URGENT CASE. — Under this name (as also under that of extraordinary case, perplexing case) are understood in moral theology and canon law those cases of grave and urgent necessity that may occur extra mortis periculum, in which it is morally impossible or inadvisable to omit or delay an action that is hindered by a particular legal provision.
In such cases, the ecclesiastical legislator usually extends the faculty of dispensation to Ordinaries, parish priests, or confessors, for the greater good of souls. Indeed, in these circumstances, human law often comes into conflict with natural law, which therefore prevails.
The general principle is established in can. 81 of the CIC, which states that Ordinaries have the faculty to dispense from pontifical laws (whether of common or particular law) when four conditions are simultaneously met: a) the case is particular, even if it concerns an entire community or a certain place; b) there is a danger of grave harm, public or private, of a moral or material nature, which can only be remedied by the immediate granting of the dispensation; c) recourse by ordinary means (i.e., correspondence) to the Holy See itself or its delegates is difficult; d) the dispensation is of the kind usually granted by the dicasteries of the Holy See, which can be known from the style and practice of the Roman Curia.
The urgent case can only be occasioned by a moral necessity to perform the action, and not, as some think, by the mere desire to perform the action, even if it be holy, such as to celebrate Mass, to receive Communion, or to contract marriage as soon as possible (unless the desire itself creates a moral necessity to act).
As to the nature of this power of the Ordinaries, which extends to all ecclesiastical laws and is valid for both the internal and external forum, authors are not in agreement, some—with greater justification—considering it ordinary power, by virtue of can. 197 § 1, while others consider it delegated by law.
The norm itself pertains to the case of a dispensation to be granted before the matter has been referred to the Holy See. However, authors, not without reason, extend the faculty even to the hypothesis that the danger of grave harm arises when the dispensation process has already been submitted to the competent Roman Dicastery, provided that the Holy See itself is informed in accordance with can. 204 § 2. The general principle established in can. 81 has several particular applications in the same CIC, especially regarding dispensation from irregularities (can. 990 § 2) or from matrimonial impediments (can. 1045), absolution from sins and censures (can. 900, nn. 1-2 and 2254), dispensation or suspension from vindictive penalties (can. 2290 § 1-2); but it should not be restricted only to these applications, as it extends
sibile to all ecclesiastical laws and to all cases not expressly excepted.
On the other hand, these particular hypotheses are not an unnecessary repetition, for they extend the faculties which can. 81 grants only to Ordinaries, according to the cases to parish priests and confessors or to the latter alone, albeit with some limitations and generally only for the internal forum.
1. **Dispensation from irregularities in c. u.** — While the extraordinary faculties of Ordinaries under can. 81 and the ordinary faculties established in can. 990 § 1 remain in force, when recourse to them is rendered morally impossible by the circumstances and the other conditions of c. u. are met, confessors themselves may dispense from all irregularities arising from an occult delict, with the exception of those arising from consummated voluntary homicide or abortion or from a delict already referred to the judicial forum (at least by the citation of the offender); the faculty of dispensation, however, exists only if the dispensation is necessary to render possible the exercise of Orders already previously received (can. 990 § 2). A case of urgent necessity is indeed excluded when the dispensation is necessary to receive Orders, even if recourse to the Ordinary is morally impossible, since the latter must administer the Order or grant the necessary faculties with prudent moderation.
2. **Dispensation from matrimonial impediments in c. u.** — When everything has been prepared for a marriage to be celebrated immediately, and thus the conditions of c. u. are met, Ordinaries may, for the purpose of both the celebration and the convalidation of the marriage, dispense in the internal and external forum from all impediments, whether public or occult, even multiple ones, with the exception of the impediment of sacred orders and the impediment of affinity in the direct line arising from a consummated marriage (can. 1045).
It should be noted that can. 1045 does not derogate from the general faculties pertaining to Ordinaries under can. 81 (v. DISPENSAZIONE; cf. the reply of the Pontifical Commission for the Authentic Interpretation of the CIC, 27 July 1942); rather, it extends such faculties with regard to matrimonial impediments, inasmuch as the dispensation may be extended even to impediments from which the Holy See does not usually grant dispensations, with the exception of the two expressly mentioned.
Moreover, whenever recourse to the Ordinary by ordinary means is morally impossible, or, even excluding difficulty of access, there is danger of violation of secrecy, the faculties granted to Ordinaries automatically pass in occult c. u. to the parish priest, the priest assisting at the marriage, and, insofar as the sacramental internal forum is concerned, to the confessor (can. 1045 § 3). It does not, however, appear—according to the more common opinion—that can. 1045 grants the faculty of dispensing from the form of celebration of marriage, concerning which, moreover, it does not seem that outside the cases contemplated by the Code and the danger of death (can. 1043, 1098), any other case of grave and urgent necessity for dispensation can be admitted.
For the case of danger of death, V. PERICOLO DI MORTE.
3. **Absolution from reserved cases in c. u.** — For this, V. CENSURA; RISERVA.
4. **Suspension and dispensation from vindictive penalties in c. u.** — V. PENE VENDICATIVE; RISERVA.
5. **C. u., and necessity as a law-causing cause.** — The Code sometimes uses certain expressions which would seem to refer to c. u., such as *urgent necessitas*, *si urgat necessitas*, etc. (can. 807, 851, 856, etc.). These are not properly cases of c. u. but of moral impossibility or grave inconvenience as a law-causing cause.
C. u. does not create any right in the aforementioned subject but grants the superior the extraordinary faculty of dispensation. Moral impossibility, on the other hand, is a circumstance by virtue of which the subject’s duty to observe the existing law ceases in a particular case, even though he remains subject to II. To judge this cessation in the concrete case, unlike in c. u., the intervention of the superior or confessor is not necessary; it suffices that the subject himself compare the law (and the obligation deriving therefrom) with the circumstance alleged as excusing. The obligation ceases in the moral sphere in view of the impossibility of its execution, unless it is a matter of an obligation of natural law prohibiting intrinsically evil acts.
In law, i.e., in the external forum, particular provisions of law must be taken into account.