NEUTRALITY. — In its etymological sense, neutrality signifies an impartial attitude between contending parties; in the specific sense given to it by international law, it is the legal condition of a State which does not participate in a war between other States, adopting toward them an attitude of impartiality. Neutrality is always connected with an existing state of war, so that it does not apply when other violent means are used which do not produce such a state, such as reprisals in time of peace, embargo, and so forth. As such, it implies abstention from hostilities and the continued maintenance of peaceful relations with all belligerents, though conditioned by particular restrictions imposed by the exigencies of war.
Neutrality may be voluntary or contractual, depending on whether it arises from the sovereign decision of a State or from a prior agreement; it may be particular, if it concerns a specific conflict, or general, if it refers to all conflicts; temporary or perpetual, according as it is limited in time or not; unarmed or armed, if the State maintains contingents for any eventuality or remains disarmed. Particular importance has been attached to perpetual neutrality, which results in the so-called neutralization of a country, established by convention, whereby one State binds itself to remain neutral in any conflict and toward any State, while the others undertake to recognize and respect the legal condition thus created, as, for example, has occurred repeatedly in the cases of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. For a state of neutrality, with its attendant rights and duties, to come into being, the declaration of war and its notification to the neutral by the belligerents is not in itself required, nor is an explicit notification by the State intending to remain outside the conflict, although such notification is commonly made.
The concept of neutrality is modern. Ancient Catholic doctrine did not recognize II. Based on the distinction between just and unjust war and on the principle that the belligerent in a just war exercises an act of vindictive justice against the violator of the law, it could not conceive of an impartial attitude toward wrong and right and therefore admitted the obligation to grant the *transitus innocuus* to the belligerent waging a just war and to deny it to the adversary. The theory became common through the influence of a celebrated text by St. Augustine, who justified the conquest of the land of the Amorites by Israel on the ground that they had refused the harmless passage requested by Moses: “for the passage was denied to those who were harmful, though it ought to be open by the law of human society” (*In Heptateuchum*, 54). Grotius substantially repeats the preceding doctrine while adding, though recognizing the need for guarantees, that the passage should in fact be harmless. It is from the impossibility of obtaining such guarantees that the concept of neutrality begins to emerge, adumbrated by Pufendorf and clearly formulated by Vattel, which after the 17th century would be developed and systematized as an international institution. This evolution was accompanied by the gradual abandonment of the distinction between just and unjust war and by the prevalence of the opposing positivist conception, which came to regard war as always lawful and thus as a political duty to maintain impartiality toward the belligerents, since the parties in conflict were exercising a faculty recognized by international law.
Neutrality, however, requires a different theoretical justification. Even while maintaining the classical distinction between just and unjust war according to the demands of morality and law, one cannot deny the difficulty for a third State of ascertaining on which side justice lies, and moreover, even supposing it succeeds in doing so, it must not lose sight of the obligation incumbent upon authority to avoid the evils that would befall the community if it participated in the conflict. A reason of the common good therefore justifies neutrality, to which, in addition to the noted difficulty, must be added the absence of any obligation to investigate the motives that led the belligerents to resort to armed conflict.
The duties and rights connected with the state of neutrality are summarized (Fifth Hague Convention, 1907) in the immunity of neutral territory from any hostile acts by the belligerents: passage of troops, munitions, supplies; establishment of means of communication or recruitment of combatants. The neutral State is bound to ensure that all this is observed, but it is not required to prevent the passage across its frontier of isolated individuals, the exportation and transit of goods useful to the contending parties, nor the use of its own means of communication, though if it establishes restrictions, it must apply them uniformly. It is responsible only for acts committed within its territory, not for those which its subjects may commit abroad. Other norms concern the treatment of military personnel who cross the frontier, who must be disarmed and interned, and the sick and wounded, to whom it may permit passage to reach their country of origin. It retains the right to repel any attack on its neutrality, even by the use of arms, without this being considered a hostile act. It is not contrary to neutrality to employ its good offices with the belligerents.
A change in the concept of neutrality, however, has taken place since the establishment of the League of Nations, whose Covenant, in Article 16, obliged all members to render mutual assistance in applying economic and financial sanctions against any State resorting to war and to take the necessary measures to facilitate the passage through their territory of military forces that would participate in the common action to enforce the obligations assumed toward the League. An identical provision is contained in the Charter of the United Nations, which, in Article 43, commits all members of the organization to make available to the Security Council, should it decide on collective action, the armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the maintenance of peace. Without abolishing the Hague Convention of 1907, which remains in force for States not belonging to the international organization, both the Covenant and the Charter of the United Nations, by introducing a mandatory rule for mutual assistance and reserving the right of passage, incompatible with the concept of neutrality, have introduced a profound legal innovation, rendering impossible, at least for members, the state of perpetual neutrality. The foundation of this innovation, which in part returns to the old position of Catholic doctrine, is the principle of international solidarity in the maintenance of peace, which has influenced even the creation of the two organizations. An excellent principle, if it were applied consistently to all the issues that commonly divide peoples and cause conflicts.