CONCLUSIO IN CAUSA

**CONCLUSION IN CAUSE (CONCLUSIO IN CAUSA).**

The conclusion in cause, according to the *Codex Iuris Canonici* (CIC), is nothing other than the termination of the instructional or probative phase of the process (can. 1860 § 1). This has always been its proper effect, even though the theoretical concept has undergone some modification over time, as frequently occurs.

The conclusion in cause is already found in use, introduced by custom (A. Reiffenstuel, *Ius canonicum universum*, lib. II, tit. 27, n. 48) rather than by any express legal precept, in very remote times (c. 11, C. XXX, q. 5; c. 8, X, II, 38, etc.). Clement V, in his celebrated constitution *Saepe* of 19 November 1306 (c. 2, V, 11 in Clem.), granted that in summary judgments sentence could be rendered *conclusione non facta*. However, while the conclusion in cause has fallen into disuse in civil procedures, the Church has maintained it clearly in its discipline up to the CIC (cf. S. C. S. Off., Instr. ad Episcopos Rit. Orient., 20 June 1883, tit. 111, n. 22; S. C. de Prop. Fide, Instr. a. 1883, n. 22; Lex propria S. R. Rotae et Sign. Ap., 29 June 1908, c. 27 §§ 1, 2; Regulae servandae apud S. R. R. Tribun., 4 Aug. 1910, § 51; Normae S. R. Rotae Tribun., 29 June 1934, art. 121; S. C. de Sacr., Instr., 15 Aug. 1936, arts. 177 ff.).

In the ancient concept, the conclusion in cause was the renunciation made by the parties of further proofs and the consequent remission of the cause to the judge’s decision (F. Schmalzgrüber, *Ius ecclesiasticum universum*, lib. II, tit. 27, n. 1), which could be done expressly or tacitly, absolutely or conditionally. Today, however, the conclusion is merely a phase of the process that occurs automatically when one of the three hypotheses contemplated in § 2 of can. 1860 takes place, which states verbatim: “This conclusion occurs whenever the parties, when questioned by the judge, declare that they have nothing further to adduce, or the time set by the judge for producing proofs has elapsed (cf. can. 1731 n. 2), or the judge himself declares the cause sufficiently instructed.” Once any of these three facts has occurred, the conclusion takes place forthwith. The judge, however, to avoid misunderstandings or uncertainties, must always declare the conclusion has occurred by means of a specific decree, whatever the fact that provoked it may have been (ibid. § 3).

This decree, which is lacking in the current norms of the Rota (cf. art. 121) and which in the Instruction of the S. C. of the Sacraments (art. 177 § 1) brings about the conclusion, does not appear to be essential to the process, nor was it, according to common doctrine (cf. R. Maranta, *Speculum aureum*, p. 4, d. 9, n. 23), the conclusion itself.

In collegial tribunals, the decree is issued by the president (S. C. de S. Instr., art. 177 § 1). The conclusion in cause pursues two principal aims: to remove any uncertainty regarding the time allowed to the parties for producing their proofs, and to expedite the instruction of the cause by preventing useless or malicious delays.

In canon law procedure, the conclusion, even if it does not touch upon the substance of the process itself, has considerable importance since significant effects are connected to II.
The first and fundamental effect is the closing of the instructional period and the consequent preclusion of new proofs (can. 1861 § 1). This preclusion, however, is not absolute; new proofs are admitted in causes that do not pass into res judicata, as well as documents discovered after the conclusion has occurred, those that could not be produced in time, and witnesses who could not be produced before the conclusion (ibid.). In any case, the admission of new proofs is decreed by the judge at the instance of a party, after hearing the other party and giving it sufficient time to examine the new proofs and to defend itself; otherwise the judgment would be null (can. 1861 § 2). Moreover, the preclusion of new proofs does not include exceptions of absolute incompetence or of excommunication, which may be raised at any stage or grade of the trial (can. 1628 § 1, 2), nor judicial confession, nor the decisive oath, which may also be tendered at any state or moment of the litigation (can. 1834 § 1).

Another effect of the conclusion is the opening of the discussion of the cause, for which the judge must allow the parties, according to his prudent judgment, a suitable period of time to present, either personally or through their advocates, their defenses and responses (can. 1862 § 2). Here a notable difference between the procedure of the Rota and that of the CIC must be noted: whereas in the latter the conclusion precedes the discussion, which immediately follows the presentation of proofs, in the Rota, by tradition—which perhaps better corresponds to the ancient concept (cf. A. Reiffenstuel, *loc. cit.*)—the conclusion occurs after the parties have exchanged their responses to one another’s defenses (art. 121).

There are other effects of the conclusion as well: thus, after the conclusion, new interrogations of the parties cannot be made (can. 1742 § 3); the voluntary intervention of a third party in the cause is not admitted (can. 1852 § 2); death, change of status, or cessation from office do not interrupt the instance (can. 1733 n. 2), etc. In antiquity, it was debated whether the conclusion in cause also bound the judge.

Some, basing themselves on c. 10, X, II, 22, which grants the judge the faculty to interrogate “whenever something occurs to his doubt,” upheld the principle: “the judge is never concluded in the cause.” After the CIC, some canonists still uphold this, especially for criminal causes. In any case, the faculty to interrogate after the conclusion must be understood as that of producing new proofs (can. 1742 § 3), which means that the aforesaid principle, if admitted at all, must be with the limitations indicated therein.

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