RESTITUTIO « IN INTEGRUM ». — It is defined by writers on canon law as the extraordinary legal remedy by which one who has suffered injury to his rights is, on the basis of natural equity and through the action of the judge, restored to the legal condition in which he was before the injury.
The institution, proper to Roman law and widely used by the praetor, acquired precise and determinate limits as the laws developed; and the law of the Church itself, both in the Decretals of Gregory IX (lib. I, X, tit. 41) and in the CIC, has restricted the action of the r. in i. to cases involving injury caused by an act or contract (can. 1684), the right of appeal by contumacious persons (can. 1847), and principally the possibility of challenging a judgment.
The definition of the r. in i. presupposes, for the legitimate institution of the action, three elements: a) the validity and rescindability of the act or transaction. The ordinary remedy of the querela nullitatis applies, in fact, to an invalid act, just as restoration of a given legal status is impossible when the act is not rescindable; b) proof of serious injury, which must have been caused by the fraud of the opposing party or by the incompetence of the injured party; the action may never be brought, however, when the injury is attributable to fortuitous event; c) the existence of a causa restituendi, which the CIC contemplates in can. 1687 §§ 1-2. A sufficient cause, in fact, for r. in i. is minority or the status of a juridical person which, because of its dedication to social purposes, cannot be burdened with the damage caused by the fault of the responsible administrators. This extraordinary remedy is granted to minors and juridical persons in order to afford them greater protection, even when ordinary remedies exist (can. 1687 § 1); this is in accordance with the well-known canonical principle: habenti remedium ordinarium non est tribuendum extraordinarium nisi hoc sit pinguius. Adults may also benefit from the r. in i. when no ordinary remedy exists to provide redress (can. 1687 § 2) and there is a just cause for restitutio which, although not specified by the CIC, may be found—and in this connection reference is also made to the provisions of Roman law—in the absence of the injured party, the fraud of the opposing party, metus, or error.
The action, as required by can. 1688 § 1, must be brought before the ordinary judge within the peremptory period of four years from attainment of majority in the case of minors, and, where juridical persons or adults are concerned, a die laesionis factae et cessati impedimenti. It is obvious that the r. in i. does not operate against rights acquired in good faith by third parties before the action was brought.
As has been observed, the r. in i. against a judgment is nothing other than a particular application of the general institution. Once the judgment has become res judicata and can therefore no longer be challenged, the extraordinary remedy of r. in i. is available if, as a result of serious new elements that have emerged or of a violation of the law, it is discovered that the judgment is unjust and therefore manifestly contrary to law. Since it is an extraordinary remedy, it follows that it cannot be invoked when the judgment is still subject to review by an ordinary means, such as appeal or the querela nullitatis.
The r. in i. may be brought only in the four cases expressly contemplated by the CIC, the first three of which are based on matters of fact alone, while the last is based on law. They arise: 1) when the judgment rests on documents subsequently proved to be false; 2) when, after the judgment, new facts emerge that entail a decision differing from the one rendered; 3) when the wording of the judgment is a direct consequence of the fraud of one party against the other. If, however, the fraud is attributable to a third party, the action for restitutio does not lie; rather, an action for damages may be brought against the third party; 4) when the judgment contains manifest elements of violation of the law. With regard to this last hypothesis, the treatises raise the question whether restitutio is to be granted in cases involving violations of procedural laws. Some writers, proceeding from the distinction between formal and substantive procedural laws, do not doubt that violation of substantive procedural laws produces injustice and that the action for restitutio should consequently be granted.
The judge competent to hear the r. in i. action may be the same magistrate who rendered the challenged judgment when its reform is sought on the basis of new facts adduced; if, on the other hand, reform is sought for reasons of law (can. 1905 § 2, n. 4), the same judge who issued an erroneous decision obviously cannot be approached. The period available for bringing the action is four years; when it is brought on grounds of fact, the period runs from the day on which the documents were discovered to be false, or from the moment when the new documents were found. In the case of a challenge based on violation of law, however, the four-year period runs from notification of the judgment itself. There is no doubt that the new judgment resulting from the r. in i. is subject to the ordinary remedy of challenge, such as appeal, whether the restitutio was based ob rationes facti or ob rationes iuris.