Intention

INTENTION. - St. Bonaventure (In IV lib. Sent., D. 6, p. 2, a. 2) defines intention as: "Will reflected (ratiocinata) insofar as it directs itself to the end." St. Thomas, deriving the etymology from tendere (toward something), specifies that intention is an act of the will, which moves the individual to act toward an end, developing the corresponding energies (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᶜ, q. 12, a. 1). This happens especially in the tendency toward the ultimate end; but it is found in all actions, according to the axiom omnis agens agit propter finem (ibid., a. 2), that is, in every action the rational being is moved by a purpose. In this sense intention coincides with the end of the agent, which, first in intention, is last in execution. Subjectively, therefore, intention is the movement of the will toward an object; objectively it is the object toward which the will tends.

I. GENERAL NOTIONS

An eminently voluntary act, the intention is connected with the voluntary. There is therefore an actual intention if the agent, during his operation, is conscious of what he is doing and of the purpose for which he acts. The intention is instead virtual when the agent, at a relatively not distant time, emitted the intention on the basis of which he moves to the action, without however reflecting during its course on the intention he had. There is, finally, habitual intention when it was emitted at a very remote time, and moreover, even if never revoked, it is nevertheless not operative, as the virtual one is, at the moment when the action develops. The agent is then led to the action by other motives; and even if questioned during the course of his acting, he might renew the intention once emitted as he might not renew it. Each form of intention — actual, virtual and habitual — can in turn be: explicit or implicit; in the first case the agent knows or knew and emitted that given intention: in the second, instead, he emitted a distinct intention which, however, by its nature also contains the intention in question. An act of love of God, for example, necessarily entails other acts of faith and of hope. Some add a fourth form of intention, the interpretative, when the manner of acting of an individual or the circumstances in which he finds himself lead one to presume a determinate intention in the agent which in fact perhaps never existed. The intention can moreover be absolute or conditioned, according as the agent emits his act without or with some restriction, subordinating the efficacy of his will to the occurrence of some circumstance.

It is not necessary that in an action there be a single intention; various intentions can concur; one subordinate to another or united by the agent, or kept distinct, provided they are not opposed.

II. INTENTION AND THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTIVITY

Intention coincides with what theologians call the end of the one acting (finis operantis), to distinguish it from the end inherent in the very object of the action or omission (finis operis). Now, if the human act necessarily receives its quality of being good or bad in the moral order directly from the object willed, insofar as the agent cannot but will what he wills, and at the same time cannot change its moral essence, it is likewise certain that the same act is clothed with a moral element also by the intention (the end of the agent), since it effectively moves him to the operation. The Angelic Doctor says forcefully that "the end is the form of the will" (In II lib. Sent., D. 40, q. 1, a. 1). In the voluntary act two aspects must be distinguished: the internal, that is, the act of the will, and the external, that is, the execution. Both receive their own moral physiognomy from their proper object. The execution receives its moral individuation from the object pursued by the action; the internal act in turn receives it from the end as from its proper object. Moreover, what proceeds from the will must be considered as a formal element with regard to the external act; the will in acting uses the other powers as instruments, and external acts bear no morality except insofar as they are voluntary (ibid., a. 6).

Morality is the result of two elements (apart from circumstances), one objective (the thing willed), one subjective (the intention, the movement of the will).

The various overlappings of these two elements give rise to various combinations, which can be summarized as follows, taking as the basic principle the philosophical axiom "bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quovis defectu." 1) An act good in itself receives greater goodness from a good intention; sometimes indeed a new goodness. Whoever gives alms in order to expiate his own sins performs a work of mercy and of religion together. - 2) If the intention is totally and gravely evil, the good act is completely vitiated. Whoever offers money to a needy person in order to make him defect from the faith performs not a work of mercy but of seduction. - 3) Joining to an act good in itself a gravely (not totally) evil intention, the act, according to the more common opinion, is not deprived of its objective goodness; it is nevertheless gravely sinful because of the intention. - 4) An objectively evil act joined to an evil intention increases its malice; sometimes it assumes two or more species of malice; for example, to lie in order to seduce. - 5) Joining to an evil act a good intention, the act, however much rendered more excusable, remains evil, saving the good faith of the agent, since one must not do evil to obtain good (Rom. 3:8). This holds whether the malice be grave or light. A lie (venial, for example) is not only sinful because of the harm it causes to one's neighbor, but is intrinsically disordered; therefore its use is unlawful even for the purpose of preventing harms (Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 26, a. 2; q. 110, a. 3). - 6) In the case of indifferent things, the morality of the act is given entirely by the intention, always apart from circumstances; dressing, eating, etc. are good acts, if done with a good intention, at least implicit. - 7) A good action, joined to a lightly evil intention, provided this is not the total cause of the acting, remains substantially good, albeit with diminished goodness.

III. WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO ACT WITH INTENTION OF SENSUAL PLEASURE

The teaching of reason and of faith can be summed up in three propositions: 1) sensible pleasure posited as the adequate and complete end of activity is against reason; 2) if the limits of what is fitting, imposed by reason, are observed, and the higher end is not excluded, it is lawful to seek sensible pleasure as the formal object of a particular action; 3) the seeking of pleasure in all actions, avoiding renunciation, weakens the moral nature of man; therefore reason imposes the exercise of temperance.

The Angelic Doctor observes that pleasure is connatural to man; man has from nature (and therefore from God) the inclination toward appetible objects; and this for the good of the individual himself and of the community, in the defense and development of life. Pleasure thus comes to have the character of a means or of an intermediate end, and in a certain way it is the first reward of action. Pleasure is to be condemned, on the other hand, when it is the fruit of a bad act, or when, though arising from indifferent things, it is intended as the complete and adequate end of activity; for in this way man is reduced to matter, without ends higher than sense and time. Reason condemns every kind of Epicureanism for which pleasure in itself is good, and therefore all pleasures are good. The equivocation here consists in not distinguishing the good in itself from the good that receives its goodness from a good being (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 34, a. 4; and qq. 31-35). Sacred Scripture too openly condemns this theory (Wis. 2:1-9; Is. 22:13; 56:10 ff.; I Cor. 15:32; Lk. 12:15-21; 16:19 ff.).

That one may at the same time directly intend sensible pleasure as the proximate end of activity, while keeping within the limits imposed by reason, follows from what has already been in part set forth. Man is not pure spirit; he is body; and if St. Paul affirms that the flesh has desires contrary to the spirit and that Christians must crucify their flesh (Gal. 5:17, 24), this is not to be understood in an absolute sense. The practice and doctrine of Christ and the Apostles explain the Pauline texts. Jesus goes to the wedding at Cana, to the table of Simon the leper, has the Last Supper prepared (cf. also Lk. 15 ff.; Mk. 2:19). There are, says the Angelic Doctor, good pleasures, « ita tamen quod nulla (delectatio) sit summum bonum ». The discerning rule cannot be pleasure itself; good and bad men experience the same pleasure in the use of the same things; the difference is given by the fact that the good taste according to the measure of right reason.

Man, in supplying the needs or conveniences of the body, can act either by taking into account only his animal nature or by considering it in the unity of spirit and body (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵒ, q. 34, a. 4).

These two principles may therefore be held: 1) whoever in acting seeks pleasure as connected with the exercise of duty acts rightly; in fact he is not led by the exclusive intention of pleasure; 2) whoever properly seeks sensible pleasure, as the reasonable nature allows, placing in it not the purpose of life but that of a given good or indifferent action, also acts honestly. His intention is pleasure; but, since he does not exclude, even implicitly, the higher end, he does not subordinate spirit to sense. The pleasurable does not contradict the honest, and the subordination of the flesh to the spirit is not removed.

Will it then be lawful to seek deliberately in all actions only pleasure, avoiding all renunciations? Supposing that one fulfills all his moral and social duties, without exposing himself to the proximate danger of failing in them, the hypothesis becomes impossible; if for no other reason, with the intention of pleasure the intention of duty is operative. Reduced to these terms, the question can in theory have an affirmative answer.

Theology, psychology and history, however, warn that our nature is infirm as well as limited; less noble instincts make their influence felt. On the other hand, duty often imposes renunciations. One must not for this reason arrive at the conclusions of Stoicism, which affirms pleasure to be an evil in itself, but one must concede the necessity of frequent sacrifice. The New Testament is moreover a program of renunciations, summed up in the figure of the Crucified, to which the Christian must conform himself. The craving for pleasure, finally, paralyzes the best energies.

IV. INTENTION AND MERIT

It is of interest not only to consider human actions under the aspect of their natural goodness, but above all in relation to the ultimate end, under what conditions and to what extent they are worthy of reward from God. Merit is properly the quality inherent in an action by which a recompense is due to the agent. In the human sphere it is enough that the action have natural goodness; but in relation to the ultimate end, for supernatural merit it must have in itself a new quality, by which God is in some way bound to reward it. If the divine reward is based on motives of fitness and goodness, the merit is called de congruo; if on infallible motives (God's truthfulness and solemn promise), it is called de condigno.

Merit de condigno requires in the object goodness, in the agent good intention and the state of Grace; on God's part, the solemn promise.

Here too there are interferences between the state of Grace and intention, between intention and merit. Some theologians require for supernatural merit a formal intention, at least implicit, and supernatural, which refers the work to God. Others, and with good foundation, teach that actual and virtual intention are praiseworthy and useful, but not necessary, habitual intention being sufficient. The nature of an action is judged by its operative principle; proceeding from a being in Grace, it is thereby itself clothed with Grace. The frequent and fervent renewal of good intention, however, increases merit, strengthens the will, purifies the love of God (cf. St. Thomas, In II lib. Sent., D. 40, a. 5). This holds for one who lives in Grace: acts performed with natural goodness are not susceptible of merit, except in one who has Grace; in one who is destitute of it they are indifferent to merit and demerit (ibid.). This is absolutely true when it is a question of merit de condigno; but for merit de congruo God bestows many actual graces, so that the sinner may come to repentance. The sinner who, moved by the desire of Grace, performs good acts with good intention merits the graces preparatory to justification; only thus are explained the exhortations of Scripture to repentance. But while in the just habitual intention suffices for merit, in the sinner an at least virtual and supernatural intention is required, since in him the motion of an actual grace is required for supernatural merit.

Connected with this is the question of the quantity of merit. Intention gives the work its quality; the same cannot be said of quantity, which in fact is proportionate to the intensity and perfection of the volitional act, informed by greater or lesser charity, by the greater or lesser nobility of the intention itself, by the actual holiness of the agent, not by words.

V. INTENTION AND OBSERVANCE OF THE LAW

Three questions may be raised: 1) whether intention is necessary for the observance of the law; 2) whether it is at least necessary for merit; 3) whether one can exclude the observance of the law by intention, while performing the prescribed work.

1) If the law is affirmative (to hear Mass), it is observed by performing the work in a human manner (awareness of what one is doing) and with at least virtual intention of attaining the intrinsic goodness of the work (in the case given, of participating in the Sacrifice). Habitual intention, or intention contrary to the substance of the work, cannot suffice: to stay in church asleep, or solely to listen to the music. In the case of real obligations (paying a debt), no intention is required, nor does a contrary intention harm. A negative law (not to work on feast days) is observed by not performing the prohibited work, even if the abstention is unconscious, involuntary, forced. At most one can sin internally. However, for merit, at least virtual intention is required of not performing the prohibited action for a good motive. Whoever does not work on Sunday does not sin; for merit he must abstain for a motive of religion or obedience. — 2) For merit, under the conditions set out, nothing more need be added; the legislator wants the work. One therefore merits even by acting without thinking of the law, or by performing the work with a different intention. For observance it is not required that one intend to attain the end willed by the law (finis operis), unless this is the essence of the law. — 3) If the agent performs the prescribed work with the express intention of not observing the law, perhaps postponing it to another time, he fulfills the law, even if afterwards he abstains from the work, even without reason. The case is excepted of an obligation freely assumed by someone, for example by vow; in this case the contrary intention has effect.

For the bibliography see at the end of the entry.

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VI. THE INTENTION IN THE MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENTS

In administering the Sacraments the pope and the bishops do not act by their own authority, whether original or derived, as, for example, when they enact a law, but simply as "delegates," "vicars" of Jesus Christ.

Juridically their action has the same value that it would have if it were performed by Jesus Christ himself. The same is to be said when the one administering the sacrament is only a priest or not even a priest (the case of Baptism and Matrimony). "One and the same is the victim [in the sacrifice of the Cross and in the Holy Mass]; one and the same is the offerer who then immolated himself [bloodily], now immolates himself through the priests" (Council of Trent, sess. XXII, cap. 2; Denz-U, 940). "Jesus Christ as priest offered himself and offers himself perpetually as victim for sins" (Pius XI, encyclical Quas primas of 11 Dec. 1925; Denz-U, 2195. Cf. also Council of Florence, Decretum ad Armenos; Denz-U, 698, and Council of Trent, sess. XIV, cap. 5; Denz-U, 899). Of Baptism St. Augustine said: "let Peter baptize, it is he [Christ] who baptizes; let Paul baptize, it is he [Christ] who baptizes; let Judas baptize, it is he [Christ] who baptizes" (In Io., tr. 6, n. 7; PL 35, 1482). With an expression from his philosophical language, St. Thomas expresses the same thought by saying: the one who baptizes is only an instrument in the hand of Jesus Christ (In IV Sent., d. 5, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 2, 3). What the cited texts affirm explicitly of the Holy Eucharist and of Baptism is verified in every sacrament. The author of every sacrament is always Jesus Christ. The bishop, the priest, the one who baptizes — with a general theological term, the "minister" of the sacrament — acts as "representative," "vicar" of Jesus Christ. And since the "minister" of the sacrament is a person, that is, a free being capable of acting as "representative," "vicar" of Jesus Christ, but also capable of acting in his own name, on his own account and not for his own ends, it follows that the sacramental rite is not a sacrament by the simple and sole fact that it has all the essential elements of the sacramental rite instituted by Jesus Christ, but because it is the rite instituted by Jesus Christ and because it is performed by one who can and wills to act as representative of Jesus Christ. If the will to act as vicar of Jesus Christ were lacking, the sacramental rite, even if perfect in its external ceremonial aspect, would not be a sacrament.

The sacramental intention is the will to act as representative of Jesus Christ. Its necessity is meant to be expressed by saying that the "minister" of the sacrament must have the intention of doing what the Church does. It was in this form that the principal explicit documents were drafted which affirm its absolute necessity for every valid administration of the sacrament. Council of Trent, sess. VII, can. 11 (Denz-U, 762); profession of faith prescribed for the Waldensians by Innocent III (1208; Denz-U, 424); questionnaire prescribed for the Hussites and Wycliffites by the Council of Constance (Denz-U, 672); Decretum ad Armenos of the Council of Florence (1439; Denz-U, 695).

1. Object of the intention

The intention of acting as representative of Jesus Christ is sufficiently present every time the "minister" performs the sacramental action, ordering that action to the end for which Jesus Christ instituted it, to the end willed by the Church (the Church wills nothing except what Jesus Christ wills). In other words, the "minister" must act willing to perform the rite instituted by Jesus Christ, as Jesus Christ instituted it, or again, in the case of Baptism administered by an unbeliever or an infidel, willing to perform that rite which Christians perform, as Christians perform it. In all these cases the "minister" of the sacrament tends consciously and freely toward a result that surpasses his possibilities as a man and that he can obtain only by using the powers received from Jesus Christ. Unbelief or ignorance can prevent the unbeliever or infidel from knowing the nature of the action he performs, but since they 1) are authorized by Jesus Christ to administer Baptism (Jesus Christ willed that the valid minister of this sacrament, necessary for eternal salvation, be every human person), 2) will to perform that rite which Christians perform, as Christians perform it, it follows that what they perform is perfectly individuated and is the Christian sacrament.

Wishing to further specify the object of the intention of the "minister" of the sacrament, let it be observed that one thing is the effect of the sacrament, Grace (and the character in Baptism, Confirmation, Order), and another thing is the "sacramental rite" that constitutes the sacrament. He certainly has sacramental intention who, in performing the rite instituted by Jesus Christ, wills to obtain the end for which Jesus Christ instituted it, or for which the Church administers the sacrament. A doubt may instead arise about the presence of sacramental intention in the "minister" when he wills to perform solely the sacramental rite. The rite, in fact, can be performed in the circumstances of place and time prescribed by the Church for the administration of the Sacraments, but it can also be performed in other circumstances, for example, in a liturgical school, before a group of doctors or nurses in order to teach how to baptize, and even by profaners out of derision.

The reformers of the 16th century asserted that the sacrament is present every time the sacramental rite is performed, even if the one performing it acts, not seriously and with the mind of administering a sacrament, but in jest. This doctrine is condemned by the Church: prop. 12 of M. Luther (Denz-U, 752), Council of Trent, sess. XIV, cap. 6 (Denz-U, 902), sess. VII, can. 11 (Denz-U, 762). Some Catholic theologians asserted that the sacrament is valid if the one administering it performs the sacramental rite seriously and well, even if he does not propose to obtain the end for which the sacrament was instituted, indeed, even if he does not even propose to administer the sacrament. It is sufficient, they thought, for validity — not for freedom — that the "minister" of the sacrament will to perform the sacramental rite seriously. It is the opinion of the so-called external intention (= an intention that limits itself to willing the external sacramental rite). The two 16th-century theologians Ambrose Catarino (v. POLITI LANCELLOTTO) and A. Salmerón are erroneously cited as the principal authors of this opinion. It is an opinion that is not safe and is to be abandoned in practice and is not followed in theory. Alexander VIII condemned the proposition of Fr. Farvacques: the Baptism given by a "minister" who observes exactly the external rite and the baptismal form is valid, but in his heart says: I do not will (to do) what the Church does (Denz-U, 1318).

It is the common view of theologians that the "minister" of the sacrament must will to administer the sacrament. This can be willed in a more or less explicit way, but it must be really willed. It is not necessary that the "minister" will the end of the sacrament, but it is not sufficient to will only to perform the external sacramental rite, even if with seriousness and dignity. In the "minister" of the sacrament an internal intention is required (= an intention that does not limit itself to willing the external sacramental rite, but penetrates into its interior and wills it as a sacrament). Precisely because the sacramental rite can be performed on different occasions and with different ends, it alone does not specify in whose name and by whose authority it is performed. Therefore something must intervene that at least implies in the "minister" the will to act as "vicar" of Jesus Christ, to perform that rite as Jesus Christ instituted it.

2. The actuality of sacramental intention

The intention required in the "minister" of the sacrament must be such as to direct his action in fact to the accomplishment of the sacrament. It must therefore be at least virtual. Habitual intention is not sufficient, because it does not influence the action. Actual intention is not strictly necessary, and it will often also be difficult to have, because the formulas that the "minister" must recite and the careful ceremonies he must perform will easily absorb his attention.

The doctrine on sacramental intention emphasizes that the sacramental rite is not a magical rite (the rite alone is not a sacrament, it is ineffective and as if it did not exist) and that the Christian priest is not an automaton, nor even a functionary who saves appearances by carefully performing the external rite while withholding from his office the better part of himself. He is a minister of Jesus Christ because he performs the prescribed rites with a sense of obedience to Jesus Christ, making his own the ideals of sanctification and salvation of his divine Master.

Giuseppe Rambaldi

VII. THE INTENTION IN THE SUBJECT OF THE SACRAMENTS

a) In infants and those likened to them as regards the Sacraments of which they are capable (Baptism, Confirmation; Eucharist and Order, these two being excluded in the current discipline), no personal intention is required for validity; the Church supplies it: Innocent III (c. 3, X, 3, 42, cf. Sum. Theol., 3ª, q. 68, a. 9).

b) In adults endowed with the use of reason: in general, for validity an explicit habitual intention is required, or at least an implicit one (cf. Innocent III, art. cit.), the Council of Trent (sess. VI: Denz-U, 798 ff.), the CIC (cann. 745, 752, with the unanimous agreement of theologians).

Given the principle Sacramenta propter homines, at times one may proceed with only an interpretative intention in the subject, at least conditionally; can. 752 requires in a baptized person deprived of the senses an explicit habitual intention; but theologians admit the possibility of baptizing even with only an interpretative intention. This holds all the more for Extreme Unction and absolution and Viaticum: one who at the point of death wishes to be saved thereby by that very fact wills the Sacraments relating thereto. One who at the point of death refuses the Sacraments not out of contempt, but only because of the idea that he is not at the point of death, has a right to the Sacraments, even if he lived somewhat tepidly.

In one who during life was hostile to religion, two hypotheses may present themselves: either he was unable to manifest any will before losing his senses, and he must be judged benignly as though he had been hostile not out of malice, but only out of ignorance; or he manifested immediately beforehand a will contrary to any act of religion. In the first case certain Sacraments may be administered to him, provided scandal is removed; not so in the second.

Penance, Communion, Matrimony and Order require at least a virtual intention, given their nature and the manner of their conferral.

It can happen that an intention formed at any time, relating to a determined action, is found to be in conflict with another intention formed at another time; which one must be considered efficacious? No general answer can be given; often the virtual or even the habitual intention prevails over the actual one, since the actual one is present only in appearance. The stronger one prevails; that is, the one which at the moment of its formation the agent intended should prevail.

Applications of a delicate nature occur in Matrimony in the conflict between the intention contrahendi, whether obligandi or adimplendi (v. MATRIMONIO), in the application of the Mass (v.), and in matters of contracts in the case of error (v. CONTRATTO), whether substantial or in the conditions attached (v. CONDIZIONE).

VIII. THE INTENTION IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL MATTERS

Intention corresponds to the classical Roman terms animus and dolus in matters of contracts and of crimes; the first has a generic sense, the second means evil intention (v. DOLO). The laws on the subject deal directly with intention insofar as it can vitiate a juridical act (v.).

In criminal matters the malice of an action depends on the intention of the agent; chance (v.), force majeure (v.), inculpable ignorance (v.), mental insufficiency (v. MENTALI, INFERMITÀ) are causes that remove or diminish responsibility. Italian criminal law (1930) distinguishes various kinds of violations (v. DELITTO), according to the intention of the agent: willful, preterintentional and negligent crimes, willful or negligent contraventions (arts. 39, 42 ff.).

The CIC, on the other hand, admits only dolus (v.) and culpa (v.; can. 2199). The CIC further lays down as a presumption (a notable thing) that, once the violation is established, in the external forum the intention is judged to be willful (can. 2200 § 2). In every action it is supposed that the agent exercises the appropriate attention and freedom. If personal or external conditions prevented the exercise of attention and freedom, it is admitted that the individual may prove their existence and influence; the same judge must sometimes weigh them ex officio (cf. cann. 2202-2206; 2229 etc.). A case of malicious intention to be presumed only after a month is found in can. 644.

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