CONTRIZIONE. – It is the principal act of the virtue of penance, by which the sinner, under the influence of God’s grace, disposes himself for the remission of sin.
SUMMARY:
I. Notion
II. Necessity
III. Division
IV. Efficacy.I. NOTION
According to the definition of the Council of Trent (sess. XIV, chap. 4), contrition consists in sorrow of the soul and detestation of the sin committed, joined to the resolve not to sin again in the future. Contrition therefore implies three elements: detestation, which is the act of the will by which one hates the sin already committed, and therefore would wish never to have committed it and seeks to destroy its consequences; sorrow, which adds to detestation a sadness of soul arising from the fact that the sinful act, in its effects, is apprehended as a present evil; and resolve, which indicates the firm will not to sin again in the future.This notion of contrition faithfully reflects the teaching of Sacred Scripture; the Council of Trent itself points this out by citing several passages from the Old Testament (Ez. 18, 31; Ps. 50, 6; 6, 7; Is. 38, 15). It is also the constant doctrine of the Fathers, summarized in the well-known saying of s. Gregorio Magno: « Paenitentia est perpetrata mala plangere, et plangenda non perpetrare » (Hom. in Evang., II, 34, 15; PL 76, 1256), which confirms the Catholic notion of contrition. Indeed, it is in the very nature of things that any act of penance should entail, together with the will to reform in the future, an effective retraction of the offense already committed.
II. NECESSITY
“This movement of contrition has at all times been necessary for obtaining the forgiveness of sins.” With these words the Council ofTrent (sess. XIV, chap. 4) teaches the necessity of c. for attaining salvation. And earlier, with regard to the virtue of penance, of which c. is the formal act, it had written: “for all men who had stained themselves with some grave sin, penance was always necessary for attaining grace and justification” (ibid., chap. 1).
This doctrine is but the particular application of the universal principle established by the same Council of Trent (sess. VI, chap. 5), concerning the necessity on the part of man to prepare himself, under the influence of Grace, for justification. Indeed, in describing how this preparation is carried out (ibid., chap. 6), the Council, among the other dispositions, lists hatred and detestation of the sin committed, together with the resolve to begin a new life and to observe the law of God.
This doctrine is founded both on Sacred Scripture (Joel, 2, 12 ff.; Lc. 13, 3-5; Act. 3, 19; cf. Ez. 18, 21 ff.; Ier. 18, 8; Eccl. 2, 22), in which God’s forgiveness is conditioned upon detestation of one’s own faults and the will to produce fruits of penance; and on the constant teaching of the Fathers, who, gathering up the admonition of Sacred Scripture, have inculcated, for every remission—both baptismal and post-baptismal—the necessity of turning to God in hatred of sin and with the resolve to lead a new life, and have devoted special pamphlets or treatises to this purpose (cf. Tertulliano, De paenitentia; Cipriano, De lapsis; Ambrogio, De paenitentia; Paciano, Epist. contra tractatus Novatianorum e Paraenesis ad paenitentiam; Grisostomo, De paenitentia). C. must therefore be regarded as absolutely necessary for attaining justification.
III. DIVISION
A first division of c. is into formal and virtual. C. is formal when sin is explicitly detested; it is virtual when sin is not explicitly and formally detested because at present there is no recollection of it; nevertheless, the disposition of the will is such that, were it to come to mind, it would certainly be detested: this is the c. contained in the act of perfect charity which is elicited without the subject having any memory of the sins committed. This division concerns the Penance (v.), insofar as it is debated whether the c. required in the Sacrament must be formal or whether virtual c. suffices.Another division, much more important historically and theologically, is into imperfect c. or attrition (v.), and perfect c. or simply contrition. This division seems to occur for the first time in the Regulae de sacra theologia (reg. 85: PL 210, 665) of Alan of Lille (d. 1202). It was used, though not frequently, by the Scholastics and by St. Thomas; it subsequently became common among theologians, especially after the Council of Trent.
It is based on the different efficacy attributed to attrition and to perfect c. with regard to the remission of sin. Since c. is intended to remove sin, that c. is called perfect which, by itself, by reason of its disposition, achieves this effect, and consequently obtains justification even before receiving the Sacrament, though with the desire for it; imperfect, on the other hand, is the c. which by itself is insufficient to achieve this effect. It is precisely with reference to this different efficacy that the Council of Trent recalls the distinction in question (sess. XIV, chap. 4); and the same line of thought can be discerned in the doctrine of St. Thomas, as well as in the earlier Scholastic tradition (cf. P. De Vooght, La justification dans le sacrement de Pénitence d'après S. Thomas d'Aquin, in Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses, 5 [1928], p. 232).
However, since, as with every act of virtue, different efficacy ultimately depends on a different formal object, theologians ask with what different formal object the distinction between attrition and perfect c. is to be connected.
On this point the teaching of Trent (loc. cit.), which seems to follow the line of thought of the Angelic Doctor (cf. P. De Vooght, articolo cit., p. 249), is sufficiently clear and precise: it is to this teaching that the common doctrine of theologians is related. The Council, that is, while assigning to attrition as a whole all the motives that are not perfect charity toward God and that commonly take concrete form either in consideration of the turpitude of sin, or in fear of hell, or in fear of punishments, reserves to perfect c. the one motive of love toward God. Perfect c. therefore exists when sin is detested on account of perfect charity, of love toward God; that is, as L. Billot explains, when sin is detested « quia est offensivum Dei propter se et super omnia appreciative dilecti » (De Ecclesiae Sacramentis, II, Roma 1918, p. 133); whereas in all other cases there is attrition.
There have nevertheless been theologians, recalled by G. De Lugo (De Paenitentia, disp. 5, sect. 1), who sought to extend to other motives, beyond perfect charity, the possibility of giving rise to perfect c. This would exist even if the detestation of sin were determined by the virtues of obedience, religion, or gratitude toward God. Among modern authors, Palmieri, Ballerini, Schifini, and Hurter have accepted this possibility, at least insofar as it concerns love of God as our good and our happiness. As De Lugo observed, underlying this position there is ultimately a practical concern, which was later clothed in doctrinal or authoritative arguments: « v'è cioè il timore che la detestazione determinata da puro amore di Dio abbia a riuscire troppo difficile al peccatore, e che pertanto egli abbia a rimanere privo degli effetti salutari della c. proprio quando ne ha maggiormente bisogno.
However, this position does not seem acceptable: both because of the manner of proceeding already noted in the Tridentine teaching (loc. cit.), which, while assigning perfect charity as the sole motive of c., attributed all other motives distinct from it to attrition; and because only through c. determined by perfect charity is there that disposition of detesting sin as the supreme evil and turning to God as the supreme good which establishes the fittingness of God’s granting forgiveness.
IV. EFFICACY
Of any c., insofar as it is placed under the influence of Grace, the proper efficacy is to dispose one toward justification. Indeed, as has already been seen, c., in its threefold element of sorrow, detestation, and resolution, is numbered by the Council of Trent among the acts by which the sinner prepares himself for justification. It follows, therefore, that c. must be supernatural, supreme, and universal.The efficacy of perfect c. consists, moreover, in reconciling the sinner with God immediately, even before the sacrament is received. This efficacy is clearly taught by the Council of Trent (sess. XIV, chap. 4), and was later confirmed by the condemnation of certain propositions of Baio (31, 32, 33, and 70), in which the coexistence of the act of perfect charity, or of perfect c., with mortal sin in the soul was affirmed. It is also demonstrated by those texts of Sacred Scripture, both of the Old and of the New Testament (Prov. 8:17; Lk. 10:27-28; Jn. 14:21-23; I Pt. 4:8; I Jn. 4:7), in which it is said that the love of God, from which c. precisely proceeds, is joined to the friendship of the Lord, the remission of sins, and all the other consequent benefits.
It is finally illustrated by the constant patristic tradition: both insofar as it teaches the efficacy of the Baptism of desire, which is tantamount to the efficacy of the act of charity in which the desire for Baptism is implicit (cf. Ambrose, De obitu Valentiniani, 51-53: PL 16, 1374-75; Augustine, De Baptism., IV, 21, 78: PL 43, 172-74); and insofar as it explicitly attributes to the act of charity such virtue and perfection as to cancel sin and restore friendship between the sinner and God (cf. Chrysostom, In S. Romanum mart., hom. I, 1: PG 50, 607; Augustine, In I Ioan., Tract. V, 10: PL 35, 2017; Peter Chrysologus, Serm., 94: PL 52, 465-66; Gregory the Great, Hom. in Evang., II, 33, 4: PL 76, 1241).
For their part, theologians, while admitting as certain this efficacy of perfect c., have rather sought to investigate its intrinsic nature and the specific causality it exercises with regard to justification. Although there has been some uncertainty and hesitation, it is now generally held that perfect c. contributes to justification, first of all as a material dispositive cause, insofar as, removing the impediment of an offense against God as an efficient cause, it becomes the final and immediate disposition for the infusion of Grace. It also contributes as a meritorious cause «de congruo infallibili», insofar as, given God’s will to remit sin whenever man does, with the help of Grace, what lies within his power, perfect c., which fulfills this condition, is infallibly joined to grace and the remission of sin.
Nevertheless, as the Council of Trent teaches, for c. to avail for reconciliation with God, it must contain the vow, at least objectively implicit, to receive the Sacrament. This is evident in any case. One could not truly love God if at the same time one were not disposed to fulfill what he has established concerning the confession of sins. More precisely, after the institution of the sacrament of Penance, it is God’s positive will that all sins committed after Baptism be submitted to the priest. It is to fulfill this will that the vow is directed, and certainly not to obtain through a future Confession the remission of sins already obtained in the act of c.
Theologians nevertheless ask whether this vow exercises a positive influence in the remission, or whether it should instead be regarded as a mere condition for c. to exercise its proper efficacy (cf. F. Suárez, De paen., disp. 17, sect. 3; D. Palmieri, Tractatus de paen., Rome 1879, pp. 106-109). Opinions do not agree, although it seems certain that s. Thomas supports the first hypothesis (cf. J. Perinelle, L'attribution d'après le Concile de Trente et d'après et Thomas d'Aquin, Le Saulchoir 1927, p. 101; P. De Vooght, articolo cit., p. 238). All agree, however, in asserting that the vow contained in c. has as its object not the confession of one’s sin as soon as possible: this is prescribed only for the priest if «necessitate urgente» he has celebrated without prior confession, having made only an act of perfect c. (cf. Council of Trent, sess. XIII, chap. 7); rather, its object is to confess it when, for other reasons, the obligation of Confession becomes pressing and one must accuse one’s sins to the priest. As is well known, this obligation, besides arising in danger of death, arises once a year for all the faithful by virtue of the precept of the Church; it also arises, and only by reason of the positive law of the Church (cf. Council of Trent, sess. XIII, chap. 7), when one must receive the sacrament of the Eucharist.
The efficacy of perfect c. described above was restricted by some authors, such as Baio and his followers, to certain exceptional circumstances. Perfect c., that is, justifies only when made in the event of death, martyrdom, or, in general, necessity. Estius also maintained something similar, although in a more mitigated form (In IV Sent., d. 17, § 2). Baian opinion, however, was rightly condemned by Pius V (prop. 71ᵃ): there is in fact no indication, either in Sacred Scripture or in tradition, for restricting the efficacy of c. to particular extraordinary cases; whereas the teaching of Trent is clear, namely, that whenever an act of perfect c. is made, reconciliation with God is always obtained (sess. XIV, chap. 4). It is nevertheless evident, and need hardly be noted, that such an act of c. is inconceivable in one who, as s. Augustine had already observed (De Bapt., IV, 22, 29), does not approach the Sacrament either out of contempt or culpable negligence.
Other theologians have attributed the said efficacy only to an act of c. possessing a particular intensity, either because of the vehemence with which the will detests sin or because of the participation of the sensitive appetite in this detestation. These are the so-called «contritionists» (v. ATTRIZIONE): on the supposition that the remission of sins in the sacrament of Penance requires perfect c., even if initial and less fervent, they conclude that only when such c. is intense can it justify outside the Sacrament. Given, however, the very extensive range of degrees of c., it would remain necessary to determine what degree is required for the act of c. to achieve the effect of justification. On this point, however, these theologians do not agree among themselves (cf. H. Merkelbach, Quaestiones de partibus paenitentiae, Liège 1937, p. 30). This disagreement alone brings the opinion into disrepute. Moreover, it does not have the teaching of the Church in its favor: both because the Council of Trent simply states, without any distinction of degree of intensity, that reconciliation with God is joined to perfect c.; and because, in condemning the propositions of Baio according to which perfect charity is not always joined to the remission of sin (propp. 31, 32, 33, and 70), the Church implicitly affirmed that c., provided that it proceeds from perfect charity, always entails justification.