MONARCOMACHI. – This term (from μοναρχία and μάχημαι: those who combat monarchy) designates those political writers, for the most part non-Catholic, who, between 1550 and 1620, outlined an early theory of popular sovereignty, grounding it in the original pact concluded between the people and the king (in opposition to its divine origin and, often, to the divine origin of all authority), which limited the powers of the sovereign. The term was first used by W. Barclay in his work De Regno et regali potestate (Paris 1600).
Although medieval theories contain references to a certain popular sovereignty and to the right of resistance, among the m. instead (ordinarily linked to entirely different philosophical principles, individualistic and rationalistic), popular sovereignty and the right of resistance are the fundamental themes around which the entire political organization is constructed. On the premise that the dignity of the human person does not tolerate subjection except to laws of one’s own making; that human reason is autonomous, and therefore authority too cannot belong directly to one person alone but to the multitude: between the king and his subjects stands the fundamental law of the State, the pact, the original agreement. The king will no longer be directly of divine origin and often, for many writers, not even indirectly; but, in accordance with the constitution, he will be a simple magistrate or delegate of the people, who may always call him back to respect the sworn agreements. The right of active resistance is the people’s legitimate guarantee that the original pact will be respected: to renounce this right means consenting to the establishment of a tyrannical regime. The m. were strenuous advocates of tyrannicide (v. TIRANNIA E TIRANNICIDIO).
The first writer to present a clear formulation of monarcomachic themes is M. Salomonio degli Alberteschi, professor of law at the University of Rome, who composed around 1516, dedicating it to Leo X, a short work De Principatus (Rome 1544), in which he maintains that the prince’s power is limited by the fundamental laws of the State, which he is bound to respect quoad vim coactivam. The prince is pars civitatis, and therefore not the source of the legal order that brings civil society into being, but bound to that same society of which he is a part and from which he derives his power (De Principatus, I, Paris 1578, p. 25). The lex regia de potestate, by which the Roman people granted the prince the summa potestat, does not represent an irrevocable alienation of the latter, but a simple grant, determined by historical exigencies and subject to precise conditions. From 1550 dates an anonymous treatise: De iure magistratum in subditus et officio subditorum erga magistratus, in which the themes that would be treated by the later monarcomachic literature are clarified in greater detail. It discusses whether magistrates should render an account to citizens of the laws they enact; it examines the relations between doctrines supporting tyrannicide and religion, and, above all, whether conventions and pacts between citizens and magistrates can be admitted on the juridical plane. But the work that provoked the liveliest controversies is De iure regni apud Scotos (1579) by G. Buchanan (1506–82), a Scottish humanist writer and historian. According to Buchanan, the king derives his authority from the pact concluded between him and the people (De iure, etc.; par. 58, Lyon 1725, p. 86), and if he violates the agreements made, he must be regarded as a tyrant and, as such, be banished from society. In this writer, as in the anonymous author of the Vindiciae contra tyrannos (1579), usually attributed to the Huguenot Du Plessis Mornay (1549–1623), one can now observe the clear tendency, evident in the m. still inspired by Christian principles, to place at the foundation of political inquiry no longer, as had been the case with medieval writers, passages from the Digest, but the most important episodes, from the political point of view, of the Old Testament. The m. could thus cite in support of their theories the pact concluded between God and the people of Israel and the commitment undertaken by the latter to maintain it and to have it enforced even by the king, who was to be replaced should he fail in his sworn faith (Vindiciae, Lyon 1643, p. 227).
F. Hotman, a French jurist (1524–90), author of the Francogallia (1573), relies on a study of an institutional-historical character in order to demonstrate his fundamental thesis, popular sovereignty. The study of the French monarchy, he says, demonstrates that the conferral of the supreme royal dignity belonged to the people; the Estates General, which the king must regard as the expression of the popular will, are therefore responsible for decisions concerning public affairs, the election or deposition of the king, the judgment of princes accused of treason, and the granting of appanages to members of the royal family. The king’s decisions have validity solely within the sphere of the law enacted by the assemblies of representatives of all citizens (op. cit., ch. 25, Frankfurt 1665, p. 283).
Giov. Mariana (v.) (1537–1624), a Spanish Jesuit and author of De Rege et regis institutione (Toledo 1598), is also usually counted among the m. It cannot be denied that he shares certain monarcomachic principles, but in him the sense that authority derives from God is still alive, even if through the popular designation of the person of the sovereign. On the other hand, it likewise cannot be denied that he was among the few to depart from traditional Catholic thought by legitimizing tyrannicide.
Among the less important m., mention should also be made of Giov. Poynet (1516–56), with his treatise A short treatise of politique power and of the true obedience which subjects owe to Kings and other civile governors (1556); Giov. Boucher (1548–1644), with De iusta Henrici III abdicatione e Francorum regno (Paris 1584); Gugl. Rose (1542–1602), with De iusta reipublicae christianae in reges impios et haereticos authoritate (there 1590); and Lambert Daneau (1530–1595), with Politicae christianae libri VII (Geneva 1596).
The fullest treatment of monarcomachic theories, and the resolution of the new problems connected with them, is owed to the German jurist Jo. Althusius, author of Politica methodice digesta (Herborn 1614). The right of resistance granted to the people, if it could have the significance of a political value to be advanced for the attainment of certain ideals, certainly could not be recognized as one of the constitutive principles of the state organization without causing the latter to degenerate into complete anarchy. It was necessary to transform the right of resistance into a juridical institution that would permit its full application without bringing about the total destruction of the State. Althusius, having recognized the sovereignty of the people—a concept framed within rigorous juridical schemes by J. Bodin in his work Les six livres de la république (Paris 1576)—admits in the constitution he expounds two powers: the ephors and the summus magistratus. The former, commissioned by the people, exercise the latter’s rights in relation to the rulers; the second, elected in the name
The contribution of the Monarchomach writers to political thought was therefore considerable; to them is owed the enunciation of all those principles—social contract, popular sovereignty, and the exercise of popular sovereignty—which, despite all the errors and judgments associated with them, would contribute to the establishment of the democratic parliamentary State, just as they had earlier contributed to the undermining of absolute monarchies and to the French Revolution.