MONARCHY. – In the classification of forms of government, monarchy (under this name or an analogous one, such as empire, principality, etc.) was soon identified as the rule of one, in contrast to aristocracy and democracy (or *politia*, according to Aristotle’s famous tripartite division). In reality, however, monarchical forms have presented themselves throughout history in very different ways, and it is not simple or uncontroversial to identify their characteristic elements.
Consider, for instance, monarchies founded on a theocratic or legitimist basis, others on a contractual, plebiscitary, or legalistic foundation; absolute monarchies, where all sovereign power is concentrated in the monarch, to the point of identifying the monarch with the State (as in the typical assertion of Louis XIV: *L’État, c’est moi*); and constitutional monarchies (the only ones still surviving), with multiple constitutional organs established by law in their structure and functions, or limited (with some residual elements of absolute power).
More than from a juridical standpoint, the various monarchies (and, in general, the various forms of government) are distinguished by their complex historical physiognomy, which is at once political, juridical, ethical, social, and religious. Sometimes, a monarchy and a republic are more akin to each other than two monarchies or two republics are to one another. Thus, to take a single example, parliamentary governments—such as the monarchies of England and the Nordic countries—are more akin to the republics of France and Italy than these latter are to the United States of America.
The opposition between monarchy and republic, though still valid, is of much lesser importance, because more effectively contrasted is the government of individuals (monarchies, life dictatorships, diarchies or polyarchies of individuals) with the government of collectivities (even in representative forms), integrating the distinction with elements concerning other aspects of the increasingly complex politico-juridical organization of States (see REPUBLIC, with particular reference to Italy).
Some authors now note that the monarch lacks that representative character which the president of a republic possesses, especially when the latter is considered as a popular government, whether of a part of the people—even a very restricted one—or extended to the broadest class (and a government of the proletariat), or of the entire people, without class distinctions. Yet even this criterion weakens, if it does not disappear altogether, when the monarch is not hereditary but elective.
Another related and significant criterion, though not absolute, is that of responsibility: the president is responsible, even if only to a limited extent, whereas the king is not. The principle of royal irresponsibility, based on the assumption that the king (inasmuch as he *is* the State, or less so) cannot do wrong, or on the transfer and concentration of responsibility in his ministers, who collaborate in the king’s acts, must nevertheless be understood with some reservations. Irresponsibility operates within the limits proper to each constitutional system, which may extend it even to other constitutional organs, such as legislative chambers. For example, loss of office might be envisaged in two circumstances, or it might be determined by politically influential events in democratic regimes. Consider cases of “deposition” of kings (in medieval English law), when the monarchy could be considered fundamentally contractual and the king had violated the pact. On the other hand, in constitutional monarchies, pressure from other organs or from the people can strongly contribute to the voluntary relinquishment of office (as in the cases of Victor Emmanuel III in Italy and, for a different reason, of Edward VIII in England).
The theoretical controversies over the best form of government, particularly between monarchy and republic, have lost much of their importance. There are arguments both for and against each solution. Thus, monarchy would be an element of stability and conservation amid the succession of political currents in government, ensuring the continuity of the State’s life in one of its cardinal elements; on the other hand, dynastic interest, as an interest of a caste, might not always coincide with the national interest as understood at a given moment by the majority of citizens. Moreover, dangers may arise from a king who is physically, intellectually, or morally unfit to exercise power, and from a regency exposed to unforeseen palace conspiracies. The republic, for its part, better satisfies the demands of the principle—commonly accepted in modern States—of equality among citizens, in contrast to any outdated conception of legitimism (see LEGITIMISM), and can select the most capable subject for the office of head of State. Electivity, however, is not without its dangers, for it may lead to dictatorship (especially a new form of legitimism based on plebiscitary foundations) and does not confer the same prestige or deep independence that may derive from attaining the supreme office by a personal right, which places the subject above all others and better enables him to act as an impartial moderator of political struggles.
In reality, it is above all historical testing that stabilizes a constitutional system, adapting it even to the exigencies of the times. Thus we see monarchies (e.g., England, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and more recently Belgium and the Netherlands) preserved and consolidated even within social-democratic regimes, which in theory might be considered among the most antithetical. Nevertheless, the most pronounced trend today is toward a progressive expansion of the sphere of republics in comparison with that of monarchies, especially since the end of the First World War. Consider, for example, Germany, Russia, and what has recently occurred in the Balkan countries; and, to say nothing of Ireland’s peaceful secession (since 1947) and the transformation of the regime in Italy by virtue of the popular referendum (see REFERENDUM; REPUBLIC).
The “Kingdom” of Italy formally dates from the proclamation enacted by the law of 17 March 1861, no. 6371, and is linked to the Kingdom of Sardinia, which was constituted under Victor Amadeus II.
With the Statute of King Charles Albert (4 March 1848), the State was transformed from an absolute monarchy into a constitutional (parliamentary) monarchy. The Statute established the fundamental rules relating to the Crown, thus removing them from the monarch’s personal power. The accession to the throne was based on a
Public law correlative to a family right, namely belonging to the House of Savoy without limitation of degree, and succession occurred according to the so-called "Salic law," more precisely, not so much in the strict letter of the law of the Salian Franks of the 5th century (which excluded women from succession to landed property), but in the conventional sense it had assumed in the monarchical regimes of France and Spain in the 14th century. This meant that women were excluded from the throne (though admitted in other constitutional systems, such as, for example, the English and Dutch systems, which still do so today), as were their descendants; the direct line prevailed over the collateral line, with the firstborn taking precedence over younger sons. In any case, succession was reserved for descendants from legitimate marriages (thus excluding natural, adopted, or legitimized children, except for the controversial case of those legitimized by subsequent marriage), and also, it seems, for those of princely rank, in accordance with the royal patent of 13 September 1780 and the royal decree of 28 October of the same year. The law on the Grand Council of Fascism (1928) provided that among the "questions of a constitutional nature," for which the non-binding hearing of the Grand Council was prescribed, there were also those relating to succession to the throne, the prerogatives, and the powers of the Crown. In practice, no such questions were ever addressed. It should be noted, against a legally untenable political opinion, that these could not be matters concerning the successor personally, but only "proposals for laws" for possible amendments to the existing norms.
The Statute laid down fairly detailed provisions regarding the king (v.) and also made mention of the royal family, which, according to the most accurate interpretation, included all members of the House of Savoy who could ascend to the Crown (and thus also serve as regent or guardian of the king) and their legitimate families. Within this framework was included the reigning family, composed, in addition to the king himself, of the queen mother, the queen consort, and their descendants (among these the presumptive heir to the throne).
Provisions were also made for the cases and methods of any "regency," though these cases never arose, while "lieutenancies" outside the statutory norms were implemented several times.
The prominent political position assumed by the head of government in the Fascist regime (particularly with a specific law in 1925) led some to classify the resulting form of government as monarchical-presidential; however, from a strictly legal standpoint, it was not entirely accurate to speak of a "dyarchy," because the king always retained a limited but fundamental sovereign right: that of dismissing or revoking the head of government (as in fact occurred with the replacement of Mussolini by Badoglio). This would not have been possible in the Nazi German regime (similar in other respects), where the powers of head of state and head of government were vested in a single individual (Hitler had in fact arranged for succession by his own decree, in the absence of legal norms).
Modern monarchies generally have an hereditary character based on common law (as in England), where the king cannot alter the order of succession except by an act of Parliament, or based on a special law (as was the case in the Italian monarchy); in either case, the right of succession is a public subjective right vested in the person lawfully called to the throne (thus creating a kind of "privileged" regime) and without interruption (the king never dies; the king is dead, long live the king).
At present, monarchical forms of government exist in Afghanistan (Constitution of 1931, art. 2); Saudi Arabia (Constitution of 1928–32, art. 2); Belgium (Constitution of 1831, art. 2); Bhutan (no written constitution); Denmark (Constitution of 1915, art. 1); Egypt (Constitution of 1923, art. 1); Ethiopia (Empire, Constitution of 1931, art. 6); Greece (Constitution of 1911, art. 24); Iraq (Constitution of 1925, art. 2); Iran (Constitution of 1907, art. 36); Japan (Empire, Constitution of 1946, art. 1); Jordan (Constitution of 1946, art. 2); Libya (1951); Liechtenstein (Principality, Constitution of 1911, art. 1); Nepal (Constitution of 1948, art. 2); the Netherlands (Constitution of 1815–47, art. 1); Norway (Constitution of 1814, art. 1); Spain (tending towards the constitutional act of 8 June 1947, art. 1); Sweden (Constitution of 1809, art. 1); Thailand (Constitution of 1947, art. 1); Vietnam (Empire, associated with France); Yemen (no written constitution). For the State of the Vatican City, V. PRIMATO DI GESÙ CRISTO. PIETRO E DEL ROMANO PONTEFICE.
The Crown occupies a special position within the English constitutional system in relation to the Commonwealth. This term, derived from the old expression "common weal," referring to a society based on the common good, was adopted for the regime of Cromwell (1649–60); in its modern sense, it has been used since the second decade of this century, first in constitutional doctrine and then in political usage. The term "empire," which was contrary to more progressive tendencies, technically referred only to India. It is often said that the king has a dual personality: one as a physical person and one as the holder of the Crown, inasmuch as legal personality is attributed to the successive holders of an office (a corporation sole). In the past, the Crown was considered one and indivisible; today, however, the view is gaining ground that it should be regarded as multiple and distinguishable even in law, at least with regard to the countries of the Commonwealth (the British Commonwealth of Nations), which includes the following states: the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. "The Crown has always been regarded as the keystone on which the arch of the Commonwealth rests and often as its only legal bond, since its member states have different parliaments and different governments but share the same sovereign. The preamble to the Statute of Westminster of 1931 defines it precisely as the symbol of the free association of the members of the British Commonwealth. However, the declaration of the prime ministers of 27 April 1949 describes the king as the symbol of the free association of the independent nations that are members of the Commonwealth and, as such, head of the Commonwealth. This latter title was introduced as a device to allow India to remain in the association once it had adopted a republican form of government. The king thus appears in two roles: as king of each of the monarchies and as head of the Commonwealth." (G. Treves). As for Ireland, the last link with the Crown was severed by the Republic of Ireland Act of 1948, which transferred to the president of that republic the powers previously vested in the king of England. Under the subsequent Ireland Act of 1949 (British), Ireland is no longer included within the British sphere, nor is it considered a foreign country; rather, it occupies a unique position in international law.