CONCLUSIO IN CAUSA. – The c. in c., according to the CIC, is nothing other than the end of the instructional or evidentiary period of the trial (can. 1860 § 1). This has always been its proper effect, even though the theoretical concept has changed somewhat over time, as frequently happens.
The c. in c. was already in use in very remote times, introduced by custom (A. Reiffenstuel, Ius canonicum universum, I, II, t. 27, n. 48), rather than by any express provision of law (c. 11, C. XXX, q. 5; c. 8, X, II, 38, etc.). In his celebrated constitution Saep of 19 November 1306 (c. 2, V, 11 in Clem.), Clement V granted that in summary trials judgment could be given conclusione non facta. Nevertheless, while the c. in c. fell into disuse in civil procedure, the Church tenaciously maintained it in her discipline up to the CIC (cf. S. C. S. Off., Instr. ad Episcopos Rit. Orient., 20 June 1883, t. III, n. 22; S. C. de Prop. Fide, Instr. a. 1883, n. 22; Lex. propr. S. R. Rotae et Sign. Ap., 20 June 1908, c. 27 §§ 1, 2; Regulae servandae apud S. R. R. Tribun., 4 August 1910, § 51; Normae S. R. Rotae Tribun., 29 June 1934, n. 121; S. C. de Sacr. Instr., 15 August 1936, aa. 177 ff.).
In the ancient conception, the c. in c. was the renunciation by the parties of further evidence and the consequent remittal of the case for the judge’s decision (F. Schmalzgruber, Ius ecclesiasticum universum, I, II, t. 27, n. 1); it could be made expressly or tacitly, absolutely or conditionally. Today, on the other hand, conclusion is merely a phase of the trial which occurs automatically, namely when one of the three situations contemplated in § 2 of can. 1860 takes place, which states verbatim: «this conclusion occurs whenever the parties, questioned by the judge, declare that they have nothing further to adduce, or the period indicated by the judge for producing evidence has elapsed (cf. can. 1731 n. 2), or the judge himself declares the case sufficiently instructed». Once one of these three facts has occurred, conclusion takes place without further formality. The judge, however, in order to avoid misunderstandings or uncertainties, must always declare that conclusion has taken place by a special decree, whatever the fact that caused it may have been (ibid. § 3).
This decree, which is absent from the current norms of the Rota (cf. a. 121) and which, in the Instruction of the S. C. of the Sacraments (s. 177 § 1), itself effects conclusion, does not appear to be essential to the trial, just as conclusion itself was not, according to the common doctrine (cf. R. Maranta, Speculum aureum, p. 4, d. 9 n. 23).
In collegiate tribunals the decree is issued by the president (S. C. de S. Instr. a. 177 § 1). The c. in c. pursues two principal aims: removing all uncertainty concerning the period granted to the parties for producing their evidence, and expediting the instruction of the case by preventing useless or malicious delays.
In canonical procedure, conclusion, even though it does not affect the substance of the trial, is of considerable importance, since significant effects are attached to II.
Its first and fundamental effect is the closing of the instructional period and the consequent preclusion of new evidence (can. 1861 § 1). This preclusion, however, is not absolute; new evidence is admitted in cases that do not become res judicata, and documents discovered after conclusion has taken place may likewise be admitted, as may documents that could not be produced in time, as well as witnesses whom it was not possible to produce before conclusion (ibid.). In any event, the admission of new evidence is decreed by the judge at the request of one party, after hearing the other, and sufficient time must be granted to the latter to become acquainted with the new evidence adduced and to defend against it; otherwise the judgment would be null (can. 1861 § 2). The preclusion of new evidence, moreover, includes neither pleas of absolute incompetence and excommunication, which may be brought at any stage and in any instance of the trial (can. 1628 §§ 1, 2), nor judicial confession, nor the decisive oath, which likewise may be tendered at any stage and at any time during the litigation (can. 1834 § 1). Another effect of conclusion is the opening of the discussion of the case, for which reason the judge must indicate to the parties, according to his prudent judgment, a suitable period of time for presenting, personally or through their advocates, their defenses and replies (can. 1862 § 2). Here a notable difference between the procedure of the Rota and that of the CIC should be noted: whereas under the latter conclusion precedes the discussion, which follows immediately after the presentation of the evidence, in the Rota, by tradition—which perhaps corresponds better to the ancient concept (cf. A. Reiffenstuel, loc. cit.)—conclusion takes place after the parties have mutually exchanged replies to their respective defenses (a. 121). Conclusion has other effects as well: thus, after conclusion, new questions may not be put to the parties (can. 1742 § 3); the voluntary intervention of a third party in the case is not admitted (can. 1852 § 2); death, a change of status, or cessation from office does not interrupt the instance (can. 1733 n. 2), etc. In ancient times it was disputed whether the c. in c. also bound the judge.
Some, relying on c. 10, X, II, 22, which grants the judge the faculty to question «quoties dubitationi aliquid occurrerit», maintained the principle: «iudici numquam concluditur in causa». After the CIC, there are still canonists who uphold it, especially with regard to criminal cases. In any event, the faculty to question after conclusion must be understood as the faculty to produce new evidence (c. 1742 § 3), which means that the aforementioned principle may, if at all, be admitted subject to the limitations indicated there.
BBL: F. Schmalzgruber, Ius ecclesiasticum universum, Rome 1738, I, II, t. 27; F. Roberti, De processibus, II, there 1922, nn. 436 ff.; A. Reiffenstuel, Ius canonicum universum, there 1931, I, II, t. 27; M. Lega-V. ARTOTIRITI, Commentarius in iudicia ecclesiastica, II, there 1939, p. 994, n. 1 ff.; P. Ciprotti, De novis probationibus post conclusionem in causa, in Apollinaria, 12 (1939), p. 110 ff.; F. Della Rocca, Istituzioni di diritto processuale canonico, Turin 1946, n. 141.