OBEDIENCE. - A moral virtue, annexed to justice, which regulates the relations of subjects with authority and makes the will ready to carry out the command of a superior (Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 80, last article).
I. NOTIONS, VALUE AND DEGREES OF OBEDIENCE
It should be noted that in obedience a general aspect can be distinguished, according to which, given the reverence owed to one who is a superior, it is contained potentially in many other virtues: in religion, if it concerns God; in piety, if it concerns parents; in observance, if it concerns superiors in general; but it is distinguished from them in that its specific object is the precept to be carried out (loc. cit., q. 104, a. 3).
Among the moral virtues it holds an eminent place, inferior only to religion; if, moreover, one considers the object that obedience despises in order to be united to God, it is the greatest of the moral virtues. Three kinds of goods can man despise in order to be united to God: external goods, goods of the body, spiritual goods. And since of these the first is in a certain way the will, and man uses all the other goods through it, obedience among the virtues is the most praiseworthy. All other good works (including martyrdom) are meritorious before God only if done in order to carry out his will (ibid.).
In Scripture the praises of obedience are most vivid, the distinguishing mark of the Redeemer, the cause of justification, while it warns that from disobedience every evil derives (Rom. 5, 19; Phil. 2, 8; Hebr. 5, 8; Lc. 2, 49; Io. 4, 34; 5, 30 etc.).
There are three degrees of obedience: 1) material obedience: execution of the work commanded; it is not a specific virtue, but only observance of the law; 2) formal obedience: execution of the work insofar as it is commanded; that is, obeying for the motive of the superior's right over the subject, conforming one's own will for this reason to the will of the superior; 3) obedience of judgment or blind obedience, which subjects even one's own way of seeing to that of the superior, holding what is enjoined by obedience to be better than what one's own reason suggests. Herein lies perfect obedience, which does not question the intention, nor weigh the reasons. Praiseworthy as regards human precepts, it is absolutely necessary in regard to God and the infallible magisterium of the Church, since here a respectful silence cannot suffice, but full submission of judgment is required.
Obedience presupposes that the superior makes his will understood; to carry out a desire or a counsel belongs to the spirit of obedience or to charity. However, the will, in whatever way it is manifested, obliges; and the more prompt the obedience, the more meritorious it is.
In its object, obedience is unlimited as regards God, the supreme master of all and of everything; as regards men it is limited by divine law (natural or positive), by every higher human authority, and by matter withdrawn from the superior's power. In case of doubt the subject cannot withdraw from obedience, since the presumption stands in favor of the superior. V. AUTORITÀ; FAMIGLIA; LEGGE.
One sins against obedience by excess: through servility, obeying even in unlawful things; by defect: through disobedience. Only formal disobedience is a specific sin; and it consists in contempt for the thing commanded or for the superior (the former an imperfect contempt, the latter a perfect one). There is contempt when the will refuses to submit because it does not wish to submit (rebellion). If it concerns a particular thing, it admits of slightness of matter; if it concerns the superior as invested with authority (not for other considerations), it is always grave (cf. Rom. 13, 2), even if the transgression be in a light matter. Such contempt is implicit in the refusal to obey in all things commanded.
II. THE CANONICAL OBEDIENCE OF CLERICS
The cleric, beginning with the tonsure (CIC, can. 108), has with his own bishop (can. 956) intimate bonds of subjection: incardination (v.), a special duty of reverence and obedience, the prohibition against leaving and much more against settling outside the diocese without the prior permission of the bishop
(cann. 111, 127 ff., 142 ff.). Priests add in ordination a specific "promise" of obedience to the bishop and his successors.
This promise, although it is not a vow, binds juridically sub gravi. Its object is set out in can. 128: "Whenever and as long as, in the judgment of the bishop, the necessity of the Church demands it, provided a legitimate impediment does not excuse him, every cleric must accept and faithfully discharge the office entrusted to him by the bishop." Such an office is to be understood in a broad sense: so as to include that of chaplain, of confessor, etc. The CIC requires necessity for the diocese, not mere utility; the final wording excluded the proposed phrase evidens utilitas, in order to avoid arbitrariness on the bishop's part; the bishop must be unable to provide otherwise for the spiritual good of souls. The priest must be free from legitimate impediments; therefore he must have sufficient strength and ability and not be subject to other grave duties. The judge in the matter is the bishop, who may avail himself of cann. 2399 and possibly 2220 ff. The priest has the right of recourse to the Holy See; which, on account of the scarcity of clergy, generally favors the bishop, except in the case of choosing the religious state. There is no trace in the first centuries of such an explicit promise, which spreads in the 7th-9th centuries, despite Rome's little favor; by the 15th century the use is general. The promise is imposed only on secular priests: until the 13th century bishops also exacted it from religious priests, but with the Mendicants exemption (v.) was extended to this point as well. Bishops and archbishops promise obedience to the pope.
III. RELIGIOUS OBEDIENCE (virtue and vow)
Obedience is one of the evangelical counsels essential to the religious state and is confirmed by public vow (v.) (cann. 487, 574, 593). To the intrinsic goodness of the virtue is added the motive of religion; and therefore for the religious obedience constitutes the most exalted moral virtue (Extr., Ioann. XXII, 1, 14; cf. also Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2³⁶, q. 186, aa. 5, 8). The object of the vow are the precepts given by superiors by force of the vow itself, not the other various prescriptions and laws of whatever form.
The Holy See and the rules generally provide that superiors bind by the bond of vow in exceptional cases, specifying their will in unequivocal form; which happens rarely; however, from every disposition of the Rule and of superiors there arises the obligation to obey by virtue of the virtue of obedience, since superiors, besides the dominative power, by which they command the vows, are invested with domestic power and, in exempt clerical religions, with jurisdiction.
The vow and, where the vow is lacking, the virtue oblige one to carry out the work in the prescribed circumstances. Obedience has very clear limits: all moral, ecclesiastical and constitutional laws, save the right of superiors to dispense. Moreover the superior by force of the vow can command only things according to the Rule, and all that is required for its convenient observance and the attainment of the ends of the institute. The Friars Minor and the Jesuits are obliged to obey in every thing that is not sin or contrary to the Rule; such an extension according to some authors concerns only the virtue, not the vow. By force of domestic power (vi virtutis), every superior can command beyond the Rule whatever is useful to the community or to the good of the person; and in doubt the presumption stands for the superior.
Heroic acts can be the object of obedience, provided the nature of the institute allows it, the individual is obliged to it, the common good demands it (persecutions, plagues, missions); as likewise if the institute cannot otherwise discharge tasks entrusted to it by the Holy See (dangerous missions). Ridiculous things can be the object of the virtue only as a test (rationabilitas in latenti).
The religious must obey by force of vow: 1) the pope and the S. Congregation of Religious; the other Congregations by apostolic mandate, or only vi virtutis; 2) the bishop in institutes of diocesan right; in those of pontifical right only in the things determined by common law; 3) internal superiors within the limits fixed by the individual legislations (cann. 499-502). Lower officials can command vi voti, only by force of the Rule or of delegation; in other cases the obligation is vi virtutis.
The gravity of the violation is given by grave matter, by the superior's intention to oblige sub gravi, by the fully human act of the individual.
Common law, save cann. 2220-22, has no specific penalties for the violation of the vow of obedience; usually the individual legislations provide in the matter.
Bibliography11 works
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