NATIONAL MINORITIES. — All the uncertainties in which juridical speculation concerning the concept of nation is entangled are reflected in the concept of the national minority. Its principal nucleus, in fact, is expressed by the adjective “national,” since the noun indicates only the extrinsic relationship in which the group stands to the political organism within which it carries on its life. Assuming with regard to the essence of the nation what is set forth under the relevant heading, the national minority may be defined as a natural social formation, held together by an internal bond of a spiritual order, composed of individuals homogeneous in origin and culture, who live in a relationship of subjection to a political organism of different origin and culture, from whose majority they differ.
This definition adheres to a unitary conception of the national minority, considered as a social entity endowed with its own being and its own natural purpose, distinct from that of the State in general. Opinions on this matter are not in agreement. Contemporary publicists and international law remain firmly anchored to the atomistic concept, which exerted its influence in the creation of the minority regime, through the treaties imposed on the States that were constituted at the end of the First World War or saw their sovereignty extended over other territories. As appears from the articles of the Polish treaty, subsequently repeated in substance in all the others, the object of the agreement is not the ethnic group in itself, but the inhabitants of the State who are of different origin, language, and religion. This position was adopted for clearly discernible ideological reasons. The principle that the architects of the European settlement wished to apply for the solution of the minority problem was that of self-determination or the free disposition of peoples, advocated by Wilson, of liberal origin and based on an atomistic conception of society.
Catholic speculation has for some time been taking a different direction. The opinion of Cathrein must now be regarded as superseded: in order better to combat the principle of nationality, he denied the nation any real unity, considering it merely a logical unity. Also superseded must be regarded the intermediate position of Meyer, who, although perceiving that rights cannot be attributed to nationality unless it is considered a collective entity, continued to conceive of them as the rights of individuals, losing sight of the group. The unitary conception has gained ground among modern writers. Among them, in the development of the principle, Delos remains somewhat uncertain. His point of departure is undoubtedly a unitary concept of the national minority, which he considers a natural social entity endowed with its own purpose; yet his point of arrival diverges from it, since he expressly excludes moral personality, to which rights should or could be attributed. An elementary reflection will suffice to demonstrate the necessity of abandoning the atomistic conception.
The existence of a unitary social entity requires three elements: a plurality of rational subjects; a common purpose toward which the conscious collaboration of the members is directed; and an internal informing principle that connects the parts with one another, giving rise to a group individually constituted as a moral subject in its own right. Now these three elements, necessary and sufficient for the existence of a unitary social aggregate, are present in the national minority. It is, in fact, constituted by a sum of individuals marked by certain homogeneous particular characteristics, who strive to preserve and develop their cultural peculiarities and therefore feel themselves united by a common destiny. The national minority, therefore, must be conceived as a unitary entity, with its own positive social being, its own natural purpose, and its own moral personality.
To this conclusion, recently reached by Catholic writers, is connected the still debated question whether the national minority must be recognized, in addition to moral personality, as also possessing juridical personality, as a social entity in its own right. In the doctrine dominated by the principles of the positivist school, the answer is decidedly negative. Proceeding, in fact, from the unproven axiom that the source of personality is the positive juridical order, and finding that no treaty and no provision has conferred the required status upon national minorities, it logically concludes that their juridical personality must be excluded. It must be acknowledged that, if the problem is posed in terms of positive law, its solution cannot differ from that accepted by the common doctrine; the picture changes, however, if it is considered in terms of natural law.
Some difficulty in recognizing the juridical personality of the national minority arises from the dispersed condition of certain ethnic groups among populations of different nationality, since, when territorial unity is lacking, the unitary concept can be applied less perfectly. Nevertheless, if a spiritual bond exists among the members thus dispersed, the existence of a certain unity cannot be excluded, and this makes it possible to overcome the difficulty. Other difficulties derive from the need for internal unity in the life of the State and from the entirely modern concept of sovereignty, conceived as an absolute and discretionary power. Some of these difficulties undoubtedly carry weight, but they do not go so far as to invalidate the natural juridical personality of the national minority. If it possesses its own social being, resulting from the convergence of wills toward the attainment of a common purpose for the benefit of the human person, it is constituted as a clearly identified subject, and as such possesses, together with moral personality, juridical personality as well, since subjective right always and invariably accompanies the person. A person without rights is a contradiction in terms. Wherever there is a physical or moral person, there is also a holder of rights, independently of any positive juridical order.
Having established the concept of the national minority, it is now necessary to determine the rights belonging to II. With regard to these, a distinction has been made between human rights and rights more particularly proper to nationality, called cultural rights. The distinction may be accepted and maintained. If one examines, in fact, the series of rights now recognized by the juridical conscience of peoples, it will readily be seen how they can be divided into two groups: rights common to all human beings, regardless of their belonging to a given national minority, such as security of life, civil and political equality, and personal and religious freedom; and rights specific to nationality, such as those concerning the preservation and development of its own culture. This latter group deserves particular mention.
A first right concerns the existence and integrity of the minority group, generally disregarded because of the aforementioned atomistic conception of the national minority, but fundamental as the juridical protection of a good whose preservation is the principal aim of every social aggregate. Connected with the original faculty of existence is the right relating to the soil where the national minority has established a permanent home, from which it derives its means of subsistence and with which it remains united almost organically. The national minority, too, has a homeland, loved and venerated with ardent feeling, in which it has the right to reside undisturbed; hence the injustice of the barbarous measure of the compulsory exchange of populations, adopted in some cases to resolve the minority problem.
A distinct nucleus of rights, more properly described as cultural rights, concerns the specific prerogatives that characterize the national aggregate. Among these must be mentioned the right to use one’s own language and to have it taught in schools, to preserve one’s own traditions and customs, and to have the means necessary to conserve, develop, and transmit them. This group of rights derives immediately to the national minority from its very nature as a natural social aggregate, whose solidarity depends upon the factors of nationality, which specify and channel the associative movement of universal tendency, and upon the end toward which its collective action is directed, namely, the perfection of the human person.
From the foregoing, the duties of the State toward the national minority and of the latter toward the State can readily be deduced. The State has the duty to ensure the existence of the ethnic group as such, its peaceful residence in its land of origin, the free use of its language, and all the other cultural rights proper to the nationality. It is not, however, prohibited from undertaking a prudent and circumspect policy of assimilation, provided that this is carried out with respect for the rights mentioned above. The national minority, for its part, as a part of the entire political organization, remains subject to all the duties arising from legal justice. It is obliged to cooperate in the common good, to show complete loyalty and submission to the legitimate authority, and to obey the laws enacted by that authority for the maintenance of social order and public prosperity. If the political power acts within the limits of justice, it is in no way lawful for the minority to plot against the State, agitate, or revolt.
Only a brief mention need be made of the international protection of the rights of national minorities and of the Church’s attitude toward them. The development of international protection was slow. Its first uncertain dawn appeared with the capitulations obtained by Francesco I from the Sublime Porte in 1535. Another still hesitant step was taken with the Peace of Westphalia and the treaties concluded thereafter, in which the persecutory principle cuius regio eius religio was replaced by that of a certain measure of tolerance in favor of subjects who professed a religion different from that of the sovereign. The so-called humanitarian interventions against the tyranny exercised by the Ottoman Empire, particularly over the Balkan populations, in Lebanon and in Syria, supported after the Congress of Paris of 1856 by the so-called European concert, reconsecrated a principle that was gradually becoming ever more evident to the conscience of peoples. With the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, a genuine protective code for national minorities entered the body of treaty-based international law. For their defense, Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania, liberated from the Turkish yoke, as well as Turkey itself, were subjected to clauses guaranteeing all citizens, without distinction of race or religion, equality in civil and political rights, in admission to public offices, and in the exercise of professions; freedom and the external practice of worship; and the hierarchical organization of the various religious communities and their relations with their spiritual leaders.
After the First World War, international protection of national minorities acquired a better organization through the creation of an appropriate tutelary regime. As has been mentioned, the victorious powers imposed upon Poland and certain other States protective clauses that included the following rights: to life and liberty; to the free profession of religion and the practice of public and private worship, together with the associated right to establish, maintain, and supervise charitable, religious, and cultural institutions; to complete political and civil equality; to use the national language; and, in some cases, to provide primary education in that language. This treaty-based protection assumed the form of genuine international protection of national minorities, since the clauses concerning them were placed under the aegis of the League of Nations, which reserved the right of supervision and intervention to ensure their observance, prohibiting the State from making any unilateral modification to them. The tutelary regime thus established was not free from defects, which rendered it ineffective in practice; nevertheless, it marked an important stage in the progress of legal institutions in favor of the human person. It was not revived after the Second World War. International law is now moving toward a collective convention on the protection of human rights, a declaration of which was adopted within the Organization of the United Nations (v. DIRITTI DELL'UOMO).
The Church’s attitude toward differences of race, language, customs, and culture has always been one of understanding, appreciation, and, where possible, protection. “The Church,” writes Pius XII in the Summi pontificatus, “the most faithful custodian of the divine educating wisdom, neither can nor does think of impairing or disparaging the particular characteristics that each people, with jealous and understandable pride, safeguards and regards as a precious heritage.” Without entering into the history of her civilizing action, conducted with the utmost respect for the customs of peoples whenever these were compatible with the principles of revealed faith, it will suffice to recall how, in the concordats concluded in the more recent period, she took care to protect the use of the language of the various nationalities together with freedom of worship. The Concordat with Poland of 1915, that with Lithuania of 1927, and that with Germany of 1933 bear witness to this vigilant protection on the part of the Church.
The most recent popes, moreover, have risen in defense of the rights of national minorities. In 1917, Benedict XV counseled the belligerent powers to take into consideration, insofar as possible, the just aspirations of peoples, in order to coordinate particular interests with the universal good of human society. On the occasion of the Second World War, Pius XII did not fail to point out the necessity of taking account of the true needs of nations and of ensuring respect for and protection of national minorities, in order to establish an order founded upon morality and justice. In his Christmas address of Dec. 1939 he stated: “In particular, one point that should attract attention, if a better ordering of Europe is desired, concerns the true needs and just demands of nations, as well as of national minorities.” More explicitly and at greater length, in his Christmas message of 1941, where he condemned the oppression of minority groups, he declared that “in the sphere of a new order founded upon moral principles, there is no place for the open or covert oppression of the cultural and linguistic particularities of national minorities, for the hindrance and restriction of their economic capacities, or for the limitation and abolition of their natural fecundity.”