Monarchy

MONARCHY. - In the classification of forms of government, monarchy (under this or an analogous name, such as empire, principality, etc.) was very early identified as the government of one alone, in contrast to aristocracy and democracy (or polity, according to the famous Aristotelian tripartition). In reality, however, monarchical forms present themselves in history in very different ways from one another, and it is neither simple nor undisputed to identify their characteristic elements.

It suffices to think of monarchies on a theocratic or legitimist foundation, and of others on a contractual, plebiscitary or legalistic foundation; of absolute monarchies, with the concentration of every sovereign power in the monarch, to the point of identifying him with the State (the affirmation of Louis XIV is typical: l'Etat c'est moi), and of constitutional monarchies (the only surviving ones), with several constitutional organs, fixed by law in their structure and in their functions, or of limited monarchies (with some residue of absolute power).

More than under the juridical profile, the various monarchies (and in general the various forms of government) are identified by their complex historical physiognomy, which is at once political, juridical, ethical, social and religious. And sometimes a monarchy and a republic are far more akin to each other than two monarchies or two republics are: thus, to give but one example, two governments with a parliamentary regime, such as the English and Nordic monarchies, are more akin to the French and Italian republics than the latter are to the United States of America.

The opposition between monarchy and republic, although still valid, is nevertheless of far lesser importance, because a more effective contrast is drawn between the government of individuals (monarchy, life dictatorships, diarchies or polyarchies of individuals) and the government of collectivities (in forms however representative), supplementing the distinction with elements concerning other aspects of the ever more complex political and juridical organization of States (v. REPUBBLICA, with particular regard to Italy).

Some authors now point out that the monarch would not have that representative character which the president of the republic has, the latter being considered as popular government, whether it be of a part of the people, even a very narrow one or one extended to the most numerous class ("government of the proletariat"), or of the whole people, without distinction of classes. However, even this criterion is attenuated, if not indeed dissolved, when it is a question of a monarch who is not hereditary but elective.

Another connected and relevant criterion, though not in an absolute sense, is that of the responsibility, even limited, of the president, as compared with the non-responsibility of the king. The principle of royal irresponsibility, based on the premise that the king (insofar as he does or does not personify the State) cannot do wrong, or on the transfer and concentration of responsibility in his ministers, who collaborate in the royal acts, must nevertheless be understood with some reservation. Irresponsibility holds within the limits proper to the various systems, which may extend it also to other constitutional organs, such as the legislative Chambers. There could, for example, be provision, in given circumstances, for the loss of office, or this could be determined by politically influential events in democratic regimes. Let one think of the cases of "deposition" of kings (in medieval English law), when the monarchy could be considered fundamentally contractual in nature and the king had violated the pacts. On the other hand, in constitutional monarchies the pressure of other organs or of the people can powerfully contribute to the voluntary abandonment of office (as in the cases of Victor Emmanuel III in Italy and, for a different reason, of Edward VIII in England).

Theoretical controversies over the best government, in particular monarchical or republican, have greatly lost importance. There is no lack of arguments for and against one or the other solution. Thus monarchy would be an element of stability, of conservation even as political currents draw near to government, assuring the continuity of the State's life in one of its cardinal elements; on the other hand, dynastic interest as caste interest might not always coincide with the national interest as understood, at a certain moment, by the majority of citizens. Dangers moreover can arise from the fact of a king physically, intellectually or morally ill-suited to the exercise of power, and from a consequent regency exposed to unforeseen palace conspiracies. The republic, on the other hand, better satisfies the demands of the principle, commonly accepted in modern States, of the equality of citizens, in contrast to any outdated conception of legitimism (v.), and can let the choice fall on the subject most capable for the office of head of State. Electivity, however, is not itself free of dangers, since it can constitute the starting point for a dictatorship (especially of a new legitimism on a plebiscitary basis) and does not confer all that prestige and that deeper independence which can derive from attaining the supreme office by a personal right, which places the subject above all others and can better make him an impartial moderator of political struggles.

In reality it is above all historical testing that stabilizes a system, adapting it, albeit, to the needs of the times. One thus sees monarchies (for example, England, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and more recently Belgium and Holland) preserving and consolidating themselves even in regimes of social democracy, which in the abstract might be considered among the most antithetical. Nevertheless the most pronounced tendency today is toward a progressive widening of the area of republics as compared with that of monarchies, especially after the end of the First World War. It suffices to think, for example, of Germany, of Russia and of what has recently happened in the Balkan countries; as well as, to say nothing of other matters, of the peaceful secession of Ireland (from 1947) and of the transformation of the regime in Italy by virtue of the popular referendum (v. REPUBBLICA).

The "Kingdom" of Italy dates formally from the proclamation that took place with the law of 17 March 1861 no. 6371, and is linked to the Kingdom of Sardinia, constituted under Victor Amadeus II.

With the Statute of King Charles Albert (4 March 1848), the State had changed from an absolute monarchy into a constitutional (parliamentary) monarchy. The Statute fixed the fundamental rules relating to the Crown, thus withdrawing them from the personal power of the monarch. Accession to the throne was based on a right public law correlative to a family right, that is, membership in the House of Savoy, without limitation of degrees, and succession took place according to the so-called "Salic law" and properly, more than according to the letter of the law of the Salian Franks of the 5th century (which excluded women from succession in landed property), in the conventional sense that it had come to assume in the monarchical regimes of France and Spain of the 14th century; that is to say, women were excluded from the throne (admitted instead in other constitutional systems, as, for example, still today, the English and the Dutch) and their descendants; the direct line prevailed over the collateral, with the firstborn prevailing over those born later. In every case it had to be a descendant of legitimate marriage (thus excluding natural, adoptive or legitimized children, save for the controversial hypothesis of those legitimized by subsequent marriage) and also, it seems, of princely marriage, in conformity with the royal patent of 13 Sept. 1780 and the royal brevet of 28 Oct. of the same year. The law on the Grand Council of Fascism (1928) provided that among the "questions of a constitutional character," for which the hearing (non-binding) of that same Grand Council was prescribed, there were also those relating to succession to the throne, to the attributions and prerogatives of the Crown; in practice no question on the matter was ever dealt with. And it should be noted, against a politically and juridically inconsistent opinion, that these could not be personal questions regarding the successor, but only "bills" for possible modifications of the norms in force.

The Statute laid down fairly detailed provisions relating to the king (v.) and also made mention of the royal family, comprising (according to the most exact interpretation) all the members of the House of Savoy who could assume the Crown (and therefore also the regency and the guardianship of the king) and their legitimate families. Within its ambit was included the reigning family, composed, besides the king himself, of the queen mother, the queen consort and their descendants (among these the presumptive heir to the throne).

The cases and modes of a possible "regency" were also provided for, cases which however never arose, while "lieutenancies" outside the statutory norms were several times put into effect.

The preeminent political position assumed by the head of government in the Fascist regime (especially by a specific law in 1925) led to classifying the resulting form of government as monarchical-presidential; but it was not entirely exact, always from a juridical point of view, to speak of "diarchy," because there always remained with the king that right, limited in extent but basic, and indeed essentially sovereign, of dismissing or revoking the head of government (as in fact happened with the replacement of Mussolini by Badoglio). This, instead, could not have happened in the German Nazi regime (analogous in other respects), because the powers of head of state and head of government were united in a single person (Hitler in fact had provided for the succession by his own act, in the absence of legal norms).

Modern monarchies are generally hereditary or on the basis of common law (common law, as in England), without the king being able to change the order of succession, save by an act of Parliament, or on the basis of a special law (as was the case in the Italian monarchy); in every case with a subjective public right on the part of the one who by law is called to succeed (so as to determine a kind of regime of "privilege") and without interruption of continuity (the king never dies; the king is dead, long live the king).

At present the monarchical form of government exists in Afghanistan (constitution of 1931, art. 2); Saudi Arabia (constitution 1928-32, art. 2); Belgium (constitution 1871, art. 2); Bhutan (has no written constitution); Denmark (constitution 1915, art. 1); Egypt (constitution 1923, art. 1); Ethiopia (Empire, constitution 1931, art. 6); Greece (constitution 1911, art. 24); Iraq (constitution 1925, art. 2); Iran (constitution 1907, art. 36); Japan (Empire, constitution 1946, art. 1); Jordan (constitution 1946, art. 2); Libya (1951); Liechtenstein (Principality, constitution 1911, art. 1); Nepal (constitution 1948, art. 2); Holland (constitution 1815-47, art. 1); Norway (constitution 1814, art. 1); Spain (tendentially with the constitutional act of 8 June 1947, art. 1); Sweden (constitution 1809, art. 1); Thailand (constitution 1947, art. 1); Vietnam (Empire, associated with France);

Yemen (has no written constitution). For Vatican City, v. PRIMATO DI S. PIETRO E DEL ROMANO PONTEFICE.

The Crown assumes a particular position in the English system in relation to the Commonwealth. This term, from an ancient word: common weal, referring to a society based on the common good, had been adopted for Cromwell's regime (1649-60); in the modern sense, from the second decade of this century, first in doctrine and then in political-constitutional usage; the term "empire," contrary to the more progressive tendencies, technically referred only to the Indies. It is usually said that the king has a dual personality, one as a physical person and one as holder of the Crown, inasmuch as the personality is recognized in the series of successive holders of an office (corporation sole). In the past the Crown was considered one and indivisible; now the opinion is gaining ground that it should instead be considered multiple and distinguishable even in law, as regards the countries of the Commonwealth (British Commonwealth of Nations), which comprises the following States: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon. "The Crown has always been considered as the keystone on which the arch of the Commonwealth rests and often also its only juridical bond, inasmuch as its States have different parliaments and different governments, but have the same sovereign. The preamble of the Statute of Westminster of 1931 defines it precisely as the symbol of the free association of the members of the British Commonwealth. But the declaration of the prime ministers of 27 Apr. 1949 qualifies the king as the symbol of the free association of the independent nations that are members of it and, as such, head of the Commonwealth. This latter title was introduced as an artifice that would allow India to remain in the association, once it had given itself a republican form. The king therefore presents himself in two guises: as king of each of the monarchies and as head of the Commonwealth" (G. Treves). As for Ireland, moreover, the last link with the Crown was cut with the Republic of Ireland Act of 1948, which attributes to the president of that republic the powers with which the king of England was invested. Also on the basis of the subsequent Ireland Act of 1949, English, Ireland is no longer included within the British ambit, but is not even considered a foreign country, for certain purposes; it must be considered in a particular position, unique of its kind in international law.

Ferruccio Pergolesi