SEDITION. - S. (from *seorsum ire*) is the violent collective uprising against public authorities or against specific persons invested with authority or entrusted with public interests.
The political aim explains many seditions found in ancient history, where one faction sought to overpower another either to impose a new order or to supplant the leaders of the opposing faction. However, the social aim was not absent, particularly in more modern times, when a series of seditions marked the beginning of a general upheaval aimed at innovations and reforms in this sphere, as occurred in the English and French Revolutions and even earlier in the Lutheran Reformation. The religious pretext also served many times to foment sedition, especially in the Byzantine Empire and in the medieval affairs of the Roman Curia. In any case, sedition implies the involvement of multiple persons who attempt to subvert the established order through acts of collective violence; and in this it finds its generic qualification as a crime. But in reality, it almost always aggravates itself with new elements that specify it into different crimes and worsen its criminal nature, as when it involves murders, massacres, devastations, etc.
For a moral judgment, one must consider the aim and the circumstances that provoke the violent act. It is also necessary to distinguish between the instigators or principal accomplices and the mere followers who participate in a non-decisive manner. Finally, one must weigh the limits and methods that may have been predefined, as well as the effectiveness of preventive measures established against possible undesired consequences, and in any case consider the possibility of timely and full retraction, which, if prompt and complete, removes all moral responsibility.
As an extreme measure of defense against a bloodthirsty tyrant
sedition may be justified if it can induce him to resign. However, one must foresee and prevent the greater evil, such as civil war, massacre, destruction, etc., which would aggravate the situation and perhaps prevent the hoped-for liberation (v. TYRANNY). In all other cases, sedition, especially if bloody, can hardly be morally justified. First, because by its very nature it tramples upon the principle of authority, which is essential to the social and moral life of man; second, because it provokes passions that can hardly be controlled and almost inevitably lead to other crimes that strip the popular uprising of any legitimate character it might have had in some cases. Finally, because violent action rarely achieves lasting improvements while often serving factional interests. Therefore, prudence is required that seeks not the subversion of the established order but the rational, progressive improvement of relations under the aegis of a higher justice.
Sedition is even less justified when it pursues religious or private ends. In the first case, the violation of divine law is evident, for in Christianity a hierarchy of powers has been established, and the Church alone is the depositary and guardian of the true religious interests of humanity. Therefore, sedition against the divine authority of the Church or against its legitimate representatives is a crime and sacrilege in every instance, even when it pursues a particular moral or religious end that does not conflict with the aims of the Church. Appropriate measures may be requested or implored according to the prescribed discipline and in the manner permitted, but never imposed upon authority through public violence. Often, under the religious pretext, private or sectarian interests operate; then sedition is aggravated by fresh malice, for it betrays the principle of authority and deceives the people, exposing them to grave dangers for unavowable partisan purposes. The responsibilities of the instigators and promoters thus remain evident, but accessory complicity does not diminish, especially if the deception could easily have been overcome or if individual responsibilities were manifest.
While modern penal laws do not consider sedition in its generic sense but rather its particular specifications that add to the fundamental element of collective crime (cf. Cod. pen. ital., arts. 20-21; 303-307), Catholic morality and the Code of Canon Law likewise emphasize the concept of cooperation and that of revolt against authority, which is at least implicitly present in every sedition. Canon 2209 establishes the criterion of imputability, distinguishing between principal or necessary complicity and secondary or accessory complicity. The former is recognized in the case of instigators and promoters as well as material executors of the crime, unless a timely and effective retraction nullified it from the outset; likewise, Canon 2211 imposes upon them joint and several liability for damages caused. Secondary accomplices, on the other hand, incur responsibility that marks them individually, always aggravated by the scandal given.
As for the implicit and explicit revolt against authority that sedition entails, the Code of Canon Law expressly considers it as a direct attack against the established order or against persons invested with legitimate power: thus Canon 2331 § 2 punishes cooperation against the Pope and his legates or one’s own bishop even when it manifests itself in seditious demonstrations; Canon 2337 punishes a parish priest who incites the people to prevent the entry of the legitimate successor. *Odium plebis* (v.), finally, which may manifest itself in a sedition, is considered a sufficient cause for the removal of a parish priest, without the sedition itself being justified. In these cases of collective crimes, the Church imposes sanctions of the same character, such as interdict; but it does not neglect other penal measures that strike the principal offenders with greater severity.