MONARCHOMACHS. — This term (from μοναρχία and μάχομαι: those who fight against monarchy) designates those political writers, mostly Catholics, who between 1550 and 1620 developed an early theory of popular sovereignty, grounding it in the original pact between the people and the king (in contrast to its divine origin and, often, to the divine origin of all authority) that limited the sovereign’s powers. The term was first used by W. Barclay in his work *De Regno et regali potestate* (Paris 1600).
While medieval theories contain hints of a certain popular sovereignty and the right of resistance, in the case of the monarchomachs (ordinarily linked to entirely different philosophical principles, individualistic and rationalistic), popular sovereignty and the right of resistance are the fundamental themes around which the entire political organization is constructed. It is premised that human dignity cannot tolerate subjection except to laws it has itself framed; that human reason is autonomous, and thus authority cannot belong directly to one person but to the multitude. Between the king and his subjects stands the fundamental right of the state: the pact, the original agreement. The king will no longer be of direct divine origin, and often, for many writers, not even of indirect divine origin; rather, according to the constitution, he will be a mere magistrate or delegate of the people, always to be recalled to respect the sworn pacts. The right of active resistance is the legitimate guarantee of the people for the observance of the original pact: to renounce this right is to consent to the establishment of a tyrannical regime. The monarchomachs were staunch advocates of tyrannicide (v. TYRANNY AND TYRANNICIDE).
The first writer to present a clear formulation of monarchomach themes is M. Salomonius degli Alberteschi, professor of law at the University of Rome, who composed, around 1516 and dedicated to Leo X, a small work *De Principatu* (Rome 1544), where he argues that the prince’s power is limited by the fundamental laws of the state, which he is bound to respect as if by coercive force. The prince is “part of the state,” not therefore the source of the legal order that constitutes civil society, but bound to that same society of which he is a part and from which he derives his power (*De Principatu*, I, Paris 1578, p. 25). The *lex regia de potestate*, by which the Roman people granted the prince *summa potestas*, does not represent an irrevocable alienation of the latter but a mere concession, determined by historical exigencies and bound by precise conditions. From 1550 dates an anonymous treatise: *De iure magistratuum in subditos et officio subditorum erga magistratus*, which further clarifies the themes that would be treated by subsequent monarchomach writings. It discusses whether magistrates should render account to citizens for the laws they enact; it examines the relationship between doctrines favoring tyrannicide and religion; and, above all, whether legal conventions and pacts between citizens and magistrates can be admitted.
But the work that provoked the liveliest controversies is *De iure regni apud Scotos* (1579) by G. Buchanan (1506–82), a Scottish humanist and historian. According to Buchanan, the king derives his authority from the pact between himself and the people (*De iure*, etc.; par. 58, Lyons 1725, p. 86), and if he contravenes the agreed conventions, he must be considered a tyrant and, as such, banished from society. In this writer, as in the anonymous author of the *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* (1579), usually attributed to the Huguenot Du Plessis Mornay (1549–1623), one now observes the decisive tendency—evident even in monarchomachs still inspired by Christian principles—to ground political inquiry not, as medieval writers had done, in passages from the *Digest*, but in the politically significant episodes of the Old Testament. The monarchomachs could thus support their theories with the pact between God and the people of Israel and the people’s commitment to uphold it and enforce it even against the king, who was to be replaced if he violated his sworn faith (*Vindiciae*, Lyons 1643, p. 227).
F. Hotman, a French jurist (1524–90), author of the *Francogallia* (1573), to demonstrate his fundamental thesis of popular sovereignty, relies on historical-institutional research. The study of the French monarchy, he argues, shows that it was the people who conferred the supreme royal dignity; the Estates General, which the king must regard as the expression of the popular will, therefore hold authority over public affairs, including the election or deposition of the king, judgment on princes accused of treason, and the granting of appanages to members of the royal line. The king’s decisions have validity only within the framework of the law sanctioned by assemblies representing all citizens (op. cit., ch. 25, Frankfurt 1665, p. 283).
GIOVANNI MARIANA (v. (1537–1624), a Spanish Jesuit and author of *De Rege et regis institutione* (Toledo 1598), is also often counted among the monarchomachs. While it cannot be denied that he shares some monarchical principles, in him the sense of the divine derivation of authority remains alive, albeit through the popular designation of the sovereign’s person. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that he is among the few to depart from traditional Catholic thought by legitimizing tyrannicide.
Among the less prominent monarchomachs, mention should also be made of: GIOVANNI POYNET (1516–56) with his treatise *A short treatise of politique power and of the true obedience which subjects owe to Kings and other civile governors* (1556); GIOVANNI BOUCHER (1548–1644) with *De iusta Henrici III adducatione e Francorum regno* (Paris 1584); GULIELMUS ROSE (1542–1602) with *De iusta reipublicae christianae in reges impios et haereticos authoritate* (ibid. 1590); and LAMBERT DANEAU (1530–1595) with *Politica christianae libri VII* (Geneva 1596).
The most complete treatment of monarchomach theories and the resolution of the new problems inherent in them is due to the German jurist JOANNES ALTHUSIUS, author of *Politica methodice digesta* (Herborn 1614). The right of resistance recognized in the people, if it could serve as a political value to be proposed for the attainment of certain ideals, could certainly not be recognized as one of the constitutive principles of state organization without degenerating into complete anarchy. It was necessary to transform the right of resistance into a legal institution that would permit its full application without risking the total destruction of the state. Althusius, recognizing popular sovereignty—a concept framed in rigorous legal schemas by J. Bodin in his *Les six livres de la république* (Paris 1576)—admits in the constitution he outlines two powers: the ephors and the *summus magistratus*. The former, by mandate of the people, exercise the people’s rights vis-à-vis the rulers; the latter, elected in the people’s name by the ephors, is entrusted with administering the rights of the community. The *summus magistratus*, whose governance must always aim at the common good, is subject to removal by the ephors as soon as he violates the pacts sworn at the time of his election. The *jus resistentiae et exautorationis*, since it belongs to the people as a collectivity, must be exercised solely by the ephors, in the forms and for the reasons sanctioned by the state’s constitutional law.
The administration of the community’s rights is entrusted to the ephors, who represent the people. The supreme magistrate, whose governance must always aim at the common good, may be removed by the ephors as soon as he violates the oath sworn at the time of his election. The right of resistance and deposition, which belongs to the people as a collective body, must be exercised solely by the ephors, in the forms and for the reasons established by the constitutional law of the State.
(from G. Millel, *Le monastère de Dapôni*, Paris 1859; Monastery – Plan of the monastery of Dafni.)
The contribution of monarchist writers to political thought has therefore been considerable; to them we owe the formulation of all those principles (social contract, popular sovereignty, exercise of popular sovereignty) which, despite all their errors and attendant judgments, contributed to the establishment of the parliamentary democratic State, just as they had previously helped to undermine absolute monarchies and the French Revolution.