SECULAR ARM. – It is not known precisely when this expression began to be used. Today the CIC, can. 2198, uses it, but with a meaning different from that of the Middle Ages.
In general, however, the s. a. may be defined as the coercive power of the State, employed to make the sentences and ordinances of ecclesiastical tribunals enforceable and to apply penalties which the Church does not deem appropriate to execute. According to Catholic doctrine, the civil authorities are obliged to provide such assistance to the Church because of the indirect superiority of the Church over the State. The Church, in fact, by reason of its very constitution, with legislative and judicial powers, also possesses coercive power, which it directly exercises only in part, having moreover the right to demand, when necessary, the assistance of secular power (can. 2214, § 1, and 2198).
For a complete understanding of this institution, it is necessary to bear in mind the exclusive competence of the tribunals of the Church in purely ecclesiastical cases (can. 1553, § 1), the doctrine of the indirect power of the Church over the State, and the treatise De delictis et poenis in the CIC; V. ASILO, DIRITTO di; INQUISIZIONE; PRIVILEGI DEI CHIERICI.
Although recourse to the s. a. may seem prejudicial to the privilege of the forum, it is nevertheless its natural consequence, given the protection afforded to the Church by Catholic rulers from Constantine onward, and the organization of the Church, which lacked its own military force. This recourse, however, did not appear to the Fathers to be the ideal solution, also because of the ease with which civil power could interfere in spiritual matters. Nevertheless, s. Agostino, who would have preferred to deal with the heretics through conversation and persuasion, in the face of their obstinacy and violence was compelled to invoke the application of the rigorous imperial laws (Ep. 93).
The Christian emperors, Constantine, Grazian and Teodosio, would regard the proscription of heresy as belonging to their own prerogatives, and it would be the rescript of Grazian, issued at the request of the Roman Council, which in 378 prescribed the rules for the intervention of the s. a.: recalcitrant ecclesiastics would be compelled by the civil authorities to submit to judgment or, after condemnation, to abandon their see (v. A. Fliche e V. Martin, Storia della Chiesa, III, Italian translation, Torino [1939], nn. 290, 549).
The most common practice in the Middle Ages was for the ecclesiastical tribunal to abandon a condemned person to the civil power. The requisite irreproachability of the clergy and the preservation of the integrity of the faith required the application of this measure. Indeed, the so-called traditio curiae occurred especially in the case of the condemnation of a delinquent or heretical cleric, or of a layman condemned for heresy. The traditio of a cleric was preceded by degradation, carried out in the presence of the lay judge, and was practiced particularly in cases of condemnation to death or mutilation. In general, surrender to the s. a. took place for the following offenses: heresy, forgery of apostolic letters, conspiracy against one’s own bishop, incorrigibility, murder, habitual sodomy, simulation of the celebration of Mass or of confession by a non-priest, counterfeiting coins, and procuring abortion. Surrender to the s. a. took place only after the delinquent had been unsuccessfully admonished and excommunicated, and it had to be accompanied by the bishop’s prayer that the delinquent’s life be spared (Gregorio IX, c. 27, X, 5, 40).
Already with Stefano di Tournai, commentator on Graziano, the question arose whether surrender to the s. a., following degradation, constituted the execution of a sentence by another judge or a new proceeding before the civil magistrate; depending on the period, one or the other view prevailed.
Whereas under Teodosio and Giustiniano, with recognition of the privilege of the forum and the exclusive competence of ecclesiastical tribunals in certain matters, the civil power became the executor of the ecclesiastical judge’s sentence, during the Frankish period there were instead two independent judgments, with the application of their respective penalties. In this case, the traditio curiae amounted to handing the delinquent over to the civil authority so that it might treat him as an ordinary criminal.
In addition to the traditio, the Church has always had the right to request secular assistance. Thus Pipino and Carlomagno had two heretical and schismatic priests imprisoned in 745 at the request of Bonifacio (Capitularia, II, p. 38), and in the 11th century, because of the continual spread of heresy, the Church solicited the support of secular power, establishing: «per potestates exteras coerceri praecepimus» (Mansi, XXI, 227). This remedy proved effective, since, out of fear of death, Berengario recanted his heresy in 1092, and others subsequently did likewise.
In the Decretum of Graziano, the traditio curiae of a cleric represents the sole exception to the privilege of the forum; it states, in fact: «a gradu debet decidi ac curiae tradi». It should be noted, however, that whereas Rufino and Stefano di Tournai admit the traditio curiae only for the penalty of death and mutilation, the doctrine subsequent to Graziano admits its universal application in cases of degradation. The commentators on Graziano find a means of distinguishing the traditio curiae «ut puniatur», the more severe but rarer form, which occurs in cases of incorrigibility, from the traditio «ut serviat» (Comment. in c. 18, caus. XI, q. 1a). The Decretum, in order to suppress errors against the faith, deals with heretical
laymen and admits the traditio for them as well in the case of a contumacious heretic (caus. XXIII, q. IV, c. 38, 39, 40, 41; q. V, c. 43, 44, q. VII). This doctrine concerning heretics, taken from s. Agostino, would later become the fundamental law of the Inquisition. The application of the death penalty through the s. a. up to the 15th century is summarized by U. Durand (Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, V, Parigi 1717, col. 1741), who states: «Papa noster non occidit, nec praecipit aliquem occidi, sed lex occidit quos Papa permittit occidi».
The legislation of the tribunals of the Inquisition with regard to the s. a. may be summarized as follows: 1) The inquisitors may compel all magistrates, including secular ones, to enforce the statutes promulgated against heretics, their supporters, and those who harbor them, also obliging them to swear to such enforcement; in the event of refusal to swear, they will be declared infamous, suspect in the faith, and deprived of office. In cases of heresy, they may use the s. a., and all temporal lords are obliged to obey them, even in the event of an appeal by the accused; and if they condemn him to imprisonment, the latter are bound to guard him faithfully (c. 10 in 6°, V, 2). 2) They may oblige all magistrates to execute their sentences, and the latter, sub poena excommunicationis, are bound to obey (Innoc. VIII, const. 10, Dilectus). 3) They may compel anyone, including magistrates, to provide their documents, if necessary, to the S. Uffizio (Alessandro IV, const. 18, Cupientes).
The s. a., however, exercises its greatest activity in the suppression of heresy. With the decline, therefore, of the tribunal of the Inquisition, the ancient procedure of surrender to the s. a. fell into disuse both in Italy and throughout all the countries of Europe. Indeed, the ecclesiastical judge would have to limit himself to declaring that a particular doctrine or position was heretical and to soliciting the support of the s. a. for the execution of that jurisdictional power which remained to him.
still remaining. The French Revolution and all the legislation inspired by it, with the abolition of every privilege, abolished the privilege of the forum and with it also the institution of the secular arm. In Italy, Art. 17 of the Law of Guarantees, by neither recognizing nor granting any compulsory execution to acts of ecclesiastical authorities, applies the theory of the hegemony of the State, denying every right to the Church. Canon 2198 of the CIC, however, with regard to purely ecclesiastical offenses and cases, claims exclusive competence for the ecclesiastical judge (can. 1553, § 1), together with the right to request, as circumstances and necessity may require, the assistance of the secular arm. The difference from the ancient institution is therefore fundamental, all the more so since modern States rarely assure the Church the aid of the secular arm. Indeed, rather than instances of a revival of the ancient institution, one finds examples of its limited effects in concordats. Explicitly so in Art. 4 of the Concordat between the Holy See and Poland and in Art. 4 of that with Lithuania (A. Perugini, Concordata vigentia, Roma 1934, pp. 34, 60).
In Italy, concordat legislation brought significant innovations and the abrogation of Art. 17 of the Law of Guarantees. The Church is in fact recognized as having exclusive competence in purely ecclesiastical cases and in matrimonial matters (Concordat: Arts. 1, 34); full recognition and legal effectiveness, including civil effects, are accorded to the judgments and measures of ecclesiastical authority in spiritual or disciplinary matters, provided, however, that they concern clerics or religious (Treaty, Art. 23; cf. also Concordat, Arts. 1, 5, 29 i, etc.).
END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.