by intention while performing the prescribed act.

1) If the law is affirmative (hearing Mass), it is observed by performing the act in a human manner (awareness of what one is doing) and with at least the virtual intention of attaining the intrinsic goodness of the act (in the case under discussion, participating in the Sacrifice). Habitual intention, or an intention opposed to the substance of the act, cannot suffice: being in church asleep, or solely in order to listen to the music. In the case of real prestations (paying a debt), no intention at all is required, nor does a contrary intention cause harm. A negative law (not working on feast days) is observed by refraining from the prohibited act, even if the abstention is unconscious, involuntary, or forced. At most, one may sin internally. For merit, however, at least the virtual intention not to perform the prohibited action for a good reason is required. Whoever does not work on Sunday does not sin; for merit, one must abstain for a reason of religion or obedience. — 2) For merit, nothing more need be added to the conditions set out; the legislator desires the act. One therefore merits even when acting without thinking of the law or performing the act with a different intention. For observance, it is not necessary to intend to attain the end willed by the law (finis operis), unless this constitutes the essence of the law. — 3) If the agent performs the prescribed act with the explicit intention of not observing the law, perhaps postponing it to another time, he fulfils the law, even if he subsequently abstains from the act, even without a reason. An exception is the case of an obligation freely assumed by someone, e.g., by vow; in this case a contrary intention is effective.

For the bibliography vedi voce. Sisinio da Romallo
VI. INTENTION IN THE MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENTS. — In administering the Sacraments, the pope and the bishops do not act by authority of their own, either original or derived, as, for example, when they enact a law, but simply as “delegates” and “vicars” of Jesus Christ.

Juridically, their action has the same value as it would have if it were performed by Jesus Christ himself. The same must be said when the person administering the sacrament is merely a priest or not even a priest (as in the case of Baptism and Matrimony). “One and the same is the victim [in the sacrifice of the Cross and in the Holy Mass]; one and the same is the offerer who then offered himself [in a bloody manner], and now offers himself through the priests” (Council of Trent, sess. XXII, chap. 2; Denz-U, 940). “Jesus Christ the priest offered himself and perpetually offers himself as a victim for sins” (Pius XI, encyclical Quas primas of 11 December 1925; Denz-U, 2195. Cf. also Council of Florence, Decretum ad Armenos; Denz-U, 698, and Council of Trent, sess. XIV, chap. 5; Denz-U, 899). Of Baptism, St. Augustine said: “let Peter baptize [even], it is he [Christ] who baptizes; let Paul baptize [even], it is he [Christ] who baptizes; let Judas baptize [even], it is he [Christ] who baptizes” (In Io., tr. 6, no. 7; PL 35, 1482). In the terminology of his philosophical language, St. Thomas expresses the same thought by saying that the one who baptizes is merely an instrument in the hands of Jesus Christ (In IV Sent., d. 5, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 2, 3). What the texts cited explicitly affirm of the Holy Eucharist and of Baptism applies to every sacrament. The author of every sacrament is always Jesus Christ. The bishop, the priest, the one who baptizes—in general theological terminology, the “minister” of the sacrament—acts as the “representative” and “vicar” of Jesus Christ. And since the “minister” of the sacrament is a person, that is, a free being capable of acting as the “representative” and “vicar” of Jesus Christ, but also capable of acting in his own name, on his own account and for his own ends, it follows that the sacramental rite is not a sacrament merely and solely because it has all the essential elements of the sacramental rite instituted by Jesus Christ, but because it is the rite instituted by Jesus Christ and because it is performed by one who can and wishes to act as the representative of Jesus Christ. If the will to act as vicar of Jesus Christ were lacking, the sacramental rite, even if perfect in its external ceremonial aspect, would not be a sacrament.

Sacramental intention is the will to act as the representative of Jesus Christ. Its necessity is expressed by saying that the “minister” of the sacrament must have the intention of doing what the Church does. In this form the principal explicit documents affirming its absolute necessity for every valid administration of a sacrament were drawn up: Council of Trent, session VII, canon 11 (Denz-U, 762); profession of faith prescribed for the Waldensians by Innocent III (1208; Denz-U, 424); questionnaire prescribed for the Hussites and Wycliffites by the Council of Constance (Denz-U, 672); Decretum ad Armenos of the Council of Florence (1439; Denz-U, 695).

1. The object of intention. — The intention to act as the representative of Jesus Christ is sufficiently present whenever the “minister” performs the sacramental action by directing it toward the end for which Jesus Christ instituted it, the end willed by the Church (the Church wills nothing other than what Jesus Christ wills). In other words, the “minister” must act with the will to perform the rite instituted by Jesus Christ, as Jesus Christ instituted it; or again, in the case of Baptism administered by an unbeliever or an infidel, with the will to perform that rite which Christians perform, as Christians perform II. In all these cases the “minister” of the sacrament consciously and freely seeks a result that exceeds his human capacities and can be obtained only by using the powers received from Jesus Christ. Unbelief or ignorance may prevent the unbeliever or infidel from knowing the nature of the action he performs; but since they 1) are authorized by Jesus Christ to administer Baptism (Jesus Christ willed that every human person should be a valid minister of this sacrament necessary for eternal salvation), and 2) wish to perform that rite which Christians perform, as Christians perform it, it follows that what they perform is perfectly identified and is the Christian sacrament.

To clarify further the object of the intention of the “minister” of the sacrament, it should be observed that the effect of the sacrament, Grace (and the character in Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders), is one thing, while the “sacramental rite” that constitutes the sacrament is another. Certainly, anyone who performs the rite instituted by Jesus Christ and wishes to obtain the end for which Jesus Christ instituted it, or for which the Church administers the sacrament, has sacramental intention. Doubt may instead arise concerning the presence of sacramental intention in the “minister” when he wishes solely to perform the sacramental rite. For the rite may be performed in the circumstances of place and time prescribed by the Church for the administration of the Sacraments, but it may also be performed in other circumstances, for example, in a liturgical school, before a group of physicians or nurses in order to teach them how to baptize, and even by desecrators as an act of mockery.

The reformers of the sixteenth century asserted that the sacrament is present whenever the sacramental rite is performed, even if the person performing it acts neither seriously nor with the intention of administering a sacrament, but as a joke. This doctrine is condemned by the Church: proposition 12 of M. Luther (Denz-U, 752), Council of Trent, sess. XIV, chap. 6 (Denz-U, 902), sess. VII, canon 11 (Denz-U, 762). Some Catholic theologians asserted that the sacrament is valid if the person administering it performs the sacramental rite seriously and correctly, even if he does not intend to attain the end for which the sacrament was instituted, indeed, even if he does not intend to administer the sacrament at all. They thought it sufficient for validity—not for freedom—that the “minister” of the sacrament seriously intend to perform the sacramental rite. This is the opinion of the so-called external intention (= intention limited to willing the external sacramental rite). The two sixteenth-century theologians Ambrogio Catarino (v. POLITI LANCELLOTTO) and A. Salmerone are erroneously cited as its principal authors. It is an uncertain opinion, to be abandoned in practice, and not followed in theory. Alexander VIII condemned the proposition of Fr. Farvacques: Baptism administered by a “minister” who precisely observes the external rite and the baptismal form, but in his heart says, “I do not wish to do what the Church does,” is valid (Denz-U, 1318).

It is the common opinion of theologians that the “minister” of the sacrament must wish to administer the sacrament. This may be willed more or less explicitly, but it must truly be willed. It is not necessary for the “minister” to will the end of the sacrament, but it is not sufficient merely to will to perform the external sacramental rite, even with seriousness and dignity. In the “minister” of the sacrament, internal intention is required (= intention that does not merely will the external sacramental rite, but penetrates into its interior meaning and wills it as a sacrament). Precisely because the sacramental rite can be performed on different occasions and for different ends, it does not by itself specify in whose name and by whose authority it is performed. Something must therefore intervene that at least implies in the “minister” the will to act as the “vicar” of Jesus Christ, to perform that rite as Jesus Christ instituted II.
2. Actuality of sacramental intention. — The intention required in the “minister” of the sacrament must be such as to direct his action in fact toward the conferral of the sacrament. It must therefore be at least virtual. Habitual intention is not sufficient, because it does not influence the action. Actual intention is not strictly necessary, and it will often also be difficult to have it, because the formulas that the “minister” must recite and the precise ceremonies that he must perform will easily absorb his attention.

The doctrine of sacramental intention emphasizes that the sacramental rite is not a magical rite (the rite by itself is not a sacrament; it is ineffective and as though it did not exist) and that the Christian priest is neither an automaton nor a functionary who merely preserves appearances by accurately performing the external rite while withholding from his office the better part of himself. He is a minister of Jesus Christ because he performs the prescribed rites in a spirit of obedience to Jesus Christ, making his divine Master’s ideals of sanctification and salvation his own.

b) In adults endowed with the use of reason, as a rule, for validity an explicit or at least implicit habitual intention is required (cf. Innocent III, art. cit.), Council of Trent (sess. VI: Denz-U, 798 ff.), CIC (cann. 745, 752, with the unanimity of theologians).

Given the principle Sacramenta propter homines, sometimes one may proceed with only interpretative intention in the subject, at least conditionally; canon 752 requires in a person to be baptized who is deprived of the use of his senses an explicit habitual intention; but theologians admit the possibility of baptizing even with only interpretative intention. This applies all the more to Extreme Unction, absolution, and Viaticum: whoever wishes to be saved at the end of life thereby wishes for the corresponding Sacraments. Whoever, at the point of death, refuses the Sacraments not out of contempt, but merely because he believes that he is not at the end of his life, has a right to the Sacraments, even if he lived somewhat lukewarmly.

In one who during his lifetime was hostile to religion, two hypotheses may arise: either he was unable to manifest any will before losing consciousness, and he must be judged benignly, as though he had not been hostile through malice, but only through ignorance; or immediately beforehand he manifested a will opposed to any act of religion. In the first case some Sacraments may be administered to him, provided that the scandal is removed; not so in the second.

Penance, Communion, Matrimony, and Orders require at least virtual intention, given their nature and the manner of their conferral.

It may happen that an intention formed at any time, relating to a specific action, conflicts with another intention formed at another time; which is to be regarded as effective? No general answer can be given; often the virtual intention, or even the habitual intention, prevails over the actual intention, since the latter is present only apparently. The stronger one prevails—that is, the one which, at the moment of its formation, the agent intended should prevail.

There are delicate applications in Matrimony in the conflict between the intention contrahendi, if obligandi, not adimplendi (v. MATRIMONIO), Mass (v.), and, in matters of contracts, error (v. CONTRATTO), whether substantial or concerning the conditions attached (v. CONDIZIONE).

VIII. INTENTION IN CIVIL AND PENAL MATTERS

Intention corresponds to the classical Roman terms animus and dolus in matters of contracts and crimes; the former has a generic meaning, while the latter means evil intention (v. DOLO). The laws on this subject deal directly with intention insofar as it may vitiate the juridical act (v.).

In penal matters, the malice of an action depends on the agent’s intention; fortuitous event (v.), force majeure (v.), ignorance (v.), and mental incapacity (v. INFERMITÀ) are causes that remove or diminish responsibility. Italian penal law (1930) distinguishes various types of violations (v. DELITTO), according to the agent’s intention: intentional, preterintentional, and negligent crimes, and intentional or negligent contraventions (art. 39, 42 ff.).

The CIC, on the other hand, admits only dolus (v.) and negligence (v. can. 2199). The CIC also establishes as a presumption—something noteworthy—that, once the violation has been established, in foro externo the intention is judged to have been malicious (can. 2200 § 2). In every action, it is presumed that the agent exercises the appropriate attention and freedom. If personal or external conditions prevented the exercise of attention and freedom, it is admitted that the individual may prove their existence and influence; at times the judge himself must weigh them ex officio (cf. cann. 2202–2206; 2229, etc.). A case of malicious intention that is to be presumed only after one month is found in can. 644.