SEcular ARM. — The precise moment when this expression began to be used is not known. Today the CIC, can. 2198, employs it, but with a meaning different from that of the Middle Ages.
In general, however, the secular arm can be defined as: the coercive power of the State, employed to enforce the sentences and ordinances of ecclesiastical courts and to apply penalties that the Church cannot execute herself. According to Catholic doctrine, civil authorities are not obliged to render such assistance to the Church because of the indirect superiority of the Church over the State. The Church, in fact, by its very constitution with legislative and judicial powers, also possesses coercive power, which it exercises directly only in part, while having the right to demand, when necessary, the aid of secular power (can. 2214, § 1, c 2198).
To gain a complete understanding of this institution, it is necessary to keep in mind the exclusive competence of Church courts in purely ecclesiastical matters (can. 1553, § 1), the doctrine of the indirect power of the Church over the State, and the treatise *De delictis et poenis* in the CIC; V. also ASILO, DIRITTO DI, INQUISIZIONE; PRIVILEGI DEI CHIERICI.
Although recourse to the secular arm may seem prejudicial to the privilege of the forum, it is nonetheless a natural consequence, given the protection of the Church assured by Catholic princes from Constantine onward and the Church’s organization, lacking its own military force. However, the Fathers did not regard this recourse as ideal, also because of the ease with which civil power could interfere in spiritual matters. Nevertheless, St. Augustine, who would have preferred to deal with heretics through conversation and persuasion, was compelled, faced with their obstinacy and violence, to invoke the application of the rigorous imperial laws (Ep. 93).
The Christian emperors Constantine, Gratian, and Theodosius considered the proscription of heresy as part of their prerogatives, and it was Gratian’s rescript, issued at the request of the Roman Council in 378, that prescribed the norms for the intervention of the secular arm: recalcitrant ecclesiastics were to be compelled by civil authorities either to submit to judgment or, after condemnation, to relinquish their office (v. A. Fliche and V. Martin, *Storia della Chiesa*, III, Italian ed., Turin [1939], nn. 290, 549).
The most common medieval usage was the handing over of a condemned person by the ecclesiastical court to the civil power. The necessary irreproachability of the clergy and the preservation of the integrity of the faith required the application of this measure. Indeed, the so-called *traditio curiae* occurred especially in the case of the condemnation of a delinquent or heretical cleric, or of a layperson condemned for heresy. The *traditio* of a cleric was preceded by degradation, carried out in the presence of the lay judge, and was practiced particularly in cases of condemnation to death or mutilation. In general, delivery to the secular arm occurred for the following crimes: heresy, forgery of apostolic letters, conspiracy against one’s own bishop, incorrigibility, murder, habitual sodomy, simulation of the celebration of Mass or of confession by a non-priest, counterfeiting of coins, and procured abortion. Delivery to the secular arm took place only after the offender had been warned and excommunicated in vain and was to be accompanied by the bishop’s prayer that the offender’s life be spared (Gregory IX, c. 27, X, 40).
Already from Stephen of Tournai, a commentator on Gratian, the question arose whether the *traditio curiae*, following degradation, was the execution of a sentence by another judge or a new instance before the civil magistrate; according to the period, one or the other criterion prevailed.
For instance, under Theodosius and Justinian, with the recognition of the privilege of the forum and the exclusive competence of ecclesiastical courts in certain matters, the civil power acted as the executor of the sentence of the ecclesiastical judge, whereas in the Frankish period there were two independent trials with the application of their own penalties. In this case, the *traditio curiae* amounted to handing the offender over to the civil authority to be treated as a common criminal.
Besides the *traditio*, however, the Church always had the right to seek secular aid. Thus, in 745, Pippin and Charlemagne, at the instance of Boniface, had two heretical and schismatic priests imprisoned (Capitularia, II, p. 38), and in the 11th century, because of the continuous spread of heresy, the Church urged the support of secular power, laying down: “we have commanded that they be coerced by external powers” (Mansi, XXI, 227). This remedy proved effective, for, fearing death, Berengar abjured heresy in 1092, and others followed his example.
In the *Decretum Gratiani*, the *traditio curiae* of a cleric represents the sole exception to the privilege of the forum; it is indeed stated: “he must be degraded and handed over to the secular arm.” It should be noted, however, that while Rufinus and Stephen of Tournai admitted the *traditio curiae* only for the penalty of death and mutilation, later doctrine following Gratian admitted its universality in cases of degradation. The commentators on Gratian distinguished between the *traditio curiae* “ut puniatur,” the more serious but rarer case that occurred in instances of incorrigibility, and the *traditio* “ut serviat” (Comment. in c. 18, caus. XI, q. 1). The *Decretum*, in order to repress errors against the faith, deals with heretical laity and admits the *traditio* even for them in the case of a contumacious heretic (caus. XXIII, q. IV, c. 38, 39, 40, 41; q. V, c. 43, 44, q. VII). This doctrine regarding heretics, taken from St. Augustine, would later become the fundamental law of the Inquisition. The application of the death penalty through the secular arm up to the 15th century is summarized by U. Durand (*Thesaurus novus anecdotorum*, V, Paris 1717, col. 1741), who states: “Our Pope does not kill, nor does he order anyone to be killed, but the law kills those whom the Pope permits to be killed.”
The legislation of the Inquisition courts with regard to the secular arm can be summarized as follows: 1) Inquisitors can compel all magistrates, even secular ones, to enforce the statutes promulgated against heretics, their abettors, and receivers, obliging them even to take an oath to this effect; in case of refusal to swear, they shall be declared infamous, suspect in the faith, and deprived of office. In cases of heresy, they can make use of the secular arm, and all temporal lords are bound to obey them, even in the case of an appeal by the accused, and if they condemn him to imprisonment, these lords are bound to guard him faithfully (c. 10 in 6°, V, 2). 2) They can oblige all magistrates to execute their sentences, and these, under pain of excommunication, are bound to obey (Innocent VIII, const. 10, *Dilectus*). 3) They can compel anyone, even magistrates, to hand over their documents if these are necessary to the Holy Office (Alexander IV, const. 18, *Cupientes*).
The blessed sword, however, exercised its greatest activity in the repression of heresy. With the decline of the Inquisition tribunal, the ancient procedure of handing over to the blessed sword fell into desuetude both in Italy and in all European countries. Indeed, the ecclesiastical judge was limited to declaring that a given doctrine or position was heretical and to requesting the support of the blessed sword for the execution of that jurisdictional power which still remained to him. The French Revolution and all the legislation inspired by it, by abolishing every privilege, abolished the privilege of the forum and with it the institution of the blessed sword. In Italy, article 17 of the Law of Guarantees, by not recognizing or granting any coercive execution to the acts of ecclesiastical authorities, applied the theory of state hegemony, denying the Church any right. Canon 2198 of the CIC, however, with regard to crimes and purely ecclesiastical causes, claims exclusive competence for the ecclesiastical judge (can. 1553, § 1) with the right to request, according to opportunity and necessity, the aid of the blessed sword. The difference from the ancient institution is therefore radical, all the more so since modern states rarely provide the Church with the aid of the blessed sword. Indeed, more than a revival of the ancient institution, examples are found of its limited effects in concordats. Explicitly in article 4 of the Concordat between the Holy See and Poland and in article 4 of that with Lithuania (A. Perugini, Concordata vigentia, Rome 1934, pp. 34, 60).
In Italy, concordatory legislation has brought significant innovations and the repeal of article 17 of the Law of Guarantees. Indeed, exclusive competence is recognized to the Church in purely ecclesiastical causes and in matters of marriage (Concordat: art. 1, 34); full juridical recognition and efficacy, even for civil effects, is given to the sentences and provisions of ecclesiastical authority in spiritual or disciplinary matters, provided however that they concern ecclesiastics or religious (Treaty, art. 23; cf. also Concordat, art. 1, 5, 29, 2, etc.).
END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.