TELEOLOGIA. — From τέλος, end, and λόγος, discourse, it denotes the science of ends. The term goes back to Ch. Wolff (Philosophia rationalis sive logica, § 85), and is applied by Kant to a science that undertakes the consideration and interpretation of nature according to relations of purposiveness (Kritik d. Urteilkraft, part 2ᵃ, § 61 ff.).
In its concrete meaning, t. is, in contemporary usage, synonymous with purposiveness, and a fact or event is teleological when it appears ordered toward achieving or realizing an end; consequently, teleological is also any conception that regards the world as purposively ordered, with relations of means to ends.
The problem of the teleological significance of reality and of the becoming of nature is resolved in dependence on the various metaphysical conceptions of reality itself. Democritus (v.) all purposiveness is excluded by the fortuitous meaning of the universe and its phenomena. Where, on the other hand, a rational Principle is posited as the foundation of being and nature (already in Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Christianity, and all philosophies of transcendence), there is also posited the basis of a teleological ordering of reality and history (v. INABILITÀ). It should, however, be noted that t. is not in itself opposed to the determinism and mechanism of nature: physical and biological laws may, on the contrary, be understood as instruments of the immanent realization of purposiveness in corporeal nature. It is precisely from the determination to act in a given direction in order constantly to realize a good (a determination manifest in the macrocosm and today, after the discoveries of modern science, with striking phenomenology in the physical-biological microcosm) that s. Tommaso infers purposiveness in nature, and hence the existence of an intelligent Ordainer: «videmus quod aliqua quae cognitione carent, scilicet corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem. Quod apparet ex hoc quod semper aut frequentibus eodem modo operantur ut consequuntur id quod est optimum. Es autem quae non habent cognitionem, non tendunt ad finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente... Est ergo aliquod intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem, et hoc dicimus Deum» (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ, q. 2, a. 3). But it must be acknowledged that a t. of nature is not necessarily connected with the theistic conception, and that purposiveness can also be understood in another way, in an immanentist sense (idealism; cf. Hegel, Vorlesungen ub. die Philos. d. Gesch., Introd., I, n. 4, 12, Italian trans., Firenze 1941, p. 9, 16, V. also p. 60 ff.).
All t. is excluded in Spinozian pantheism: «ostendam naturam nullum sibi finem praefixum habere, et omnes causas finales nihil nisi humana esse figmenta» (Ethica, I, prop. 36, ed. G. Gentile, Bari 1933, p. 42). For Kant, the reality of final causes in nature cannot be proved by experience; «tuttavia il giudizio teleologico è applicato a ragione, almeno problematicamente, all'investigazione della natura; ma soltanto per sottoporla a principi di osservazione ed investigazione mediante l'analogia con la causalità dei fini, e senza lusinga di poterla spiegare» (op. cit., § 61, ed. cit., p. 218). The teleological judgment, founded on a purely “regulative” principle and not a “constitutive” one of the causal derivation of the phenomena of nature, therefore does not, according to Kant, serve for a theological deduction: «Perciò nella t., in quanto si riferisce alla fisica, si parla giustamente della saggezza, dell'economia, della preveggenza, della beneficenza della natura, senza però farne un essere ragionevole (il che sarebbe assurdo), ma anche senza ardire di mettere al disopra di essa un altro essere intelligente, come artefice, perché ciò sarebbe temerario» (ibid., § 68, p. 244).
In another sense, reported by Lalande (op. cit. in the bibliography, p. 1086), t. may also denote the science of the ends (individual and social) of human action.
Indeed, it is very difficult to conceive of vital phenomena as being guided by chance and probability, since life in itself requires such a complexity of material conditions—to refer only to these—that they may be regarded as the least probable conditions capable of occurring in nature and that, if they were to occur once by chance, they would certainly have no means of being maintained if guided by these laws. Life, however, is preserved, and biological phenomena prove to be directed toward this end: the preservation of life, of this highly improbable event. The preservation of life is achieved through the preservation of the animal and plant species that represent it, by means of an incessant succession of generations. Thus, in every individual and in every generation, embryonic, organological, sexual, etc. development is directed toward an end: reproduction, for the preservation of the species.
On the other hand, however, if biological phenomena are considered according to an absolute finalist criterion, one would arrive at the conclusion that the various acts of biological activity are not only not dominated by chance but are instead directed by an internal force that guides them toward a determined end, by an entelechy: a biological act would not be the consequence of determining, causal conditions but would be realized by developing a preordained principle directed toward a precise end. Examples of biological phenomena that become comprehensible only by accepting a principle of finality are innumerable; it is sufficient here to recall the development of embryonic organs, even highly complicated ones, which do not yet function but are constructed for a future function; the very structure of differentiated organs, which is perfectly adapted to their specific function; the numerous phenomena of preordained adaptation, or preadaptation; the phenomena of convergence; adaptations between different organisms and especially between animals and plants for life in common; coapting structures (hinges, articulations); the structure of the organs of sexual coaptation; the structure of anchoring organs (plant seeds, parasites, etc.). Finally, finality is manifested in psychophysiological processes. On the basis of these facts, very many biologists have accepted the principle of t., which is the basis of every vitalistic conception (Hertwig, Celesia, Driesch, Cuenot, Russel, Durken, Rignano, Bertalanffy, etc.).
Many facts, however, have demonstrated that in biological phenomena, just as in inert matter, conditions may occur that respect the principle of causality. Above all, in the study of embryonic development, in the study of adaptations, etc., the validity of causality appears evident. Roux (1885) deserves the credit for demonstrating the importance of causality in many aspects of development, thereby initiating a new branch of embryology, the mechanics of development. Likewise, in other biological phenomena, such as the heredity of characteristics based on a distribution, according to the laws of chance (probabilistic laws), of the factors contained in the parents’ gametes, behavior according to the laws of the inert world is visible. These incontrovertible facts concerning causal and statistical phenomena in living organisms have led even biologists of great stature, under the influence of materialist and mechanistic ideas, to suppose that even phenomena revealing finality in the most evident manner are a pure illusion resulting from an anthropomorphic interpretation of nature, and that they must instead be interpreted according to the same laws of physics and chemistry as the inanimate world. Rabaud, G. Dumas, J. Needham, E. Gognehim, J. Loeb, F. Christmann, K. Sopper, to cite only a few, are representatives of this current. But this way of viewing things leads to the consequence that all biological phenomena, and human life itself, are the result of chance and therefore without purpose.
Many other facts seem to limit the principle of t. in organisms: thus, certain tropisms that lead to destruction, such as the flame which, by attracting insects, kills them; thus, the many acts considered useless in life (the visitation of insects to self-pollinating flowers, mimicries that do not protect against specific enemies, terrifying appearances assumed by certain animals for defense but which arouse no terror in their enemies); thus, hyperregenerations which, instead of restoring an equilibrium, greatly aggravate the disequilibrium caused by amputation; heteromorphoses, that is, the repair of an amputation by means of an abnormal organ; distellic conditions, with cases of hypertely, that is, the exaggerated development of organs, such as the defenses of extinct elephants and the canine teeth of the Quaternary tiger of California (Smilodon); gigantisms, with cases of atelia or the production of useless organs; and monstrosities, etc. Nevertheless, in judging these examples, which mechanists adduce against the principle of t., one must not forget that the same anthropomorphic evaluation, if it is valid for criticism in a teleological judgment, is equally valid in an antifinalist judgment.
The study of biology therefore leads to this conclusion: the finality of many biological phenomena and of life itself is also manifested through a causal process. This is not a contradiction (if it lies in the nature of things!), and it is necessary to reconcile the two aspects. This should cause no wonder if one takes into account that the substrate on which life pulsates is matter and that, as such, it is also subject to the laws of physics and chemistry. But living matter is a highly peculiar kind of matter, and it is in that adjective that the enormous difference between this matter and that of the inanimate world lies; consequently, while on the one hand it obeys the laws of this inanimate world, on the other it opposes them, so that the less probable dominates the more probable and the principle of entropy is reversed (Fantappié, 1942; Schroedinger, 1943).
Even today biologists and philosophers are divided into two camps: the materialist and the vitalist; but reality always lies in the concordance of antitheses. Thus, in biology one finds phenomena directed by the principle of causality, both deterministic and indeterministic (statistical; according to Bernoulli, the latter too are directed by this principle), and phenomena in which t. is evident, safeguarding an optimistic conception of the world against the notion of its pointlessness, and defending the highest expression of vital phenomena, namely free will or freedom of volition.
TELEPATIA (τῆ) = distant and πάθος = suffering; that which is suffered by someone). — clairvoyance (v.) in which the cognitive relationship takes place between two or more intelligent beings (between “mind and mind”; “transmission of thought”).
Current studies conducted using scientific methods, particularly at Duke University in Durham, indicate that t. is a genuinely existing phenomenon, connected with a particular sensitivity present in all human beings, in a more or less latent and developable form (“ESP effect” = extra sensory perception).
Cases of “thought-reading” displayed in variety shows are often related less to genuine t. than to trickery or to particular abilities on the part of the “diviner” in exploiting the small involuntary indicative signs of the person guiding him (imperceptible muscular contractions of the hand, changes in breathing, etc.).
For the moral judgment, V. TELESTESIA.
Giuseppe de Ninno