EXEQUATUR and PLACET. – A form of control exercised by States with jurisdiction over the acts of the Church, which manifested itself in the necessity of prior examination and authorization by the civil authority for any disposition of ecclesiastical authority, especially papal, so that it might have publicity and executory force within the territory of the State. This institution—which, depending on the place or the material scope of its application, appears under the most varied names: *e.*, *p.*, *vidimus*, *paretis* (from the literal meaning of the words themselves: *esequisca*, *piace*, etc.), *placitum regium*, *praemunire*, *droit d’amour*, *de verificatione*, *lettre d’attache*, *regio pase*, and which is commonly designated in public law etymology as the *diritto di placitazione*—constituted one of the most notable and debated juridico-political prerogatives arrogated in the past by governments in relation to the Church, understood both as an assertion of supremacy over it and as a precautionary measure, arising as a corollary from the so-called *ius caveundi*, or right to keep watch in matters concerning the Church.
When this institution—which, as was natural, always provoked the most energetic protests from the Church—began cannot be determined with certainty. The first traces seem to be found, albeit as simple measures of an occasional nature rather than as an assertion of a right of the State to control the entire ecclesiastical legislation. In England, in the provisions of William the Conqueror (1066–87), it was forbidden for papal letters to be received, paid, or published unless they were first examined and approved by the king; synods and councils were likewise to be held only with his consent. Later, still in England, this was refined with the institution of *praemunire*, established in the 13th century, and which under Richard II was especially directed toward prohibiting the importation of bulls and their publication without royal consent and the acceptance of benefices directly from the pope.
Some have also seen the most remote precedent of the institution, still in the 14th century, in the faculty granted during the Western Schism by Urban VI to prelates of certain places, to refuse execution of papal acts unless they were first presented to them and approved, so as to avoid the inconveniences that might arise from the execution of bulls from different popes. In any case, the institution became generalized throughout Europe, assuming a juridical character only in the 16th century, and despite the most vigorous protests from the Church (the constitution *Quoad ea quae* of Martin V, 30 Apr. 1413; the bull *In coena Domini* of Julius II of Apr. 1511; etc.), it continued to be introduced ever more widely in various States. The practice was thus extended to ecclesiastical acts concerning the provision of both major and minor benefices, to papal bulls, to citations and decisions of Roman tribunals and congregations, to pastoral letters, instructions, and episcopal circulars, to the deliberations of Chapters and synods, as well as to the dispositions of ecclesiastical authorities residing only temporarily in the State, such as nuncios, delegates, and apostolic visitors. It even reached the point of subjecting to prior government assent the convocation of synods and councils, and in the 18th century—which was for the Church the period of greatest humiliation in the face of the assertions of supremacy by States—to prohibiting communication between the clergy and the faithful with the Holy See except through official State channels. Some went so far as to affirm the necessity of prior government examination for the promulgation not only of measures concerning the so-called mixed causes (under this title, for example, the disciplinary decrees of Trent were not received in France), but also of purely dogmatic documents, that is, those concerning solely matters of faith and doctrine.
The justification given was that it was necessary to ensure that no prescriptions of another nature were included, which in practice made the admission of purely dogmatic bulls dependent on the government’s approval.
It is therefore not surprising that, while regalists such as Van Espen defined the *placet* as “a right of guarantee against the encroachments of the Church inherent by nature in political government,” it was the object of the most vehement reprobation in various papal acts, and that other authors declared it to “border on heresy, not falling into the abyss of anathema only for the lack of a canon that formally condemned it as such” (D’Avino).
In essence, *exequatur* permitted a most minute interference by the State in ecclesiastical matters, which the advocates of State jurisdiction justified on three grounds: police (especially in forbidding the dissemination of acts of ecclesiastical authorities and in controlling correspondence between citizens and the Holy See); political-economic (particularly in interfering with the conferral of benefices and dignities); and statutory or juridical (aimed at controlling changes and additions to the body of Church laws and statutes so that they did not conflict with State laws).
It is clear how this entire construction was not only clearly contrary to Catholic doctrine on the relations between Church and State (v.), but also incompatible with the most common conception of the functions and competence of the modern State with its precise delimitation of its sphere of activity, which does not permit encroachments or intrusions into matters foreign to its order—such as those of a religious nature, which fall within the exclusive competence of the Church, a perfect society or original order, and hence sovereign and autonomous in its own sphere. Thus, where there are mixed matters that in some way may concern both orders or spheres of competence, their regulation cannot be resolved except on the basis of agreements between the two powers, and not through a unilateral activity of control of a more or less police-like nature, such as *placitazione*.
In Italy, the exercise of *exequatur* and *placet*, which in various forms was still in force in almost all States, was first brought under uniform regulation by Royal Decree No. 1169 of 5 Mar. 1863 and by Royal Decree No. 1374 of 26 July 1863, and other subsequent norms. With Article 16 of the Law of Guarantees (v.), “the *exequatur* and royal *placet* and any other form of government assent for the publication and execution of acts of ecclesiastical authorities” were declared abolished, except for acts concerning the assignment of ecclesiastical benefices and the provision of major and minor benefices (excluding those of Rome and its suburbicarian sees). A subsequent Royal Decree No. 320 of 23 June 1871 provided that *exequatur* was required for acts and provisions of the Holy See, and the royal *placet* for those of diocesan ordinaries. The *exequatur* was granted or denied by royal decree, while the granting of the *placet* was delegated to the Procurator General at the Court of Appeal of the place where the benefices were located. Later, however, by Law No. 640 of 6 May 1920, it was established instead that acts of the Holy See concerning the provision of major benefices and the assignment of ecclesiastical goods were subject to *exequatur*, and those of the Holy See and diocesan ordinaries concerning dignities, canonries, parishes, and other minor benefices were subject to *placet*.
*Exequatur* and *placet* were abolished by the Concordat of 11 Feb. 1929 (Art. 24), though special modalities were established therein to ensure that appointments to ecclesiastical offices and benefices are made in agreement with the Italian Government.
EXQUATUR AND PLACET — «EXULTET»