CONSUETUDINARIES. - C. in general are those who have contracted a habit (consuetudo) in the most proper sense of habit, and for this reason they are also called "creatures of habit."
In itself, habit, even in the moral sphere, is the cause that produces the habitus, and therefore between the two concepts there is the same distinction as between cause and effect; but in moral theology, often, as here, the two terms are identified. Furthermore: the habitus in itself can be good or bad, but here, given the subject matter that concerns us, only the bad habitus is taken into consideration.
I. GENERAL NOTIONS
At least for the more recent theologians, c. are the sinners who have contracted the habit of a particular sin or of particular sins, and who go to confession for the first time after having contracted the habit. If after this first confession they fall back into the same sins, and present themselves again at the tribunal of penance, they are no longer called c., but recidivists (v. RECIDIVITY).
Careful attention is needed. With regard to c. there has been talk of a subject who, in the repetition of acts, acts under the impulse of habit, not of passion. The habit of sin, according to the common acceptation, which is also that of St. Thomas and of St. Alphonsus, is a permanent quality, by which the individual is naturally inclined to sin, by which he falls frequently, promptly, easily and almost without any resistance. Passion, on the other hand, is a movement of the sensitive appetite that originates from the perception of an external object, albeit with repercussions in the organism of the agent. One who acts from habit has his intellective and volitive faculties almost naturally and permanently ordered to a bad end; one who acts from passion is ordinarily inclined to good, and only momentarily feels the impulse to evil. The former, therefore, sins moved from within, out of bad will; the latter, excited from without and out of weakness. The former acts spontaneously, with ease and promptness, and yields even to a slight temptation, almost without resisting; the latter is also a vanquished man, but one who has been overpowered by passionate excitement, ordinarily grave, after having struggled seriously. One who sins from habit rarely has the impulse of repentance; one who sins from passion, on the other hand, immediately rouses himself and grieves over the sin.
It must be noted, however, that the falls that occur from passionate impulse, if they are repeated frequently, gradually become habit.
To have the habit of sin two things are required: 1) the repetition of sinful acts of the same kind; 2) a certain measure of frequency in the repetition itself of the acts.
When the depraved habit may be said to be established cannot be determined by a fixed rule, because it depends on the rather practical evaluation of three elements: a) the disposition of the person who sins; b) the more or less long span of time that elapses between one sinful act and the next; c) the different nature of the sins.
Wishing to give an orientative idea, not to be taken as a mathematical rule, one could say: 1) in sins of action committed alone, e.g., theft, drunkenness, five falls each month for a considerable time may suffice to form the habit, provided that a certain span of time elapses between one fall and the next; 2) for sins of action committed with others (e.g., fornication) one fall a month for a year may suffice; in sins of thought (e.g., hatred) or of speech (such as blasphemy), one or two falls a week for the same span of time may suffice.
But here it is always supposed that the other elements required for the formation of the habit exist, that is, that there be ease, immediacy and an almost absolute lack of resistance in the falls, without there then being immediate repentance and sorrow for the sin committed.
II. THE IMPUTABILITY OF THE ACTS OF THE CONSUETUDINARIES
The habit or acquired disposition can be voluntary or involuntary. One speaks of a voluntary habit when its formation was knowingly willed, and there has been no retraction - or also, even if the contraction of the habit was involuntary, when the subject has become conscious of it without proceeding to retraction - or when the agent, after retraction, has neglected the means necessary for the extirpation of the bad habit.
One speaks of an involuntary habit when the subject has effectively retracted the depraved habit voluntarily contracted; or has retracted it as soon as he became conscious of it, if it was involuntarily contracted.
As for the imputability of a bad habit contracted, it is soon stated: the voluntary habit in the sense described above is imputable; the involuntary one, or even merely non-voluntary, and not yet adverted to, is not.
As for the imputability of the acts which in the C. are caused by the bad habit, the following principles hold: 1) when the habit is involuntary, although it increases the element of voluntariness because of the greater impulse it brings to the action, it diminishes and sometimes removes imputability, because it diminishes or removes the possibility of a free determination. In other words, the acts in this case are either not imputable or have their imputability reduced, according to the degree of advertence.
2) When the habit is voluntary, it always increases the element of voluntariness, and however much it diminishes the degree of freedom in the action, it generally increases the malice of the act. The reasons are evident: the habit was voluntarily contracted; a certain advertence remains even with the habit; the greater propensity of the will in the action, the facility in sinning, is due to the subject who originally willed the habit with all its consequences.
III. THE CONSUETUDINARIES AND SACRAMENTAL ABSOLUTION
What importance does a bad habit have in relation to the judgment of evaluation that the confessor must make concerning the dispositions of the penitent (can. 886): in other words, how must the confessor conduct himself with cons. sinners?
The question is posed above all for habits that incline to grave sin. Naturally it is supposed that the habit is voluntary and therefore imputable, and that the penitent denounces it as such either spontaneously or at the request of the confessor, which he cannot refuse (Denz-U, 1208). Now, provided there is an effective retraction of the habit, that is, the purpose of eradicating it by effective means, cons. can and must be absolved. In fact the bad habit is not a sin, except as an initial act of will; but, as time goes on, it is only an inclination to sin.
It should be noted that the retraction concerns the present disposition of the will, and must not necessarily extend to the future, except as a purpose to employ the necessary means for an effective eradication of the habit. The foresight of the future can make this realization appear difficult: this does not matter.
Only if he is confirmed in grace or has had this revelation can he be certain of his future impeccability.
Furthermore, the retraction suffices if it is made with ordinary signs of penance, without extraordinary signs being necessary, since these are not required for the penitent to be said to be well disposed to the Sacrament.
Bibliography9 works
Pietro Palazzini