STILUS et PRAXIS CURIAE. — These are two canonical juridical institutions which differ very little from one another and are relevant in the CIC as norms in cases where the law is deficient.
The first (stilus), from the formal point of view, refers to the forms and solemnities uniformly observed in the performance of ecclesiastical acts by the public ecclesiastical authority. When it refers to the norms used in the congregations, tribunals, and offices of the Holy See, one speaks of Stilus Curiae Romanae. From the material point of view, it refers to the principles constantly observed in the performance of certain acts or decisions, predominantly judicial ones. The second, that is, praxis, in the strict sense coincides with stilus taken in the material sense; in the broad sense it is equivalent to stilus. The two terms are sometimes taken in an even stricter sense, in which case stilus indicates the formalities customarily used in grants of grace; usus forensis formalis indicates the same formalities observed in contentious matters; praxis then designates stilus in the material sense, that is, decisions in matters of grace and contentious matters. In contentious matters, matters decided uniformly are also called usus forensis taken in the material sense, or auctoritas rerum perpetuo similiter iudicatarum.
As stated, a distinction is made between a stilus and a praxis of the Curia in general, and a stilus and a praxis proper to the congregations, tribunals, and offices of the Holy See (S. et p. C. Romanae). As a general rule, stilus habet vim legis: this refers to stilus in the formal sense.
Although the CIC does not speak of the stilus and praxis
of the local diocesan curiae, both may be invoked not to remedy a defect in a universal law, but only to fill gaps in a particular diocesan law. This follows by analogy. The CIC, in fact, deals with the stilus and praxis of the Roman Curia where it speaks of ius suppletorium (can. 20). Since the law, however generally and abstractly drafted, cannot foresee and regulate every concrete case in social life, it is both appropriate and necessary to establish particular norms indicating the means by which the shortcomings and deficiencies of written norms may be addressed (the so-called problem of gaps in the law, which receives particular solutions varying from one legal system to another). Since this serious problem also exists in the canonical legal system (v. INTERPRETAZIONE), the ecclesiastical legislator has expressly included, among the other subsidiary sources, the stilus and praxis of the Roman Curia in can. 20. These may produce juridical effects only when certain conditions are met, namely: 1) the absence of legal provisions for the concrete case, so that application of the subsidiary norms becomes indispensable; 2) that such application be lawful. Recourse to subsidiary sources is expressly excluded, in fact, in penal matters (nisi agatur de poesia applicandis), with regard to singular rights, privileges, and, generally, in cases for which extensive interpretation is not permitted (cann. 19, 983, 2219 § 3).
The stilus and praxis of the Roman Curia are not based on any juridical norm, but are applied only when recourse to analogy, both iuris and facti, proves insufficient. A distinction is usually made between stilus iuris and stilus facti. The former is true supplementary law. Judicial judgments and administrative acts (decrees, decisions), although they cannot produce new general law, may in fact be taken into consideration when norms can be deduced from them for resolving particular cases in the absence of a statutory provision, and thus become binding. From this derives usus forensis and the auctoritas rerum similiter iudicatarum, especially that of the Apostolic Signatura and the S. R. Rota. The latter, on the other hand, is not true subsidiary law, since it establishes obligatory and binding norms only for the officials of the Curia in carrying out the acts of their office. This also occurs in the exercise of delegated power, insofar as the validity of acts is concerned.
It is a question of particular importance, and one debated in legal scholarship, whether stilus can give rise to customary norms. Earlier authors are found to have maintained that judicial judgments, by themselves, can give rise to a custom. But according to the better view, the judge, whose authority is limited to declaring what the law is between the parties, cannot, through his judgments, constitute law in the proper sense, however many times he may repeat them. Accordingly, the praxis of the Curia and of the tribunals acquire the force of customary law only when the circumstances show that the people to whom the res iudicata relates conform to it by observing it as a legal norm for a certain period of time, thereby forming, together with the concurrence of the other conditions, a custom. Only then can it be said that those judgments produce laws in the proper sense, not by their own force, but by virtue of the deep-rooted custom of the people, of whom the judges themselves are a part (v. GIURISPRUDENZA).