ASSENT.
An essential moment of judgment (v.) consisting in the act by which the mind adheres to a proposition, that is, affirms the relation of unity or distinction between subject and predicate. The term comes from the Latin *assensus*, by which the subsequent technical usage rendered the Greek συγκτα-θεσις, translated by Cicero as *assensio* or *adprobatio*, and—attributing its introduction to Zeno—he defines as the entirely voluntary act by which the mind assents to the content of an evident representation (συγκτασία), itself called by the same Zeno "comprehensive" (καταληπτική), and which, "once accepted and approved" (συγκταθέσεις), he termed "comprehension" (καταληψις) (Cicero, *Acad.*, I, 40; and in general H. Ritter and L. Preller, *Historia philosophiae graecae*, 10th ed., Gotha 1934, §§ 484–86).
Contrary to the Cartesian thesis, assent is an act exclusive to the intellect and is distinguished from the consent of the will, which is rather an affective adherence of the will to the truth intuited and affirmed by the intellect. The distinction, however, is almost overlooked in common usage, which—failing to distinguish the various analytical moments of judgment—understands assent synthetically as the intellective-volitive adherence to a given proposition. In this sense, dissent is opposed to assent, though logically every critical act of thought is always an affirmation and thus an assent. According to the varying content of the judgment, assent may be certain-opinative or true-erroneous. Particular issues arise with assent not founded on the evidence of the relation between subject and predicate but on extrinsic authority (v. FEDE).
In legal language, assent often refers to the act of will by which one who is not the author or party to a juridical act must, by law, supplement the will of the latter so that the act may be valid.
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