QUASI CONTRACT
It is, according to doctrine and in some positive legal systems (including the Italian Civil Code of 1865), one of the sources of obligation (v.).
I. CONCEPT
For jurists, a quasi contract is a voluntary and lawful act from which an obligation towards a third party or a mutual obligation between the parties arises, without there being—even implicitly—any consent (cf. Italian Civil Code 1865, arts. 1097, 1140). For moralists, with few exceptions, quasi contract exists not only in the above hypothesis but also in every case where external consent is lacking but is tacitly included in an act (the so-called tacit contract), as occurs when someone assumes or accepts an office or position (e.g., physician, judge, teacher, mayor, parish priest, etc.).II. LAW
The doctrine of quasi contract is closely tied to the historical origin of the term. Classical Roman law did not know this term nor had a theory on the subject; it nevertheless took into consideration certain transactions from which an obligation arose without the intervention of consent, and it grouped these transactions with contract figures. Given as a principle that the essential element of a contract is consent, postclassical jurists, unable to fit these figures into it, developed the theory of quasi contract, indicating by this name those lawful acts that gave rise to an obligation without the agent having the will or intention to contract one; and Justinian sanctioned the principle. These obligations are not strictly understood to arise *ex contractu*, but since they derive their substance not from wrongdoing (*non ex maleficio*), they arise *quasi ex contractu* (C. III, 28). The particle *quasi* in the text clearly indicates a similarity and a distinction: there is a similarity in that in the cases mentioned a true obligation arises from a lawful act (not from wrongdoing); and there is a distinction in that no true contract exists without agreement or consent, even if tacit.Among recent legislations, the German and Swiss avoid classifying the sources of obligations; the French and the Italian of 1865 (art. 1097) admit four sources of obligations. In doctrine, the advisability of retaining the term "quasi contract," which does not appear in the current Italian Civil Code, has been debated. However, in the enumeration of the sources of obligations, it is affirmed that these derive from contract, from unlawful act, or from any other act or fact capable of producing obligations in accordance with the legal system (art. 1173). The legislator, therefore, while avoiding the term, admits other sources of obligation besides contract and unlawful act.
Among these acts or facts, the current Italian Civil Code, following the precedent, regulates three figures of quasi contract: management of another's affairs (arts. 2028–32), payment of what is not due (arts. 2033–40), and unjust enrichment at another's expense (Roman *actio de in rem verso*: arts. 2041–42).
It is disputed whether other forms or civil figures of quasi contract may be added to these; in practice, art. 1173 at least admits the possibility of other figures not specifically contemplated by the Code.
III. MORALS
Moralists include within the figure of quasi contract any obligation arising from the acceptance or assumption of a public office or position; in this case, one should rather see a tacit contract. The reason for this extension may be found in the fact that, at the time when civil law became the object of moralists' attention, Roman law was not known and studied in its classical origins but in Justinian's compilation, with other non-Roman modifications and traditions, while the obligation arising from public office could materially be likened to that of *negotiorum gestio* (*quasi ex mandato*). Recently, some moralists have returned to the Roman concept; thus D'Annibale (Summula theol. mor., II, 4th ed., Rome 1896, no. 437) and Vermeersch (Theologiae mor. prim., II, 11, 1923, no. 408); others simply note the different notion, and others do not mention it at all.IV. ORIGIN OF THE OBLIGATION
Following the Roman law concept, authors seek the foundation of the quasi contract obligation in various theories; the one that finds greatest favor and appears most consonant with legal principles places the foundation in the principles of justice or natural equity, sanctioned by positive law; inasmuch as natural law forbids one who has received things not due to keep them and not to return them to the owner or to compensate others for expenses incurred. For moralists, obviously, different foundations are given, in harmony with the different concept of quasi contract.As a rule, the obligation arising from quasi contract falls under strict justice at least with regard to the figures regulated by civil law, given the principle that civil law, in determining the right of property, by sanctioning or completing natural law, obliges in conscience. One must therefore adhere to the relevant norms established by civil laws under penalty of sin, unless in a specific case their application proves contrary to the principles of natural justice. This norm also applies in ecclesiastical matters and for ecclesiastical persons among themselves, by virtue and within the limits of c. 1529. Indeed, the canon expressly speaks only of contracts in general and in particular, both named and unnamed; but according to c. 18, quasi contracts must also be included, especially since the CIC does not make them obligatory, being concerned only with what properly pertains to ecclesiastical matters.
If one considers in particular the various positive prescriptions (e.g., of the current Italian Civil Code), one must note that obligations arising from quasi contract are clearly distinct from those derived from contract; and whereas in the latter the individual's will manifested in consent fixes their terms in harmony or addition to the law, quasi contract obligations follow norms of natural equity, interpreted either by the law or by the judge (arts. 2030, 2031, 2037, 2038).
As regards the moral aspect of quasi contracts in the moralists' sense, the general norms apply concerning sufficient expertise and adequate updating, diligence in the performance of office such as a good *paterfamilias*, diligence that translates into promptness in responding to requests, loyalty and commitment in promptly bringing the matter to a good conclusion, the exclusion of any form of corruption or favoritism, without forgetting the grave duty of charity to render service gratuitously in cases prescribed by law or demanded by the individual's poverty.