SEDIZIONE. – S. (from seorsum ire) is the violent collective uprising against the public authorities or against particular persons invested with authority or with public interests.
The political aim explains many s. found in ancient history, where one faction sought to overcome another either to impose a new order or to supplant the representatives of the other. The social aim was not absent, however, especially in more modern times, when a series of s. initiated a general upheaval directed toward innovations and reforms in this sphere, as occurred in the English and French Revolutions and, earlier still, in the Lutheran Reformation. Religious pretexts also served many times to provoke s., especially in the Byzantine Empire and in the medieval vicissitudes of the Roman Curia. In every case, s. implies the participation of several persons who attempt to subvert the established order through acts of collective violence; and therein lies its generic classification as a crime. In reality, however, it is almost always aggravated by new elements that specify it as various offenses and worsen its criminal character, as when it involves murders, massacres, devastation, etc.
For a moral judgment, it is necessary to bear in mind the purpose and circumstances that provoke the violent act. It is also necessary to distinguish the instigators or principal accomplices from the mere followers who participate in it to a non-determinative degree. Finally, one must assess the limits and methods possibly laid down in advance, as well as the effectiveness of preventive measures established against possible undesirable consequences, and in every case consider the possibility of recantation, which, if timely and complete, removes all moral responsibility.
As an extreme measure of defense against a bloodthirsty tyrant, s. may be justified if it can induce him to resign. It is necessary, however, to anticipate and prevent the greater evil, which might be civil war, massacre, destruction, etc., aggravating the situation and perhaps preventing the hoped-for liberation (v. TIRANNIA). In every other case, s., especially if bloody, could hardly be morally justified. First, because by its nature it tramples upon the principle of authority, which is essential to the social and moral life of man; secondly, because it provokes passions that could hardly be controlled and that lead almost inevitably to other crimes, thereby removing the character of legitimate protest that a popular uprising might in some cases possess. Finally, because the violent act can hardly achieve lasting improvements, while it often serves factional interests. Prudence therefore imposes itself: it seeks not the subversion of the established order but the rational, progressive improvement of relations under the aegis of a higher justice.
Even less justified is s. when it pursues religious or private ends. In the first case, the violation of divine law is evident: in Christianity, this law has created a hierarchy of powers and is the sole custodian and guardian of humanity’s true religious interests. Therefore, s. against the divine authority of the Church or against its legitimate representatives is a crime and sacrilege in every case, even when it pursues a particular moral or religious aim that does not conflict with the Church’s aims. Appropriate measures may be requested or implored according to the prescribed discipline and in the permitted ways, but they may never be imposed upon authority through public violence. Private or sectarian interests often operate under a religious pretext; in that event, s. is aggravated by fresh malice, because, by subverting the principle of authority, it deceives the people, exposing them to grave dangers for incontrovertibly partisan purposes. The responsibility of the instigators and agitators therefore remains established, but accessory complicity does not disappear, especially if the deception could easily have been overcome or individual responsibilities were evident.
While modern penal laws do not consider s. in its generic meaning so much as the particular specifications added to the fundamental element of collective crime (cf. Cod. pen. ital., artt. 20-21; 303-307), Catholic morality and the CIC likewise insist on the concept of cooperation and on that of revolt against authority, which is implicit, at least, in every s. Can. 2209 establishes the criterion of imputability, distinguishing principal or necessary complicity from secondary or accessory complicity. The former is attributed to the instigators and agitators as well as to the material perpetrators of the crime, unless an effective prior recantation has annulled it from the outset; likewise, can. 2211 establishes their joint liability for the damages caused. Secondary accomplices, on the other hand, retain the responsibility that they individually incurred in fact, always aggravated by the scandal given.
As for the implicit and explicit revolt against authority entailed by s., the CIC expressly considers it a direct attack against the established order or against persons invested with legitimate power: thus can. 2331 § 2 strikes at conspiracy against the pontiff and his legates or against one’s own bishop, even when it takes the form of seditious demonstrations; can. 2337 punishes the parish priest who incites the people and attempts to prevent the entry of the legitimate successor. odium plebis (v.), finally, which may manifest itself in a s., is considered sufficient cause for the removal of a parish priest, without thereby justifying the s. itself. In these cases of collective crimes, the Church imposes sanctions of the same character, such as interdict; but it does not neglect the other penal measures that punish the principal persons responsible with greater severity.