Sedition

SEDITION. - S. (from seorsum ire) is the violent collective uprising against the public authorities or against specific persons invested with authority or with public interests

The political aim explains many s. found in ancient history, where one faction sought to overpower another either to impose a new order or to supplant the representatives of the other. The social aim was not absent either, especially in more modern times when a series of s. was the beginning of a general upheaval tending toward innovations and reforms in this sphere, as happened in the English and French Revolutions and even earlier in the Lutheran Reformation. The religious pretext likewise served many s., especially in the Byzantine Empire and in the medieval vicissitudes of the Roman Curia. In any case s. implies the concurrence of several persons who attempt to subvert the established order by acts of collective violence; and in this it finds its generic qualification as a crime. But in reality it is almost always aggravated by new elements that specify it as various crimes and worsen its criminal nature, as when it involves homicides, massacres, devastations, etc.

For a moral judgment it is necessary to keep in mind the aim and the circumstances that provoke the violent act. One must further distinguish the instigators or principal accomplices from the simple rank-and-file who participate in a non-determining measure. Finally one must weigh the limits and methods possibly predefined, as well as the efficacy of the preventive means established against possible unwanted consequences, and in every case consider the possible retraction which, if timely and full, removes all moral responsibility.

As an extreme measure of defense against a bloodthirsty tyrant s. can be justified if it can induce him to resign. But one must foresee and prevent the greater evil, such as civil war, massacre, destruction, etc., which would aggravate the situation and perhaps prevent the hoped-for liberation (v. TIRANNIA). In every other case s., especially if bloody, could hardly be morally justified. First of all because by its nature it tramples on the principle of authority, which is essential to the social and moral life of man; secondly because it provokes passions that could hardly be controlled and lead almost inevitably to other crimes that remove the character of legitimate protest that a popular uprising might have in some case. Finally because the violent act hardly ever obtains lasting improvements, while it often obeys factional interests. Therefore prudence imposes itself, seeking not the subversion of the established order but the rational progressive improvement of relations, under the aegis of a higher justice.

Even less justified is s. when it pursues religious or private aims. In the first case the violation of the divine law is evident, which in Christianity has created a hierarchy of powers and which alone is the depositary and guardian of the true religious interests of humanity. Therefore s. against the divine authority of the Church or against its legitimate representatives is a crime and sacrilege in every case, even when it pursues a particular moral or religious aim that does not conflict with the aims of the Church. The appropriate measures may be requested or implored according to the prescribed discipline and in the permitted ways, never imposed on the authority by public violence. Many times under the religious pretext private or sectarian interests operate; then s. is aggravated by a new malice because, by subverting the principle of authority, it deceives the people, exposing them to grave dangers for incontestable partisan aims. The responsibilities of the instigators and agitators therefore remain demonstrated, but accessory complicity does not cease, especially if the deception could easily have been overcome or the individual responsibilities were evident.

While modern penal laws do not consider s. in its generic meaning so much as the particular specifications that are added to the fundamental element of collective crime (cf. Cod. pen. ital., arts. 20-21; 303-307), Catholic morality and the CIC insist equally on the concept of cooperation and on that of revolt against authority which implicitly at least occurs in every s. Can. 2209 establishes the criterion of imputability, distinguishing principal or necessary complicity from secondary or accessory complicity. The former is recognized in the instigators and agitators as well as in the material executors of the crime, if a prior effective retraction did not annul it from the outset; likewise can. 2211 sanctions for them joint responsibility for the damages caused. To secondary accomplices, on the other hand, there remains the responsibility that they in fact contracted individually, always aggravated by the scandal given.

As for the implicit and explicit revolt against authority that s. entails, the CIC expressly considers it as a direct attack against the established order or against persons invested with legitimate power: thus can. 2331 § 2 strikes at conspiracy against the pontiff and his legates or one's own bishop even when it is expressed in seditious demonstrations; can. 2337 punishes the parish priest who agitates the people and attempts to prevent the entry of the legitimate successor. The odium plebis (v.), finally, which can manifest itself in a s. is considered a sufficient cause for the removal of a parish priest, without the s. itself being justified. In these cases of collective crimes the Church imposes sanctions of the same character, such as the interdict; but it does not neglect the other penal measures that strike the principal responsible parties with greater severity.

Salvatore Indelicato