Obedience

OBBEDIENZA. – A moral virtue, annexed to justice, which regulates the relations of subjects with authority and makes the will ready to carry out the command of a superior (Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2ᵃᶜ, q. 80, a. ultimo).

I. NOTIONS, VALUE, AND DEGREES OF O

It should be noted that in obedience one may distinguish a general aspect, according to which, when considered as the reverence due to one who is superior, it is potentially contained in many other virtues: in religion, when it concerns God; in piety, when it concerns parents; in observance, when it concerns superiors in general; but it is distinguished from these insofar as its specific object is the precept to be carried out (loc. cit., q. 104, a. 3).

Among the moral virtues it occupies an eminent place, inferior only to religion; if, moreover, one considers the object that obedience despises in order to unite itself to God, it is the greatest of the moral virtues. There are three kinds of goods that man can despise in order to unite himself to God: external goods, goods of the body, and spiritual goods. And since, in a certain sense, the first of these is the will, and man uses all other goods through it, obedience is the most praiseworthy of the virtues. All other good works (including martyrdom) are meritorious before God only if they are performed in order to carry out his will (ibid.).

In Scripture the praises of obedience are most vivid: it is the distinguishing mark of the Redeemer and the cause of justification, while Scripture warns that every evil derives from disobedience (Rom. 5, 19; Phil. 2, 8; Hebr. 5, 8; Lc. 2, 49; Io. 4, 34; 5, 30, etc.).

There are three degrees of obedience: 1) material obedience: the execution of the commanded act; it is not a specific virtue, but only observance of the law; 2) formal obedience: the execution of the act insofar as it is commanded; that is, obeying because of the superior’s right over the subject, and for this reason conforming one’s own will to that of the superior; 3) obedience of judgment

or blind obedience, which also subordinates one’s own way of seeing things to that of the superior, considering what is ordained by obedience as better than what one’s own reason suggests. Here lies perfect obedience, which neither discusses the intention nor weighs the reasons. Praiseworthy with regard to human precepts, it is absolutely necessary with regard to God and the infallible teaching authority of the Church, since an obsequious silence cannot suffice here, but a complete submission of judgment is required.

Obedience presupposes that the superior makes his will known; carrying out a desire or a piece of advice belongs to the spirit of obedience or to charity. Nevertheless, the will, however it may be manifested, imposes an obligation; and the more prompt the obedience, the more meritorious it is.

As regards its object, obedience is unlimited with regard to God, the supreme master of all and of everything; with regard to human beings, it is limited by divine law (natural or positive), by every superior human authority, and by matters withdrawn from the superior’s power. In case of doubt, the subject may not exempt himself from obedience, since the presumption favors the superior. V. AUTORITÀ; FAMIGLIA; LEGGE.

One sins against obedience by excess through servility, obeying even in illicit matters; and by defect through disobedience. Only formal disobedience is a specific sin; it consists in contempt for the thing commanded or for the superior (the former being imperfect contempt, the latter perfect contempt). There is contempt when the will refuses to submit because it does not wish to submit (rebellion). If it concerns a particular matter, it admits of slightness of matter; if it concerns the superior insofar as he is invested with authority (and not for other considerations), it is always grave (cf. Rom. 13, 2), even if the transgression concerns a trivial matter. Such contempt is implicit in the refusal to obey in all things commanded.

II. CANONICAL OBEDIENCE OF CLERICS

The cleric, beginning with the tonsure (CIC, can. 108), has intimate bonds of subjection with his own bishop (can. 956): incardination (v.), a special duty of reverence and obedience, and prohibition against leaving, and still more against settling outside, the diocese without the bishop’s prior permission (cann. 111, 127 sqq., 142 sqq.). Priests, at ordination, add a specific “promise” of obedience to the bishop and his successors.

This promise, although it is not a vow, is juridically binding sub gravi. Its object is set forth in can. 128: “Whenever and for as long as, in the judgment of the bishop, the necessity of the Church requires it, provided that a legitimate impediment does not excuse him, every cleric must accept and faithfully discharge the office entrusted to him by the bishop.” This office is to be understood broadly, so as to include that of chaplain, confessor, etc. The CIC requires necessity for the diocese, not mere usefulness; the final wording excluded the proposed phrase evidens utilitas, in order to prevent arbitrary decisions by the bishop; he must be unable to provide for the spiritual good of souls in any other way. The priest must be free from legitimate impediments; thus, he must possess sufficient strength and ability and not be subject to other grave duties. The judge in this matter is the bishop, who may make use of cann. 2399 and, where appropriate, 2220 sqq. The priest has the right of recourse to the Holy See, which, because of the scarcity of the clergy, generally favors the bishop, except in the case of a choice of the religious state. There is no trace in the first centuries of such an explicit promise; it spread in the seventh to ninth centuries, despite Rome’s limited favor, and by the fifteenth century the practice was general. The promise is imposed only on secular priests: until the thirteenth century bishops also required it of religious priests, exemption (v.) was extended to this matter as well. Bishops and archbishops promise obedience to the pope.

III. RELIGIOUS OBEDIENCE (virtue and vow)

Obedience is one of the essential evangelical counsels in the religious state and vow (v.) (cann. 487, 574, 593). To the intrinsic goodness of the virtue is added the motive of religion; therefore, for the religious, obedience constitutes the highest moral virtue (Extr., Ioann. XXII, 1, 14; cf. also Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2³⁶, q. 186, aa. 5, 8). The object of the vow is the commands given by superiors in virtue of the vow itself, not the various other prescriptions and laws of whatever kind.

The Holy See and the rules generally provide that superiors impose the bond of the vow only in exceptional cases, specifying their will in an unequivocal form; this occurs rarely. Yet every provision of the Rule and of superiors gives rise to the obligation to obey by virtue of obedience, since superiors, in addition to the dominative power by which they command the vows, are invested with domestic power and, in exempt clerical religious institutes, with jurisdiction.

The vow and, where the vow is lacking, the virtue oblige one to carry out the action in the prescribed circumstances. Obedience has clear limits: all moral, ecclesiastical, and constitutional laws, without prejudice to the superiors’ right of dispensation. Moreover, by virtue of the vow, the superior may command only those things that accord with the Rule, and everything required for its proper observance and for the fulfillment of the purposes of the institute. The Friars Minor and the Jesuits are obliged to obey in everything that is not sinful or contrary to the Rule; according to some authors, this extension concerns only the virtue, not the vow. By virtue of domestic power (vi virtutis), every superior may command, beyond the Rule, whatever is useful to the community or to the good of the individual; and in case of doubt the presumption favors the superior.

Heroic acts may be the object of obedience, provided that the nature of the institute permits this, that the individual is obliged to undertake them, and that the common good requires it (persecutions, epidemics, missions); likewise, when the institute could not otherwise discharge assignments entrusted by the Holy See (dangerous missions). Ridiculous things can be the object of the virtue only as a test (rationabilitas in latenti).

The religious must obey by virtue of a vow: 1) the pope and the Sacred Congregation of Religious; the other Congregations by apostolic mandate, or only vi virtutis; 2) the bishop in institutes of diocesan right; in those of pontifical right, only in matters determined by common law; 3) internal superiors within the limits established by the individual legislations (cann. 499-502). Inferior officials may command vi voti only by virtue of the Rule or of delegation; in other cases the obligation is vi virtutis.

The gravity of the violation is determined by the gravity of the matter, by the superior’s intention to bind sub gravi, and by the individual’s fully human act.

Common law, without prejudice to cann. 2220-22, contains no specific penalties for violation of the vow of obedience; the individual legislations usually make provisions concerning this.

BUL.: V. the commentators on the Sum. Theol., the canonists in their exposition of the cited canons, the moral theologians, and the classical treatise writers on regular law and asceticism. In addition: F. Heiner, Die canonische Obedience oder der Diöcesamblerus V. sein Bischof, Friburgo 1882; F. Ciseva Bousert, De canonica fieri saecularis obedientia, Lovano 1904; J. B. Raus, L'obéissance religieuse d'après F. Suárez, in Novo. rev. théol., 49 (1922), pp. 61-74; id., De sacrae obedientiae virtute et voto, Lione 1923; R. Brouillard, Les commandements des supérieurs religieux, in Rev. des comm. relig., 3 (1927), pp. 47-51; S. Goyeneche, Circa ambitum voti obedientiae, in Comm. pro religiosis, 11 (1930), pp. 165-68; J. Creusen, L'obéissance au pape, in Rev. des comm. relig., 7 (1931), pp. 3-12; G. Kindt, De potestate dominativa in religione, in Ephemer. theol. Lovano, 19 (1942), pp. 246-95; J. B. Pasciak, De obedientia religiosa secundum d. Thomam, Roma 1945; E. Ranwez, A qui doit-on obéissance?, in Rev. dioc. de Namur, 1 (1946), pp. 48-54, 117-25; 199-210; R. B. Robert, L'obéissance dans le clergé diocésain, in Ami du clergé, 60 (1950), pp. 49-54. Sisinio da Romallo