MONARCHIA. — In the classification of forms of government, the m. (under this or a similar name, such as empire, principality, etc.) was soon identified as the government of one person, in opposition to aristocracy and democracy (or politia, according to the celebrated Aristotelian tripartition). In reality, however, monarchic forms appear in history in very different ways, and it is neither simple nor uncontroversial to identify their characteristic elements.
One need only consider monarchies founded on theocratic or legitimist principles, and others founded on agreements, plebiscites, or legality; absolute monarchies, with the concentration of every sovereign power in the monarch, to the point of identifying him with the State (the typical statement is that of Louis XIV: l'Etat c'est moi); constitutional monarchies (the only ones to survive), with several constitutional organs, established by law in their structure and functions; or limited monarchies (with some residue of absolute power).
The various monarchies (and, in general, the various forms of government) are identified less from the legal standpoint than by their complex historical physiognomy, which is at once political, legal, ethical, social, and religious. And sometimes a monarchy and a republic are far more akin to each other than two monarchies or two republics are to each other: thus, to give only one example, two governments with a parliamentary system, such as the English and Nordic monarchies, are more akin to the French and Italian republics than the latter are to the United States of America.
The opposition between monarchy and republic, although still valid, is nevertheless of considerably less importance, because it is more effective to oppose government by individuals (monarchies, life dictatorships, diarchies or polyarchies of individuals) to government by collectivities (even where representative in form), supplementing the distinction with elements concerning other aspects of the increasingly complex political and legal organization of States (v. Italy).
Some writers now point out that the monarch would not possess the representative character that the president of a republic does possess, when the latter is regarded as a popular government, whether it be the government of a part of the people, however small or extended to the most numerous class (“government of the proletariat”), or of the entire people, without distinction of classes. This criterion too, however, is attenuated, even if it does not disappear, when the monarch is not hereditary but elective.
Another related and significant criterion, though not in an absolute sense, is that of the responsibility, even if limited, of the president, in contrast to the irresponsibility of the king. The principle of royal irresponsibility, based on the presupposition that the king (insofar as he does or does not personify the State) cannot do wrong, or on the transfer and concentration of responsibility in his ministers, who collaborate in royal acts, must nevertheless be understood with some reservations. Irresponsibility applies within the limits proper to the various constitutional systems, which may extend it also to other constitutional organs, such as legislative chambers. It might, for example, be provided that under certain circumstances the office would be forfeited, or that this result would be determined by politically influential events in democratic regimes. One may think of cases of the “deposition” of kings (in medieval English law), when the monarchy could be regarded as fundamentally contractual in nature and the king had violated the agreements. On the other hand, in constitutional monarchies, pressure from other organs or from the people may powerfully contribute to the voluntary relinquishment of office (as in the cases of Vittorio Emanuele III in Italy and, for a different reason, Edward VIII in England).
The theoretical controversies over the best form of government, particularly whether monarchical or republican, have lost much of their importance. There are arguments both for and against either solution. Thus, monarchy would be an element of stability and preservation even as political currents approach government, ensuring continuity in the life of the State in one of its cardinal elements; on the other hand, dynastic interest, as a caste interest, might not always coincide with the national interest as understood at a given moment by the majority of citizens. Dangers may also arise from a king who is physically, intellectually, or morally ill-suited to the exercise of power, and from a consequent regency exposed to unforeseen palace conspiracies. The republic, on the other hand, better satisfies the requirements of the principle, commonly accepted in modern States, of the equality of citizens, in opposition legitimism (v.), and can result in the choice of the person most capable of serving as head of State. Electiveness, however, is itself not without dangers, since it may constitute the prelude to a dictatorship (a kind of new legitimism on a plebiscitary basis) and does not confer all that prestige and deeper independence which may derive from attaining the supreme office by a personal right that places the individual above everyone else and better enables him to act as an impartial mediator in political struggles.
In reality, it is above all historical testing that stabilizes a constitutional system, adapting it, even if only to the demands of the times. Thus monarchies (e.g., England, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and more recently Belgium and the Netherlands) may be seen to survive and consolidate themselves even under regimes of social democracy, which in the abstract might be regarded as among the most antithetical. Nevertheless, the most marked tendency today is toward a progressive expansion of the area of republics in comparison with that of monarchies, especially since the end of the First World War. One need only think, for example, of Germany, Russia, and what has recently occurred in the Balkan countries; and, to say nothing of other cases, of Ireland’s peaceful secession (since 1947) and the transformation of the regime in Italy by virtue of the popular referendum (v. REPUBBLICA).
The “Kingdom” of Italy formally dates from the proclamation made by the law of 17 March 1861, no. 6371, and is linked to the Kingdom of Sardinia, constituted under Vittorio Amedeo II.
With the Statute of King Carlo Alberto (4 March 1848), the State had changed from an absolute monarchy into a constitutional (parliamentary) monarchy. The Statute established the fundamental rules concerning the Crown, thereby removing them from the monarch’s personal authority. Accession to the throne was based on a right
public law corresponding to a family right, namely membership in the House of Savoy, without limitation of degree, and succession took place according to the so-called “Salic law,” properly speaking less according to the letter of the law of the Salian Franks of the fifth century (which excluded women from succession to landed property) than in the conventional sense that it had assumed in the monarchical regimes of France and Spain in the fourteenth century; that is to say, women were excluded from the throne (but were admitted in other constitutional systems, such as, for example, those of England and the Netherlands even today), as were their descendants; the direct line prevailed over the collateral line, with precedence given to the firstborn over the younger children. In every case, the successor had to be a descendant of a legitimate marriage (thus excluding natural, adopted, or legitimized children, except for the controversial case of children legitimized by subsequent marriage) and apparently also of princely marriages, in conformity with the royal patent of 13 September 1780 and the royal brevet of 28 October of the same year. The law on the Grand Council of Fascism (1928) provided that among the “questions of a constitutional nature,” for which the hearing (not binding) of that Grand Council was prescribed, there should also be those relating to succession to the throne and to the powers and prerogatives of the Crown; in practice, no question on this subject was ever dealt with. It should be noted, against a politically and juridically unfounded opinion, that the questions could not concern personal matters relating to the successor, but only “proposed laws” for possible amendments to the rules in force.
The Statute established fairly detailed provisions concerning the king (v.) and also referred to the royal family, comprising (according to the most accurate interpretation) all the members of the House of Savoy who could assume the Crown (and therefore also the regency and guardianship of the king), together with their legitimate families. Within it was included the reigning family, composed, in addition to the king himself, of the queen mother, the queen consort, and their descendants (among them the heir presumptive to the throne).
The cases and procedures for a possible “regency” were also provided for, although these cases did not arise, whereas “lieutenancies” were instituted several times outside the statutory provisions.
The pre-eminent political position assumed by the head of government under the Fascist regime (especially following a specific law in 1925) led to the resulting form of government being classified as monarchical-presidential; but, from a strictly juridical point of view, it was not entirely accurate to speak of a “diarchy,” because the king retained that right—limited in scope but fundamental, and essentially sovereign—of dismissing or removing the head of government (as in fact occurred when Mussolini was replaced by Badoglio). This, by contrast, could not have occurred under the German Nazi regime (which was analogous in other respects), because the powers of head of state and head of government were united in a single person (Hitler had in fact provided for the succession by his own act, in the absence of statutory provisions).
Modern monarchies generally have a hereditary character, either on the basis of common law (as in England), without the king being able to alter the order of succession except by an Act of Parliament, or on the basis of a special law (as was the case in the Italian monarchy); in every case, with a subjective public right vested in the person whom the law calls to succeed (thus establishing a kind of “privilege” regime), and without interruption of continuity (the king never dies; the king is dead, long live the king).
At present, the monarchical form of government exists in Afghanistan (Constitution of 1931, art. 2); Saudi Arabia (Constitution of 1928–32, art. 2); Belgium (Constitution of 1871, art. 2); Bhutan (which has no written constitution); Denmark (Constitution of 1915, art. 1); Egypt (Constitution of 1923, art. 1); Ethiopia (Empire, Constitution of 1931, art. 6); Greece (Constitution of 1911, art. 24); Iraq (Constitution of 1925, art. 2); Iran (Constitution of 1907, art. 36); Japan (Empire, Constitution of 1946, art. 1); Jordan (Constitution of 1946, art. 2); Libya (1951); Liechtenstein (Principality, Constitution of 1911, art. 1); Nepal (Constitution of 1948, art. 2); the Netherlands (Constitution of 1815–47, art. 1); Norway (Constitution of 1814, art. 1); Spain (tendentially under the constitutional Act of 8 June 1947, art. 1); Sweden (Constitution of 1809, art. 1); Thailand (Constitution of 1947, art. 1); Vietnam (Empire, associated with France);
Yemen (which has no written constitution). For Vatican City, V. PRIMATO DI S. PIETRO E DEL ROMANO PONTEFICE.
The Crown occupies a special position within the English constitutional order in relation to the Commonwealth. This term, derived from an ancient expression, common weal, referring to a society founded upon the common good, had been adopted for Cromwell’s regime (1649–60); in its present meaning, from the second decade of this century, first in doctrine and then in constitutional political usage; the term “empire,” contrary to the more advanced tendencies, technically referred only to India. It is commonly said that the king has a dual personality, one as a physical person and the other as holder of the Crown, insofar as personality is recognized in the succession of successive holders of an office (corporation sole). In the past, the Crown was regarded as one and indivisible; now the opinion is gaining ground that it should instead be regarded as multiple and legally distinguishable as well, insofar as concerns the countries of the Commonwealth (British Commonwealth of Nations), which comprises the following states: the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. “The Crown has always been regarded as the keystone supporting the arch of the Commonwealth and often also as its sole legal bond, insofar as its states have different parliaments and different governments, but have the same sovereign. The preamble to the Statute of Westminster of 1931 expressly defines it as the symbol of the free association of the members of the British Commonwealth. But the declaration of the prime ministers of 27 April 1949 describes the king as the symbol of the free association of the independent nations that are its members and, as such, head of the Commonwealth. The latter title was introduced as an expedient enabling India to remain in the association once it had adopted a republican form. The king thus appears in two capacities: as king of each of the monarchies and as head of the Commonwealth” (G. Treves). As for Ireland, the last tie with the Crown was severed by the Republic of Ireland Act of 1948, which assigns to the president of that republic the powers formerly exercised by the king of England. Also under the subsequent English Ireland Act of 1949, Ireland is no longer included within the British sphere, but neither is it regarded as a foreign country for certain purposes; it must be considered to occupy a particular position, unique of its kind, in international law.