PETIZIONE. — The “right of petition” addressed to the supreme authorities of the State (directed to the king, as in the English “Bill of Rights,” or to the Chambers, as in the constitutions of the last centuries, including the Albertine Statute) has been classified among the liberties, civic rights, or constitutional guarantees.
It has never been of very great importance, and its effectiveness has diminished with the gradual establishment of other means for expressing the will and desires of the people (the press, public meetings, political parties, etc.). Nevertheless, the institution has been retained even in the most recent constitutional documents, including the Italian one, on the grounds that in certain circumstances it may be put to some useful purpose. It is a right belonging to all citizens (in the past, according to a disputed opinion, also to foreigners), solely “to request legislative measures or to set forth common needs” (art. 50). A petition may therefore be collective as well as individual, but never in the interests of private persons, who must instead apply to the competent administrative or judicial authorities. Its examination is regulated by the internal rules of the Chambers. Thus, according to the Senate’s very recent rules, the president forwards petitions to the standing committees, which have the power to verify their authenticity preliminarily; they report monthly on their contents, and the Senate then decides on the further course of their examination. When they refer to bills already introduced, they are examined together with those bills.
Aristotle speaks of p. di p. in Anal. pr., II, 18 (16): « quando aliquis, quod ex seipso notum non est, per seipsum demonstrare conetur, tunc petit quod a principio erat quaesitum » (τοτ' αἰτεῖται τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς; cf. s. Tommaso, De fallaciis, cap. 13). « Ἀρχή » does not mean here, nor in the parallel text (op. cit., I, cap. 22 [23]), « principio » syllogism (v.), but has a temporal sense: « that which was proposed at the outset (for the demonstration): « τὸ προκείμενον » (op. cit., II, cap. 18 [16]).