SECULAR ARM. - It is not known precisely when this expression began to be used. Today the CIC, can. 2198, uses it, but with a meaning different from that of the Middle Ages.
In general, however, the s. a. can be defined as: the coercive power of the State, employed to render effective the sentences and ordinances of ecclesiastical tribunals and to apply the penalties that the Church does not see fit to execute. According to Catholic doctrine, the civil authorities are bound to lend such aid to the Church because of the Church's indirect superiority over the State. The Church, in fact, by her very constitution, with the legislative and judicial powers, also has the coercive power, which she directly exercises only in part, having then the right to demand, in case of need, the help of the secular power (can. 2214, § 1, and 2198).
To have a complete view of this institution, it is necessary to keep in mind the exclusive competence of the Church's tribunals in merely ecclesiastical causes (can. 1553, § 1), the doctrine of the Church's indirect power over the State, the treatise De delictis et poenis in the CIC; v. also ASYLUM, RIGHT of; INQUISITION; PRIVILEGES OF THE CLERGY.
Although recourse to the s. a. may seem prejudicial to the privilege of the forum, it is nonetheless a natural consequence of it, given the protection assured to the Church by the Catholic princes from Constantine onward, and the organization of the Church, which is without a militia of her own. This recourse, however, did not appear to the Fathers as the ideal thing, also because of the ease of interference by the civil power in spiritual matters. Nevertheless St. Augustine, who would have preferred to deal with the heretics through conversations and by way of persuasion, in the face of their obstinacy and violence is forced to invoke the application of the rigorous imperial laws (Ep. 93).
The Christian emperors, Constantine, Gratian and Theodosius, will regard the proscription of heresy as forming part of their attributions, and it will be the rescript of Gratian, made at the request of the Roman Council, that in 378 will prescribe the norms for the intervention of the s. a.: recalcitrant ecclesiastics will be compelled by the civil authorities to have themselves judged, or, after condemnation, to abandon their see (v. A. Fliche and V. Martin, Storia della Chiesa, III, Italian trans., Turin [1939], nos. 290, 549).
The most common use in the Middle Ages was the abandonment of a condemned person by the ecclesiastical tribunal to the civil power. The necessary irreproachability of the clergy and the preservation of the integrity of the faith required the application of such a measure. In fact, the so-called traditio curiae occurred especially in the case of the condemnation of a delinquent or heretical cleric, or of a layman condemned for heresy. The traditio of a cleric was preceded by degradation, carried out in the presence of the lay judge, and was practiced particularly in cases of condemnation to death or mutilation. In general, the handing over to the s. a. took place for the following crimes: heresy, falsification of apostolic letters, conspiracy against one's own bishop, incorrigibility, murder, habitual sodomy, simulation of the celebration of Mass or of confession by a non-priest, counterfeiting of coins and procured abortion. The handing over to the s. a. took place only after having in vain admonished and excommunicated the delinquent and had to be accompanied by the bishop's prayer that the delinquent's life be spared (Gregory IX, c. 27, X, 5, 40).
Already with Stephen of Tournai, a commentator on Gratian, the question arose whether the abandonment to the s. a., consequent upon degradation, was the execution of another judge's sentence or a new petition before the civil magistrate; according to the various periods, one or the other criterion prevailed.
While, in fact, under Theodosius and Justinian, with the privilege of the forum and the exclusive competence of ecclesiastical tribunals in determined matters being recognized, the civil power becomes the executor of the sentence of the ecclesiastical judge, in the Frankish period, on the other hand, there are two independent judgments with the application of penalties proper to each. In this case, the traditio curiae amounts to remitting the delinquent to the civil authority so that it may treat him as a common criminal.
Besides the traditio, however, the Church has always had the right to ask for secular aid. Thus Pepin and Charlemagne have two heretical and schismatic priests imprisoned in 745 at the instance of Boniface (Capitularia, II, p. 38) and in the 11th century, because of the continuous progress of heresy, the Church solicits the support of the secular power by establishing: «per potestates exteras coerceri praecepimus» (Mansi, XXI, 227). This remedy proves effective, since, for fear of death, Berengar in 1092 abjures heresy and, like him, others afterward.
In Gratian's Decretum the traditio curiae of a cleric represents the only exception to the privilege of the forum; it is said in fact: «a gradu debet decidi ac curiae tradi». It should be noted, however, that while Rufinus and Stephen of Tournai admit the traditio curiae only for the penalty of death and mutilation, the doctrine after Gratian admits its universality in cases of degradation. Gratian's commentators find the means to distinguish the traditio curiae «ut puniatur», the graver but rarer one that occurs in the case of incorrigibility, and the traditio «ut serviat» (Comment. in c. 18, caus. XI, q. 1a). The Decretum, in order to repress errors against the faith, treats of lay heretics and admits the traditio also for them in the case of a contumacious heretic (caus. XXIII, q. IV, c. 38, 39, 40, 41; q. V, c. 43, 44, q. VII). This doctrine on heretics, taken from St. Augustine, will later be the fundamental law of the Inquisition. The application of the death penalty through the s. a. up to the 15th century is summarized by U. Durand (Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, V, Paris 1717, col. 1741) who says: «Papa noster non occidit, nec praecipit aliquem occidi, sed lex occidit quos Papa permittit occidi».
The legislation of the tribunals of the Inquisition with regard to the s. a. can be summarized as follows: 1) The inquisitors can compel all magistrates, even secular ones, to enforce the statutes promulgated against heretics, their supporters and harborers, obliging them also to take an oath of such observance; in the case of refusal to swear they will be declared infamous, suspected in the faith and deprived of office. In case of heresy, they can use the s. a. and all temporal lords are bound to obey them, even in the case of an appeal by the accused, and if they condemn him to prison, these are bound to guard him faithfully (c. 10 in 6°, V, 2). 2) They can oblige all magistrates to execute their sentences and these, sub poena excommunicationis, are bound to obey (Innocent VIII, const. 10, Dilectus). 3) They can compel anyone, even magistrates, to give their documents, if they are necessary, to the Holy Office (Alexander IV, const. 18, Cupientes).
The s. a., however, displays its greatest activity in the repression of heresy. With the decline, therefore, of the tribunal of the Inquisition, the ancient procedure of abandonment to the s. a. falls into disuse both in Italy and in all the countries of Europe. In fact, the ecclesiastical judge will have to limit himself to the declaration that a determined doctrine or position is heretical and to having to solicit the support of the s. a. for the execution of that jurisdictional power that remains to him still. The French Revolution and all the legislations inspired by it, with the abolition of every privilege, abolished the privilege of the forum and with it also the institution of the b. s. [secular arm]. In Italy, art. 17 of the Law of Guarantees, by recognizing and granting no coercive execution to the acts of ecclesiastical authorities, applies the theory of the hegemony of the State, denying every right to the Church. Canon 2198 of the CIC [Code of Canon Law], however, with regard to crimes and purely ecclesiastical causes, claims for the ecclesiastical judge exclusive competence (can. 1553, § 1) with the right to request, according to opportunity and necessity, the help of the b. s. The difference from the ancient institution is therefore radical, all the more so since modern States rarely assure the Church the aid of the b. s. In fact, rather than a revival of the ancient institution, one finds examples of its limited effects in concordats. Explicitly in art. 4 of the Concordat between the Holy See and Poland and in art. 4 of that with Lithuania (A. Perugini, Concordata vigentia, Rome 1934, pp. 34, 60).
In Italy, concordat legislation has brought significant innovations and the repeal of art. 17 of the Law of Guarantees. The Church is in fact recognized as having exclusive competence in purely ecclesiastical causes and in matrimonial matters (Concordat: art. 1, 34); full recognition and juridical effect, including civil effects, is given to the judgments and provisions of ecclesiastical authority in spiritual or disciplinary matters, provided however that they concern ecclesiastics or religious (Treaty, art. 23; cf. also Concordat, art. 1, 5, 29 i, etc.).
Bibliography7 works
END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.